
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THE THEOLOGY OF LUTHER'S LECTURES ON ROMANS

by The Rev. A. SKEVINGTON WOOD

Part I

"A Reform manifesto": thus did Professor James Mackinnon[1] characterise Luther's Commentary on Romans. This twofold collection of interlinear and marginal glosses (*glossae*) and continuous expositions (*scholia*), discovered only at the birth of the present century and first published in 1908 under the editorship of Johannes Ficker, represents the doctrinal core of the Protestant Reformation. The Wittenberg Theses only marked the practical outcome of a theological revolution which had already been announced in Luther's Lectures on Romans, delivered in the years 1515 and 1516. This declaration of theological independence merits close attention. It is indeed a work of genius "of very great span, of remarkable clarity and vigour," as Henri Strohl[2] affirmed. Karl Holl[3] went even further. He regarded this as Luther's greatest achievement, along with his Galatians, and thought it still unsurpassed.

Luther's course on Romans furnishes the key to his theology. Here his Copernican revolution is effected.[4] He transfers the theological centre of gravity from subject to object, from man to God. In opposition to all egocentric forms of religion he insists upon a purely theocentric relation to God. *Soli Deo gloria* is the motto of Luther no less than of Calvin. " 'Let God be God!'—that is the whole purport of Luther's reforming work," claims Professor Philip S. Watson[5] in a recent and invaluable study of Luther's theology. This Godward reorientation of theology is the *Leitmotif* of Luther's Lectures on Romans. In the Introduction to the Glosses he sounds this trumpet note:

[1] *Luther and the Reformation*, Vol. I, p. 176.

[2] *L'Épanouissement de la Pensée Religieuse de Luther*, p. 12.

[3] *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, Bd. I, p. 420.

[4] cf. A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, Vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 463 ff.; H. Boehmer, *Luther and the Reformation in the Light of Modern Research*, p. 80; P. S. Watson, *Let God be God!* pp. 33 ff.

[5] op. cit. p. 64. For the phrase in Luther, cf. *Luthers Werke*, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar) (W.A.) Bd. X, I, p. 25.

"The chief aim of the Apostle in this epistle is to break down all human righteousness and wisdom, and, on the other hand, to establish, increase and magnify sins and follies which do not exist (i.e. we do not recognise their existence because we are deceived as to our righteousness), to make us know that they do exist, that they are both many and great, and that to destroy them completely Christ and His righteousness are necessary to us"[1] (3). He epitomises the purpose of the epistle similarly in the opening sentences of the *Scholia*: "The sum of this epistle is to break down, pluck up and destroy all wisdom and righteousness of the flesh (of whatever importance they may be in the sight of men and even in our own eyes), be they exercised never so sincerely and from the heart, and to plant, establish and magnify sin (however unconscious we may be of its existence) (157). . . . For God wishes to save us not by our own (*domestica*) righteousness and wisdom, but by a righteousness and wisdom from without (*extranea*); not one which comes and grows from ourselves, but which comes from elsewhere into us, which is not earthly in its origin but Divine" (158). The whole relationship between God and man thus rests on a Divine basis, not a human one. Here, as elsewhere, Luther's thinking begins with God. God is not the final goal of speculation, the limiting concept, as He is for the philosopher: He is the necessary starting point of all inquiry.[2]

In his introduction to the Glosses Luther makes it clear that he will deal, as Paul does, with both Justification and Sanctification. These are quite inseparable one from the other. Both are the acts of God and both are grounded on the sure promise of God. Despite the charges that have been laid at his door, Luther is no antinomian. He abhors antinomianism as much as he abhors legalism. He succeeds in distinguishing between Justification and Sanctification without severing their essential unity, and thus avoids the extremes of quietism and perfectionism. He nevertheless preserves their correct inner sequence, realising that Justification is the mother of Sanctification, and thus, for him, the greatest stress is always laid on

[1] The references in brackets are to the page in W.A. Bd. LVI, from which all quotations have been translated.

[2] cf. K. Holl, op. cit., pp. 37 f., and F. W. Schmidt, *Der Gottesgedanke in Luthers Römerbriefvorlesung*, in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Lutherana III, pp. 117 ff.

the former. The antithesis of *sanctificatio* and *iustificatio* is not merely an *et – et*, but a *cum – tum*, not a simple "both – and" but "both – and also in particular".[1] In his exposition of the Psalms Luther had not fully clarified his position in this respect. In Romans he discovered the true Pauline emphasis and made it his own. The first eleven chapters of Paul's epistle treat of Justification, the last five of Sanctification. Luther is content to mould his own theology on the same pattern (3), without, however, recognising any formal distinction between the two elements.

1. Justification

(i) *Man*

"In working out the problem of salvation," wrote Professor Mackinnon,[2] "Luther starts with the assumption of man's moral impotence through sin and his absolute dependence on God for salvation." This is, however, no speculative assumption in the philosophical sense. It is derived from the very nature of God Himself. At the outset of his argument the theocentricity of Luther's approach becomes apparent. God is the righteous God who looks for righteousness in His creatures. He is holy and He requires holiness. Man cannot remain in ignorance of this ethical demand, for it is revealed in the Law. The Law is found in the "letter" of the Old and New Testaments. Christ, by His perfect fulfilment of the Law, reveals its deepest implications. His life becomes for the Christian an open book in which the true Law may be read. Obedience to the Law involves complete self-renunciation, for only he who hates himself can fulfil what God requires (392). It is from this perspective that Luther views the nature of man. He considers man in relation to God. Only so can man be truly understood.

Luther does not work out a Christian anthropology in the Lectures on Romans. His few references to man's moral constitution apparently betray a savour of Scholasticism. He resorts to the Nominalist distinction[3] between *syntheresis* and *conscientia* (355). *Syntheresis* he recognises as a certain natural aspiration

[1] cf. A. Köberle, *The Quest for Holiness*, pp. 93, 253.

[2] op. cit., p. 176.

[3] Duns Scotus had defined these terms. *Syntheresis* is the "*habitus principiorum qui semper est rectus*". *Conscientia* is the "*habitus proprius conclusionis practicae*". Sent. II, dist. 39, qu. 2, 4; cf. R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 3rd Ed., Bd. II, p. 98.

of the soul toward the good (275). "We are not thus altogether inclined to evil," he admits, "since there is left to us a part of our nature which is disposed to the good, as appears in *syntheresis*" (237).[1] But he is careful not to exaggerate its power. He speaks elsewhere of "this tiny movement towards God" (275). *Syntheresis* thus plays a part in what might almost be called Luther's natural theology.[2] Luther taught that the knowledge of God is twofold—general and particular. The latter only comes through Christ, but the former is the natural possession of all men. By it, as Paul says in Romans 1.19, the Gentiles knew God by nature. Commenting on this and the following verse, Luther writes: ". . . it follows most surely that they had an idea or notion of divinity, which doubtless is in them from God, as he here says. . . . They knew that it is the mark of divinity, or of Him who is God, to be mighty, invisible, just, immortal, good; therefore they knew the invisible things of God and His eternal power and divinity. This major of the practical syllogism, this theological *syntheresis*, is unobscurable in all men. But in the minor they erred" (177).

It is important to realise, however, that this general knowledge of God is not the result of any human inquiry. It is a gift of God which antedates any search of man for truth. "This knowledge includes a consciousness of natural law, which is nothing else but God's unalterable will of love. This Natural Law is not conceived by Luther as a part, so to speak, of the inward psychological furniture of human nature, but as something given in and with the 'theological conscience', that is, the awareness of being confronted, with a mediated immediacy, by the living God Himself."[3]

Conscientia has a double function. It makes man aware of God's Law and at the same time compels him to acknowledge his inability to obey it as God requires. Conscience is thus an accuser (204). It is the witness within man against himself. It is a *mordere* and *murmurare* in his breast (23). It exposes the superficiality of man's attempts to conform to the Law of God. The Divine precepts are burdensome. Man may strive to fulfil them externally but inwardly he detests them (340). Human

[1] cf. W. A. Bd. I, pp. 32, 36, 224; Bd. IX, p. 18, for references to *syntheresis* in this early period.

[2] P. S. Watson, op. cit., p. 76.

[3] ibid., pp. 112 f.

nature is thus fundamentally hostile to the Law and is only restrained by fear of punishment. Because of this inherent antagonism to the Law, man is therefore unable to perform it as he would, from the heart, freely, spontaneously, joyfully. So far from obeying the Law voluntarily, then, man obeys it contrary to his own inclination (205). It is the sinner alone whose actions are naturally spontaneous. "The flesh achieves this, however, since with delight and without repugnance and difficulty it works according to concupiscence" (342). But God requires just such free, spontaneous obedience to His Law. Only those who find duty a delight truly obey. Man may be capable of doing what he considers good, but he is incapable of doing what God considers good. He may perform what man calls the Law of God, but he cannot perform what God calls the Law of God.

(ii) *Sin*

By such an argument and with such a high criterion Luther establishes man's moral impotence. It is not an arbitrary assumption; it is an actual fact grounded in the nature of God Himself. It is by the Law that the knowledge of sin is imparted. The self-righteous fail to comprehend the implications of the Law, for it is impossible to grasp its significance without considering the sin which it denounces (339, 340). Sin and wrath, then, come through the Law (334). It is the Law that compels the honest man to confess the moral defectiveness of his actions. But if all our deeds bear the mark of sin, is not the will that produces them itself evil? Actual sins surely indicate the presence in man's moral nature of an evil power, i.e. sin. Man is a sinner because his will is enslaved by concupiscence. For Luther this is the source of all actual sins: but it is more. It is the mask under which sin hides in man. Concupiscence makes the body which it dominates a body of sin and the spirit which it imprisons rebellious to the Law of God (287).

What does Luther mean here by concupiscence? As Paul Tschackert[1] points out, he has not fully developed his theory in these Lectures, but the basis is there. *Concupiscentia* in Luther does not mean primarily sensuality, but self-love, self-seeking, self-centredness. It is the essence of that egocentricity which

[1] *Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre*, p. 34.

thwarts the gracious overtures of God at every turn. Luther here differs from Augustine. Augustine had stressed that self-love is the root of evil, but he contrasted a perverted self-love with a proper self-love which is directed to God Himself. Thus for Augustine it is evidently not self-love as such, but the wrong direction of self-love that is the essence of sin. Luther, on the other hand, knows no justifiable self-love. The Law of love demands absolute self-abnegation. In the Lectures on Romans Luther breaks free from the Augustinian conception which had dominated the Middle Ages.[1] We can watch the process of emancipation. In the *Scholia* on Romans 13.10, Luther concedes the possibility of two interpretations of Christ's commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Luke 10.27). It may mean that both are commanded—to love one's neighbour and to love oneself. Or it may mean that only love to our neighbour is commanded, whilst the way in which we love ourselves in obedience to our selfish nature is set forth as a pattern. Luther inclines to the latter interpretation (482). Later in the *Scholia*, on Romans 15.2, Luther returns to the question and is bold to declare, "with due respect to the Fathers" (517), that the traditional interpretation derived from Augustine is false. When God commands man to love his neighbour as himself He in no way requires that man should love himself. Self-love is a vicious love which must be destroyed. It is perverse and crooked and can only be made straight when it ceases to seek its own and seeks what is its neighbour's (518). As Dr Nygren[2] indicates, "Luther has departed so far from the traditional idea, which discovers a *commandment* of self-love in the commandment of love to one's neighbour, that he finds this latter to contain a direct *prohibition* of every kind of self-love."

For Luther, it is this deep-rooted egoism which constitutes the state of sin. Concupiscence is more than the weakness of human nature remaining as the punishment of original sin after its guilt has been removed in baptism. It is itself sinful. It involves guilt (274). It represents the principle of sin within human personality. Concupiscence affects the totality of man's nature; it is an "infirmity and wound of the whole man" (352). It compels a man to seek his own good instead of others' good.

[1] For this section cf. A. Nygren, op. cit., pp. 491 ff.
[2] ibid., p. 495.

It makes man his own end and idol (361). He is *curvatus*—crooked or bent. But when Luther uses this expression he does not mean, as Augustine did, that man is bent down to the earth, but that he is turned in upon himself. "And this agrees with Scripture, which describes man as bent upon himself (*incurvatum in se*) in such a way that he turns to his own account not only bodily, but even spiritual goods, and seeks himself in all things. And this crookedness is now natural, the natural vice and natural evil" (356).

(iii) *Original Sin*

This clinging egoistic wilfulness, this inordinate universal self-love, Luther identifies with original sin. Immediately we recognise a further break with tradition. According to the Nominalists (especially Occam) original sin was the deprivation of a certain quality in the will involved in God's imputation of Adam's sin to the race descended from him.[1] In his earliest writings Luther apparently accepted that view. But in the Lectures on Romans he quite clearly insists that original sin is far more than the absence of original righteousness (313). It is "the loss of all rectitude and all potency in all our faculties, both of the body and the soul, of the inner and the whole of the outer man" (312). God imputes to us as guilt the totality of concupiscence and we are deservedly condemned as unrighteous on account of our own crimes and sins (312, 283). Although it is true that by the effect of the actual sin committed by Adam, all are born sinners, yet man's individual responsibility before God is not alleviated (316, 317). Although he sins Adam's sin, he has made it his own. He is chastised for his own most grievous fault.

Original sin is, moreover, "the proneness to evil (*pronitus ad malum*), the dislike of good (*nausea ad bonum*), the aversion to light and wisdom, the love of error and darkness, the flight from and abomination of good works and the running to evil (312). . . . Hence, as the Fathers have rightly remarked, this original sin is itself the fuel (*fomes*), the law of the flesh, the law of the members, the languor of nature, the dictator, the original disease. For man is like a sick person, struck by a mortal malady, and the malady deprives not merely one mem-

[1] R. Seeberg, op. cit., Bd. III, pp. 634 f.; Bd. IV, p. 90.

ber, but all the members of health, resulting in the debility of all the senses and all the powers of the organism. More than this, it causes a dislike of all that is wholesome and a desire for all that is noxious. It is indeed that many-headed hydra, that monster so stubborn with which we wrestle unto death like Hercules in the Lerna of this life: it is Cerberus the untamable hound, and Antheus, unconquerable though dashed to the ground" (313). This section is one of the purple patches of the Lectures. As Mackinnon[1] justly remarks, it is rhetorical and doctrinaire, without even a Rembrandtian ray of light to relieve the picture. And yet it is not the mere visionary outburst of the fanatic. Read in the light of Luther's autobiographical confessions his doctrine of original sin, like that of Paul himself, is seen to be born out of a profound religious experience. He does not deal with this difficult theme either as a detached philosopher or as a merely academic theologian. His theology is always the theology of experience. That is not to condemn it as "subjective". Luther would hardly have recognised such a category. By experience he means a Divine-human confrontation in which God visits man and addresses him. In all genuine Christian experience the stress is laid not on man hearing, still less feeling, but on God speaking. In such a situation of personal encounter with the Divine, man is so utterly humbled that he lays even his boasted wisdom at God's feet: "Down reason, then! At least, vain reasonings down."

Luther concludes the passage quoted above with these words: "I have found no one to give such a clear account of original sin as Gerard Groote in his little treatise, 'Blessed is the Man', where he speaks, not as a rash philosopher, but as a sound theologian" (313). Luther is referring to Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen, whose devotional manual, *De Spiritualibus Ascensionibus*, opens with the words of Psalm 84.5, "Blessed is the man whose strength is in Thee". The third chapter deals with original sin and expresses views similar to those expounded at greater length by Luther.

(iv) *Grace*

Justification, in Luther's teaching, is a gift of God's unmerited and unmeritable grace. His own discovery of a gra-

[1] op. cit., p. 182.

cious God revolutionised his conception of salvation. He rejected the Scholastic scheme of salvation by works and gladly accepted the Biblical doctrine of salvation by grace. The whole relationship between man and God was now set on a new footing: it depended not on man's achievements but on God's free, boundless mercy. It is in this gracious outpouring of His blessings that God shows Himself to be truly God. Here we see God at His greatest. "The glory of God appears in all its splendour when the weak and sinful are received in grace. For this is the glory of God, when He fills us with benefits" (520).

The theocentric emphasis of Luther's theology is nowhere more marked than in his doctrine of grace. Grace is no longer, as the Scholastics held, a new quality or habit in man, but a work of God in which He is Himself personally and immediately present (287). It is the very favour of God Almighty, His free benignity. It is an attribute of the God whose property is always to have mercy. It is the power of God intervening directly in human destiny. As God is responsible for revealing sin, through the Law which man cannot accomplish as He requires, so also He assumes full responsibility for removing sin. The saving power resides in God alone and not in any virtue, any merit, any righteousness or any good whatever which is alien to Him (356, 357). Salvation depends solely on the merciful will of God; it is outside the scope of human efforts. God is the source of all help. He saves alone (382). The whole root and fount of salvation is in Him (421).

Grace is essentially a free gift. Luther agrees with Augustine that grace is not grace unless it is free. Gift and grace are almost interchangeable terms, though grace brings us nearer to the heart of God (318). Grace is generative and creative (379). It is always conceived in terms of God's personal action, not as the infusion of an abstract quality. It is powerful and effective. Grace alone can subdue concupiscence and awaken faith. The evil egoistic will of concupiscence is conquered by the good and potent will of God, brought into subjection, and transformed, so that the sinner can say he has been repaired by grace (341, 390, 391).

Grace takes precedence over all works whatsoever. It is *prima gratia* (379). "Where, then, is our righteousness?" asks Luther, "Where are our good works? Where is our free will,

the contingency of things? It is this [the grace of God] that ought to be preached, that is what is worth preaching, that is what slays the wisdom of the flesh. . . . So man sees that in himself dwells no good thing, but all good is in God" (382).

In one passage in the *Scholia* Luther seems to return to the Medieval doctrine of preparatory merit. The doctors of later Scholasticism taught that if man did what was in him (*facere quod in se est*) he would acquire a disposition to grace and the merit of congruence. This *meritum de congruo* God would reward with grace, on the basis of which a man could proceed to perform works which would display the merit of worthiness (*meritum de condigno*).[1] Now in his comment on Romans 3.21 Luther says, referring to prayer and penitence: "Grace is not indeed grace without this self-culture (*agricultura sui ipsius*)" (257). Does this indicate a retrogression to Occamism? Hardly. As Seeberg[2] shows, this is no more than the deep desire to be justified, with no thought of work-righteousness. It is only the wicked who think they can earn their salvation. It is the *Sawtheologen* who aver that a man can love God and keep His commandments in his own strength (274). What Luther means by *agricultura sui ipsius* is a spiritual earnestness in which merit is out of the question. He does indeed speak of a disposition to grace, but the disposition is itself a gift of grace. It is a gracious disposition to the reception of grace (254, 255). Concupiscence produces a permanent indisposition to grace. A mere fearful repentance is not sufficient to remove that indisposition. Prevenient grace must pave the way for the major miracle of grace in Justification.

(v) *Gospel*

It is in the Lectures on Romans that Luther first distinguishes plainly between Law and Gospel. In the Commentary on the Psalms he had not clarified his mind on the subject. The light dawned upon him as he pondered Romans 1.17. His coming of age as a theologian is marked by the discrimination with which he handles this delicate matter. He was to claim later that the differentiation between Law and Gospel contains the sum of all Christian doctrine and is the test of a

[1] R. Seeberg, op. cit., Bd. III, p. 645.
[2] ibid., Bd. IV, p. 91.

true theologian. "If the Law reveals the necessity of grace," he writes,[1] "the Gospel presents grace as a reality. The doctors who make the Gospel anything other than good news do not understand it; they transform it into Law and change Christ into Moses. The Law procures us Christ, the Gospel provides Him." That is a basic principle with Luther: what the Law demands, the Gospel offers.

In the Commentary on Romans, however, Luther has not yet defined the two offices of the Gospel—the strange work (*opus alienum*) of interpreting the Law and effecting its spiritual use (*usus spiritualis*, *theologicus* or *elenchticus*) and the proper work (*opus proprium*) of preaching Christ.[2] The Gospel appears in Romans as God's revelation of grace, which must become the object of faith (171). The power of God has as its aim the salvation of believers. God has manifested this power in the Gospel, which is the Word that can give salvation to all who believe in it (170). It is, as it were, a spiritual amulet preserving the wearer from every wound, for whoever believes on the Gospel will be saved. Our merits have not earned this privilege; it is a gift in fulfilment of God's promise.

Luther's conception of the Gospel only serves to underline the Divine sovereignty. Justification is the work of God alone. Man cannot contribute to it. He can only trust in God as the patient trusts the doctor. If he regains his health the credit goes to the Celestial Surgeon. God takes the initiative; He offers His services; He begins, continues and brings the work to a happy issue. Not only is *prima gratia* a free gift, but grace is always a sovereign Divine act, which man can never merit (379). God is only God as and because He gives. Man can but receive the Divine bounty with glad thanksgiving. This is the heart of the Gospel, says Luther.

(vi) *Faith*

If, then, the Gospel is to exercise its saving influence upon us, it must be accepted in faith. "For by grace are ye saved, through faith" (Eph. 2.8). Luther rightly distinguishes the offices of grace and faith in Justification. His emphasis on *sola fide* is not intended to depreciate the miracle of grace. For

[1] *Commentary on Galatians*, ed. E. Middleton, p. 75.
[2] cf. W.A., Bd. I, pp. 105, 113; R. Will, *La Liberté Chrétienne*, p. 70.

Luther *sola fide* and *sola gratia* are bound up with one another. "Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace" (Rom. 4.16).

Luther defines faith as confidence (*credulitas*) in God, or belief in the reality of His promises (46, 225, 226). Faith "conforms" to the Gospel. It is on the one hand a healthy fear, inspired by Divine threats, and on the other hand a trustfulness founded on the sure declarations of God. But as Luther regards the Gospel as the fulfilment of the Divine promise, faith accordingly becomes for him the joyful certainty of salvation.[1] Commenting on the *locus classicus* in Romans 1.17 Luther resolutely rejects the Scholastic doctrine of incomplete faith (*fides informis*). Setting aside Lyra's interpretation of "from faith to faith" (ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν) as meaning "from incomplete faith to complete faith", Luther roundly declares that no one can live by incomplete faith, neither does Justification come by it (172). Incomplete faith is not even to be regarded as incipient faith: it is not faith at all. The sense of this phrase, according to Luther, is that Justification is altogether of faith; what is effected is not seen but is ever clear to the eyes of faith, as Paul says in 2 Corinthians 3.18. The revelation of God in Christ is not evident to sight: it can only be apprehended by faith (173). Once again Luther's thought is thoroughly theocentric. In his teaching on faith, where he has so often been accused of pietistic subjectivism, Luther's chief concern is to safeguard the primacy of grace. In the faith-relationship, God is the determining factor, not man.

This becomes apparent as we examine those passages in which Luther describes faith as itself a gift and asserts the subordination of man to God. It is God who grants faith (114). It is His own special gift (227). Faith transcends all that man can feel or think (445). It transforms reason and leads it to a knowledge of God's will (446). God brings every thought into captivity to Christ. The will is completely subjugated under the grace of God (379). In the moment of faith man's powers lie passive beneath God's hand (399). Faith is thus associated from first to last with humility. Luther constantly speaks of humble faith and the humility of faith (218, 276, 282, 283).

[1] cf. A. Jundt, *Le Développement de la Pensée Religieuse de Luther jusqu'en* 1517, p. 174.

One can characterise Justification as being by humility almost as much as by faith (449). The imputation of righteousness can be traced back to humility (259, 283). Such humility implies obedience. The subjection of faith produces a ready fulfilment of God's commands. Luther refers to the faith of obedience as well as to the faith of humility. It is by believing and obeying that the Word of God is known (46). "We obey, believe, yield and humbly subdue our thoughts and feelings" (253). As faith is closely related to humility and obedience, so is it also to hope (280). Faith is grounded on God's promise. Faith and promise are interrelated (45). Luther, like Paul, can speak of hope in the context of salvation (Rom. 8.24). Justification is by hope as well as by faith (269). Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Luther regards hope as an element of faith, together with obedience and humility. Faith is a comprehensive term. It is the consummation and compendium of the Gospel. It is life and the living word abbreviated (409).

In Luther's theology faith is not egocentric but theocentric. It is not merely an intellectual assent or an emotional condition. Faith transcends reason and feeling. It is not *fiducia* based on human works but *fiducia* based on God's promise. Faith is a gift of God to man which lifts man to God. "Faith and God belong together (Large Catechism, 386). In the *sola fide* our personality is attached to God in a relation of utter dependence. Man no longer tries to bind God to his own self-consciousness; he knows himself wholly bound by God and so faith brings humility with it. He no longer seeks to exalt himself but holds fast to the judicial grace of the Cross, which sustains him in the life that is there begun, continued and ended. He does not ask about the result or the reward, he does not expect or count on a future Sanctification, he does not boast of a future transformation in which he will no longer need the grace bestowed on the dying thief; he clings to the promises of God, whose favour he regards as a greater good than any self-imagined and self-made righteousness."[1]

(vii) *Forgiveness*

We now reach the crux of Luther's theology—his teaching

[1] A. Köberle, op. cit., p. 82.

on Justification itself. We move from the circumference of this subject to the centre. In what terms does he expound this vital doctrine? The Gospel reveals the righteousness of God which is by faith. What is the connexion between faith and righteousness? That is the critical issue. In his conception of righteousness Luther deviates from the teaching of Augustine and remains strictly Pauline. Certainly he quotes *De Spiritu et Littera* (Cap. 9) where he read: "The righteousness of God is not that with which God is righteous, but that which He imparts to man, since He justifies the ungodly" (36). But whilst Luther approves the first part of that statement, he combats the second. The righteousness of God in the matter of Justification is not that which He imparts but that which He imputes or, better, reputes. It is a righteousness which is real yet not realised. "Scripture understands by the terms righteousness and unrighteousness something quite different from that which the philosophers and the jurists understand. These aver that it is a quality of the soul, but, according to Scripture, righteousness depends more on God's imputation than on the essence of the thing itself. For he has not righteousness who has solely the quality of it; such an one is altogether a sinner and unrighteous. But only he is righteous whom God on account of the confession of his unrighteousness and his imploring the Divine righteousness mercifully reputes and wills to hold righteous. Thus we shall all die in sin, i.e. in unrighteousness as we were born in it, but we shall only be justified by the reputation of the merciful God, through faith in His Word" (287).

This is the clue to Luther's whole doctrine of Justification. It is worked out more fully in his later writings, especially in the Commentary on Galatians, but he has already laid hold of his main principles. The keyword is imputation. This term, which finds its natural habitat in the law-courts rather than in Christian theology, has unhappy associations. As Dr Vincent Taylor[1] writes: ". . . its atmosphere is commercial. Too easily it suggests the thought of a *quid pro quo*, or even a fictitious estimate. Most of the objections to the doctrine of Justification by faith are probably strongly influenced by the passages in which it appears. Righteousness, it is held, is something im-

[1] *Forgiveness and Reconciliation*, p. 55.

puted rather than real." Now that is precisely Luther's objection to the prevailing Occamist theology. His chief aim in expounding the Pauline doctrine of imputation is to avoid any suggestion of a legal fiction and accentuate the reality of sin, righteousness and faith. Luther treats the whole question of Justification in personal terms. It involves an I-Thou relationship between God and man. Such technicalities as *imputatio*, *non-imputatio*, *reputatio*, *acceptatio* are not simply abstract theological formulae. They represent an attempt to analyse a Divine-human encounter. It may therefore assist our understanding of Luther's thought at this point if we proceed on the basis of Seeberg's[1] statement that imputation for Luther is just another expression for forgiveness. It is noteworthy that Luther interprets forgiveness in the modern sense as including both remission of sins and restoration to fellowship. Such a conception of forgiveness is inevitable when it is considered as a personal relationship. There are some sentences in R. C. Moberly's[2] *Atonement and Personality* which come close to Luther's view. Forgiveness is "an attitude of a person to a person. It can only be understood in terms of personality. I cannot forgive a river or a tree. I cannot forgive an animal except just so far as I do (whether rightly or wrongly) recognise in it the attributes of a rational soul; if I forgive a man, it is in relation to the meaning of that man's personality—its complex present, its immense possible future—that all which I do in the act of forgiving finds at once its justification and its explanation. . . . Forgiveness is, in part, a remitting of punishment. It is in part a treating, nay even a recognising of the person forgiven as good: and yet it is no one of these things simpliciter, by itself. It is no one of them apart from that justifying cause, within the personality of the forgiven, which makes this treatment and recognition, not unrighteous but righteous."

Both these aspects of forgiveness appear clearly in Luther's Lectures on Romans. He starts with the Nominalist formula of "acceptation" but, as Mackinnon[3] indicates, he transforms it in the light of Paul's doctrine of Justification. God accepts the sinner as righteous by the way of the non-imputation of sin

[1] op. cit., Bd. IV, p. 113.
[2] pp. 54 f. Quoted in part by V. Taylor, op. cit., p. 28.
[3] op. cit., p. 190. This section closely follows Professor Mackinnon's lucid analysis.

and the reputation of righteousness. These represent the negative and positive aspects of forgiveness (284). Non-imputation, or the remission of sins as Luther preferred to call it, is not a purely arbitrary act as it was in the Nominalist system. God will only remit sins that are confessed and bewailed (285). And such remission depends upon the redemptive work of Christ. "God does not give grace freely in the sense that He exacts no satisfaction, but He gave Christ as a satisfier for us so that He might give grace freely to those who thus, make satisfaction themselves through another (37) . . . and that we, being unrighteous, for whom such things had been done, might seek our righteousness from God alone, who first remits our sins by such a propitiation" (38). By His active indwelling in the justified soul Christ covers the remaining unrighteousness (289). Non-imputation is thus far more than a judicial act. It is conceived in personal terms. It is the work of Christ in the soul of man. "It has respect to the real righteousness operated in us by Christ, as well as to the righteousness by which He satisfies God in our stead. This is, in fact, the characteristic element of it."[1]

The positive aspect of forgiveness, the righteous recognition of the sinner as righteous, Luther describes as imputation or reputation. Both terms are used, but reputation is perhaps preferred. The meaning of the verb δικαιοῦσθαι, says Luther, is to be reputed as righteous before God. It is in this sense alone that one must understand the expression of the Apostle: "the doers of the law shall be justified" (Rom. 2.13). They will be reputed righteous. Of the same sort is the saying: "For in Thy sight shall no man living be justified" (Psalm 143.2)—that is, he shall not be reputed righteous (201). To repute is also to adopt (*suscipere*), to receive (*accipere* or *recipere*), to appropriate (*assumere*), to accept (*acceptare*). God not only regards the sinner as righteous; He treats him as such. He restores him to fellowship with Himself. He recreates the broken relationship. Only God can do that. The sinner is utterly incapable of re-establishing contact with God. The initiative must come from Him. "We are therefore righteous extrinsically and not because of ourselves or our works, but we are righteous solely by the reputation of God. Reputation is not in us or in our power.

[1] ibid., p. 191.

Therefore our righteousness is not in us or in our power" (269). Once again the theocentric bias of Luther's outlook becomes apparent as he resolutely refutes the Nominalist view that God is pleased to accept our works and because of them reputes us righteous. Reputation is what God does for us on the basis of His grace and not of our merit. The dual nature of forgiveness as remission of sin and restoration to fellowship is thus expressed by Luther under the categories of non-imputation and reputation.

. . . .

In the limited compass of this present survey it is not possible to furnish a full exposition of Luther's doctrine of predestination as contained in his *Römerbriefvorlesung*. Suffice it to say that he is a faithful interpreter of St. Paul and does not shirk the lengthy section of the epistle which deals with this controversial issue. He is quite conscious that he is handling explosive material. He describes the doctrine as "a very heady wine and an epicurean dish, strong meat reserved for the most advanced" (400), and would prefer not to speak of the question did not the text compel him to do so.

He presents predestination in a less forbidding form than the Nominalists had done. The idea of an arbitrary election decree is subordinated to that of the outworking of a Divine plan. Luther thus approaches this perplexing problem from a teleological standpoint. God's purpose is being fulfilled in human life, but it only reveals itself progressively as it is realised. Predestination, says Luther, is bitter-sweet. To those who rely on the wisdom of the flesh it is bitter, but to those who are humble in heart and possess the Spirit it is very sweet (383, 388). If there was no Divine plan and salvation depended merely upon our will and works it would be uncertain indeed. Salvation is a matter not of contingency but of necessity (382). It is not our wandering will that saves but the inflexible and immutable will of God.

The impartial reader of Luther's exposition of Romans 9-11 cannot fail to discern one overruling preoccupation—to reserve to God the glory due to His name. As Köberle[1] has said: "He gladly used the doctrine of election as the one theological statement that completely assured the honour of God and the utter

[1] op. cit., p. 71.

humiliation of man." "Behold, the voice of the flesh cries, 'Mine! Mine!' Take that 'mine' and say 'Glory to Thee, O Lord!' and thou shalt be saved" (386). It is in the light of Luther's theocentric concern that we must view his teaching on predestination.

Luther's whole doctrine of Justification is thus an exposition of his watchword *Soli Deo Gloria*. It is this dominant motif which provides the clue to his approach to the "strong rock and foundation of the Christian religion".[1] Unless we seek to understand Luther from within the framework of his own categories of thought we shall necessarily misinterpret him. It is in terms of his Copernican revolution in theology that his doctrine of Justification must be considered.

It is equally essential to remember that for Luther Justification and Sanctification are distinguished without being separated. In a further article we shall turn to his teaching on Sanctification as represented by the Lectures on Romans, but meanwhile it cannot be stated too emphatically that for Luther Justification and Sanctification belong together. They must both together form the core of Christian preaching, "for if one should be destroyed it would carry the other with it, and again where the one continues and is rightly taught it brings the other with it".[2]

(*End of Part I*)

[1] Homily "Of Salvation".
[2] Luther, *Sämmtliche Werke, Erlangen*, XIV, p. 151.

RECENT TRENDS IN ANGLICAN EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

by Canon M. A. C. WARREN

An exposition of recent trends in Anglican Evangelical Theology can best be introduced by referring to the Preface of a book which is but little known to-day, the *Horae Homileticae* of Charles Simeon, one time Vicar of Holy Trinity Church in Cambridge. His twenty-eight volumes of sermon "skeletons" are long since dead. They never possessed any very great influence in themselves but remain a monument of patient industry and remind us that the profound influence of Charles Simeon in his own day and upon many in succeeding generations was based on no superficial charm of personality but on a life deeply and profoundly rooted upon the rock of Scripture.

In his preface Simeon says:

> The author is no friend to systematisers in Theology. He has endeavoured to derive from the Scripture alone his views of religion, and to them it is his wish to adhere with scrupulous fidelity; never wresting any portion of the Word of God to favour a particular opinion, but giving to every part of it that sense, which it seems to him to have been designed by its Great Author to convey.
>
> He is aware that he is likely, on this account, to be considered by the zealous advocates of human systems as occasionally inconsistent: but if he should be discovered to be no more inconsistent than the Scriptures themselves, he will have reason to be satisfied. He has no doubt but that there is a system in the Holy Scriptures (for truth cannot be inconsistent with itself); but he is persuaded that neither Calvinists nor Arminians are in exclusive possession of that system. He is disposed to think that the Scripture System, be it what it may, is of a broader and more comprehensive character than some very exact and dogmatical theologians are inclined to allow.

That passage from the writings of a great Evangelical one hundred and thirty years ago affords a clue to understanding the Anglican Evangelical approach to Theology.

Systematic Theology is not an Anglican failing! True to the English genius, we are somewhat suspicious of tidiness, viewing it whether in Church or State with considerable mis-

giving. Parties and Schools of Thought within our Church are seldom very clearly defined. In proportion as they are *too* clearly defined they fail to win the support of more than a few. It is interesting to reflect that with the possible exceptions of the Cambridge Platonists and the Non-Jurors there are individual theologians but no schools of theological thinking within the Church of England until the middle of the nineteenth century. For nearly three hundred years Anglican piety was nourished on the Bible and the Prayer Book. Churchmen during those centuries were divided much more by politics than by theology.

The Evangelical revival under the Wesleys, and especially that part of it which never left the Church of England, was born of a new discovery of the Bible. Its devotional life was nourished on the Book of Common Prayer. Charles Simeon, the greatest expounder of Evangelical insights, was "no friend to systematisers in theology".

Early Evangelicalism was if anything divided in theology on the Calvinist-Arminian issue—the age-old problem of the relations of Grace and Freedom. What held Evangelicals together and gave them coherence was:

(*a*) loyalty to the Bible, which finds fine expression in that attitude of mind illustrated by my quotation from Simeon;

(*b*) loyalty to a particular tradition of Biblical interpretation which might crudely be termed "Paulinism";

(*c*) a consequent stress upon the free operation of the Holy Spirit in Conversion, in preaching, in extempore prayer meetings, and in prophetic decisions;

(*d*) a common attitude to pleasure and money; and

(*e*) a common missionary endeavour.

Possessing and possessed by the Bible, systematic theology was commonly regarded as an unnecessary elaboration of the Gospel, or even by some as a form of disloyalty to it, though it was generally recognised that where the Bible required supplementing, there was a common body of doctrine in the writings of the great sixteenth century Reformers to which Evangelicals could appeal.

That somewhat incohate picture is I think fairly true to the facts about Evangelicalism any time between 1750 and 1850.

But I shall have failed completely if I do not make it clear that the vitalising power within Evangelicalism derived from an experimental awareness of two profound theological doctrines —the doctrine of the Atonement and the *testimonium internum Spiritus*.

Evangelicalism was born at the foot of the Cross. There God did something for man which man could not do for himself. There God did something instead of man so that man need no longer attempt to do it for himself. That discovery, witnessed to in the heart by the assurance that now all things were become new, was the inspiration of Evangelicalism. Scarcely less important, this new experience was saved from mere subjectivism by a deep conviction about the operation of the Holy Spirit as personal, an objective belief in Him as a Person, and a willingness for day-to-day guidance in actual living. The fact that this experience and discovery came through the study of the Bible was the anchor of the revival. Gripped by the joy of forgiveness, assured of its abiding reality by the Holy Spirit, and with the Bible as their charter and their chart the Evangelicals set out to explore and navigate the known and the unknown world. And they are still doing it.

Such a temper was bound by its very nature to become missionary. And as a matter of history Evangelicalism has poured its energies with an almost reckless abandon into the missionary movement. Yet this was never just activism, an attempt to escape the discipline of thought by a multiplication of good works. The contribution of Evangelical scholars both to the study of other religions, the translation of the Bible into vernaculars, and to the study of missionary theology, what on the continent they call "Missiologie", has been and is very considerable. The stream of such scholarship, far from decreasing, is increasing in a marked fashion to-day.

One important sequel from this missionary expansion has been the growing Evangelical understanding of the nature of the Church, as well as of the place of the Sacraments. This new emphasis within Evangelical theology owes more to this missionary experience than to any theological developments in England, and in part explains why Evangelicals find the Ecumenical movement congenial to their thinking. That movement with its forward-looking conception of the coming great

Church owes its origin to the missionary movement as much as to any other single influence.

Historically two other events have driven Evangelicals to give a more conscious and explicit attention to Theology—on the one hand the Oxford Movement which has appeared to constitute something in the nature of an attack on the Reformation, and on the other the movement of Biblical criticism.

From 1850 till to-day Evangelicalism has been sorting out its ideas in relation to these two movements. The attack on the Reformation has, I would suggest, been profoundly creative just because it has been unsuccessful. Assuming that its opponents held no doctrine of the Church at all, the protagonists of the Oxford Movement have contributed to a recovery by the Protestant Churches of their own high Church traditions, have led to the discovery by Anglicans of every school of thought that seventeenth century Anglicanism had a very high doctrine of the Church indeed but not a medieval one, and in so doing have provided Evangelicals with ample choice from which to formulate a conception of the Church which can do justice to their own missionary experience overseas, and to the Ecumenical movement, as well as to their Reformation insights, and to their inheritance in the Anglicanism of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries out of which Evangelicalism emerged.

There can be no denying that Biblical criticism has deeply divided Evangelicals. That the division has not been mortal and is to-day far less bitter than a generation ago is due to two things.

Firstly those same unifying factors which held Evangelicals together in the eighteenth century in spite of the Calvinist-Arminian split, have still held together men who were otherwise deeply divided on critical issues, and our generation has been fortunate in having men with the comprehensive vision of Simeon who could see the strength and virtue in both points of view.

The second factor preventing this division from being mortal has been the revival of Biblical Theology. The full implications of this are only in the process of being worked out. But the widespread recapturing of the Biblical perspective by

many who had tended to accept the presuppositions of a liberal humanist philosophy has exerted a reconciling influence.

I would not for a moment pretend that the conflict has been resolved. But it is evident that the issues which divide Evangelicals can no longer be defined in terms of the conflicts between liberalism and fundamentalism of a generation ago. Probably this is due more than anything else to the fact that while little original and fresh thinking has been done either on the doctrines of the Atonement or the internal witness and guidance of the Holy Spirit, yet these two great doctrines experimentally appropriated have continued to dominate the thinking of Evangelicals.

Now this very revival of Biblical Theology, the by-product in part of the earlier Biblical criticism, and in part of the living experience of the Church in the furnace has led in turn to a new understanding of the Church. Biblical criticism and the test of persecution, the status of a minority in a hostile world, has given to many a new appreciation of the social character of salvation, though the approach is quite different from the more Incarnational approach of traditional Catholicism. "To become a child of God" is seen to involve becoming the brother of all God's other children. We are saved into a family. This is the insight given to the interpretation of the Bible by a persecuted or about to be persecuted Church. It is characteristic however that on this view it is by attachment to the Father through Christ that we become spiritually attached to His family. This order, as we see it, is true to the New Testament which preached Christ, not the Church, as the object of faith.

One result of all this has been a rediscovery of and a reaffirmation of the central importance of justification by faith. Another result balancing this has been the new recognition of the truth of earlier Evangelical practice which gave full value to the interplay of the inward and the outward, the visible and the invisible in religion. The Sacraments are being seen afresh as being vitally important. There follows from this a new approach to the question of order. Unity and continuity are seen to be of real consequence. Order which helps to secure these is seen to be both a vehicle and an expression of inward unity. Nevertheless the inward unity takes priority over the outward

—"He is not a Jew which is one outwardly". The Church therefore is seen to be constituted by a grace-faith relationship between God and His people. Lack of outward unity and continuity, or rather some traditional marks of these, is a defect but it is not destructive of the Church. There follows from this a renewed sense of the value of Episcopacy with a firm denial that it constitutes the *esse* of the Church.

It will be seen that I am proceeding experimentally. Evangelical theology is the outworking of a living experience and its interpretation. As such it becomes a school of thought. Experience for an Evangelical commonly precedes reflection. Such system as we achieve is achieved by thinking through what has happened, not speculating about what ought to happen if certain propositions are accepted as true.

This leads on to the subject of Revelation. We agree that revelation is to be conceived supremely as the activity of God in the history of Israel culminating in the Incarnation and the Atonement. This Revelation is complete but only in the sense that it cannot be repeated. It has still got to be apprehended and accepted. The last things have not yet fully happened. But we would assert that the activity of God becomes revelation only when it leads to a personal meeting of men with God in a direct relationship. The inspired record of this activity and this meeting is the Bible. The Bible thus understood is indeed a record of the revelation, but it is also an instrument of it because it is the means by which the Holy Spirit brings men under the same events and into the same meeting. The common acceptance of this is doing much to unite Evangelicals who were once divided by differing formulations of the doctrine of inspiration.

There follows from all this that we find in the Word and the Sacraments instruments by which the Holy Spirit effects this meeting—parallel instruments all the more effective when they are closely associated. A new emphasis follows upon preaching as communicating Christ and not just instruction, the while the Sacraments are welcomed as communicating Christ and not just symbolising Him. In both the Holy Spirit is active. In all this thinking a paramount stress is laid on personal categories:

God is personally active. God personally meets men.

God is active. The stress is on His activity not on ideas about Him.

God the Holy Spirit acts towards the soul of man through His chosen instruments, calling forth from man the response of faith which can alone make the "meeting" a fact of experience.

Evangelical theology is a growing theology, growing by the dialectical interplay of contemporary thought, learning from other schools, yet with its roots deep in an experimental approach to religion which it treasures as a heritage from its earliest days. It is most exciting being an Evangelical to-day. Generally speaking it would not be unfair to say that Evangelicanism is experiencing a real theological revival. Evangelicals to-day are far more theologically conscious than their immediate forbears. They are becoming better equipped for the task of bearing witness to Biblical and Reformation insights, thanks to such theological fellowships as the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature and the Tyndale Biblical Research Group. Nor is this deeper interest in theology merely or even primarily polemical. They share increasingly in the theological revival which has accompanied, and to some extent created, the Ecumenical Movement and which would seem to have affected all major denominations and confessions. They do this with the greater enthusiasm because Bible-centredness is perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of this revival in both its Catholic and Protestant manifestations. A field which is being freshly explored to-day, that of Eschatology, is one in which it may be that Evangelicals have a particular contribution to offer precisely because they stand rather in the prophetic than the priestly tradition and their historical sense is the sharper. Again the experimental use of the Bible in private devotion and in evangelism makes them more familiar with the text of the Bible than many who have recently become enthusiastic for Biblical theology but who have not been reared in this discipline. This may prove to be a real gift Evangelicals have to offer in helping the contemporary theological revival to avoid fads and fancies.

Evangelicals are better equipped to-day than they were a generation ago to play their full part in the developing life and witness of the Church of England. Because all debates on questions of Church Order tend nowadays to be thrown back rapid-

ly on theological principle, they are striving honestly to examine their presuppositions afresh, forswearing the shibboleths of a mere "party-line", the while they remain quite determined in their insistence that God has given to them some particular insights which He wants them to use for the service of His Church throughout the world.

In what I have written I have run the risk of being misunderstood as being complacent. That is far from what any responsible Anglican Evangelical is feeling. Rather what I have tried to do has been to convey something of the exhilaration at being involved in the theological debate of this generation, of having, as I believe Anglican Evangelicals have, something to contribute, and as slowly becoming better equipped by their own studies to learn from others so that in the final issue there may be something better that they may offer to the greater glory of God.

UNIVERSALISM AND MORALS

by The Right Rev. HERBERT GRESFORD JONES

I

The acids of Universalism are biting deeply into our national life: and we are indebted to the *Scottish Journal of Theology* for this timely discussion. It was that good Scot, Alexander Whyte, who observed that "if fear slays its tens, presumption slays its thousands". Nothing can be more natural than the hope that all may end happily in some future state of existence. But such a philosophy calls for some surer foundation than that of human opinion however ably presented. And there seems to be something alarming, to us at least who own allegiance to Christ as God, in the presumption that, to entertain this hope, we may lightly disregard His most solemn warnings as to the decisiveness of this present life. Were the ancient Greeks wrong in believing that presumption (*hubris* as they called it) was the prelude to disaster? Unquestionably Universalism has cost us dear in many ways. It is with its effects in the sphere of morals that this article is concerned.

"Is it heretical?" asks Dr Robinson. I would submit that down the ages Universalism has proved *the* heresy. In the seventeenth century John Bunyan, in his *Holy War*, tells us that the first piece of armour with which the Devil arms the town of Mansoul against Emmanuel is "Hope of doing well at last what lives soever you live".[1] Jeremiah must needs lament: "Mine heart within me is broken because of the prophets that say unto everyone that walketh after the imagination of his own heart, No evil shall come unto you."[2] To go further back still, is it not just this offer of sin-with-impunity that, in our earliest religious folk-lore, the serpent makes to the woman in his "Ye shall not surely die"?[3]

What *is* new is the immense dominance and aggressiveness of Universalism during the last fifty years. What *is* new is the startling breakdown of morals, the lowered tone in society, not least among the young, which it has inevitably precipitated.

[1] *Holy War*, Bagster's Ed., p. 51. [2] Jer. 23.9, 17. [3] Gen. 3.4.

I am old enough to remember the dismay that was felt when Archdeacon Farrer in 1879 published his *Eternal Hope*. From the Universalists' standpoint what more ideal propagandist—the revered headmaster, the author of the then popular *Life of Christ*, the author no less of *Eric, or Little by Little*, that each sponsor was forward to place in her young godson's hands? His effect was just this that with his urbane manner, with his easy idiom, with the Abbey pulpit as a sounding-board, he vastly popularised what was at that moment stirring in many minds. The floodgates were opened. The year following Dr Pusey, with all the weight of his great learning, replied to *The Eternal Hope* in forcible terms. He knew, we all knew, the decay in religious life that was bound to ensue. But in vain; the tide was steadily rising. Universalism was to receive another powerful impetus from the pen of that charming and gracious person Mr Lowes Dickinson. I met him once in the rooms of a friend at King's, and can well understand the range of his disciples. It was in the *Hibbert Journal* of April 1903 that with frank lucidity he summarised what he assumed to be "the postulates of modern optimism":

(1) that the world is not entirely good, but embodies a real (and not merely an apparent) process in time towards a good end;

(2) that this end is one in which all individuals will somehow participate;

(3) that, therefore, individual souls must be immortal, and that all of them ultimately reach heaven.

All this: with the inevitable consequences! Remove the "Sanctions" by which our Creator has planned for our welfare to distinguish right from wrong, and what happens? We who are pastors must of necessity build upon our predecessor's substratum. We find only too soon whether it be of precious stones or of stubble. Early in this century I succeeded a vicar imbued with this "modern optimism": to discover on many sides the tragic price of it. Never shall I forget the tone in which a mother told me of her daughter's ruin. " 'Mother,' she said to me, one Sunday morning, returning from Church, 'the vicar says there's no hell. I've got nothing now to keep me from falling.' And she fell." That was over forty years ago. Multiply that by all the fungus growth of Universalism since. What

does it all add up to? Is it any wonder that our young men and our young girls, bent upon some irremediable folly, are defiantly saying to us, "if I want to, why shouldn't I?"

And—if we want to—why not? If Dr Robinson is right, if in some future state "the sinner must yield", if individual souls "must all of them ultimately reach heaven", if freedom is a delusion, if the law of consequence is nugatory, Why not? If it is all the same in the end, why not enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season? Why not fling to the winds all restraint? Why not, as so many are doing, go atheist all the way? What is to hinder society from that complete moral collapse into which it seems to be rapidly drifting? We blame successively our parents, our magistrates, our psychologists, our cinemas; but in all honesty the primary cause of the trouble is undoubtedly spiritual. The responsibility seems in the first instance to rest with those who have removed the railings from the edge of the precipice, and taken down the old "Danger" signposts—our Universalist theologians themselves.

II

Why shouldn't I? This haunting question of our young people is, I submit, a question of national urgency. If the cause of our débacle is spiritual, so will be the remedy. As Lord Haldane said: "If by thinking you have got into difficulties, it is only by thinking that you will get out." If we have lost our way, by following the false guide, we shall regain it by reverting to the true. "Lord to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of Eternal life."[1] It is the refreshing fact that through all the recent researches of historical science the authority of Christ has assumed a fresh magnitude. And there are two things about Eternal life on which He seems to be always insisting:

(1) its availability to everyone in the world;

(2) the necessity for its immediate acceptance.

To a man-conceived Universalism to be reached "somehow", "ultimately", in a future state, Christ opposes a God-planned Universalism—open to all here and now. Christ would have all men to be saved. All: however remote, however "lost", however sinful. "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilder-

[1] John 6.68.

ness even so must the Son of Man be lifted up that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have Eternal life."[1] Out of all the allegories of the Hebrew scriptures Christ goes out of His way to choose that which suggests the maximum on God's part for the minimum on man's. As many as look to the Cross are made whole. Eternal life is offered "gratis" to whosoever will say "Yes" and not "No" to God's amazing offer. "Him that cometh to Me I will in no wise cast out."[2] Christ is come not merely to save but to seek. He seeks Zacchaeus. He seeks the woman of Samaria. He seeks at infinite cost each lost sheep. That divine pressure for our response which Dr Robinson so eloquently describes is infinitely real both in revelation and in experience. But the whole necessity for our acceptance, the disaster of our refusal, is just in this that our final answer cannot be deferred to some other world existence. According to all that Christ has revealed to us it must be made in this life and now. This is the real point at issue. Christ's offer of salvation must, it appears, be accepted by us in our present state of probation. "Now is the accepted time; Now is the day of salvation": "To-day if ye will hear His voice harden not your hearts." The trouble about our universalist friends is that for a *certain* "to-day" they substitute a *nebulous* "to-morrow". To the detriment of innumerable souls they procrastinate to a purgatory of their own imagining that vital decision which, according to divine revelation, must be made by us on this side of the grave. John Henry Newman in his indictment of "Liberalism", as "Enemy No. 1" of the Church, defines it as "the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are by their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word".[3] Into this pitfall Universalists fall. Solely on the ground of what seems to them to be reasonable, they postulate, as the arena of all their hopes, a *post mortem* situation for which we have no dominical authority whatever.

Mr Lowes Dickinson, with the detachment of a layman, is quite defiant of all such authority. "These postulates (quoted above[4]) whether or no they may seem credible, are", he writes,

[1] John 3.14. [2] John 6.37. [3] *Apologia*, Note A. [4] p. 0.

"at any rate directly opposed to all the modes of thought that have been or are officially accepted in Christendom." But Dr Robinson writes as a theologian. And theology is a science. It must proceed not on wishful thinking but on evidence. And on what evidence, we are bound to inquire, does Dr Robinson ask us to flout the tremendous warnings of our Lord himself?

When Christ came every centre of religious thought whether in Asia or in Greece and Rome was alive with future probation, metempsychosis, transmigration. It is therefore the more significant that in marked contrast with such contemporary expectation, He throws open Eternal life to immediate acceptance. Who, humanly speaking, could have needed probation more than the malefactor by his side on Calvary? But to this man, in prompt response to his prayer, comes the unfaltering assurance, "*To-day* shalt thou be with Me in Paradise." How could Christ have discouraged universalist presumption more decisively than in that "Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many will seek to enter in and shall not be able"?[1] How could He have done so more effectively than in posting up before our eyes the unforgettable cartoons of the fixed gulf[2] and the shut door?[3] Professor Oliver Quick, one of the sanest of theologians, does not put it too strongly when he declares that "both the New Testament and the teaching of the Church seem to make it clear that what had taken place in the soul before physical death must finally decide its destiny". . . . "Christ's own solemn warnings about the narrowness of the gate that leads to Life, the difficulty of entering it, and the fewness of those that find the entrance, are not to be explained away."[4]

III

Where does all this lead us? Are we to succumb to the siren voices, or are we to bind ourselves to the mast? Is it to be presumption or acceptance, ostrichism or reality? Which is right? Only the great Day will show. Now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: Now we know in part; but then shall we know even as also we are known.

Meanwhile we are surely wise to see that this whole ghastly trouble of hell is no crude medieval doctrine. Hell like Heaven

[1] Luke 13.24. [2] Luke 16.26. [3] Matt. 25.10.
[4] Quick, *Gospel of the New World*, pp. 112, 115.

begins now. It is a hideous fact—"a malignity, filthy, petty and enormous" as H. G. Wells calls it—that confronts us daily as we open our newspapers, that stares out at us from many an anguished face in the streets, that horrifies us only too often in our own hearts. You can no more eliminate it by denying its existence than you can, by mere negation, eliminate war or cancer or crime. It is that against which God Himself is perpetually at war.

Wiser are we, in this day of opportunity, to lay hold with both hands of His offer of deliverance which centres at the Cross. For it is here that we find release and power. And it is here that we find that which is so sorely needed in religious circles to-day, the urgent concern to bring others to deliverance too.

It is this note of urgency that rings out through the New Testament. Again and again we read of this burden of urgency coming upon the Church, and of believers in consequence being the more added to the Lord. General Booth used to say that the worst of sinners could be saved, provided that some one person were urgently concerned to save him. Society around us may seem strangely apathetic. But there is also widespread anxiety and expectation. At the heart of things the Church is as a pile of dry stuff very ready for kindling, and it is just this note of urgency that is the spark needed to set it alight.

THE NORM OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS[1]

by The Rev. Professor W. MANSON

In the New Testament there is only one principle or standard of Christian knowledge, character and life—Jesus Christ Himself. All other norms of religious insight, belief and practice are superseded in Him, or if they continue to be valid, it is because they have been taken up into Him, amended, re-enacted and completed. In this sense the New Testament on what is really its first page asserts: "No one has at any time seen God; the divine One, the only Son, who is on the Father's breast, has made known the mystery." All eyes in the New Testament are turned, therefore, towards the Christ who as the Living Word stands above the written word, as Head of the Church stands above the Church, and as Lord of history stands above history. Written word and Church are there, and exist in a relation of mutuality or interdependence; both of them are in subordination to Him who is their informing principle of authority. But this general recognition that Christ is the norm of life, character and thought for His people hardly prepares us for the singular fulness and diversity of the schematic formulations by the aid of which, in the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament, the dependence of Christian life on Jesus is expressed and enforced. Some of these formulations are so sharply defined and featured that a brief reference may be made to them before we pass further on.

There is, for example, the *Pauline* norm of the Christian life expressed most characteristically in the formula: "It is not I who live now, but Christ lives in me." Here is a pattern or scheme of Christian existence which is as individual and distinctive as the Pauline theology as a whole is individual and distinctive. In other words, here we have got the Apostle himself. The formula I have cited indicates a deeply mystical and profoundly inward and emotional apprehension of life to which

[1] Inaugural Lecture, New College Divinity Session, 1949-50.

in point of imaginative reach and intensity it would be hard to find anywhere a parallel in literature. The Christ of Pauline religion is primarily and essentially the Christ within the soul. It is within the soul that this Christ is "formed", lives, suffers, dies, is raised and taken up to glory. While history is behind this theology in the sense that God did actually, in the fulness of historical time, send His Son into the world of men, did exhibit Him on the Cross for the expiation of our sins, and did raise Him from the dead and give Him glory, these things did not come alive for the Apostle, they were not actual for him until the day on the Damascus road when, as he lay prone and helpless on the earth, *grace reached down to him on his ground-level*, and God, as he says, revealed His Son "in him". From the standpoint here indicated—and it is the standpoint not only of the Apostle Paul, but of much derivative evangelical religion of the subjective, introspective type—history is in a sense phantasmic; the soul is the real world. St. Paul was one who in earlier days had insisted on bringing the whole Law of God to the test of his particular experience: and now by an equal compulsion he insists that the mighty acts of God in redemption, the Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of the Son of God, shall all verify themselves by events within the arena of his personal life. The Christian revelation is, on this showing, a mystery in which we participate. All the things that happen to Christ happen in us. Is He alive? We live in Him. Did He die? We die in Him. Is He risen? We are risen with Him. But, while the Pauline formula or scheme of the Christian life is thus sharply and unmistakably featured, it cannot be regarded as providing a self-contained or self-subsistent norm. For who is this Christ, this Son of God, whose life, passion and resurrection are to enact themselves within the Christian soul? Here St. Paul, as his Epistles abundantly show, is dependent upon historical knowledge, the same kind of knowledge for which we depend upon the Synoptic Gospels.

Very different from the Pauline formulations at this point are those which we find in the *Epistle to the Hebrews* and in the Johannine literature. In the Epistle to the Hebrews there is not a particle of that mysticism of faith-union with the Redeemer which is the core of the Pauline norm of life. The eyes are directed not to a Christ within the soul, nor to a present

work of grace within the soul, but to a Christ who, though He was made historically one with His brethren on earth, is now in heaven, and carries on His work of grace in heaven. It is indeed the very summit or culminating point of the writer's argument that the Christ who is our High-priest with God has passed through the heavens, and is "within the veil". He has carried with Him the anchor to which our souls and all our hopes are made fast, and has thus transported the gravity-centre of our lives as Christians to the heavenly world. Here the Christian life is not a present fruition or state of repose or condition of proleptic salvation but a tense, all-out concentration of hope directed to an eschatological end. Christians are runners in a race which extends before them, and in which they look away or look ahead (ἀφορῶντες) to Jesus who, as He has started and preceded us on the course [of faith], must also bring us to the finish. This is a norm of Christian life about as different from the Pauline norm as it is possible to be, yet at the points in which it is most antithetical to Paul, it comes into the closest conjunction with the Synoptic representation. In the *Johannine literature* again, to say only a word on this subject, the tension or polarity which we have seen to subsist between the regulative ideas of the Christ within and the Christ on high, between present process and eschatological consummation, is almost entirely surmounted. From the Johannine standpoint the darkness is over, and the light of the eternal day "now shineth". The Christian walks in this light, and in keeping himself there, and in knowing, loving and obeying Christ, he knows himself already to possess the eternal life. In this point of insisting on adhesion as disciples to the Master's words and commandments, the Johannine norm of life, though it has some mystical and intellectual affinities with the Pauline norm, represents in essentials an epilogue or necessary last chapter to the Synoptic representation.

It will have been noticed that in this brief review of the Apostolic norms of the Christian life the facts have in every case, in one way or another, thrown us upon cross-references to *the Synoptic Gospels*. Such impulsion has been inescapable since the Synoptic embodiment of the Christian law of life has a natural and historical primacy. There is (1) the closeness of the relation in which the Synoptic tradition stands to the his-

torical Jesus; there is (2) the concrete character and richness of its matter; and there is (3) the fact that, as evolving from the process of "the training of the Twelve", the Synoptic norm is moulded at every point by relation to the facts and features of a human situation. In all of these points the Synoptic norm is qualified, as none of the others are, to serve as the ultimate frame of reference in this whole matter. To the Synoptic norm of life, then, we shall now pass on; and we shall have to consider two things in particular: (1) how the norm comes into position in the narrative-scheme of the Gospels; (2) how it is articulated and developed by reference to the principle of the Messianic calling of Jesus.

(1) We begin with a brief glance at the opening chapters of the Gospel according to Mark. There at the outset, on the very first page, which records how Jesus received His Messianic call and in the power of the Spirit entered on His work in Galilee, we read that He called four men to His side with the words, "*Come, follow me*". These men—and a fifth is added presently to their number—now become witnesses of His actions, hearers of His words, associates of His life, companions of His way, and confidants of His mind on matters of religious thought and conduct. Up to this point Mark has not used the word "disciples" to designate them, but in Chapter 2, which records a series of public accusations against these followers of Jesus because of their new-found freedom in the matters of fasting and the Sabbath-laws, they appear under this name, as scholars in attendance on Jesus, and Jesus, using figurative language, speaks of them as "friends of the bridegroom" or guests at a wedding-feast, therefore as an altogether privileged circle. In the same chapter we are given the enigmatic parables of the new patch on the old coat and the new wine in the old wineskins. What do these somewhat tantalising illustrations signify in the existing context? If we look long enough and closely enough, we shall, I think, find that they refer to the followers of Jesus, and their meaning is that the followers of Christ are a new creation, a phenomenon of the Messianic and eschatological age, not a patch-up or makeshift from the old clothes of Judaism. In Chapter 3 we hear how Jesus, as opposition to Him develops, draws the circle of these followers more closely round Himself: "He appointed twelve [of them] to be

with Him, and that He might commission them to preach" etc., and the new spiritual links which bind them to Jesus and to one another are declared to take precedence over all earthly affections and ties. In Chapter 4 it is added that to this inner fellowship of disciples the "mystery" of the Kingdom of God is disclosed, whereas to outsiders this same Kingdom remains veiled in "parables", remains, that is, a figure of speech, a colourful vision, an imaginative dream, or, as we might say, a myth. And so the story goes on.

By the time we reach Chapters 8 and 9 of Mark the Messianic crisis has come on. John the Baptist has been done to death, and Jesus, now confessed as Messiah by the inner circle, knows His time has come to leave Galilee to face the last issue at Jerusalem. A new note enters into the Synoptic representation. Hitherto the word to the disciples has been "Come, follow me". Now there is the solemn insistence: "*If any one will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me:* For he who wills to save his life will lose it", etc. The words were spoken to the Twelve at a moment of crisis. The meaning is that if at this parting of the ways His followers are to retain any interest in the Kingdom of God and the eschatological future, they have got to abandon their homes and farms and kindred in Galilee, and to take their lives in their hands for the sake of their proscribed master. What will it profit them to hold on to these possessions and securities when the Kingdom of God is at stake? But while the demand applied in the most literal sense to the Twelve, the Christian tradition embodied in Mark says that Jesus spoke the words also to the multitude, that is, to all hearers: Jesus was laying down a rule for all followers. This is deeply significant. The Christian tradition has left little or no record—apart from the Parables—of teaching given by Jesus to men in general. It has preserved only His instructions to the inner circle, but these are taken as normative for all. So a deeper tone—the negation of the *ego*, the dying of a man to self—comes into the Synoptic norm, and it is under the ceiling of this profounder, graver, more existential sense of the Christian calling, which turns the way of discipleship into a path of renunciation, that all must now go forward. We cannot travel with the Markan narrator right to the end of his record. The general pattern of the Synoptic calling has

now come into view. To live your life with Christ—to negate your self for Christ—that is the norm.

But even this is not yet the end. The hour is to come when, with all this all-in engagement to share the life of Jesus, the disciples have to understand the distance which separates them from the Lord. "They were on the way going up to Jerusalem," we read, "and Jesus was advancing on ahead of them, and a strange feeling came over them, a sensation of fear." The disciples were now in fact to be "scandalised" by what was to happen to Jesus. In the Garden of Gethsemane His nearest and dearest were to be visibly placed at a remove from Him. At the Cross they were all to stand very far off indeed. Under these circumstances they remain doubtless aware of their connexion with Jesus, but it is now the connexion of men over whom the knowledge steals, as in St. Peter's case, that their sins form part of that "fearful enmity of the carnal heart of man towards God" which rages round Jesus and hounds Him to His doom. They find themselves in actual fact standing amid these last events not with Jesus but with the crowd, with those who have need to beat the breast and to cry, "Woe, woe unto us!" There is not one of these most pledged followers of Jesus who is not in this hour distanced from Him, and under constraint to say:

> My sins have taken such an hold on me,
> I am not able to look up to Thee:
> Lord, I repent; accept my tears and grief.

And at this moment if they can go on to say:

> But Thou hast taken all my sin away,
> And I in Thee dare now look up and pray;
> Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief,

it is because something has meantime intervened by which it has been signified to these followers that their oneness with their Master has not been just something of their own choosing or of their own creating, but of His, and it is this that steadies them now in this awful hour of self-discovery. What—we have to ask—is it in the disciples' experience which corresponds to, which forms the counterpart at this moment to the Atoning Death of Jesus? There is only one answer. It is the numinous sacrament by which the oneness of the Saviour with His followers in His Passion is effectuated even within the separation

wrought, as they so clearly now see, by sin. For at the Last Supper, when Jesus took the bread into His hands, and said, "This is My body, which is for you," He had also gone on to give it to them, saying, "*Take ye, eat ye*", and by this word "Take ye, eat" Jesus had associated these disciples sacramentally with His sacrifice. He had definitely consecrated them for inheritance in the Kingdom of God as those who, despite their brokenness so soon to be made visible, formed one body with Himself. He had given their lives a sacramental dependence on His own. So, in building up the Synoptic norm of the Christian life, let us to the two determinations already specified—"Live your life with Christ", "Negate your self for Christ"—not forget to add as third determinant, sanctifying both these others, the sacramental principle, "*You are not your own*".

(2) Having thus considered how the Synoptic norm of the Christian life comes into position in the Gospel-history, we may now turn to look at it in its over-all aspect and character. But at this point an addition has to be made to the sketch which has now been outlined. We have seen that, to begin with, Christians are to follow Jesus, to be His scholars, to share His life, to be a new creation, to have His mystery communicated to them, to get beyond the myth-stage of spiritual understanding. But what is it to do and to be all this? What does it mean to be followers of Jesus, sharers of His life, participants in His mystery? Here we have to place ourselves in front of something which is not in Mark. Mark is deficient in respect of the teaching of Jesus. We have to go for this to the other Synoptists, above all to St. Matthew and the *Sermon on the Mount.* For it is only there, as we listen to the Beatitudes, and realise that the Gospel of the Kingdom of God signifies no relaxation of the past religion of the Law and the Prophets but, on the contrary, represents its "fulfilment", and come face to face with the inexorable demand of the purity, holiness and love of God —the thing which man never attains to, but which he may never more for a moment put out of his mind—it is only there that we hear and see at last what it means to share with Jesus, what it means to follow Him, what it means to be His new creation, to be initiated into the Kingdom of Heaven, and to have religion "de-mythologised". But it is only as we go into

that searching light that we begin to understand also what it is to negate self, if that grace be granted us, and what it is finally to receive the Blessed Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ. — To return to our Synoptic norm, there are three stages.

(1) Christian are, to begin with, "learners" in the school of Christ, associates of His "way". The word "disciple" occurs 73 times in Matthew, 46 times in Mark, 38 times in Luke, 78 times in John, and 28 times in Acts: in the rest of the New Testament it does not occur even once. We are on good historical ground, therefore, if we begin with this idea. Now it is not at all a comfortable thing to be all the time under the eyes of Jesus and to have Him before our eyes, to be partners of His way and involved in His situations, to be searched and known, to have our life ploughed up and ploughed under, to be poignantly aware of being almost always in the wrong, and of having to be made over again if we are ever to be of any service to God, to have to review not only our conduct but our opinions and prejudices. It is not very pleasant to be told, with Peter, that you have a radically ungodly mind, that you have no sense or savour of the things of God, and that you are doing Satan's work for him. The natural man does not like being thus remorselessly turned over to the light—but it is *life*. And it is not very agreeable or composing to live with the Sermon on the Mount, and, considering what we have been and are, to compare notes with it about sincerity, and purity, and goodness, and obedience. It is a very scarifying experience which we do not ordinarily invite. It is far more instinctive with us, as with St. Peter, to wish to get out of it all backwards and to say: Let me go, for I cannot bear, I cannot endure this light! "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord!" That is only natural, but to go forward into that light—is *life*.

So the Synoptic norm of life has its foundation in humility, and teachableness, and penitence. The first of the Beatitudes is "Blessed are the poor in spirit", and whatever else that fathomless word means, it means that, where you have got a really teachable man or woman, sooner or later his, hers, will be the Kingdom of God.

(2) Christians as disciples of Jesus learn before very long that "self" is the obstruction. Self is the thing which keeps the

Kingdom of God from coming to pass, as we know in our souls. So the mystery of the Kingdom shapes itself in the call: "Deny thyself, and take up thy cross, and so follow Me." At first it seems enough to have a Leader and a cause—the Kingdom of God—and an enthusiasm; but it is soon seen that our *ego* may travel with us thus far, and say "Aye, aye" to everything quite comfortably. But let there be no misunderstanding about this matter. According to the Synoptic norm of life, it is not *things* that a man has to stroke out of his life, but the personal principle of hesitation, weakness, fear, clinging, evasion, reservation, refusing to share with Christ, not merely in mind, but in fortune. It is not asceticism that is here the cure—for no rules or regulations are given by Christ for that, and contrived or calculated asceticism only indurates the *ego* which is the root of the trouble. Rather must the disciple let *Christ* prevail with and over his original instincts in the moments of decision. What the Synoptic norm really means is the giving place in our lives to the Christ, who goes forward to His Passion, letting Him, in effect, become our *ego*, so that life thus realised in fellowship with Him becomes in the final sense life from the dead, the awakening and raising of a new personality.

But because this realised necessity of appropriating not only the mind but the fortunes, the very life of Jesus, brings as its sure consequence, and essentially, the discovery of the actual distance between us and Jesus Christ—a separation which no idealism can bridge—and a weight of mortal, sinful consciousness which has no parallel in the world outside of Christianity—

> My sins have taken such an hold on me,
> I am not able to look up to Thee—

there comes into the Synoptic norm a third stage.

(3) If I bring the Sacrament in here, and the sacramentalising of the disciples' way, it is because the Synoptic record brings it in here—as the last episode in our Lord's relations with His disciples on earth—and if the Synoptic record brings it in here, it is because it belongs here. So let none of us say, as people of a philosophical and abstract way of thinking sometimes say, that the Sacrament in Christianity adds nothing to what is already given in the Word. There is a distinguishing between spirit and matter which is neither Christian nor spiritual but only gnostic and rationalistic, and which does not take

account of the infinite depth of the purpose of mercy and of sympathy with broken and convicted men in which the Saviour acted at the Last Supper. He was dealing with disciples to whom the Word had already come, who knew all about the truth of God and their calling, but who had also come, like St. Peter, to know themselves, and for whom, because they had come to know themselves, it was not at all apparent how grace could *materialise* for them. In such an experience something more than the reasoning word was needed, and a sacramental significance is given to discipleship without which the Synoptic norm of life would not provide a through way, but might only lead to the waste land and despair.

In what has preceded I have tried to work out the pattern of the Christian life as it shaped itself in the mind of those who drew up the Synoptic records of Jesus. Clearly the earliest Christian community felt the need of setting down in writing the apostolic witness not only to the mission and teaching of the Lord but to the rule of life which He had given His disciples to follow. The formulation in the Gospels corresponds to a necessity in the life of the Church. And how concrete it is! It would be a profitable and interesting task to inquire in the end how far the other New Testament norms of the Christian life—the Pauline norm, for example—admit of being put together with the Synoptic as interpretative additions. It would be even more interesting, perhaps, to take each by itself and estimate them in their singleness. It would be instructive to inquire how far the Christian Church would have got if it had had to depend on the Pauline Epistles alone for the instruction of its life and the development of its mission, or even on the high universals of the Fourth Gospel alone. Could the Church have been saved from Gnosticism, or could it have preserved at the heart of it so great a principle of concrete and inexhaustible relevancy to history and to the world? These are not questions which can be answered. But if the question to be put should be: "Do you consider that the Synoptic Gospels, taken by themselves, afford an adequate norm of Christianity?" I do not think that there should be any doubt as to the answer.

AMSTERDAM AND THE CHURCH'S FORMER TEACHING ON SOCIAL ORDER

by The Rev. STEWART MECHIE

None of the findings of the Amsterdam Assembly has excited more interest than that which calls upon the Church to refuse to identify itself with either Communism or *laissez-faire* Capitalism. On the one hand this finding has brought the World Council of Churches into bad odour with big business circles in America: on the other hand it has caused a certain quiet rejoicing among British Socialists. It is not surprising that Labour supporters in Britain should claim to have the desired solution intermediate between Communism and Capitalism. What is surprising, however, is that some churchmen appear to be inclined to agree. Without being an opponent of Labour one may question the wisdom of such easy acceptance of its views. Would it not be wiser for churchmen to recall the social teaching of the Church in earlier ages and seek there the inspiration for new creative solutions?

As Professor Tawney has pointed out, there are four main attitudes which religious opinion may take up towards the world of social institutions and economic relations. It may adopt the ascetic attitude which would flee from their contamination: it may take them for granted and ignore them as matters of indifference to the religious life: it may associate itself with an agitation for some particular reform: or it may at once accept these worldly spheres and yet seek to purify them, claiming them for the Kingdom of God and endeavouring to transform them according to the mind of Christ. All four attitudes were represented in the thought and practice of the Medieval Church, but not all were equally representative. It was the fourth that was most characteristic of that age. To-day all four attitudes may be found and another besides. Christians whose social consciences have been thoroughly awakened have tended in recent generations either to take up the third attitude and concentrate on some specific measure like temperance reform, better housing or the prevention of

war; or they have adopted a new attitude and thrown in their lot with whatever Radical or Socialist movements might be current. Following such secular insights, socially-minded Christians have turned their attention chiefly to the question of the ownership of the means of production, seeking a remedy for injustices and inequalities in the extension of public ownership through the State. Experience, however, is proving that, in Brunner's words, "the direct absorption by the State of economic undertakings is only suitable where an expressly natural monopoly is concerned. The nationalisation of economic affairs in general, State-socialism, is, however, the sure way to the total-State, even if those who desire this nationalisation abhor the total-State. Once the economic life is absorbed by the State, the total-State is there, whether or not people desire it" (*Communism, Capitalism and Christianity*, pp. 13 f.). Perhaps Christians would have been wiser to take a leaf out of the book of the Medieval and Reformation Church and, while accepting private ownership, to concentrate on the question of use rather than ownership. Is it necessary or justifiable for Christians to take over insights wholesale from a movement like modern Socialism which has grown up almost exclusively on secular soil? Now that the Church has largely come back to the fourth attitude and is again insisting that all the proper activities of mankind in this world are within the scope of God's purpose and that there is a word of God for social and economic life, is it not time for the Church to-day to turn its attention to the social doctrines which the Church of the past proclaimed in days when this was its characteristic attitude also?

It may be objected that the social teaching of that age was too closely adapted to the conditions of an agrarian feudal economy to be even worthy of consideration to-day. Such a judgment ignores the fact that there was a constant process of development in the Church's teaching. "The economic teaching of St. Antonino in the fifteenth century, for example, was far more complex and realistic than that of St. Thomas in the thirteenth, and down to the very end of the Middle Ages the best-established and most characteristic parts of the system—for instance, the theory of prices and of usury—so far from being stationary, were steadily modified and elaborated" (Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 30). That elaboration continued after

the Reformation. Luther, it is true, looked on society with the eyes of a conservative countryman. He took no account of the work of the later canonists in their attempts to relate medieval social doctrine to the new facts of trade, and, as Dr W. G. Peck has put it, "roundly castigated the Fuggers and other financiers with an early medieval cudgel". Calvin held as firmly as any of his predecessors to the belief that the maintenance of economic morality was a task for the Church: and, while Fenton, an English divine, could say a generation later that "Calvin deals with usurie as the apothecarie doth with poyson", it is also true that he accepted the new developments of highly organised international trade and finance as legitimate spheres for a Christian man. Moreover, recognising the impossibility of distinguishing in principle between rent of land or houses and interest on capital put into business, he admitted a qualified acceptance of a moderate interest on loans. Calvin, in short, was neither an early medievalist dominated by the desire to arrest the tide of progress and preserve an agrarian economy, nor was he the parent of economic man and the fountain head of laxity in economic ethics.

The truth would seem to be not so much that the Church in the person of its theologians and moralists failed to keep pace with the changing economic facts and to adjust its social teaching accordingly, but rather that influential groups, which in that age became increasingly dominant in political and economic life, more and more infected by the modern temper which reckons business one thing and religion another and therefore more and more impatient of all attempts to regulate economic matters on religious principles, swept the Church's authority on these matters aside. Professor Tawney, in his introduction to the Elizabethan Thomas Wilson's *Discourse upon Usury* (pp. 108 f.) shows the significance of this transition to a secularised theory of life.

> When the century began, 'to live by usury as the husbandman doth by his husbandry' had commonly been treated as ignominious, immoral, or positively illegal; when it ended, money-lending was on the way to enjoy the legal security of a recognised and reputable profession. But that change itself was part of a larger revolution which was to set a naturalistic political arithmetic in the place of theology, substitute the categories of mechanism for those of teleology, and turn religion itself from the master interest of mankind into one department of life with boundaries which it

is extravagant to overstep. For the theory of usury which the sixteenth century had inherited had not been an isolated freak of casuistical ingenuity, but one subordinate element in a general system of ideas, and the passion which fed on its dusty dialectics is intelligible only when it is remembered that what fanned it was the feeling that the issue at stake was not merely the particular question, but the fate of the whole scheme of medieval economic thought which had attempted to treat economic affairs as part of a hierarchy of values embracing all human interests and activities, of which the apex was religion.

The period of transition was prolonged. Churchmen, both Reformed and Anglican, fought a long rearguard action both in word and deed. To take a Scottish instance, one finds the General Assembly in 1596 complaining of "oppression under pretext of law, be usurie and be contracts against law—forstalling of mercats—ane regrateing be gentlemen burgesses and commons, qwhairby the pryces of victuall is marvelouslie raised, to the great hurt of the poore, and suchlyke girnelling of victualls, and withholding of them from the mercats, and not threshing them out in due tyme" (*Booke of the Universall Kirk*, p. 435). The reference here is to two of the three typical practices which were aimed at by the institution of the Just Price—forestalling, or the buying up of goods before they reached the market; regrating, or buying in the market with the intention of selling later at a higher price; and engrossing, or obtaining so large a share of goods in the market as to enable one to dominate the price. Moreover the Church sought to use its discipline to enforce economic morality. Tawney quotes from the St. Andrew's Kirk-Session Register the punishment of a usurer and a defaulting debtor before that ecclesiastical court (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 135).

It was, however, a fruitless struggle for the Church. The new commercial and financial classes would brook no interference, and as the seventeenth century advanced the claim of theologians and moralists to regulate economic activities was gradually abandoned. The fornicator, but no longer the usurer, remained the object of ecclesiastical discipline, and economic affairs became increasingly uncontrolled by any sense of the unity and wholeness of the human task in this world. Not only has religion in the past influenced, to a degree which we to-day find difficult to credit, men's outlook on society: it is also true that economic and social changes have reacted powerfully on

religion. Here is a case in point. A new social situation had begun to develop long before the Reformation, and it gathered momentum as it proceeded The Church began by claiming authority, continued for a long time to protest, but finally reconciled itself to the new situation by abandoning its claim to deal with certain aspects of life. The outcome was that what the Church once denounced as usury and unjust prices it came in the course of a few centuries to concur with economic man in regarding as laws of nature.

Now, however, that the Church once again claims life in its wholeness for God and His Christ, why should the Church's former teaching on social order be so neglected? Neither at Amsterdam nor since has much reference to it been made. This is the chief lack in Brunner's *Communism, Capitalism and Christianity*, up to a point so cogent. Perhaps in this matter as in others the sad loss of William Temple was apparent. As readers of his *Christianity and Social Order* are aware he had considerable acquaintance with the Church's social teaching and found light and leading in it. In the last twenty years of his life he moved away from the Labour-Socialist position which at one time he occupied and, significantly for the argument of this paper, turned his attention from industrial ownership to financial control, from the social question as posed by Socialism to the social question as dealt with by the former social teaching of the Church. For evidence one may cite his address at the Albert Hall meeting in September 1942 and his address to the Bank Officers' Guild, both published in the volume *The Church Looks Forward.* It might be said that Temple was trying there to bring the concepts of the Just Price and the Restraint of Usury up to date.

When the old theologians looked at economic affairs within the framework of man's supernatural origin, his fall, redemption and supernatural destiny, they had to face the question of the purpose of work, and they concluded that work performs its true function to the greater glory of God when it satisfies men's natural needs in this world. The canonised economist St. Antonino of Florence put it thus: "The object of gain is that by its means man may provide for himself and others according to their state. The object of providing for himself and others is that they may be able to live virtuously. The object of a vir-

tuous life is the attainment of everlasting glory." The needs, however, even of a simple community require some exchange of the product of labour, and the Church was concerned to see that the exchange was just. With the development of a money economy the Christian moralist perceived that, in order to maintain the principle that the prime object of work is the satisfaction of man's natural needs, the medium of exchange must be kept functional. It must not be allowed to distort the exchange of goods by becoming itself the real object of work and exchange. It was this perception, says Dr W. G. Peck, which lies beneath the two great principles of the Just Price and the Restraint of Usury.

The idea of the Just Price rested upon the conviction that the real as distinct from any artificially inflated price of an article was capable of being ascertained. In the rough and ready methods of arriving at it both the cost of production and the state of the market, both the producer's claim to a fair remuneration and the necessities of the consumer, especially of the poor, had to be taken into account. In those days a fair remuneration meant maintenance according to the customary standard of a man's class. That would hardly be acceptable in our more democratic age; but it may be suggested that the principle of a "moral first charge" is still valid, though we should probably interpret it in terms of a standard of living which the resources of civilisation at any given time make it possible to maintain as the minimum standard for the whole population. Since a regulated price need not mean a fixed price, the modern equivalent for a just price for each article might be a just level of prices in general. Similarly, the restraint of usury would require careful discrimination in the light of modern conditions. Economists might differ as to what is properly to be described as usury; but there is good evidence for the belief that usury, in a sense open to moral condemnation, is no insignificant phenomenon but a widespread and radical fault in modern civilisation. (See Thomas Robertson's *Human Ecology*, Part 2.)

The important point, however, is that the attitude of the Church in past centuries to usury and the just price did not represent isolated judgments on these particular issues. The old theologians opposed whatever was in their view definable

as usury because they considered it to violate the Christian philosophy of life. Their economic concepts arose from their theology. Admittedly these concepts cannot be applied directly to the present situation. Further, the world to-day may be no more willing to listen to the Church's guidance than it was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That is no reason why the Church should keep silence. Indeed if the Church goes so far as to condemn both Communism and Capitalism it is surely incumbent upon it to stress the Christian interests which its own old teaching was designed to conserve and promote, so that, *mutatis mutandis*, it may give guidance and inspiration towards the new creative solutions for which the Amsterdam finding calls.

PROFESSOR T. W. MANSON ON BAPTISM

by The Rev. ERNEST A. PAYNE

The last number of the *Scottish Journal of Theology* contained an article of great interest and importance by Professor T. W. Manson under the title "Baptism in the Church". It was a weighty and illuminating contribution to the discussion of the ordinance of baptism which is now proceeding vigorously in almost every Christian communion. One brought up in the Baptist tradition and adhering to it by conviction read with appreciation Professor Manson's admission of the strength of the case against infant baptism so far as it rests on the New Testament evidence. On the other hand, the general treatment of the subject and the conclusions reached include some rather surprising statements and raise a number of questions.

Professor Manson argues that "the fundamental idea" (p. 393)[1] behind Christian baptism is incorporation into the New Israel. He believes, however, that from very early times there was tension between this conception and that of Spirit-baptism, with which it became associated. He illustrates the tension from the New Testament itself, from the liturgical practice of the Church and from the divergent attitude in West and East to the relationship of baptism and confirmation. So far as post-Reformation developments are concerned, and the controversy between Paedobaptists and those who would restore believers' baptism, Professor Manson suggests that an "atomistic individualism" has had unfortunate results in theological thinking and practice. "The fundamental issue", in his view, "is not that between Paedobaptists and Antipaedobaptists, but that between those who follow the traditional practice of the Church and those who reject water-baptism of any kind in favour of Spirit-baptism" (p. 400). He then sets out "the key points" of a theological defence of water-baptism, which, he thinks, carries with it "the justification of infant baptism" (p. 400). His three points are that water-baptism is (1) a rite of admis-

[1] The page references, unless otherwise stated, are to Professor Manson's article in the *S.J.T.*, Vol. 2, No. 4.

sion to a community, (2) a rite representing appropriation by Christ, and (3) a rite indicating, and in some sense conferring, the gift of the Spirit. On all three counts he would argue that infant baptism is fitting and justifiable. He criticises Karl Barth for inconsistency. Professor Manson would not himself attempt to settle the matter "merely by digging up precedents in the Apostolic or the sub-Apostolic Age" (p. 403). The Church may and must "adapt herself and her methods to the task she has to do". "If it were proved to-morrow that not a single infant baptism took place in the first two centuries, that would not prove that the Church did wrong in starting the practice in the third or continuing it in the twentieth century. The crucial question about baptism is that of the relation of the individual to Christ in His body, the Church" (p. 403).

One had hardly expected the article to end with so frank a disavowal of the necessity for scriptural authority for the Church's practice in regard to baptism, particularly in view of Professor Manson's earlier commendation of Mr Flemington for his recent argument that "the real authority for going on with water-baptism is Jesus Himself—not a text at the end of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, but the whole person and work of the incarnate Lord" (p. 400; cf. W. F. Flemington, *The New Testament Doctrine of Baptism*, pp. 115-129). The abandonment of the quest for scriptural or apostolic authority in regard to those who should be the subjects of baptism surely raises much wider and more serious issues than the immediate question before us. Professor Manson would apparently, like the late Professor N. P. Williams, "trust the instincts of the historic Church". "The argument *a praxi ecclesiae*", wrote Professor Williams, "is the only, but also a sufficient, ground for affirming the legitimacy and laudability of Paedo-baptism" (*Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin*, p. 552). To take such a line appears to be a departure from the general Protestant position that the Scriptures are, as the *Westminster Confession* puts it, "the rule of faith and life". It opens the door to many other departures from apostolic practice. What, for instance, of the elaborations of the Mass, or the claims that have been made for Episcopacy?

On these wider issues I do not propose to comment. Professor Manson would, I think, immediately reply that he had

provided an adequate safeguard by his insistence on "the mind and purpose of Christ" (p. 403) as the constant norm by which variations should be judged. It is his treatment of the intention of Christ, and his interpretation of New Testament baptism, that are our immediate concern and that here call for further examination.

Is it not surprising that Professor Manson can expound the basic ideas associated with New Testament baptism without mentioning repentance or faith, save in a passing admission that New Testament statements readily lend themselves to an interpretation in terms of the immersion of the candidate on his profession of faith (p. 397), and that he can even write somewhat disparagingly of conversion and the decision of the convert (e.g. p. 399)? Surely the element of personal response is one of the ideas requiring full discussion. John's baptism was, no doubt, "a rite of incorporation into an Israel 'prepared to meet her God' " (p. 392), but it was a rite to which the essential preliminary, in John's mind, was repentance and the confession of sin (Mt. 3.2, 6,11; Mk. 1.4; Lk. 3.3; Acts 13.24, 19.4). The record of Peter's speech at Pentecost, when—somewhat surprisingly, as many critics have felt—the Apostles adopted water-baptism as the rite marking adherence to the new community, gives his concluding exhortation in these words: "Repent, and be baptised every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost" (Acts 2.38). The context of almost all the Pauline references to baptism includes the idea of personal penitence, and implies that the rite of baptism was the symbolic representation of the washing away of actual sin (e.g. Acts 22.16; Rom. 6; Col. 2.11-12). The same is true of 1 Pet. 3.21 and Heb. 6.1 f. The accounts of baptisms in Acts almost all explicitly mention the belief or faith of the individual or individuals concerned; with this we may compare Paul's reference in Gal. 3.26-27.[1]

[1] Cullmann, *Die Tauflehre des Neuen Testaments*, 1948, admits the presence of a confession of faith in the case of Gentiles and Jews who were baptised in apostolic times, but argues that such a confession was not a necessary element in the rite, which is, if rightly understood, completely independent of personal decision or faith. Faith should follow baptism, but need not precede it. He makes considerable use of 1 Cor. 12.13, Gal. 3.27 and Acts 2.41, which he takes to mean that the candidate is "the passive object of a divine act, subject to disposition by God" (p. 26). His interpretation of these texts seems to the writer extremely arbitrary and to depend on taking them out of their context.

It is surely entirely arbitrary and unsatisfactory, when setting out the main ideas connected with New Testament baptism, to omit penitence and faith. Does not the conception of baptism as a rite involving personal confession resolve, to some extent at least, the tension between the act of incorporation and the gift of the Spirit, with which Professor Manson begins his exposition? Professor Manson has himself provided us, in *The Teaching of Jesus*, pp. 308-312, with a lucid and impressive account of our Lord's teaching on the necessity of repentance. Was not baptism in apostolic times clearly conceived as the dramatic representation of that change of heart in a man which is, as Professor Manson says, "an essential condition of his receiving God's forgiveness" (op. cit., p. 311), and which is itself a work of the Spirit of God?

This is not to deny that incorporation into the new Israel, appropriation by Christ and the manifestation of the gifts of the Spirit are not other and inseparable elements in Christian baptism. The rite was so striking and impressive, its history and associations so varied and solemn, that it could take to itself and express more than one meaning. But to start by ignoring the element of personal confession is to do violence to the Biblical evidence, and invites the suspicion that it is ignored —even if unconsciously—because it is difficult to reconcile with later practice.

Throughout his article Professor Manson presents incorporation in a strangely impersonal and objective fashion. "The members are not taken in in order that they may be saved, or because they are saved, but in order that they may be available for the use of Christ. . . . The immediate business on the agenda, here in the world at any time that may be marked 'A.D.', is that Christ's Ministry should go on, that there should be a body responsive to the impulses of His Spirit" (p. 401). This, and other passages in the article, may no doubt be distinguished from the *ex opere operato* view of the sacraments. But it is difficult to see that they would not justify that indiscriminate baptism of Indian villagers with a fire hose of which Karl Barth writes so scornfully. Is not the gospel only properly understood in terms of an I-Thou relationship? And is not any doctrine or practice dangerous which obscures this? The initiative is with God; all is of grace; for faith itself we depend upon Him.

But has "atomistic individualism" (p. 398) proved itself anything like so great a danger in the history of the Church as corporate irresponsibility? Is it not the special function and glory of baptism that it demonstrates so clearly the work of Christ in winning a response from men and drawing them together into the fellowship of the Church? How easy it is to slip into notions and comparisons which are really sub-Christian is shown by the fact that Professor Manson can offer as an analogy to his membership of the Christian Church his natural birth into a family, where choice and personal decision are inoperative. Is not the whole movement of Old Testament religion in its preparation for the New Covenant a movement emphasising the inadequacy and danger of thinking in such terms of man's relationship to God? "Whosoever shall do the will of God," said Jesus, "the same is my brother, and sister, and mother" (Mk. 3.35).

Professor Manson criticises Karl Barth for inconsistency and for attempting "to avoid the logical consequences of his adoption of Baptist basic principles" (p. 397 n., cf. p. 402). Barth has become convinced that New Testament baptism involved a responsible act on the part of the baptised, and that only if so administered can the rite properly proclaim the gospel. He is, however, anxious to preserve the validity of other aspects of Christian truth, e.g. the fact that baptism is by its very nature unrepeatable, that it is a sacrament of the Church and far more than an individual act, that the prime agent throughout is God Himself. Barth is determined not to run the risk of becoming an Anabaptist. He pleads for a reform of the Church's practice from within. In the first edition of his 1943 lecture he paid tribute to the witness borne by those who have stood for believers' baptism and expressed the hope that there might be a "rapprochement" with those of the main stream of the Reformed tradition, if the latter restored the primitive practice and Baptists refrained from demanding "re-baptism". This passage has disappeared from later editions of the lecture. Whether or not it still represents the mind of Barth himself, it remains the hope of a considerable number of Baptists. The main position championed by Barth may seem to involve him in "self contradiction", as Professor Manson claims (p. 402). But this is part of the price that has to be paid for our present ecclesiasticla

confusion, by those who hesitate to separate themselves from their churches and are not sure that there must be "reformation without tarrying for any". It is no more illogical than the efforts of those who insist on the necessity of faith for the appropriation of the blessings of the gospel and then try to justify the baptism of infants by what Barth calls "exegetical and practical artifices and sophisms", no more reprehensible, surely, than omitting all consideration of penitence and faith when treating of baptism as portrayed in the New Testament.

"The crucial question about baptism", says Professor Manson, "is that of the relation of the individual to Christ in His Body, the Church" (p. 403). It is strange that he nowhere comments on the widespread concern shown to-day in many different communions, on pragmatic as well as dogmatic grounds, about the results of the baptism of infants. Emil Brunner has criticised infant baptism no less outspokenly than Karl Barth. It undervalues and obscures "the fundamental assertion of the Reformation: *Nullum sacramentum sine fide*". "The contemporary practice of infant baptism", says Brunner, "can hardly be regarded as being anything short of scandalous" (*The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 132). Suppose all were ready to grant Professor Manson's contention that the Church may legitimately vary her practice in regard to the subjects of baptism, would it not still be true that the present situation calls for a reconsideration of the matter? "It is not merely possible, it is inevitable," as he himself says, "that the Church should learn by experience what Christ means her to do, and how to do it most effectively" (p. 403). The evidence set out in reports recently presented to the Convocations of Canterbury and York—*Confirmation To-day* (1944) and *Baptism To-day* (1949)—as well as the further discussions to which they have led, indicates that in the Church of England, no less than in the Reformed Churches of the Continent, there is not only widespread concern about the consequences of infant baptism, but also a considerable, and probably growing, body of opinion in favour of baptismal reform. Some Anglicans are, indeed, in favour of abandoning infant baptism (cf. *Baptism To-day*, pp. 28 f.). They believe, that is to say, that "the relation of the individual to Christ in His Body, the Church" would be better set forth if baptism were deferred till the age of responsible consciousness.

Theologians and ecclesiastical leaders will have to give increasing attention to these matters. If the scholars—and among them Professor Manson—are right who argue that the real authority for going on with water-baptism is Jesus Himself, is it not likely that His authority may also be claimed for believers' baptism? Do not the New Testament references to penitence, confession and faith support the view that this form of baptism was in accordance with His "mind and purpose"? Does not the rite then, and only then, fully express the gospel? Might not a return to what is admitted to have been the general practice in apostolic times better suit the present situation of the Church in an age which must be recognised to be post-Constantinian and post-Augustinian, if not post-Christian?

ST. MARK, 9.14-29

by The Rev. C. E. B. CRANFIELD

In reading the Gospels it is as well to bear in mind the process of selection which lies behind them;[1] for the stories about Jesus which are included in the Gospels are, as Jn. 20.30, 21.25 remind us, only a small selection from a much larger mass of material. Quite often—and perhaps this is particularly true of the miracle-stories—the most effective approach to the question of an episode's message for ourselves is to ask what feature or features of it would have struck Christians of the fourth to seventh decades of the first century as specially significant and so contributed to its preservation, when so much was allowed to be forgotten. The purpose of this article is to indicate three such features of the episode recorded in Mk. 9.14-29 and to suggest that it is in them that we have also to recognise the significance of the passage for ourselves.

1. The Person of Jesus Christ

In the first place, the early Christians must have valued this story for the light which it sheds upon the person of Jesus Christ. This miracle, like all the other miracles of Jesus, was to the eye of faith an eloquent sign of the mystery of His person. It is true that Jesus resolutely refused the temptation to work miracles as proofs of His divine authority or as portents designed to frighten unbelief into a sort of belief.[2] But at the same time He did regard His miracles as signs to those who had eyes to see.[3] Though not proofs to the unbelieving, they were luminous with meaning for those who did believe. They also had the effect of rendering unbelief inexcusable: the Jews who saw the miracles *ought* to have discerned their meaning.[4]

For the early Church the fact of the cure was itself a witness

[1] Selection took place, of course, at different stages—in the memory of eye-witnesses, the moulding of oral tradition, the compilation of any written sources the Evangelists had, and finally in the composition of the Gospels. The wealth of detail in Mk. 9.14-29 suggests that this story came to Mark directly from an eye-witness rather than via oral tradition.

[2] Mt. 4.5-7, Mk. 8.12 (cf. Mt. 12.39; Lk. 11.29), Mk. 15.32.

[3] Mt. 11.4 ff., cf. Jn. 2.11. cf. A. Richardson, *The Miracle-Stories of the Gospels*, pp. 48 f.; the whole book is extremely stimulating.

[4] Mt. 11.20 ff.

to the mystery, the mighty secret, now to faith the open secret, of the divine authority and power of Jesus. Mark further draws attention to Jesus' divine authority and power by a number of touches in his narrative—by his use of two words, that in the Bible have significant associations, "were greatly amazed" (ἐξεθαμβήθησαν)[1] in verse 15 and "rebuked" (ἐπετίμησεν)[2] in verse 25, and by the emphatic personal pronoun in the same verse (ἐγὼ ἐπιτάσσω, which we might translate "it is I who command").[3] The words "all things are possible" (verse 23)[4] have a similar significance. For Jesus, indeed, all things are possible. The same expression is used in 10.27 with reference to God. All-mightiness is a characteristic of *God*.[5] For Jesus all things are possible, because He *is* God. What men, the disciples, have failed to do, He does. Luke well sums up the meaning of the incident, when in 9.43 he says: "And they were all astonished at the majesty of God" (ἐξεπλήσσοντο . . . ἐπὶ τῇ

[1] Why were they amazed? Was Jesus' face still shining after the Transfiguration like Moses' face in Exod. 34.29 ff.? In support of this Hauck notes the word ἰδόντες. But, as Gould points out, if this were so, the command of secrecy (9.9) was useless. Or was it simply that they were surprised at His opportune arrival? But for this the intensive form (ἐκ-) would be very strong. A much more satisfactory answer is supplied by G. Bertram in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, III.3 ff. According to him the amazement of the multitude is Mk.'s means of representing the arrival of Jesus for the believer as an epiphany of the Lord. He cites a number of passages (Mk. 1.27, 10.24, 32, 16.5 f.; Lk. 4.36, 5.8-10—we may perhaps add Mk. 12.17) where expressions of fear and amazement serve to emphasise the revelation-content (*Offenbarungsgehalt*) or Christological significance of a particular scene.

[2] cf. E. Stauffer's art. in Kittel's *T. W. z. N. T.*, II, 620 ff. The word ἐπιτιμάω has two meanings agreeing with the two meanings of the simple verb—to honour and to impose a punishment. The latter usage develops into that of "rebuke", "reprimand", in classical and hellenistic Greek. In the LXX the word obtains a special sense from the thought of the Word of God, which creates and destroys. The creating word of God calls into being (בָּרָא), the rebuking word brings to destruction (גָּעַר). Ἐπιτιμάω became the technical term for the divine rebuke. See for example Ps. 104.7, 80.16, 106.9, 2 Sam. 22.16, Jb. 26.11. In Zech. 3.2 it is Satan who is rebuked—cf. the demon here. In the N.T. it is used of Jesus rebuking Peter (Mk. 8.33), John and James (Lk. 9.55), evil spirits, as here, the winds and sea (Mk. 4.39), a fever (Lk. 4.39), and of His strictly commanding secrecy about His Messiahship (Mk. 8.30). Used of Jesus it denotes His divine authority, His exercise of the "*Herrenrecht*" of the living God. It is also used of men rebuking men; it then usually denotes a usurping of the divine right, and so a rebuke that is not allowed to stand (e.g. Mk. 10.13 f., 48, and 8.32). Only once in the Gospels according to Stauffer is a spontaneous rebuke of a man by a man allowed to stand unchallenged, and that is in Lk. 23.40, where it is not arrogance but humility which speaks (*keine Zurechtweisung von oben herab, sondern vom Standpunkt des Bussfertigen aus*). cf. the brotherly rebuke of the erring Church-member (Lk. 17.3, 2 Tim. 4.2, 2 Cor. 2.6).

[3] Swete compares 10.38 f., 14.58, and Jn. *passim* for this emphatic ἐγώ of Christ.; cf. also Exod. 3.14.

[4] See footnote on p. 64. [5] cf. Mk. 14.62, where "the power" stands for God.

μεγαλειότητι τοῦ θεοῦ)—it was *God's* majesty that they had seen manifested in Jesus.

Jesus is here seen as the Vanquisher of Satan and his kingdom. God's world has been occupied by a usurper, who tries to guard his ill-gotten treasure as a strong man guarding his house; but the Stronger One than he has entered and is despoiling him. The exorcisms were to the early Church signs of the Saviour, who has overcome the devil and delivered mankind from his power.[1] Mk. 9.14-29 is a proclamation of Jesus Christ as the Saviour of men in the totality of their existence from the power of Satan.

The story also furnished an indication of Christ's motive. The father in his distress beseeches Jesus: "Have compassion on us, and help us" (*βοήθησον ἡμῖν σπλαγχνισθεὶς ἐφ' ἡμᾶς*). The fact that Jesus does help suggests that He has compassion. The verb "to have compassion" is in the New Testament only used of Jesus (apart from three occasions on which it is used by Him with reference to figures in the parables that have a specially close connexion with Himself—Mt. 18.27, Lk. 10.33, 15.20).[2] It denotes not a mere sentiment, but something which expresses itself in active assistance. In the New Testament it is reserved for the divine *ἀγάπη*. We must see in this and in the other miracles of healing and also of feeding the motive of compassion.[3] They are signs of the divine pity.

This story then was valued by the early Church, because it was a proclamation of the mystery of Christ's Person, His divine authority and power, His triumph over the devil and his dominion, His Saviourhood, His compassion. And this part of its message is no less true, no less relevant, for us. If we want to hear the Word of God to us in this passage, the first thing is its testimony to Jesus Christ. We must receive it as the promise and assurance that, as He was for this father and son in their deep distress, so He still is and will be for us and for the world to-day in its need and chaos the Saviour and Deliverer, whose authority and power and pity are the very authority and power and pity of the living God.

2. The Coming Lord

But, when Mark was writing his Gospel, Jesus was no longer with His disciples in the old way. Since His ascension they

[1] cf. G. Aulen, *Christus Victor*, esp. 99 f. [2] cf. K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, III/2.252.
[3] *Pace* A. Richardson, op. cit., 29-34.

could no longer see or touch Him. They must have known the temptation to feelings of wistful loneliness, a longing for the old days when He had been with them in the flesh. There is a special feature of this story (shared with 6.45-52) which must have endeared it to them. It tells of Jesus returning to His disciples after being away from them. So it must surely have seemed a precious promise of the coming Lord, telling them both of His comings to them unseen, through the Holy Spirit, in Word and Sacrament (the presence referred to in Mt. 18.20, 28.20) and of His final coming in glory.

Here again the feature that is likely to have struck the early Church is also a clue to the story's message for ourselves. It is still a promise of the coming Lord. It has a bearing on our public worship; for the essential thing in our Christian services is neither the charm of the preacher's personality, nor his eloquence, nor the quality or heartiness of the singing, nor the beauty of the place, but something far more solemn and far more joyful, which perhaps we are rather apt to forget—the real presence of the Lord who comes to keep His tryst with His own. This passage challenges us to expect Him. Where a congregation has learned this lesson, its services will lack neither awe (cf. "were greatly amazed"—verse 15) nor joy (cf. "running to Him saluted Him"[1]—the same verse). But the spiritual comings of the Lord are not limited to the appointed hours of public worship. Whenever and wherever His disciples are seeking to obey His command to be His witnesses, and, as they are faced, like the disciples of old, by the need and distress of the world and are conscious of their powerlessness to meet it, they are to look for Him to be with them. And so they are to be comforted and emboldened, till at last He comes in glory.

Perhaps it is not far-fetched to see a significance in the connexion of this episode with the Transfiguration, which it follows in all three Synoptic Gospels. It was from the glory of the Transfiguration that Jesus returned to His disciples and to the multitude. So, not only in His final coming when every eye shall see Him, but also as He comes to His Church in Word and Sacrament, it is as the glorious Lord that He comes, from the right hand of the Father, from that ineffable glory, of which at the Transfiguration the three had a glimpse.

[1] D and the Old Latin actually have προσχαίροντες for προστρέχοντες!

3. The Nature of Faith

A third thing about this episode that must have impressed the early Christians is that it had much to tell them about the nature of faith. Once more the message is equally for us. Under this heading we must consider four things. (*a*) First there is the lesson of the disciples' lack of faith (verses 19, 28 f., and Mt. 17.20—"your little faith"). While Jesus is away on the mount of Transfiguration, they are faced with the distress and need of the world in the persons of the father and his son —just as to-day the Church throughout the world is faced with men's distress and need. The father had brought his boy to Jesus ("to thee"—verse 17); but, finding that Jesus is absent, he not unnaturally thinks that the disciples who are associated with Him may be able to do something. So to-day men look to us who are associated with Him with a wistful expectancy. Very often even scorn and sarcasm are only a rather thin disguise for a secret hope that perhaps the Church might be able to help. The disciples try to cast out the evil spirit, and fail. It was not that they did not expect to succeed—they did. Their lack of faith did not consist in any failure to expect great things. On the contrary, they tried, because they thought that they would succeed. Had not Christ given them authority to heal the sick and to cast out demons (Mk. 3.15, 6.7)? And, moreover, had they not actually already exercised it successfully (Mk. 6.13, 30; cf. Lk. 10.17 with reference to the Seventy)? Having tried and failed, they are painfully embarrassed. It would have been better for them, had they not thought to work this cure, but had told the father to wait till Jesus came back. But, as it is, they are horribly discomfited. Then Jesus returns, and saves the situation. But afterwards, when they are in the house, they ask Him, "Why could not we cast it out?"[1] And

[1] Better thus translated than as in R.V. For such private conversations between Jesus and His disciples cf. 4.10, 7.17, 10.10. It has been suggested that this is a way of introducing the early Church's interpretation. It is possible that this is so here (so F. Hauck and others), but it is not proved. It is, however, intrinsically probable that the disciples would have asked Jesus this question. We need not assume that 28 f. are an addition by the early Church added because the problem of such failures was troubling them; though we may readily admit that it was probably because such failures were not unknown to them and did in fact constitute a problem that they would be interested to preserve this bit of tradition. Lk. however omits this conversation altogether—perhaps because he wanted to spare the apostles (cf. his omission of Mk. 8.32b-33, 10.35-40, 14.31, 50, and of the reference to Peter's cursing and swearing in Mk. 14.71).

we can almost hear their unspoken thoughts behind their question! Had they not been injured? Why had He who had given them power let them down? So one might go back to a shop with one's purchase after finding that it does not work satisfactorily. But it was not God's gift that had proved inadequate or unreliable. Jesus gives the answer, "This kind can come out by nothing, save by prayer". His answer in the parallel passage in Mt.—"because of your little faith"—comes to the same thing. It was not lack of pious practices that was the trouble (though there is a tendency in the MS tradition to take it this way),[1] but something much more radical. It was complete misunderstanding of the manner of God's giving. They had thought that Christ's gift was a matter of routine—His power given to them in such a way that they had henceforth the disposing of it and could, so to speak, produce it out of their sleeves when they wanted. They had to learn that divine power is never given to men in that way. It has ever to be asked for afresh ("by prayer") and received afresh. It can never be re-

[1] In verse 29 the words "and fasting" are omitted by the original scribe of ℵ and by one of the correctors, by B, k (the chief representative of the African family of the Old Latin) and also by Clement; they are included by A, C, D, L, W, Θ, Ψ, Fam. 1, Fam. 13, the Byzantine text generally, Old Latin, Vulgate, Syriac (Sin., Pesh. and Harkl.), Egyptian (Sah. and Boh.), Ethiopic, Gothic and Armenian; and possibly we should add the Chester Beatty Papyrus which has a space for the words. Is it more likely that "and fasting", if original, would be omitted, or, if not original, would be added? Apparently there was a tendency to add references to fasting, as is seen in Acts 10.30, 1 Cor. 7.5, in both of which the Byzantine text favours the addition (though in both instances the MS evidence for inclusion is weaker than in Mk. 9.29). We find also that this verse with the reference to fasting is added in the Byzantine and other authorities in the Mt. parallel. A motive for addition was near at hand in the interest of the early Church in fasting, which is indicated by Mk. 2.20, Acts 13.2, 14.23, Didache 7, Justin Apol. 1.61, etc. It is more difficult to think of a possible motive for omission. Hauck's suggestion that it would be omitted because it seemed to contradict Mk. 2.18 ff. is not very likely; for there it is assumed that the disciples *will* fast after Jesus has left them. Hauck's point is surely a more weighty reason for thinking the words "and fasting" intrinsically improbable than for thinking that a scribe would omit them, if he found them; for scribes' alterations are usually due to less subtle reasons than that which he suggests. The contemporary interest of the Church would more likely weigh with a scribe. Certainly the intrinsic probabilities are against the words being original; for there is no mention of Jesus fasting except during the forty days, and (as Hauck argues with opposite purpose) Jesus expressly sanctioned His disciples not fasting so long as He was with them. We conclude that "and fasting" is not part of the original text, and that behind this addition lies a radical misunderstanding of Jesus' point. Mt.'s form of Jesus' answer gives the true point. By "prayer" He means not merely prayer as a pious exercise, but rather the sense of complete dependence on God from which sincere prayer springs. But it was early misunderstood in the sense of a meritorious human pious activity, as though what the disciples needed was a greater "holiness" of an ascetic sort, a superlative measure of human spiritual attainments.

duced to a matter of human routine. It is idle for us to imagine that we can possess it and store it up for future use. That is to make the same mistake as the Israelites made about the manna (Exod. 16). When they thought to store it up for future use and to save themselves the bother of fresh gathering, it bred worms and stank. For us to trust in God's power in the sense that we imagine that we have it in our control and at our disposal, though it looks like great faith and is not seldom hailed as such in Christian circles, is tantamount to unbelief; for it is really to trust in ourselves instead of in God.

How relevant this is to our situation! How easily do we make the mistake the disciples made! When faced by the clamant needs of the world, do we not sometimes try to reconstitute with consummate artistry the psychological and other circumstances of our past religious experiences, only to find that after all everything is empty? When we have tried to substitute our comfortably secure routine for humble dependence on the God who is free, our pious phrases become a mere abracadabra, and we are powerless to help men in their need. And when we experience failure, in our discomfiture and embarrassment are we not prone to fall to questioning among ourselves[1] and to sordid recriminations? We blame our failure on each other—it's the fault of the dull preachers, lack of keenness on the part of laymen, or the counter-attractions of the cinema. But mutual recriminations and arguments of this sort between ourselves or with those outside do not get us very far. Least of all does it help, when we go on to blame our failures on to some inadequacy or unreliability of the gift of Christ. Rather do we need to listen again to Christ's answer and to bring ourselves and our Church life under the criticism of this passage. In its light we must re-examine not only such ecclesiastical conceptions as "validity", but also our preaching,[2] our

[1] Wellhausen suggested that in verse 14 "scribes" (γραμματεῖς) might be a false *explicitum* for the pronoun αὐτούς, introduced into the text to explain "questioning" (συζητοῦντας). There is no MS support for this in verse 14, but the fact that some MSS have substituted γραμματεῖς for αὐτούς in verse 16, and the variants πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ἐν ὑμῖν and πρὸς ἀλλήλους for the second αὐτούς in that verse might seem to lend some support to Wellhausen. If he is right, then the disciples were arguing among themselves.

[2] cf. St. Augustine's advice to the preacher: "Oret, ut Dominus sermonem bonum det in os eius" (*de Doctrina Christiana*, IV.15) quoted by Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, 111.

organisation, our traditions, above all our denominational self-complacencies. How often are our hands so full of our traditional denominational riches, the efficiency of our organisation, our splendid past successes, our personal religious experience, that we are unable to receive the gift that God wants to give us—anew. This passage bids us come again and again to God with empty hands to receive power again and again from Him afresh. It bids us take with full seriousness the warning of Jn. 15.5—"apart from me ye can do nothing"—realising that it points to a relationship with Christ, that is not a fossilised past experience or a stereotyped matter of routine, but that constantly renewed personal relationship of humble dependence, of asking and receiving, that is faithful prayer.[1]

(*b*) The second thing that this passage has to say about faith is in verse 23. Jesus repeats the father's words indignantly in order to rebuke the lack of faith to which they gave expression.[2] He seeks to rally that faith, with which presumably the father had originally sought Jesus and which was still probably undaunted when he applied to the disciples, but which had been grievously damaged as a result of their failure—as men's

[1] cf. H. Roux, *L'Evangile du Royaume*, pp. 220 f. (this is a commentary on Mt. which deserves to be more widely known in this country than it is), and also K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, I/2, pp. 356-397, which, though not concerned with this passage, is extremely interesting in this connexion.

[2] In verse 23 it is best to read τὸ εἰ δύνῃ, πάντα . . . with ℵ, B, C (with the unimportant variant δύνασαι for δύνῃ), Fam. 1, Egyptian (Sah. and Boh.), with which W also agrees (except that it has τοῦτο for τό. The article τό is omitted by the Chester Beatty Papyrus, D, Θ, Fam. 13, the Old Latin, Vulgate, Syriac (Sin. and Pesh.); but this difficult τό is much more likely to have been omitted than inserted by a scribe. Some authorities (A, D, Θ, Fam. 13, the Byzantine text generally, the Old Latin, Vulgate, the Syriac (Pesh.)) insert πιστεῦσαι after δύνῃ (or δύνασαι). Here it is likely that the word was added, to make the sentence easier. Blass' conjecture τί τὸ εἰ δύνῃ;—for which there is some support in one MS of the Old Latin which has "Quid est si quid . . . " and in the Bohairic—is unnecessary. Those who added the word πιστεῦσαι must have understood the subject of δύνῃ here to be the father. If they were right in this, the sense would be: "The question is not whether I can do anything, but whether you can (*sc.* believe)." But, if this were the meaning, the article τό would be awkward, and one would also rather have expected the personal pronoun σύ to be put in, seeing that the whole point would be in the fact that the subject of δύνῃ is now not Jesus but the father. So it is better to take the subject of δύνῃ to be Jesus, as it was on the father's lips. The explanation is then that Jesus quotes the father's words indignantly, in order to challenge them, and the article τό is the mark of quotation, which has the effect of making the words εἰ δύνῃ the equivalent of a noun. We can then either take τὸ εἰ δύνῃ as a *nominativus pendens*, and translate: "As to your 'If you can' . . . "; or we can put a full-stop (or exclamation mark) after it, and render: "You say, 'If you can', indeed! . . . "; or a question mark, and translate: "Do you say, 'If you can'?" or "What is this 'If you can' of yours?" Of these the first is preferable.

faith is often damaged by our failures. Jesus is unwilling to do what the father asks until He has re-established in him some measure of faith. In the Gospels faith is constantly mentioned in connexion with Jesus' miracles. This does not mean that Jesus could not heal a person, unless the patient (or someone on his behalf) had faith. Even in Mk. 6.5, where it is said that "He could there do no mighty work"—apparently because of the people's unbelief, as the next verse would seem to suggest—the words are immediately followed by "save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk, and healed them". Jesus no doubt *could* work miracles for those who had no faith at all; but normally He did not, because He did not want to be a mere portent-monger, but to save men. For this a personal relationship between a man and Jesus was necessary—i.e. faith. It is important to realise that "faith" in the Synoptic Gospels is not—as some have mistakenly imagined—a mere confidence that Jesus can perform the particular miracle in question, not "faith" merely in the sense in which it is used in modern faith-healing, but faith in the characteristic New Testament sense.

From this reluctance of Jesus to work miracles except where some faith is present, we may learn the lesson that He will not be made use of for our purposes, will not be used by us as a mere means to an end. Perhaps we should also see in it a warning against a danger that often besets Church-workers, the danger of resting content when we have managed to get people into Church for community hymn-singing or some other thing they may happen to like, or to get them to come to us for various welfare amenities, as though that were all that needs to be done. We are to draw the conclusion, not that we are not to render practical assistance to unbelievers, but that we must not be content until we have helped them to a real faith in Jesus Christ.

(*c*) But there is still more about faith in verse 23. Jesus says to the father, "All things are possible to him that believeth", which is best taken to mean, "A man who has faith will not set any limits to what I can do", i.e. "If you had faith, you would not cast doubts upon what I can do by your '*if* you can', you would not set limits to my power".[1] True Christian faith

[1] Wellhausen pointed out that, although according to the sense of the passage so far one would expect the faith here referred to to be the faith of the Healer (the apostles failed because they lacked true faith, but One who has perfect faith

means believing that nothing is impossible for Jesus Christ. We may compare Mt. 8.5-13, Lk. 6.1-10. Faith knows that a single word of His is mightier than all the world beside, it reckons with an almighty Saviour, and does not dare to set limits to His goodness and power. In this light what does our faith look like?

(*d*) Finally, the father's cry, "I believe; help thou mine unbelief", has something to say about faith. Faith is indeed an energetic, importunate, grasping after the help of God, a grasping that will not take no for an answer, a wrestling with God like Jacob's, persistent like that of the Syrophenician woman (Mk. 7.25-30) or the importunate widow of the parable (Lk. 18.1-5), the faith of Luther's *Preface to Romans*. It is an activity of the believer. This is one side of the picture. The father does believe. But he is honest enough and realistic enough to know that his faith is but a poor inadequate thing, and mixed with unbelief. And that which he had to acknowledge, we need to acknowledge too. Believers—yes, but at the same time unbelief is subtly intertwined with all our faith. Therefore we are not to put our trust in our own activity of trusting, not to believe in our own believing, not to rely on our hold on God; rather are we to trust in His grace, His hold on us. We are to rely on God alone, not partly upon our own reliance on Him. We are not to elevate our own faith (in so far as it is our activity), our own experience of God, into an object of faith. When we do that, we are guilty of idolatry. Not a little of our talking about our experience smacks of this

in His Father can do what they failed to do), the following verse shows that this is not the sense, but the faith here referred to must be that of the one asking for healing. The father of the epileptic takes Jesus' words to be a rebuke of his own unbelief and a challenge to him to believe. The sentence might mean: "There is nothing which a man who has faith cannot do"; or "There is nothing which cannot be done (*sc.* by Jesus or by God) for a man who has faith"; or "There is nothing which is impossible for (i.e. in the view of—an ethic dative) a man who has faith" —in other words, "A man who has faith will not set any limit to what I (Jesus) can do". At first sight, the first alternative would seem the most natural meaning of the words, and in support of it such passages as Mk. 11.23, Mt. 17.20, may be adduced. It is a possible interpretation—though we must object to expressions such as that of Gould *ad loc.* ("the omnipotence of faith, which places at man's disposal the divine power", *vide* 3.a). On the other hand, Moffatt's interpretation –the second above—might seem to be supported by those passages which show Jesus requiring faith on the part of a sick man or of someone who is asking for healing on his behalf, before working a miracle; but *vide* 3.b. On the whole, it seems preferable to take the third possibility; for, though the others are both things which Jesus might conceivably have said, this fits the circumstances of the context better. We may compare Mk. 10.27.

idolatry.[1] The father in this episode in the Gospel believes; but it is not upon the fact of his belief, but upon the pity of Jesus, that he relies.

[1] cf. K. Barth, op. cit., I/2, pp. 272, 441, 489 f.

"HOPE" (*'ΕΛΠΙ'Σ, 'ΕΛΠΙ'ΖΩ*) IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

by The Rev. Professor ALLAN BARR

The limitations of a study of ideas upon a purely verbal basis are at once apparent in the case of Christian hope. Hope is conspicuous in many passages of the New Testament where the word itself does not occur. It is a sufficient indication of this fact that the word "hope" does not occur anywhere in the book of *Revelation*. For a complete investigation of the idea one would, therefore, have to examine not only the passages specially concerned with "hope" but every exhortation, every prayer and in fact every future tense in every book of the New Testament. If, however, we recognise the limitations of our study we may expect to find in the passages where the word itself appears a sufficient if not complete illumination of the characteristics of Christian hope, which is central as it is all-pervasive in New Testament thought.[1]

Hope is so universally a mark of human life that theological interest centres not upon hope in its natural or common manifestations but upon the distinctive characteristics of Christian hope. Hope and fear are frequently set in antithesis. But psychologists point out that while fear is an elementary or primary emotion arising from an instinct which men share with the animals, hope belongs to a class of emotions or feelings on a higher level of organisation, described by such terms as "derived emotions" or "prospective emotions of desire".[2] Hope therefore implies not merely instinctive impulse but a developed desire for future good, requiring the exercise of intelligence in relation both to the grounds of hope and to the picture of the desired end formed by the expectant mind. It is accordingly

[1] A complication arises through the use of synonyms in our English versions. The A.V. translates the verb *ἐλπίζω* no fewer than 18 times by the word "trust". Notable examples are Mt. 12.21, Lk. 24.21, Jn. 5.45, 1 Tim. 4.10. The R.V. restores uniformity in these cases. On the other hand there are several Greek synonyms which emphasise the idea of expectation inherent in hope. Reference to these is made later in this study.

[2] See W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 338 ff.; A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, pp. 457 ff.

at these points, the grounds of hope and the content of hope—the "things hoped for"—as well as in respect of intensity or certitude that we shall find the distinctive characteristics of Christian hope in comparison with the hope of common human experience.

It is usual to distinguish three elements in hope. There is expectation; the future holds at least the possibility of desired events, and these are awaited with expectancy. There is trust, a confidence in the grounds of hope, which may amount to little but a belief in the turn of luck or the swinging of the pendulum, but in religious hope is the strong foundation of the whole structure.[1] And there is the element of patience, a reinforcement of the power to endure the difficulties and hardships of the present in the prospect of better things to come. The points at which, as mentioned above, the distinctive features of Christian hope may be observed correspond with an emphasis on one or other of these three elements. The patient endurance of present troubles corresponds to the certitude and intensity of hope, trust to its grounds, and expectation to its content.

New Testament Hope Distinctive

Common or natural hope has, of course, its place in the New Testament writings. Not only do sinners lend to those of whom they "hope to receive" (Lk. 6.34) and the masters of a demoniac girl lose "the hope of their gains" (Acts 16.19) but Christian writers speak, for example, of "hoping to come shortly" (1 Tim. 3.14) or hoping "to see you in my journey" (Rom. 15.24, cf. 2 John 12, 3 John 13.14) in a way which it would be fastidious to distinguish from the hopes expressed in countless commonplace letters and postcards written to-day by anyone. One is soon conscious, however, that even in dealing with common things and events the New Testament writers frequently show a vigour and certainty of hope that is due to the strength of their Christian faith. "I trust (ἐλπίζω) in the Lord Jesus to send Timotheus shortly unto you", Paul writes

[1] The study of hope in the O.T. is also complicated by the use of synonyms. Several Hebrew roots belong to the sphere of hope, with emphasis on one or another of the three elements mentioned, and these are variously translated. The common Hebrew verb בָּטַח, which regularly appears in the English versions as "trust" is usually rendered by ἐλπίζω in the LXX.

to the Philippians (2.19). Observe how this is balanced immediately afterwards (2.24) by the confident "But I trust (*πέποιθα*) in the Lord that I also myself shall come shortly", and compare 2 Cor. 3.4, 12, where trust (*πεποίθησις*) corresponds to hope (*ἐλπίς*). So Paul writes to Philemon (22) "I trust that through your prayers I shall be given unto you." And there is just a touch of Apostolic authority as well as confidence in such passages as 2 Cor. 1.13, "We write none other things unto you, than what ye read or acknowledge; and I trust (*ἐλπίζω*) ye shall acknowledge even to the end."

The Assurance of Hope

Even within the range of common desire, then, hope in the context of Christian faith and fellowship acquires a certain sureness and strength. How far it is separated in its higher aspirations from natural hope is perhaps most vividly illustrated by what Paul says of it in Rom. 5.1-5. Christians, justified by faith, have peace with God and access into this grace wherein they stand; they also rejoice triumphantly in hope of the glory of God. This hope, says Paul, far from being dimmed or crushed by troubles and hardships (*θλίψεις*) is actually produced by them; for we know that "tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope". That is, the troubles which assail the Christian produce *ὑπομονή*, not the patience of resignation but the endurance of a well-trained soldier; endurance produces *δοκιμή*, the tried worth of the veteran; and that tried worth, that tested character, in turn produces hope. This is no anti-climax, as it would be if it had in view only the hope that is natural, the hope that "springs eternal in the human breast", the hope that wears thin under tribulation till in the end it almost merges into its opposite, despair. No; the hope of which the Apostle writes is not a natural endowment with which one is equipped at the beginning, to soften trials or escape from them into pleasant fantasy; it is the crown and prize of a life of valiant heroism. Hence, for Paul, tribulations have a value for the Christian which may even add something to the exultant joy of Christian hope; for it is through such tribulations that a man is made fit to hold and enjoy the "hope of the glory of God". There is, therefore, an assurance, a certitude, in Christian hope which amounts to

a qualitative difference from ordinary hope. It is a hope, as Paul says, "that maketh not ashamed", brings no disappointment (Rom. 5.5). It is from a Christian source that hope, "sure and stedfast", gets its familiar symbol, the anchor (Heb. 6.19).

"The Patience of Hope"

Corresponding to the note of assurance in Christian hope is "the patience of hope" (ἡ ὑπομονὴ τῆς ἐλπίδος, 1 Thess. 1.3) the endurance of present troubles in the strength of the hope for the best that is yet to be. This word and the corresponding verb (ὑπομένω, usually rendered by "endure" in the A.V.) are associated with the word "hope" in several passages of the New Testament. Christians wait with patience for the hope that is not yet seen (Rom. 8.25). They are to live "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation" (Rom. 12.12). Christian love "hopeth all things, endureth all things" (1 Cor. 13.7).[1] In *Revelation* the idea of Christian endurance is characteristic, and the word (ὑπομονή) in some degree fills the place of the missing word "hope". John is, with his brother Christians, "partaker in the tribulation and kingdom and patience which are in Jesus" (Rev. 1.9, R.V.). In the apocalyptic chapters of the Gospels, which present the substance of Christian expectation, though the word "hope" itself is not used, we find the same stress on "patience". "He that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved" (Mk. 13.13, cf. Mt. 24.13, Lk. 21.19).

In the Epistles also, in those passages where Paul draws an analogy between the Death and Resurrection of Christ on the one hand and the present sufferings and future glory of the Christians on the other (2 Cor. 4.7-18, Philipp. 3.7-11) there is clearly a similarity of ideas to those elsewhere expressed by the words "endurance" and "hope", especially as the phrase in the former passage (4.17) "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" so closely resembles the descriptions of the goal of Christian hope in other passages. And probably the most striking instance of the association of endurance and hope is to be found in the great passage of *Hebrews* (11.1-12.2) which

[1] Endurance is also associated with hope in Rom. 5.3, 4 (discussed above), 15.4, 2 Cor. 1.6, 7. In some passages it is associated with faith and love, as hope is in the triad of 1 Cor. 13.13. So 2 Thess. 1.3, 4, 1 Tim. 6.11, 2 Tim. 3.10, Tit. 2.2.

culminates in the supreme example of that forward-looking faith which is "the substance of things hoped for", even Jesus Himself, "who for the joy that was set before him endured (ὑπέμεινε) the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God".

The Ground of Hope. Faith and Hope

Whence, then, comes this quality of assurance and the accompanying will to endure? It arises from the distinctive ground of Christian hope. Natural hope has its grounds too, more or less rational, invented if they do not exist. They may be discerned by nothing better than the wearing of rose-coloured spectacles, reliance on gambler's luck, the turn of the tide, the principle that if winter comes spring cannot be far behind, or on human ingenuity and effort. The New Testament ground is not a new one. It is, as in the Old Testament, trust in God, whose goodness and mercy are to be relied on, and whose promises cannot fail.[1] Hence the close connexion between faith and hope in a number of New Testament passages.[2] Faith "is the substance of things hoped for", it is by faith that we have firm assurance of our hopes (Heb. 11.1). Hence God Himself, the object of faith, can be called "the God of hope" (Rom. 15.13) and the heathen, who are without God in the world, have no hope (Eph. 2.12).

But the Christians exercise this trust in a new historical situation. A twofold experience has given them a new revelation of the love of God as the ground of all their hopes as of all their present blessings. For first, Christ has come in the flesh. His life, death and resurrection have proved God's redeeming love for sinful men. Hence the limitless sweep of the Christian's hope—"What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?" (Rom. 8.31, 32). But further, there was an inner, personal experience of the love of God that had followed the decisive self-giving of Christ. In the fellowship of the Church they had received the gift of the Holy Spirit. And Christian hope, says Paul, "never disappoints us,

[1] So expressed, in the simplest terms, in 1 Tim. 4.10, 5.5, 6.17, 1 Pet. 3.5.
[2] e.g. 1 Cor. 13.7, 13, Gal. 5.5, 1 Thess. 1.3, 5.8, 1 Pet. 1.21.

since God's love floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us" (Rom. 5.5, Moffatt). On that unassailable foundation, the redeeming and sanctifying love of God in Christ, the hope of the Christian "abides".

"Things Hoped For"

While God Himself is ultimately the object as He is the ground of Christian hope, New Testament thought is not thereby prevented from entertaining concrete hopes in which the future destiny, under God, of the individual Christian, the human race and the whole creation is envisaged. It is true, of course, that the early Christians had no interest in political Utopias or programmes of social progress such as engross the modern mind. Even where the pictures of the future take the form of detailed description, as in *Revelation* and other apocalypses, it is clear that we have to deal there with the language of symbolism and not with prosaic plans and forecasts. The New Testament description of the future is achieved, indirectly where there is symbolism, and directly elsewhere, by the use of language rich in religious and ethical association, and closely bound up with the new experience of Jesus Christ and His saving power.

In our own times the term "Christian hope" has come to be so generally applied to the individual's prospect of a survival of death and a blessed life thereafter that the words are often used exclusively in that sense. The New Testament, of course, holds out such a hope. Jesus Himself speaks to the disciples of the "many mansions" in His Father's house (Jn. 14.2) and promises the dying thief "Verily, I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise" (Lk. 23.43). Paul in prison facing the prospect of death has "a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better" (Philipp. 1.23).

Generally, however, among the early Christians, deeply convinced that the events which dominated their lives were signs of the end of the age and the consummation of God's purposes, these hopes are held in the wider eschatological context. It may be difficult to decide the true emphasis in the verse rendered in the A.V. "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable" (1 Cor. 15.19) but it is clear

that the whole passage in which it occurs is one in which hope is fastened to the thought of a general resurrection. the significance of which is determined by the Resurrection of Jesus Himself. It is in a similar context that we find non-Christians described as "others which have no hope" (1 Thess. 4.13) Hope, connected with the prospect of a general resurrection and usually with the Rising of the Lord Himself, is a prominent theme in the addresses reported in Acts (e.g. Paul's "of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question", 23.6, cf. 24.15, 26.6-8, also 1 Pet. 1.3). To the same circle of expectations belongs the Parousia of Christ which is expressly connected with hope in *Titus* 2.13, "looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ". In the same Epistle (1.2, 3.7) we find the phrase "hope of eternal life", contrasting, in its futurity, with the "hath eternal life" characteristic of the Gospel and First Epistle of John.

In other passages the content of the Christian's hope is filled by such conceptions as "righteousness" (Gal. 5.5) and "grace" (1 Pet. 1.13) as one would expect since it springs from God's redemptive action in Christ. But specially striking are the passages where the New Testament writers connect hope with "glory" (δόξα). Here we have a conception which allows hope to range beyond the individual and the Christian community so as to gather within its embrace the race of mankind and indeed all creation. So the "such hope" of 2 Cor. 3.12 is set in a context of which glory is the theme. "Christ in you, the hope of glory" (Col. 1.27) applies it specially to the Gentiles.

But it is in that Magna Charta of Christian hope, the eighth chapter of Romans, that the full range and splendour of the conception of "glory" as the goal of hope is seen. The new life in the Spirit experienced by those who have been justified in Christ is a guarantee of the future "glory which shall be revealed in us". As adopted sons of God, freed from all bondage, Christians have become heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ, destined to share His glory (vv. 14-18). Not only are "many brethren" to be gathered into the glorified family. The whole of creation awaits the manifestation of the sons of God and is to be delivered from the bondage of corruption into their glorious liberty (vv. 19-21). Modern revolutionaries hardly dream

of the creation of a new humanity and certainly stop short of proposing to remake the Universe. Paul does not propose to remake it but he is confident that it will be remade, and his confidence is based on the new life experienced in Christ (vv. 22-28). Very impressive is his appeal to Predestination. Men foreknown of God, predestinated to be conformed to the image of His Son, called and justified, "them he also glorified". The past tense (ἐδόξασε) is very remarkable. The Apostle means, of course, "will glorify". But he is dealing with the purposes of God. The golden chain of these purposes stretches from eternity to eternity. Paul grasps this chain where it is nearest to him, where it passes through his life. He is a Christian, "called according to his purpose".[1] No explanation can be admitted but that which is set in the eternal will and purpose of God. Can the future, then, be any less sure? The coming glory is as certain, is in a sense as deeply rooted in the past, as his present calling and justification. And it is a glory that all creation will share (vv. 28 ff.).

Expectation

The formation of such hopes leads to an emphasis, in some New Testament passages, upon the element of expectation in hope, so that it becomes rather an anticipation in thought of what is sure to come than a groping of desire for a holding place. To the Galatians Paul says (5.5) "For we through the Spirit wait for the hope of righteousness by faith" (Moffatt, "the righteousness we hope for"). In *Titus* 2.12, 13, we are taught that we should live in this present world "looking for that blessed hope".

In these two cases and in others we see the tendency to introduce in place of the word "hope" (ἐλπίζω) synonyms which emphasise the eagerness of expectation. We find, for example, in 2 *Peter* 3.13 the Christian hope in its widest sweep thus expressed: "Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for (προσδοκῶμεν) new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness". Similarly, several compounds of the verb δέχομαι are used by various writers for hope regarded as expectant

[1] cf. "the hope of his calling and . . . the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints" and "one hope of your calling'. (Eph. 1.18, 4.4).

waiting.[1] So Joseph of Arimathæa "waited for the kingdom of God" (Mk. 15.43). So the Corinthians are "waiting for the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 1.7, R.V.), to the Philippians Paul writes that from heaven "we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ" (3.20, cf. Heb. 9.28) and Jude counsels his readers, "Keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life" (21). But it is as we turn again to the eighth chapter of Romans that we find some of the most striking uses of these synonyms. Hope (*ἐλπίς*) has an essential place in our salvation (v. 24).[2] Yet it is as if Paul felt the word was inadequate to express the eagerness with which creation "waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God" (v. 19), and with which we who have the firstfruits of the Spirit "groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" (v. 23) and "with patience wait" for the hope that is not yet seen (v. 25). A very expressive word is that translated in v. 19 "earnest expectation" (*ἀποκαραδοκία*) which suggests a tense physical posture, a readiness to spring out and meet the expected object of desire. The word is bracketed with "hope" (*ἐλπίς*) in Philipp. 1.20.

"All Things in Christ"

Many modern minds may not be sufficiently impressed when the content of Christian hope is expressed by words like "righteousness", "grace" or even "glory". These will seem vague, airy and abstract, administering at best an emotional stimulus. And indeed New Testament hope would be open to this objection, but for one fact that gives to every conception of hope its sure direction and complete definition—the fact of Jesus Christ, known by historical testimony and by the indwelling of His Spirit. For mankind the hope is that He will be but the firstborn among many brethren, conformed to the image of God's Son (Rom. 8.29). For creation the earnest expectation is for the manifestation of such sons (v. 19). So to

[1] *ἐκδέχομαι, ἀπεκδέχομαι, προσδέχομαι.*

[2] It seems most probable that the dative in *τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν* was not intended by Paul to convey an instrumental sense as in our English versions. The salvation of which we were assured at conversion (so that it can rightly be said that we were then saved) was and still is a salvation the realisation of which lies in the future and is an object of hope.

the writer of 1 John all Christian hope is filled with His image "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is" (1 Jn. 3.2). To Christians has been revealed the purpose of God "that in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth" (Eph. 1.10).

GOD'S PEOPLE AND THE REMNANT

by The Rev. J. C. CAMPBELL

I

The conception of the Remnant is a distinctive element in the national consciousness of Israel. It gives expression to the radical faith of that people in their national destiny. From a purely secular point of view it may be regarded as an idea of great survival value, contributing to the spiritual toughness of Israel. Such rationalisations are within limits illuminating and legitimate. When we turn to the particular Biblical witness to the Remnant we find that it divides into two main tendencies. In the optimistic message of the so-called false prophets it was an ingredient in the eschatology of weal which served to soothe the hearts and uplift the hopes of patriotic Israelites. It was a popular belief similar to that faith in the British capacity for muddling through, which at times appears in our own people. On the other hand in the preaching of the canonical prophets the popular conception of the Remnant was subjected to rough and critical treatment and received a fresh content. Our concern is to bring out this new content given to the conception by the Prophets and to determine the meaning and importance of the Remnant for the doctrine of the Church.

II

In the pre-exilic prophets by whom the process of revaluing this conception is begun, it is seen against the background of the prophecy of doom. It is one of the things that comes within the sweep of the "besom of destruction". In a passage which appears to have the popular conception of the Remnant in view, Amos (3.12) says: "As a shepherd taketh out of the mouth of the lion two legs or a piece of an ear, so shall the children of Israel be taken out. . . ." Not a very valuable remnant! In chapter 9 vv. 1-4, 9 he gives a description of escapees being ruthlessly hunted down by the wrath of God: "I will slay the last of them with the sword: he that fleeth of

them shall not flee away, and he that escapeth of them shall not be delivered." The summary of the prophetic message given in 2 Kings 21.10-15 states vigorously: "I will stretch over Jerusalem the line of Samaria and the plummet of the house of Ahab: and I will wipe Jerusalem as a man wipeth a dish, wiping it and turning it upside down. And I will forsake the remnant of mine inheritance and deliver them into the hand of their enemies." It is implied in this passage that the Jerusalemites had been priding themselves on being the true Remnant. At a later date, Ezekiel (ch. 9) describes with horror the commission given to a destroying angel to wipe out the residue of Israel. This radical rejection of Israel in those who claim to represent it seems final. The prophets proclaim a judgment in which no man can abide. Yet the prophets do not abandon the idea of the Remnant. They give it a new interpretation. Where they speak of it, it appears as the creation of the grace of God. "It may be", says Amos (5.15), "that the Lord of hosts will be gracious unto the remnant of Joseph." In the same spirit are the words of Isaiah (1.9): "Except the Lord of hosts had left unto us a very small remnant, we should have been as Sodom, and we should have been like unto Gomorrah." And in Micah (5.6), the Remnant is "as a dew from the Lord, as showers upon the grass that tarrieth not for man, nor waiteth for the sons of men".

It would be tempting to identify the Remnant with a special group or class called to fulfil Israel's historic mission. But in the Bible we do not find this. Jeremiah sought in vain for such representatives (5.1-5). The Rechabites, a minority group with great influence, are nowhere regarded as the Remnant. Nor does a body of refugees who have made their way to safety become entitled to make this claim. The existence of the Remnant must be conceived in the light of the Biblical witness to the redemptive activity of the God of Israel. It is called into being by God acting in judgment and grace, not by secular condition or accident of history. That is to say that the continuity of Israel's history is not expressed in any of the forces or tendencies of secular history. It comes from the redemptive action of God. One might say that Israel exists in spite of all that secular forces can do. This element of discontinuity is very marked in Israel's history. It is very patchy. It is not

easy to make a satisfactory reconstruction of all the elements in it, because the unity and meaning of Israel's history lie beyond its achievements and efforts in the world in the will and purpose of God. The shape that Israel's history takes is that of hope in an expected end. The conception of the Remnant is a supreme expression of that eschatological character of Israel's history. It is this relation of human action to an expected end, this element of eschatological tension that explains why the grace of God is never conceived of as operating in a mechanical and lifeless way. This eschatological tension is apparent in the character of the Remnant. A hopeful response and signs of grace and new life are obvious in them. In Isaiah (16.14) there is reference to a remnant of Moab which is described as "very small and feeble". But the Remnant of Israel is never so negligible as that. However great a judgment they have passed through, they always appear as undefeated and dedicated men, stirred by a great call, filled with hope in a future given by God. "The Remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity nor speak lies" (Zeph. 3.13). "The Remnant of Jacob shall be among the Gentiles, in the midst of many the people as a lion among the beasts of the forest, as a young lion among the sheep" (Mic. 5.8). "I have left seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have now bowed unto Baal and every mouth which hath not kissed him" (1 Ki. 19.18). "I will . . . purge away thy dross and take away all thy sin, and I will restore thy judges as at the first and thy counsellors as at the beginning" (Isa. 1.25-26). Here indeed is the renewed strength of those that wait upon the Lord.

III

What is the significance of the Remnant? Obviously the mere preservation of an élite is not an end in itself. Skinner (Cambridge Bible, Comm. on Isa., Vol. I, p. lxiv) understands Isaiah to have formed his band of disciples (Isa. 8.16) as an "inner circle which should be the nucleus of the future people of God". They are to be a task force active in building up anew the people of God. The inadequacy of this view seems to me to be that it envisages the People of God as being reconstituted on the basis of an idea or programme or body of doctrine propagated by the Remnant. Of course the Remnant

will have something to say and to do. But the nature of the Remnant in this passage must be understood in close relation to Isaiah's reference to himself and his children as "signs and wonders in Israel from the Lord of hosts". In Biblical usage signs and wonders refer to events or things witnessing to the redemptive activity of God. The object of that redemptive activity is Israel as a whole. It is that redemptive activity witnessed to by Isaiah and his children which gives the Remnant, the group of disciples their significance. Their significance is not to be measured by the visible results of their activity but rather by the fact that they witness to what God is doing and will do for the whole people. They are there in a representative capacity to witness to the present existence and justification in God's sight not of the Remnant only but of the whole body of Israel, saints and sinners. They are a sign, as Paul puts it "that God has not forsaken His people". The Remnant witnesses to the fulness of Israel, the Israel κατὰ πνεῦμα an object of faith. This is clearly brought out in 1 Kings 19.18. The seven thousand faithful who do not bow the knee to Baal represent the whole of Israel. We find this symbolism in 1 Kings 20.15. "He numbered all the people, even all the children of Israel being seven thousand" (cf. K. Barth, *Kirch. Dog.* II/2, pp. 297-303).

To define more clearly the nature of the Remnant it is further necessary to regard them as exercising a vicarious function. It is characteristic of the Remnant of prophetic and biblical witness that they do not seek a destiny for themselves apart from the judgment that falls on the mass of the people, as if they merited a better fate. Rather they bear the brunt of the judgment in humility and hope. The words of Micah (7.9) would be an appropriate confession on the lips of the Remnant: "I will bear the indignation of the Lord because I have sinned against Him, until He plead my cause and execute judgment for me. He will bring me forth to light and I will behold His righteousness." The prophets and the men who put together the Old Testament have the same outlook. They give an unsparing condemnation of the natural life and religion of Israel. Israel in their testimony appears as anything but the People of God. It is their unflattering picture of their people that has at different times made men wish to disparage

and disown the Old Testament and the tie with Israel. Yet the prophets though often weary of their people and filled with horror at their evil hearts and evil ways, never disown them. It is this people, all Israel, that is their whole concern. They stand by it not on account of any racial or national loyalty, but by the constraint of the justifying grace and love of God. They conceive the love of God so infinite in its resource and unwearied in purpose that it can bear and overcome the rebellion and sin of Israel. This witness of the prophets and the Remnant culminates in the prophesy of Deutero-Isaiah where Israel, the Remnant and the figure of the Servant alternate as object, witness and agent of a final revelation and act of the forgiving love of God. This is the essential burden of biblical prophecy. The prophets witnessed to the presence and coming of God in judgment and grace. They were prophetic of that final indictment and crowning mercy of the Cross of Christ, which made an end of the old rebellious and stiff-necked Israel and brought into being, in new obedience, the New Israel of Jews and Gentiles. In so far as it lives by and witnesses to that ultimate hope the Old Testament Remnant is representative of the Church in Israel, witnessing to the presence of God with and for His people and to the fulfilment of God's purpose with all Israel, hoping and believing in His mercy, often cast down, but not destroyed, acknowledging the righteous judgment of God on a sinful people, but stirring also with new life.

IV

It is important for an understanding of the Remnant to realise that it was not an enthusiast's dream nor a distant ideal. It took concrete shape in history. Witness is given to the existence of the Remnant, the Church in Israel, at different times and in varied forms. In Jeremiah (ch. 24) in the figure of the good and bad figs a distinction is made between the true and the false Remnant, when two parties make opposing claims. In Jeremiah (ch. 42) there is a decision given on a claim to be the true Remnant made by a party of refugee Jews. In a different situation we hear of a Remnant returned to Jerusalem and receiving from a prophet a message of hope (Zech. 8.1-8). The closing chapters of Ezekiel are about the Remnant. In Maccabean times we hear of a synagogue of scribes who claimed

to represent the true Israel (1 Macc. 2.42, 7.12). The Pharisees also seem to have thought of themselves as representing the true Israel in distinction from the mass of the people (Jn. 7.49).

Outwardly the Remnant may not make a very impressive appearance. There may be rival claims to represent the true Israel as in the time of Jeremiah and in the post-exilic division between Jews left in Palestine and those of the Captivity. Validity of a claim to be the Remnant—i.e. to represent the true Israel, is not sustained by any continuity of tradition or historical succession. Constitutive is the presence of God in His Word mediated through a prophet. We find this in the case of Isaiah and his group of disciples (8.16-18) and in Zech. 8.1-8 where assurance of the fulness of Israel is given by the word of the prophet. Typical is the situation described in Jer. 42. Here we have the well known account of the party under Johanan Ben Kareah claiming to be the Remnant, and of how they tried to get the authority of a word from Jeremiah to justify their flight to Egypt. Jeremiah, after a period of waiting on the Word, refused to give them this authority. Obedience to the Word of God delivered by him is decisive for acceptance or rejection of the claim to be the Remnant. The same criterion applies in a different situation in Ezek. 11.14-21. There it appears that the Jews left in Jerusalem regard the men of the exile as castaways and assume that the blessing of God is with those left in Jerusalem where the Temple ritual is still a token of God's presence. The Word given to Ezekiel is that though Jahveh can be but little of a sanctuary[1] to the men of the captivity—i.e. they are deprived of outward ordinances and ritual—yet He is with them and will bring them back and give them possession of the land. There is even added a promise that they will carry out a reformation of the cultus when they get back (v. 18). It would appear from this that in the Church as the Israel of God, purity of worship and doctrine and validity of orders is not to be guaranteed by tradition or a hierarchy but only by obedience to the Word revealed and proclaimed again and again—an event which ever and anew calls into being and reforms the Church.

V

All such witness of the Remnant in the Old Testament is

[1] A.V. mistranslates here.

imperfect. In many forms and in different situations it takes concrete shape and bears its testimony in word and deed, but the hour of the Great Return, which the appearance of the Remnant is to herald, has not yet struck. But the hope never dies. The New Testament witnesses to the fulfilment of that hope in judgment and grace through the action of God in Jesus Christ. In that judgment Christ alone abides. In that sense He is the true Remnant fulfilling all that the others had seen afar off. He is the pledge that the fulness of Israel and the Gentiles will be brought in. It would appear from the parables of the Tares (Mt. 13.24-30) and of the Net gathering fish of every kind (Mt. 13.47-50), and also from His attitude to men, that Jesus did not attempt to give an outward and visible form to the Remnant. He left the time and manner of its manifestation in the hands of God. It is in the light of His Cross and Resurrection that the true nature of His Messianic deeds and claims is revealed and that it appears that the great turning point has come. The Transfiguration reveals the continuity of the Church with the Israel of the Old Testament through Christ the Remnant. His words as in the Sermon on the Mount recalling the Covenant on Sinai, His deeds, the Call of the Twelve, His institution of the Sacraments are messianic acts creative of the New Israel. The special position conceded in the early Church to the congregation at Jerusalem shows the importance attached to the concrete witness of this congregation to the fact that the Church is the true Israel of God, that salvation is of the Jews. That position did not carry with it the admission of any hierarchal claims to authority. We see that in the free attitude of Paul towards the "pillars" at Jerusalem, and also in the dubious character of Peter as depicted in the Gospels. The Church is not now built up by the authority or tradition of men but by the deeds of the living, exalted Christ in word and sacrament, and by the work of His Spirit. The critical and operative word here is revelation (cf. Mt. 11.25-27, 16.17; Rom. 1.17, 3.21; Gal. 1.12, 16; Eph. 1.17).

VI

New Testament witness to the Remnant calls attention to the fact that the Church is not built up round the cosmopolitan idea but on particular historical events of unique significance—Jesus

Christ, the Apostolic biblical witness, the People of Israel. Cosmopolis for Christians is the Jerusalem of biblical witness. Here in the matter of the Church is that particularism which appears in other aspects of the Christian faith. The link with these far-off places and persons is no imagined one. When we speak of the Church as the Israel of God, a peculiar people, we are not speaking metaphorically as we do when we speak of ourselves or others as Spartans or Vandals or the last of the Mohicans. We do so because through these channels, through that tie we are made members of a real community, a divine gift of fellowship and life, more abiding than anything in the world, is bestowed.

The New Testament witness to the Remnant also establishes the elements of the Biblical community as norm and source of the Church's life. This does not mean that we are to find in the Bible a legal and rigid pattern of Church life and order, but that in obedience to the word that speaks in the Apostolic and Biblical witness the Church will be built up in richer and more glorious form by the presence of the Lord. The Remnant witnesses not to something done that is to be copied again and again but to the work that God is going to bring to fulfilment. It is with the expectancy of faith that we listen for the word that builds up Jerusalem.

Lastly the Remnant witnesses to the wholeness of the Church as something already given, present to God. It is the token of a fulness already there. This turns us away from the idea of a Christendom that by historical process and development will produce richer and more varied forms, as worldly institutions and societies have a rich and varied natural growth and development. The Church must not aspire to be ruled by the same laws as the kingdoms of the world round about. The way to a rich and full life such as no natural law or kingdom of the world can give is by seeking with the Israel of God that life which God has promised to it, the rule of God and the fellowship of His people mediated through word and sacraments. In turning ever and again to the witness of the apostles and prophets the Church will not find itself cramped and hindered in its life and action. In response to the word of apostles and prophets, acting in faith and obedience as the Israel of God it will discover anew the abundant life of Zion, the Jerusalem from above, the mother of us all.

BOOK REVIEWS

Christ et le Temps. By Oscar Cullmann. Delachaux & Niestlé. 7 fr. 50 suisses.

It is good to know that this book, now published in French as well as German, is soon to appear in this country. For it will fill a serious gap. There is plenty in English from the philosophical point of view on the relation of God to time. One thinks at once of the notable line of Gifford and Bampton lecturers who have wrestled with the great problems of time and eternity in Christian thought. But it is characteristic of this study precisely that it is not called *God and Time*, but *Christ and Time*. It is Biblical and Christocentric, rather than theistic, in its approach. It insists that a Christian discussion of time must begin not, like philosophy, from first principles, but from the middle; that history is not so much to be understood from the point of view of eternity as eternity from the point of view of history; that the clue to history is not a point outside time but a single event inside history itself.

This is an offence not only to the philosopher but to the historian, for whom the isolation of one bit of his material as the criterion for assessing the rest must appear entirely selective and arbitrary. But the Christian can no other, unless he is to dissipate the Faith in metaphysics or myth. For the Biblical conception of a line of salvation, rooted in time and the succeeding crises of events, and running before and after from Christ the Middle, is the very Gospel itself. Christianity, as the Creeds testify, is *Heilsgeschichte*.

The great merit of Professor Cullmann's treatment is that he takes time seriously. He points out that it is wholly contrary to the N.T. to speak of the Incarnation as "the irruption of eternity into time" or "the conquest of time by eternity". It is rather "the fulfilment of time", the final justification of time, as itself carrying ultimate meaning and reality. Indeed, the whole contrast between time and eternity as different in kind, and therefore the existence of a *problem* of time is Hellenic rather than Hebraic. The Hebrew notion of eternity is unashamedly, even naïvely, durational. The difference between time and eternity is simply quantitative. Eternity is unlimited time; or rather, "what we call 'time' is simply a fraction, limited by God, of that same limitless duration of time which is His" (p. 44).

The characteristic Hebraic contrast is not between time and a

timeless eternity but between this *aion* and the *aion* to come, both conceived temporally. If its derivation from this basic concept of *aion* is kept constantly in mind, the N.T. understanding of "eternal" (life, etc.) can never be hellenised away into something purely qualitative. "Eternity is the infinite succession of *aiones*. To be able to define the primitive Christian conception with fidelity, we ought to be able to employ a terminology which takes account of this fact. In default of it, we keep the usual terminology, but without ever forgetting that beyond the distinction between 'time' and 'eternity' stands the unique concept of *aion*, which comprehends them both" (p. 44).

In contrast with the O.T., the N.T. introduces, not a new conception of time, but a new division of time. Its essential conviction is that "the prodigious event of the coming of Christ has given time a new centre. . . . The *plerousthai* has already taken place, . . . and it is no longer the parousia but the cross and resurrection of Christ which form the centre of the whole of history and give it its meaning" (p. 60). "The age to come" has already supervened upon "this age" and is in the process of eclipsing it.

The oft-quoted phrase of von Ranke's, that "every age is equidistant from eternity", is not to be paralleled in the N.T. "For the first Christians, that which gives to each epoch its peculiar value is, on the contrary, the relation which unites it to a central event in time" (p. 48). While the first part of Professor Cullmann's book is devoted to relating the whole process to this unique climacteric of history, the second is concerned to show that in relation to this event, and because of it, each stage in the line of salvation has nevertheless its own incommunicable value and validity, its own *ephapax* communicated to it by that of the central event.

Under this head Professor Cullmann has some illuminating things to say about the periods both before and after Christ. On the interpretation of the O.T. he writes: "To find the witness to Christ in the Old Testament is not to find there the incarnation of Jesus, but, in the light of our knowledge of Christ incarnate and crucified, to be able to see in the past events of the history of salvation the *preparation* for the incarnation and the cross" (p. 96). To say that Calvary is already latent in the O.T. is to deny the *uniqueness* of the time before Christ in the economy of God. Likewise, with reference to the present, Kierkegaard's "idea of *contemporeity* presupposes that with Jesus Christ there occurs a stop in time, in the history of salvation, of such a sort that we can only come to salvation in *returning* to Him" (pp. 103-4). This equally robs the age of the Church of its peculiar and irreplaceable validity.

The characteristics of this present period, where "the ends of

the ages" overlap, where the Spirit, that element of "the last days", is at work in the life and sacraments of the Christian community, are reflected *par excellence* in the eschatological nature of the whole mission of the Church. The end will come when the Gospel is preached to all nations. The command and the promise of Mt. 28.19-20 are expressly bound to this age, between the resurrection and the parousia. "Go ye . . . and make disciples of all the nations, . . . and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the consummation of *the age*." "There is not here, as the general interpretation has it, an imprecise indication of time, equivalent, for example, to 'always', but a clear allusion to the eschatological character of the mission, which must be completed in the course of the period immediately present, *and which gives to it its meaning*" (p. 115). This eschatological urgency is reflected equally in the N.T. understanding of the person and work of the evangelist. "When . . . St. Paul designates himself the, *οἰκόνομος μυστηρίων θεοῦ*, that is not to say simply that he administers divine doctrines of salvation, but that he is actively accomplishing the history of salvation. . . . *οἰκονομία* and *μυστήριον*, thus juxtaposed, designate in the N.T. that which we call the history of salvation or the history of revelation" (p. 161).

The book ends with sections on the relation of this history of salvation both to world history as a whole and to the individual. They contain chapters on the Christological foundation of the state and of ethics. "No domain of human existence escapes moral judgment. That is because the sovereignty of Christ embraces all things; it is because the 'indicative' relates to everything in heaven and earth, that the 'imperative' also embraces all things" (p. 165). The final chapter on the individual and eschatology contains a good discussion of the resurrection of the body and the N.T. insistence that it does not supervene immediately upon death.

This notice has deliberately been written in the form of a preview rather than of a critique. There will be time enough to estimate how well Professor Cullmann has done his work when a general debate is possible on the English edition. There are a number of places where one could wish for fuller discussion even within the limits which he sets himself. In his chapter on the Biblical terminology, for instance, he fails to notice the distinction, and even opposition, between the N.T. use of *kairos* (time in relation to God's purpose) and *chronos* (time abstracted from this, and therefore "delay") with all that this implies. Moreover, he never discusses the word *aionios* itself at all. Again, one would like to see more closely how he would redefine "the infinite qualitative difference between God and man" if, as it appears, time is to be predicated of both "univocally", and there is only a distinction of quantity.

Or, once more, after reading his valuable chapter on the relation of history and myth, one cannot be certain how far and in what sense he *does* want to insist on the historicity of Adam. It is neither timeless myth nor literal history, but what in between it is hard to define. And the same applies to the Second Coming, which he seems to accept as historical much too uncritically.

But the wider question is also bound to arise, whether it is possible to discuss the Christian understanding of time without trespassing beyond the terms of reference which Cullmann accepts. Time and eternity are legitimate themes of philosophy: indeed they are its very warp and woof. Is it a finally satisfactory Christian position simply to put up a notice round all dogma: "Metaphysicians will be prosecuted"? *As a corrective* it may be extremely salutary to turn out every trace of Greek philosophy with a pitch-fork (even Barth is mercilessly harried for offending Hellenisms). The Greek conception of time and eternity *is* totally opposed to the Biblical understanding, and it is good to hear it roundly clapped as heresy. Thomists and their fellow-travellers *must* be made to think again. But the position Cullmann adopts would rule out the possibility of *any* Christian philosophy. Granted, as he says, that we need new categories, and granted that these, if they are truly Biblical will appear naïve and offensive to the wisdom of this world; can we not, must we not, if we are to be whole Christians, go on to attempt a Christian metaphysic of time which is not heretical? Is there an ultimate divide between metaphysics and history? To the Hellenic view there is. But surely another way of expressing the uniqueness of the Incarnation as the centre of the history of salvation would be simply to call it a *metaphysical event*. To the Greek, the juxtaposition of these two words is foolishness. But may not a *Christian* philosophy take this as the very knot in its thread, the foundation of all its thinking, where others start with "actus purus" or "cogito, ergo sum"?

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON

The Glory of God and the Transfiguration of Christ. By ARTHUR MICHAEL RAMSEY. Longmans, Green & Co. 9s. 6d.

READERS of Canon Ramsey's excellent little book, *The Resurrection of Christ*, will take up this new volume with eager expectation. Nor will they be disappointed. The first part of the book is a study of the conception of the "glory" of God as it can be traced throughout Scripture; the second part is a discussion of the Transfiguration of Christ, in which the author claims that the Biblical teaching concerning the "glory" is objectified and given its crowning illustration.

In the Old Testament, *kabod* is used with reference to both the revealed being and character of Yahveh and also to the physical phenomena whereby his presence is manifested. Which of these uses is prior in time? Even in the Pentateuch, and regularly in the great prophets, the *kabod* is linked rather with God's holiness: the "glory" is that union of sovereignty and righteousness which is the essence of the divine character. At the same time in the writings of the Priestly School, both within the Pentateuch and in such authors as Ezekiel, the *kabod* is connected with a local theophany on Sinai or in the tabernacle and the temple, and is described with all the imagery of thunder, fire and cloud.

In later pre-Christian Judaism we meet the conception of the *Shekinah*, which is not identical with the *kabod* but regularly suggests the *dwelling* of God's "glory" with men, and conveys the truth of God's omnipresence without infringing the doctrine of his transcendence. In the LXX most significantly the Greek word δόξα is used to represent both *kabod* and *Shekinah*, so that two conceptions, distinct in the Hebrew and Aramaic literature, become fused in the Greek. Moreover the word σκηνή and its derivatives are used to represent both "tabernacle" and (with a verbal assonance) *Shekinah* (cf. Jn. 1.14), and this unified imagery of God's glory and his tabernacling with his people is the background of much of the thought of the New Testament.

The word δόξα in the N.T., like *kabod* in the O.T., is used both of the "glorious" nature of God and also of the light and radiance which are its semi-physical manifestation. Compare the accounts of Paul's conversion and especially e.g. 2 Cor. 4.6. The "glory" is perhaps predominantly eschatological. It is the radiant heavenly state into which our Lord is exalted at his Resurrection (Acts 7.55; Rom. 6.4; 1 Pet. 1.21), in which he will come at the Parousia (Mk. 8.38), and into which Christians also hope to enter at the last day (Rom. 8.18; Col. 3.4; 1 Pet. 5.4). The "glory" which is his own by right Christ prays may be shared by his own (Jn. 17.5, 22, 24).

But in the events of the Gospel and in the experience of the Church this eschatological "glory" has already been anticipated or "realised". Jesus' messianic sayings contain the implicit claim that the *kabod* has been manifested in His own mission. In particular does St. John insist that the "glory", which the Church is destined one day to behold with open vision, has already been revealed in the historical life of Jesus (Jn. 1.14). The miracles of Jesus are "signs" that the glory of heaven has broken through to earth (Jn. 2.11). Correspondingly for Christians too eschatology is being anticipated in the here and now, and the glory of the parousia throws its light backwards into the present life of the Church. As Christians

even now "we all . . . beholding . . . the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory" (2 Cor. 3.18).

Specially striking is the association of "glory" with the Passion. If Jesus pictures the Son of Man in glory, He also insists that "the Son of Man must suffer". The Cross is not a tragic interruption of the work of Christ: it is a step to the throne of glory. "Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory?" (Lk. 24.26). St. John particularly dwells on the truth that the glory of Christ is a glory whose secret the Passion ultimately discloses. When Judas goes out to betray Him, Jesus exclaims: "Now is the Son of Man glorified, and God is glorified in him" (Jn. 13.31). When in the person of the Greeks the whole world brings its homage, he declares: "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified. . . . Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit" (Jn. 12.23-4). Similarly the author of Hebrews writes: "We behold Jesus because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour, that by the grace of God he should taste death for every man" (Heb. 2.9).

The Transfiguration of Christ gathers up in itself all this many-coloured significance of the doctrine of the "glory". The whole setting of the episode, with its imagery of light and cloud, connect it plainly with the *kabod* of the O.T. The story is no mere projection into the earthly life of Jesus of ideas belonging properly to the post-resurrection period, a tendentious reading-back of the later faith of the Church. Clearly the Synoptic writers believed that Jesus had been seen on one occasion in that state of light and radiance which would be His in the glory beyond the Passion. Luke says explicitly that "they saw his glory". If John omits the incident it is because for him the glory was manifested not in any one isolated incident but in the life as a whole. The transfiguration is an authentic historical event, admittedly supernatural, but congruous with Christian belief in Christ's person and easily intelligible in the light of the experience of the great mystic Saints.

As in our study of the doctrine, so in the Transfiguration we find the glory portrayed as both eschatological and "realised". Probably Mark regards the incident as primarily a foretaste of Jesus' glory at the parousia; the imagery of light and shining garments is most naturally associated with an eschatological picture of the coming of the Son of Man; and the appearance of Moses and Elijah portends the nearness of the Messianic age. Indeed the new age is already being realised. The glory is already present because the Messiah is here. The reference to "tabernacles" (*σκηνάι*) is clearly intended to suggest that God's glory in the *Shekinah* is again dwelling with God's people. Finally Luke in particular closely re-

lates the glory at the Transfiguration with Jesus' imminent death: Moses and Elijah "appeared in glory and spake of his decease which he was about to accomplish at Jerusalem".

The Transfiguration is thus "a mirror in which the Christian mystery is seen in its unity. Here we perceive that the living and the dead are one in Christ, that the old covenant and the new are inseparable, that the Cross and the glory are of one, that the age to come is already here, that our human nature has a destiny of glory." We are indebted to Canon Ramsey for a most suggestive and stimulating study.

There are misprints on page 42, line 10 (A for 1); page 46, last line but one; page 62, five lines from bottom; page 79, line 5; page 118, four lines from bottom; and page 141, line 9. And the author cannot make up his mind as between Tabor and Hermon! (pp. 113, 135, 146).

G. H. C. MACGREGOR

From Moses to Paul: A Christological study in the light of our Hebraic heritage. By GEORGE A. F. KNIGHT, Professor of Old Testament Studies, Knox College, Dunedin, New Zealand. 194 pp. Lutterworth Press, 1949. 15s.

THE Nicene Creed is and will remain the standard expression of the orthodox Christian faith. But the illegitimate inference is sometimes drawn that the Christological statements in the New Testament are the first tentative efforts towards the Christology which received its full theological formulation in the fourth and fifth centuries. Consequently sermons are preached, which explain that our Lord is the second Person of the Holy Trinity, having two Natures in one Person; congregations listen respectfully. But they ought to be hearing rather that He is *Immanuel*, the Effulgence of the Father's Glory, the *Shekinah*; for it is these Biblical terms that give us the authentic Christology, in concrete symbolic language, in comparison with which the rationalised language of the later formularies is thin and abstract. Such is the general theme of this book, which is likely to be indispensable to all who are seeking to find out the way of a truly Biblical Christology; and since Christians and Jews share the inheritance of the Old Testament, there is hope that they will find here the way of the much needed renewal of contact.

It is possible to find fault with the author on two counts: first, that his rejection of Greek theology in the introductory chapter is too unqualified. He can rightly complain that the early Church, faced with the duty of presenting the Gospel to Greek minds, was rather too ready to pick up Greek conceptions of individual salva-

tion to be attained by right knowledge. On the other hand, the whole tenor of his book shows that he would heartily accept the Christological definitions of the four great Councils. In condemning the Arians, the Apollinarians, the Nestorians and the Monophysites, the Church was in each case upholding the Biblical Christology against a Greek perversion of it; and the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed are virtually composed of Biblical terms and phrases; the *homoousion*, as St. Athanasius explained, is Biblical in intention. And the second fault is that this book is arranged in such a way that it is unnecessarily difficult, at least for Gentile readers. If anyone should become bogged by the time he has reached the fourth or fifth chapter and be tempted to put the book aside in despair, he should turn to the chapters on the New Testament Christology, and return later to the middle part.

This is a book of importance, and provides much material to study and digest. We have first a study of the Biblical conception of the human *nephesh*. There is in the Bible no trichotomy of body, soul and spirit, nor even a dichotomy of body and soul; it thinks of man as one. Further, as Pedersen and Johnson have shown, it does not regard man, in our Western way, as an isolated individual, but regards his personality as "extended" into his wife, children, home, possessions, and the posterity which inherits his "name". As regards God, it is not ashamed to be anthropomorphic; His personality too is extended, in His Name, His Angel, His Word, His tabernacling Presence and the *Shekinah*, His *shaliach* who is sent to speak His words. God is therefore "one" in the inclusive sense (*'echad*), in which man and wife are "one flesh"; not one in the sense of "monad" (*yachid*). In the *Shema*, Deut. 6.4, Yahveh is *'echad*.

But Maimonides, in interpreting the oneness of God, uses *yachid* (pp. 144-3). For (says our author), as the Christians made the mistake of taking up too thoroughly with the Greek ways of thought, and gave the Jews the impression that they were deifying Christ and in making more than one Person in the Godhead, were acknowledging two, or three, Gods, so on their side the Jews shrank from the Biblical phrases describing the extension of God's personality, because these were used in our Christology, and drew back into a somewhat harsh conception of Him as transcendent. But in our day many barriers are breaking down. Biblical Theology makes it possible for Catholics and Protestants to make a new approach to the idea of the Church; for in the Bible Israel is undeniably a visible society. May it not be that it can also bring Jews and Christians together? When the Jews see us taking the Old Testament seriously once more, will they be willing to be left out? Here, however, we are given a useful warning (p. 147), that in speaking with Jews we

should be careful how we refer to our Lord as the Messiah: for "Messiah" to them is a human deliverer, and they think that we are deifying a man, not understanding that to us "Messiah" means the divine Saviour, the Son of God come down from heaven.

This book is so rich and fruitful that it is tempting to pursue its themes further. The Reformation was a "rejudaissance of Christianity" (p. 10). Yes, thank God for that. But it is only partly true, for as is trenchantly pointed out in the last chapter (pp. 173-4), Protestantism has erred gravely in leaving behind the Biblical conception of man's nature, and accepting (unconsciously) the Greek conception of man as an individual: "no one shall come between me and my God"; salvation is of the individual person. On the Catholic side there has been a certain amount of this same individualism, and there has been the thoroughgoing rationalisation of theology on Greek lines, and the forgetting of the Biblical Christology. But the other side of the account is that the constant use of Scriptural phrases in prayer, as in the Book of Common Prayer and more thoroughly in the Latin breviary and missal, has kept these ways of thought alive. Thus the liturgical movement leads by a direct road to a revival of Biblical ways of thinking. And further, the conception of the "extension of personality" has found expression in the Catholic realisation of the Church as the mystical body of Christ; the sense of the communion of saints, as a living reality (in spite of the many abuses which have crept in); and the conception of worship as a participation in the Church's common prayer and praise. It would seem that some of the more un-Protestant elements in the Catholic tradition are really rather deeply Biblical.

A. G. Hebert

Can Two Walk Together? By Ian Henderson. vi+171 pp. Nisbet, 1948. 10s.

This book is a valuable contribution to a contemporary discussion. The author commands a wide knowledge, and his incidental comments are often amusing as well as interesting.

His concern, as his sub-title indicates, is with the quest for a secular morality, for a standard of behaviour unconditioned by adherence to a definite religious faith. Inevitably he devotes most of his time to a discussion of the idea of natural law: I say this, for his very excellent sections on the ethics of "my station and its duties" and on Brunner's *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* are concerned partly to reveal the deficiencies of these theories where they attempt to establish themselves without unconsciously taking for granted something of the teaching of the natural law school. Where "natural law" is concerned, he wishes to show that in effect the fundamental

principles of a "natural law" ethic are abstractions from a view of the world that is religious and dogmatic in character. These principles emphatically do not form a court of appeal before which Anglo-Saxon, Nazi and Communist can alike be brought and whose findings they can be constrained to accept. Anyone who pretends that they are, be he Jesuit father, Oxford academic moralist, a preacher in Westminster Abbey, is simply misunderstanding our grasp on these principles and their hold on us. It is perfectly true that where our resistance to the Führer was concerned, we were inspired by our conviction that racialism was a *moral* outrage: it is true also that for the same reason, we found it hard to understand why the German people were so acquiescent in acceptance of his purposes. But that is not because the dignity and worth of the individual was something which shone evident in its own light, but because our religious culture, unlike that of the devout German Evangelical, had accustomed us to view critically, as of religious duty, the claim of tyrants to refashion their own and other societies in their own image.

Now I have learnt a great deal from Professor Henderson's learned and lively discussion: but I confess to one misgiving. It is that his epistemology and logic often seem to me rather shaky. It would be easy enough for those trained at all in those abstract fields to produce a detailed criticism of his second chapter, which he could dismiss on the ground that it missed the wood for the trees: but even if one averts from that kind of thing, it must be said that he does not handle the question of ethical intuition with confidence; and he would surely agree that the criticism of that concept lies at the foundation of a great deal of what he has to say. I confess to surprise that he found in a Jesuit writer so facile an identification of ethical and mathematical insight as he attributes to Fr. Rickaby. Certainly it was the view of John Locke: and I think, of Sir David Ross. But there have been profounder intuitionists like Butler, who seem to me to have maintained something very different, and more congruous with Aristotle's insistence that in ethics one could only hope for that kind of precision of which the subject matter permitted. Even if we leave out of account the problems created by the development of non-Euclidean geometry (in Professor Ernest Nagel's view, the occasion of the most important revolution in logic in the last century), it should surely have been obvious that the principles of morality, as conceived by the intuitionist, were not the object of that sort of insight which yielded us (or was supposed to yield us) geometrical axioms. The profound intuitionist saw them differently, perhaps more in the manner described by Mr H. W. B. Joseph in his discussion of the self-evident evil of cruelty to which unfortunately Professor Henderson does not refer.

But further I find it very hard to understand how Professor Henderson is using the term dogma. Does he use it in T. E. Hulme's sense? If so, he might have served his purpose better by using Collingwood's more neutral term, presupposition. Or is he deliberately employing it as a blanket term to cover the transition from ethical or sociological analysis to theology proper? At times, he does seem by introducing the word covertly to slip a hint of the mysteries of eschatology. I wish I could join him down here. For in the end his argument stops just at the point at which it becomes exciting. He does succeed in showing the human futility of the myth, I had almost said the "illusion", of an autonomous, absolute morality. Yet he shows at the same time that the tenacity of these principles is bound up with the continuance of a religious tradition, which speaks of a transcendent God visiting and redeeming His people. In other words he seems to show the significance of dialectic here, of argument between the dictates of morality and the invading commandment of faith, of argument that is as long as a man's life and that cannot be evaded.

Why does he stop? Is it because he wishes to move on the plane of political theory? But has he not shown that in effect deep study of political theory raises issues that take us outside its immediate province? I am not saying—into theology, but at least into that propaedeutic study of epistemology that is essential to theology, *even if itself continually fertilised by theology*.

Perhaps I have misunderstood him radically. If so, I hope he will forgive me. Two further comments, and I have done.

(1) In discussing the idea of natural law, it is important to attend to the nuances of medieval teaching as well as to the theories of the Enlightenment. As writers like Canon Demant and Professor d'Entrères insist, although the "rights of man" of the Enlightenment have the inspiration of Christian tradition behind them, "natural law" for Aquinas was much more than a catena of such claims. It was the sense of an overarching universal hand by which human life was circumscribed, of bounds men must not pass, of order not imposed but discovered woven into the fabric of things. Such an idea persists clearly in Edmund Burke, one of the most severe critics of the "inalienable, imprescriptible rights of man".

(2) In fairness to Bradley, it might be said that his utilitarian opponents were themselves hostile to the idea of "natural law". It was Jeremy Bentham who spoke of the teachings of the French Revolutionaries on this subject as "nonsense on stilts".

Incidentally the Oxford Union pacifist resolution should be dated 1933, not 1935.

D. M. MacKinnon

Christianity and Fear. By Oscar Pfister. Zürich.

A lengthy volume under this title has been recently written by a Swiss pastor at Zürich, Oscar Pfister, who has made a study and practice of Psycho-analysis. He thinks the problem of Fear has been grievously neglected by mental scientists. He sets out by the latest methods of depth psychology and medical hygiene to demonstrate the necessity of a "general concentration of the Christian religion and way of life upon the unity of love and faith which was the essence of the teaching of Jesus and of which His life was the pattern".

This is a laudable intention, but the author seems to exaggerate when he describes Fear as the "one great evil affecting human life". From another aspect Fear may serve as a necessary safeguard and wholesome deterrent against wrong-doing. In the Old Testament godly fear, equivalent to reverence or the consciousness of God, is regarded as an essential condition of all true knowledge and wisdom.

There can be little doubt, however, of the disquieting prevalence of other types of Fear, especially in our own time. Many are haunted and harassed to-day by the terror of war, the horror of atomic bombs, the dread of totalitarian tyranny and severity, and the consequent loss of freedom and security. There are few among us who would not confess in their secret heart to some lurking fear—illness, failure, unemployment, poverty, senile decay and at last the inevitable end and what lies beyond the gates of death. To those with untroubled trust in the omnipotent protection and care of an omniscient Father of love such timidities appear groundless and almost childish; yet to great numbers they are the source of much misery and anxiety, robbing life of zest and serenity. There are few, indeed, who could repeat the boyish boast made by Admiral Lord Nelson to the old lady warning him of danger on a river's brink: "Fear, grandmamma, I never saw fear. What is it?" Still fewer perhaps could emulate the American General in the civil war over slavery for the union of the States, Stonewall Jackson, who declared that "the fear of the Lord was the only fear he knew". Absence from Fear was one of the Four Freedoms promulgated by Franklin Roosevelt and humanity is still on its quest.

Our Swiss authority discusses the subject historically and chides the Churches for aggravating the malady more than alleviating it. They have departed largely from the fundamental principle of early Christianity and can rarely pass the test of its Founder: "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." They have failed to act on the Apostolic ideal and to persuade the world of its reality. "God is Love; and he who lives in love lives in God, and God in him." "There is no fear in love. No! Love, when perfect, casteth out fear, for fear implies pain, and

the man who feels fear has not attained to perfect love" (1 Jn. 4.16, 18). The worst and most devastating tragedy is the lack of love and the complaint is made of one Church in the book of Revelation that its members had lost their enthusiasm and given up loving one another. They are exhorted to repent and to remember from whence they had fallen lest they become lustreless and incapable of bringing any light or leading to the world around them. True Christian love does control fear and according to another Scripture "God has given us not a Spirit of cowardice, but one of power and of *love* and of a sound mind" (2 Tim. 1.7). The Master Physician of souls who came to minister to minds diseased and distressed by obsessions and hallucinations can drive out the demons of fear and incipient insanity and all kinds of timidity. The words "Be not afraid" were continually on his lips. In a chapter on Sublimation and Religion in her *Psycho-Analysis for Normal People* Geraldine Coster (Principal of Wychwood School, Oxford) points out that in his work of helping and healing Christ shows a particular realisation of the devastating effects of the fear complex. "He hastens to relieve the terrors of his disciples in a storm; He exhorts the poverty-stricken peasants of the countryside not to waste their strength in faithless anxiety about their future need of food and clothing. He calms and heals the demoniacs whose insane fears have been exaggerated into violent mania by the ignorant and brutal treatment they have received. . . . In the life of Christ there are but few incidents in which power and love are dissociated." It is quite evident that the Christianity of Christ is not a "religion of fear" as falsely represented at times by its opponents but a religion of compelling love and consequently the overcoming of fear. We can certainly venture to say with Pfister that wherever Jesus is faithfully accepted, the dragons of fear have to fly. "Jesus never made salvation depend on the belief in any given dogma, or participation in any religious ceremonies or on subordination to the institutions of the Church." "Ye shall know them by their fruits", He said, and this is the practical test of sincere discipleship. "A man cannot belong to Christ unless he has the Spirit of Christ" (Rom. 8.9 in Mgr. Ronald Knox's translation). The Apostle thus echoes his Master in insisting that the first fruit of the Spirit is love. There was something new and revolutionary in the teaching of Jesus. His influence (in Pfister's words) worked a "mighty simplification and laicisation of religion, a return to nature because it was a return to the God of love". It is true that Jesus gave the gravest warnings and used the most terrible threats, but they lose their terrifying aspect for all who obey His new commandment. "It is precisely by reason of the gravity of His claims and warnings

that He was the greatest consoler and helper overcoming the dragon of fear and still helping to-day to overcome it." Genuine Christian faith and love should thus enable us to face life's problems and sorrows bravely and cheerfully without undue tremor or foreboding. The Christian message implies not only penitence, forgiveness, reconciliation, but brotherliness, kindliness, helpfulness and devotion to the good of others along with patient endurance of many trials which are the lot of all. Where these qualities are lacking the result is tension, disharmony, alienation, frustration and all the dangers of jealousy, distrust, hostility and "unhappy divisions". It must be confessed with regret that sectarian groups, ecclesiastical leaders and theological controversialists have too often erred in this respect. They have forgotten the charity that thinketh no evil and is not easily provoked, "never rude, never selfish, never irritated, never resentful, always eager to believe the best and always hopeful". It is not the opinion of Pfister alone that they have sadly departed from the fundamental principle of Jesus. By their pride, intolerance, harshness, bitterness and discourtesy to opponents they have brought censure upon themselves, alienating the sympathy and incurring the condemnation if not the contempt of the outside world and more charitable minds. In some cases they have exploited the weaknesses and propensities of human nature, inducing neurotic tendencies and morbid scrupulosities. By pretentious claims to infallibility and exclusive authority with preposterous exactions, prohibitions and threats and even tortures of dire character they have replaced the principle of love by what Pfister terms "compulsive formations like dogmas, magic rites and institutions", resulting in a kind of chill through the introduction of "neuroticisations and orthodoxisations" into Christianity. "If the element of dread in reverence (the *tremendum* as opposed to the *fascinosum* or joyous attraction) assumes excessive dimensions, love is immediately endangered." It is possible, no doubt, to overdo this conception of compulsion neurosis and yet it contains no little truth. The prospect of torments in a future world has been employed by more than one branch of the Church to reduce its adherents to a becoming state of humility and submission. The injunction in Jude 5.23 to *save some with fear* like brands plucked from the burning is of doubtful application and scarcely justifies such methods, implying rather compassion and pity; though any motive leading men to the unfailing Deliverer from fear may be defensible. (This type of preaching used to be common in evangelistic appeals but is not now generally to be commended.)

It seems undeniable that certain creeds have been unduly pressed in detail to secure the subordination or expulsion of troublesome heretics and coercive measures adopted which amounted to perse-

cution and cruelty, intimidation and injustice. The employment of the confessional, compulsory penances, masses, fastings and other restrictions, with the threat of excommunication and damnation in cases of omission, are all evidently calculated to keep immense numbers in suspense and subjection. It is difficult to refute this conclusion though conditional alleviations are offered in the shape of absolutions and indulgences. The idea of future terrors is not, however, confined to one Church. In the view of Pfister and not a few others Calvinism is culpable of "sadistic cruelty" in consigning vast hosts to perdition and choosing a select number for eternal bliss. This is unfortunately the only feature of Calvin's teaching with which most of his critics are familiar. There are much finer elements in Genevan theology which deserve more attention. Countless numbers have found relief from the bondage of fear in the assurance of God's supreme sovereignty and overruling providence with resignation to His will, and also firm faith in His redemptive purpose of love leading us through mysterious paths to highest good. Froude, Carlyle and other historians bear ample testimony to the fact that this austere Puritan creed has acted as a moral tonic and put iron into men's blood. It has been a potent force in restoring courage, conquering nervelessness, ministering comfort, stimulating resolute effort and sturdy independence. Its effects are seen not only in individuals but upon whole communities and nations, inspiring them with a new sense of responsibility to God and their part in fulfilling some mission in His service. Men with this invincible conviction, called and enlisted under a heavenly Leader, finding their security in God, are not easily quelled or defeated. Not only in England and Scotland, but all over Europe, wherever Calvinism penetrated and its real genius was free to work, it infused fearless resistance to political tyranny and a vehement hatred of priestly pretensions. It was everywhere the friend and ally of freedom against the powers by which in those days freedom was threatened. This faith made dauntless men who believed that kings, statesmen and nations, with all their fierce passions and antagonisms, were but instruments of the divine Will and all working under the direction of One whom we know to be infinitely just and good. In his impartial survey Pfister reminds us that Roman Catholics have found equal satisfaction, however delusive it may appear to others, in a similar faith with obedience to well-organised control and an optimum amount of happiness, mingled with tremulous but pleasurable emotion in the performance of enforced duties and the spectacle of awesome rites and ceremonies with little intelligence of their meaning. He grants that Catholicism has made invaluable contributions to the struggle with fear through its achievements in the fields of

philanthropy and culture with its refuges, hospitals and monasteries, its literature, art, music and architecture. He qualifies this admission by adding that its attitude to fear is beset by numerous dangers, especially in its sexual teaching on marriage, and its basis in repressions. "There is no cause for surprise in the perpetual series of renunciations of the Church in favour of systems where faith and love are organised in a different way; or in the fact that oppositional Churches have arisen in the form of Protestantism. . . . The vast apparatus erected by Rome to combat fear shows that success in these endeavours has been strictly limited. . . . If free self-determination is essential to the freedom of personality then there is little left of the latter in Catholicism. . . . History recalls the torture chambers and stakes of the Inquisition, which ended its hangman's work only at the protest of civilisation and the world-conscience. . . . It is evident that the intensification of fear goes hand in hand with cruelty." On the other hand it must be confessed that the Reformed Churches often failed to provide the right palliatives for fear in the Gospel of Jesus with its piety and its ethics founded upon love as the central power in faith and life. Dogmas and tenets were enforced upon ministers and people which were no part of original Christianity and which frequently led to bitter and foolish controversy. Highly reprehensible measures were pursued by Calvin to intimidate his adversaries and the same intolerant policy has been followed by domineering ecclesiastics of later days who with pharisaic superiority deny the existence of honesty and good sense in all who do not share their beliefs.

Pfister notes that under Catholicism the central aspect of the idea of God, His love and mercy, is practically destroyed by the imposed necessity of the intercession of other authorities and an innumerable host of guardian saints. This reveals the enormous distance between this system and the teaching of Jesus with his constant and immediate sense of the loving God-Father. The institution of the Papacy became a powerful factor towards the intensification of fear for individuals whose conscience caused them to conflict with the Pope and the Church in matters of faith. This is illustrated by the history of Luther whose spiritual experience is discussed at considerable length in this work. We are told that Luther suffered all his life from intense fears and phantasies of the devil. This is partly explained by his temperament but mainly by his upbringing in an unhappy environment, with a heavy father and a strict mother who, he said, once whipped him till the blood came, evidently with the same intention as Wesley's parents of "breaking the youthful will". Luther also received severe floggings from incapable masters at school and enjoyed none of the tender

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affection and patient understanding so essential to the well-being of every child. All this combined to develop a sensitiveness of every fault committed in the eyes of God and made him apprehensive of sins that existed only in his imagination. Such discipline led him to take refuge in a convent. It was difficult for Luther to escape entirely from the thraldom of tradition and superstition associated with rigid and rigorous monasticism in which he was originally trained. A neurosis was produced which exploded afterwards with dramatic consequences. His *Table Talk* repeatedly contains the statement that he always celebrated Mass with the utmost terror. Later, when the "furious papist" became the enlightened reformer, he describes the Mass, in his impulsive fashion as, "the greatest and most fearful abomination". Compulsive forms of religion, with meticulous insistence on minute and trivial instruction on every detail of conduct and ritual, the slightest deviation from which was a mortal or venial sin punishable by purgatory or worse, all failed to bring him true peace of conscience. On his visit to Rome he was so shocked by the moral decay and corruption of the contemporary papacy and clergy that his honest soul rose in revolt. It was in the Greyfriars Tower at Wittenberg that the truth of Justification by Faith, and the human impossibility of man justifying himself before God, dawned upon his mind as a new revelation, and the burden of fear dropped from him with all its terrors of judgment. From Paul he takes a conviction of the omnipotence of divine and merciful grace, which forgives and justifies, not according to the merits of man, but in accordance with its own plenitude. The mechanism adopted by Luther to ward off fear consisted in making the grace of God the sole cause and in removing the causal element from man. This faith he defended with strenuous tenacity in his Ninety-five Theses and it enabled him to take an unflinching stand before the tribunal at the Diet of Worms. "The Lord is my defence and my refuge who saveth the upright in heart: I will not fear what man can do unto me" was the foundation of his confidence. He determined to follow his reason and conscience and his interpretation of Bible truth in scorn of consequences. So Luther is rightly regarded by Pfister as a liberator—a "Liberator from the collective-neurotic system represented by Catholicism, by virtue of the rediscovery of divine love". Christianity to him as to St. Paul and so many more was a religion of deliverance. In his case as again and again in Christian history we find Jesus Christ meeting men as Redeemer and Saviour from the slavery of fear and the sense of guilt. Luther's struggle against sin continued to the end, as almost universally in spiritual experience, and even doubts about his own salvation. Köhler reminds us that the Kingdom of God as a Christian com-

munity based purely on faith and love is an ideal; it is never real because men will never be pure Christians. They may form societies, but they can never attain the highest form of society, which is that held together by the bond of love. In Luther's eyes the world remained a "devil's hostel" and in his thought remained monastic ideas. Yet it was a great achievement to alleviate fear by means of a return to the doctrines of grace and he threw fruitful seed into the ground which introduced a progress which could not be halted. While displaying some limitations and pedantries of Germanic scholarship, this is a notable and valuable work full of spiritual insight and discernment which are exemplified in these incisive quotations taken from the summary:

> Christianity cannot provide social programmes, but it can overcome the fear which causes so much harm in social life, and it can kindle a light guiding those who have eyes to see towards freedom, towards a powerful because powerfully loving personality and towards a society enjoying the blessings of prosperity. . . . The spiritual leader must liberate the individual by the force of his love and patience as Jesus Christ did. . . . Genuine Christianity is attested not by historical investigation or dogmatic arguments, but solely by loyalty in administering the testament of love and the living power of love derived from Jesus Christ. . . . For Christian Christians (there have been all too many non-Christian "Christians") there can only exist the one form of heresy which is to regard as a heretic anyone confessing Christ and his love. An ecumenical community among all Christians can be built only on this foundation and where this foundation exists the unity cannot fail to arise even without the aid of synods and councils. . . . The restoration of Christian love to a dominant position infuses love and spirit into the narrowest and into the widest religious community. But this love must be a true love in the sense of Jesus Christ—not a sickly, sentimental, shallow embracing of millions.

These views deserve thoughtful consideration by many in the present-day Church and they are supported by facts in the historical survey which is also readable and suggestive.

GEORGE R. S. REID

Four Centuries of Scottish Psalmody. By MILLAR PATRICK, D.D. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.

THE approaching tercentenary of the Scottish Psalter of 1650—the metric version still in use to-day—gives a topical interest to this book. But Dr Patrick has given us a volume that is much more than a commemoration of a historic event. It lives up to its title by giving a vivid and authoritative account of Scottish psalmody from the Reformation to the present time, with an introductory chapter treat-

ing of the origins of metrical psalmody in the Reformed Church on the Continent, and of the French, Anglo-Genevan, and English Psalters which were the main sources both of the verses and the music of our earliest Scottish Psalters. And so well is it all done, that it is safe to prophesy the book will prove the classic history of Scottish psalmody for many years to come.

It is superfluous to say that the author has a knowledge of this whole field unrivalled by that of any of his contemporaries. In his Chalmers Lectures he had told the story of the 1650 Psalter, and in the Lee Lecture, delivered in 1935, had discussed the great Scottish Psalter of 1635, the tercentenary of which occurred in the year of his lectureship. The same year, Sir Richard R. Terry, by re-editing the 1635 Psalter in a form which reproduced the music in its original notation together with a modern transcription of it (*The Scottish Psalter of* 1635, Novello) made available for us the musical treasures of this remarkable Scottish praise-book, which had been neglected and forgotten almost from the time of its first appearance three hundred years before. For although the Rev. Neil Livingstone, of Stair in Ayrshire, by his monumental edition of this same Psalter, published in 1864, put all writers on Scottish psalmody thereafter immensely in his debt (a debt generously acknowledged both by Sir Richard and Dr Patrick), his labours created as little general interest as did those of Edward Miller who edited the original Psalter. Both books were fated to suffer an almost immediate and shameful neglect.

The two lectures mentioned above, revised and extended, form the nucleus of Dr Patrick's volume, and, together with the introductory chapter on "The Pedigree of Scottish Psalmody", constitute the material of the first half of the book. This section, one feels, will have interest primarily for the serious student of psalmody. The second half, treating of the development of Scottish psalmody from 1650 to the present day, will prove fascinating and informative reading for the large general public by whom our metrical psalms and tunes are still held dear.

Into the first section is gathered a fund of exact information, gleaned from a wide variety of sources, many of them difficult of access by the student. It represents the harvest of long years of patient and affectionate research; and a careful perusal of the book leaves one with the impression that nothing of vital historical significance has been omitted. The first Scottish Psalter of 1564, and those of 1635 and 1650, are, of course, discussed at length, and the more or less familiar editions of Andro Hart and Edward Raban receive adequate treatment. (In a book that so frequently delights with its wealth of out-of-the-way information, one is almost sur-

prised that the author did not mention that Raban's psalters have an interest and importance in the story of Scottish typography, as great as they have in the story of Scottish psalmody.) But an account is also given of much less familiar Psalters, such as those of Bassandine and of Charteris, and of the St. Andrews Psalters to which a most informative chapter is devoted.

Contrary to Reformation practice—and with most unfortunate results, as the succeeding century was to show—the 1650 Psalter was printed without music. The conditions of the time were such that, Dr Patrick writes: "what astonishes us is not the failure to publish tunes, but the fact that it was found possible to issue any Psalter at all." Everyone knows that the Westminster Assembly, by seeking to provide a metrical Psalter that might prove commonly acceptable to the Church both in England and Scotland, was initially responsible for its production. What few people know is the chequered history of its compilation, and the multitudinous revisions it underwent in Scotland after it was sent down from Westminster, ere the General Assembly of the Scottish Church finally approved the version and authorised its use.

The author's account of these protracted labours forms one of the most valuable chapters in the book. It leaves one with the impression that, whatever literary blemishes attach to the version, it is little short of a miracle that the final form in which the version at last issued, should have had any literary virtue at all, much less those qualities which authorities from Scott to Robertson Nicol have found to commend in it.

One persistent misconception Dr Patrick will now, it is hoped, have effectively and for ever removed, namely, the belief that the 1650 version was almost entirely based on the metric psalms of Francis Rous. It is difficult to understand how writers, who ought to have known better, should have continued to attribute to Rous so generous a part in our psalm book. For it was long ago demonstrated that, of the 8,620 lines in the Psalter, less than 900 were taken from Rous's psalms. Dr Patrick mentions a distinguished professor of Scottish history, and even so scholarly a musical authority as Dr H. G. Farmer, as amongst those who have perpetuated this strangely persistent fallacy. One might also add Mr Percy Scholes, who, in his amazingly comprehensive and generally reliable *Oxford Companion to Music*, writes: "In the middle of the seventeenth century, the psalm versions of Francis Rous, Provost of Eton, Speaker of the House of Commons, were adopted [in Scotland] *with some revisions however*"! (The italics and the exclamation mark are your reviewer's.) The truth is that the Psalter is a highly composite work, which drew upon a great variety of sources, known and un-

known, and to which Rous contributed only about one-tenth of the whole.

In the latter half of his book Dr Patrick discusses the century of musical decadence which followed 1650—"The Great Eclipse", he terms it; the subsequent revival which synchronised with, and was largely inspired by the Wesleyan Revival; the rise of the choir movement, pioneered in the north-east by Thomas Channon, and later developed in the "era of the great precentors" by enthusiasts like R. A. Smith, Thomas Hately and William Carnie; and the influences which led to the addition of the Paraphrases and hymns to the Church's service of praise.

There will be general agreement with the opinions which the author ventures in his short closing chapter, "The Future of Scottish Psalmody". Many of the psalms, for obvious reasons, cannot be sung. In cases where they are merely metrically, and not ethically, offensive, they may be sung in the prose version to chants. But, however much one may desire to see the prose chant more extensively employed, Dr Patrick is on safe ground when he says that "the day when chanting in prose will be generally acceptable in most Scottish churches, is still far away". And one might add, that, until it is done a great deal better than in most places, both in England and Scotland, where it is at present in practice, the farther away the better.

Many more portions of the metrical psalter, however, lend themselves for congregational singing than are commonly employed, particularly if we rid our minds of the quite irrational idea that the psalm must be the opening act of worship. The 1929 Psalter lists over one hundred such passages; but in few churches does the range of psalms in use extend to anything approaching this number. Doubtless the Church of Scotland, when it undertakes its next revision of the Church Hymnary, will follow the example of some other Presbyterian Churches, and include a section embodying the best of the metrical psalms. This might encourage their more extensive and discriminating use; and even those of us who think most highly of our Hymnary, would find no difficulty in excising a sufficient number of hymns to accommodate all, and more than all, the suitable portions of the Psalter. But when that day comes, many will regret the passing of a book which has served the Church so well, and which has held the affections of the Scottish people for three centuries.

A word of commendation is due to the Oxford Press. The book is beautifully produced, in the best traditions of the distinguished press that prints and publishes it.

ALEXANDER SMART

Cosmo Gordon Lang. By J. G. Lockhart. Hodder & Stoughton. 25s.

It was recently remarked that reading Mr Lockhart's *Life* of Cosmo Gordon Lang had not increased the regard held by the speaker for the Archbishop. The effect of the book upon your reviewer has been exactly the opposite. Here is the story finely told of a man whose character, "complicated, introspective, emotional", was surely and slowly moulded by the Holy Spirit until it came to be one in which humility triumphed over pride; sincerity was not ultimately stifled by an unusual sense of the dramatic; and penitence purged self-conscious egotism.

One change in the order of the admirable photographs with which the volume is lavishly provided would have afforded pictorial evidence of this spiritual pilgrimage. The Frontispiece is a reproduction of Sir William Orpen's portrait, now at Bishopthorpe, of which Archbishop Söderblom said: "That is what the devil meant him to be, but thanks be to God it is not so." But it is the picture facing p. 449 and entitled "The Last Days" which depicts the faithful servant whom God made out of the schoolboy who at the age of thirteen could write the imaginary entry in *Who's Who* assigning to himself the highest offices in the political world and the reward of an earldom. A Frontispiece should depict the "real man", and always the "real man" is to be seen at the end of life. The pictures taken in chronological order are an illuminating commentary on the verbal unfolding of a life of absorbing interest. Mr Lockhart has written a book which, apart from the many-sided interest of his subject, is excellent reading and holds one's attention on every page.

Messrs Hodder & Stoughton are also to be congratulated upon a well printed production, pleasing to handle and provided with an attractive cover. There is an excellent index.

It may be hypercritical to point to one or two minor inaccuracies of a "drafting" character. For instance, your reviewer happens to know personally three out of five of the Chaplains attending the two Archbishops at the Coronation of King George V, and the names beneath each in the picture (facing p. 225) is, at least in the case of four out of five, under the wrong man! Then there is the slip of "Episcopal Church of Scotland" instead of "in Scotland" in a number of places: and the old favourite, to a Kentish man, of "hopfields" for "hopgardens" (p. 432). This last is in a quotation from the Archbishop's autobiographical notes, as is also another rather surprising "mistake" on p. 177. Here is the account of the masterful way in which the then Vicar of Portsea carried a young man, overcome with "nerves", through his ordination as deacon. It is stated that the Questions followed the reading of the Gospel.

In the Anglican Ordinal the Deacon reads the Gospel not only after the Questions but after the Laying on of Hands.

For the readers of the *Scottish Journal of Theology* there are obviously matters in the biography which can claim a local and specialised interest. Lang's pride in his Scottish descent, his unfailing acknowledgment of all that he owed to his upbringing and early training in a manse of the Church of Scotland, and the depth of his affection for the Scottish countryside and especially for the West Highlands and his beloved "Cell" at Ballure are well known.

His views on Reunion present considerations worth pondering by all who have that cause at heart, a cause to which he dedicated himself at his ordination and for which he strove consistently throughout his long life. His biographer can state that "any approach to Reunion which should overlook the Established Church of Scotland would have been inconceivable to him" (p. 269). He also says: "Fifty years earlier Lang had emphasised the error of trying to deal with the Church of Scotland over the head of the Scottish Episcopal Church" (p. 366). This remark is in the context of his criticism of the Conversations at Malines when there was an omission to take proper account of the Roman Catholic community in Great Britain. It was to the Representative Church Council of the Episcopal Church at Aberdeen in 1894 that Lang, then the young Dean of Divinity at Magdalen College, Oxford, read a paper enunciating principles which he then considered should govern approaches to Reunion to which we find him generally adhering as Archbishop of Canterbury at the time of the Lambeth Conference 1930. He believed that there must be an avoidance of undue haste: points of agreement must first be found and emphasised, leaving the points of difference to be dealt with later. He urged that Anglicans had more in common with Presbyterians than was generally allowed: and that there must be "recognition that for a hundred and thirty years after the Reformation, Episcopacy and Presbyterianism flowed together in a confused stream". Although at the Revolution in 1688 their courses had separated, signs were not wanting that "these two main currents are again approaching" (p. 265). The development of these ideas of 1894 into working principles in 1930 is set out at length in Chapter XXIX ,"Reunion", and particularly on pp. 358 and 359. It is interesting to note the importance which he consistently attached to the conception of "growing together". May we not think that he would have rejoiced to see the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches of which this will to "grow together" is characteristic?

To return to the more personal aspect of the biography, Mr Lockhart deserves the highest praise for the way in which he has

woven the copious autobiographical notes (mostly pencilled) left behind by the Archbishop into a continuous and fascinating narrative. His own "connecting links" and comments are admirably done, and, while the device of a slight inner margin leaves no doubt as to whether we are reading Lang's or the author's words, yet the latter has somehow adapted his own style to that of his subject in such a way that the whole flows on without any lack of smoothness.

Lang's life marks the end of an epoch. Perhaps this may be seen most clearly by comparing the account of his life at Bishopthorpe with the following extract from the Dean of Lichfield's (the Very Rev. F. A. Iremonger) *Life* of his successor both at York and Canterbury, the late Archbishop William Temple. "It is doubtful whether Temple ever cast off a certain uneasiness at the thought of the vast house and grounds that were now to be his home and his care . . . so grand and so anomalous! His predecessor had felt no such qualms. Cosmo Lang was not the man to break a tradition of splendour. . . . But Lang's conception of what an Archbishop should do and avoid in maintaining the dignity of his office dies with him."

Yet one cannot read these pages without perceiving that this regard for the dignity of his office was no mere cloak for personal ambition. "I care little", he used to say, "what people think of Cosmo Gordon Lang, but I care very much what they think of the Archbishop of Canterbury." No doubt he was moved by personal ambition. He possessed to an unusual degree the dramatic sense which made him see himself in a great part and determine to play it to the full. The friendship of the great of this world was an unconcealed pleasure to him. But these characteristics only deepened the intensity of the lifelong struggle to make utterly real the words of Scheffler's hymn which he made his own at his ordination and returned to at every self-examination:

> O Love, I give myself to Thee,
> Thine ever, only Thine to be.

KENNETH C. H. WARNER

Introduction to Scripture Teaching. By J. W. D. SMITH. Thos. Nelson & Sons Ltd. 6s.

THIS book, which aims at helping those "who find the Scriptures difficult to teach", is written with the eye on the object. Further volumes in the series are promised, dealing with the principles of syllabus construction and with the practical problems of teaching method. Here the author sets out to help teachers to clarify their own minds, before they attempt the task of clarifying their pupils' minds.

He begins with a historical survey. In this, he first expounds and examines the traditional "view of the Bible"; he goes on to treat of what he calls the "period of criticism and confusion"; lastly, he deals with the modern period and the return to fundamentals in Christian thought. Possibly, he is a little hard on the Fathers, not to speak of our own forefathers; not all interpreted the Scriptures quite as allegorically as might be supposed from his account. There follows an admirable section on "The Bible and the Teacher", with a particularly helpful discussion of the nature of Revelation and of the human errors which are to be found in the Old Testament narrative. "The Bible", says the author, "is the record of that process of divine revelation which culminated in Christ; but the words of the Bible are not themselves the substance of that revelation. . . . The divine Word alone is infallible." More, perhaps, might have been said about the gradual development, throughout the Old Testament, of man's conception of the Divine Nature. At the appropriate stage, it is, I believe, possible to awaken boys' interest in this; the study of Isaiah, for example, becomes immensely more fruitful, if it can be shown how the idea of God was ennobled and enlarged in the great prophets.

Mr Smith's treatment of the first chapters of Genesis is judicious and suggestive, particularly in his emphasis upon the difference between historical (or scientific) truth and religious truth. When he turns to the New Testament, he is equally helpful, not least in his chapter on Miracles, always a source of difficulty to the inexperienced teacher. There is also a valuable passage (pp. 86-90) on the Christian view of history; in a later book, it is to be hoped, teachers will be referred to Professor John Baillie's illuminating exposition of this in his *Invitation to Pilgrimage.*

The third and last section of the book is headed "The Content of Scripture Teaching". There is (perhaps inevitably) some repetition; a good deal of the ground covered here has already been surveyed in the second section. The young teacher will gain much from Mr Smith's treatment of the problems of selection and presentation; his two "practical examples" really do illustrate the principles which he lays down—that passages selected must contain permanent religious truths relevant to the stage of the pupils' development; that care must be taken to explain the historical background; and that the lesson must be so presented as to "ensure that the spotlight of interest is thrown on the correct point in the story".

In the last two chapters, we return to the Old and New Testaments. The author lays special emphasis upon the orientation of all Scriptural study. All teaching, he says, must be Christocentric. One of the virtues of this book is its insistence that the teacher of the

Scriptures must look first and last, and must help his pupils to look first and last, "unto Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith". We who teach the Scriptures have one paramount duty—to tell boys and girls of "all that Jesus began both to do and to teach". This book will surely help us in the fulfilment of that Christian duty.

But we have another duty; we must make our pupils familiar with the unmatched beauty and inexhaustible riches of the Authorised Version. In later volumes, no doubt, something will be said about the value of memorising great passages of the Scriptures. It is true that their literary beauty is of secondary importance; but, in declaring the message of God to man, it is fitting that we should teach our pupils to value, as a precious heritage, the language in which that message is given to them. At a time when traditions are being too freely abandoned, reference should be made even in an introductory volume, to the literary treasures laid up for us in the Bible.

D. Forbes Mackintosh

Essays and Addresses by George Freeland Barbour. Edited with a biographical introduction by A. F. Giles. Oliver & Boyd. 8s. 6d.

The many friends of G. F. Barbour will be very grateful to Mr Giles for the issue of this book. It contains a selection of essays contributed to certain journals and of addresses delivered on various occasions. They display admirably the range of his powers and the width of his interests. One is constantly impressed by his philosophic acumen, his spiritual insight, his concern for social justice, his constant preoccupation with the questions of peace and war, and his life-long devotion to his Church. While all the chapters are valuable, three are deserving of special notice. The paper on "Time, Memory and the Wholeness of Life", contributed to *The Hibbert Journal* when the author was 57, may be read and re-read with profit by any man who feels the chill approach of age. The essay on "Security as a Personal and Social Ideal" exposes the spiritual limitations of all social programmes and contains a useful warning against Utopian dreams. The chapter on "Scottish Religious Thought. A Forty Years' Retrospect" is history in miniature. It conveys with many a vivid touch a picture of the ethos of the Free Church of Scotland, as it was enlarged by the Union of 1900 and moved on to the greater Union of 1929. With filial affection Barbour describes its progressive outlook, its evangelical urgency, its missionary enthusiasm, its ardent conviction of its own spiritual independence, and its sense of the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the life both of the individual and the Church. Nothing

could be more unlike the "liberalism" which is the cock-shy of Continental theologians and with which it is at times ungratefully identified. Nevertheless, by reason of the width of his own spiritual heritage he could perceive certain *lacunae* in the life of the Church of his fathers, and heartily supported the ecumenical movement, which brought it into relation with the thought and piety of the Church Universal.

It is good that "Memories of John Kelman", hitherto privately circulated, should now be made accessible to a larger public. It displays on a small scale Barbour's unusual gifts as a biographer. Here we find that power to analyse a spiritual situation, that "eye" for the significant fact, that skill in conveying the total impact of a man's personality even to the very sound of his voice, which made the "Life of Alexander Whyte" one of the greatest of Scottish biographies. We see J.K. at the very height of his influence in the pulpit of the New North and on the stage of the old Operetta House. We see him in the Manse presiding over those Sunday suppers, at which men sometimes forgot to eat, so brilliant was the talk. We see the very man himself—the gallantry of his bearing and his message, the colourfulness of his vivid speech, and the stark intensity with which he wrestled with the consciences of men. Many, who were stirred by J.K. to make or to re-make their lives, will be deeply moved to meet him again in these pages.

The biographical introduction by Mr A. F. Giles is worthy of its subject. It is a model of taste, judgment and expression. While doing full justice to the many interests of his friend, he does well to emphasise his deep attachment to the Scottish countryside, especially to the woods and streams of his own Perthshire, and his happiness in the home-circle at Fincastle, of which he was the beloved head.

E. J. Hagan

THE THEOLOGY OF LUTHER'S LECTURES ON ROMANS

by The Rev. A. SKEVINGTON WOOD

Part II

In a previous article Luther's doctrine of Justification as expounded in his Lectures on Romans has been subjected to analysis. We now proceed to examine his teaching on Sanctification. But here a *caveat* must be entered. Luther is often seriously misinterpreted on this point. He is unjustly accused of severing Justification from Sanctification. He failed, it is said, to link faith with love. This alleged dissociation is classed as one of the two radical errors of Protestantism in the recent Anglican report entitled "Catholicity" (p. 25). Such a misconception arises, no doubt, from an unduly subjective approach to Luther's doctrine of Sanctification and a corresponding neglect of the objective emphasis necessarily implied in his major theocentric concern.

So far from disrupting the holy alliance between Justification and Sanctification, Luther succeeds in dissecting the two elements without dissevering them. He rightly treats the whole question in terms not of abstract theology but of personal relationship. He discerns an organic unity between forgiveness and holiness. These are inseparable members of a living whole. They must always be held in tension. Adolf Köberle,[1] himself a faithful exponent of Luther, well declares: "If the faith of Justification is endangered when the gift of Sanctification is not exercised, so the Sanctification will still more surely enter into false paths if it is not based on Justification and guided by it. We might sum it up in two statements: (1) Without the continual return to Justification, Sanctification falls into Pharisaism and the wildest exaggeration; (2) When, however, we hold fast to the condemning and pardoning word of forgiveness, Sanctification receives its true modesty and its true vitality." With this all-important principle in mind we now turn to Luther's doctrine of Sanctification in the *Römerbriefvorlesung*.

[1] *The Quest for Holiness*, p. 250.

2. Sanctification

(i) *The Righteousness of God*

The basic and determinative factor in Sanctification, according to Luther, is the righteousness of God. Man ought to be holy because God is holy; man can be holy because God is holy. For the righteousness of God is not merely a passive quality of His nature: it is an active exercise of His will. This integral relationship between righteousness as attribute and activity is fully recognised by Luther. For him, as indeed for St. Paul (262),[1] the righteousness of God means both the righteousness with which He is righteous and that by which He makes us righteous too (36, 215).[2] ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ is that righteousness by which He justifies sinners (171, 172). In both Apostle and Reformer we meet "the idea of a positive righteousness, immanent in God and manifesting itself outwardly in justifying the sinner".[3]

If Luther realises the fundamental identity of *iustitia Dei passiva* and *iustitia Dei activa*, he is equally insistent upon the mutual opposition between God's righteousness and man's. A great gulf is fixed between human work-righteousness and the righteousness of God. Luther was tired of the scholastic reiteration of this Aristotelian conception of δικαιοσύνη (418). The contrast between righteousness human and Divine is most marked when Luther sets their manifestations over against each other: the judgment which man passes on himself, and that which God pronounces on him (235). When man judges himself according to his own lights he considers himself righteous and good. When God judges him according to His righteousness He finds nothing righteous, nothing pure in him. The judgment of God is of an infinite penetrativeness. Works performed with the utmost care appear worthless in His sight.

[1] Cf. W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *Romans*, p. 25: "The righteousness of which the Apostle is speaking not only proceeds from God but *is* the righteousness of God Himself: it is this, however, not as inherent in the Divine Essence but as going forth and embracing the personalities of men. It is righteousness active and energising; the righteousness of the Divine Will as it were projected and enclosing and gathering into itself human wills."

The references in brackets are to the page in *Luthers Werke*, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar) (W.A.) Bd. LVI, from which all quotations have been translated.

[2] Cf. F. W. Schmidt, *Der Gottesgedanke in Luthers Römerbriefvorlesung* (in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Lutherana III), pp. 119-20, 159 ff., 212 ff.

[3] A. Sabatier, *L'Apôtre Paul*, p. 259.

The most righteous act becomes unrighteous before Him; the most sincere, hypocritical; the most stainless, sullied and the most sacred, profane.

This righteousness of God man ought to praise, glorify and love. But he cannot truly praise it save in accusing himself, glorify it save in condemning himself or love it save in hating himself. Thus the righteousness of God makes posssible the righteousness of man by destroying the illusion of self-righteousness. The righteousness of God is the operative cause of salvation, and that not only because God is righteous in Himself, but because God, as it were, goes out of Himself to justify us (172). This same outgoing Divine righteousness is equally the source of Sanctification. The moral regeneration of the believer is an act of God. Sanctification is not a human structure reared upon the Divine foundation of Justification. Both Justification and Sanctification are through and through the work of God. In thus stressing the absolute dependence of Sanctification upon the righteousness of God Luther remains true to his theocentric *Grundmotiv*.

(ii) *Regeneration*

It has been suggested by some that Luther's doctrine of Justification inevitably involves an undermining of morality. Denifle[1] accused Luther of sacrificing righteousness to Justification. He was simply juggling with sin; there was no real exorcism of evil. Regeneration held no firm place in his theology. Such is the charge brought against him.

Already, even in dealing with Justification in these Lectures, Luther has explained himself with sufficient thoroughness to rebut such an ill-informed indictment. He asserts with all the emphasis that he can command that man is justified by grace *alone*. But he is equally insistent that Justification is the prelude to the moral regeneration of the believer. Righteousness can only flow from Justification; Justification must necessarily produce righteousness. Once a man is justified, only then and surely then will he become morally and religiously good, or, to use Luther's own expression, please God. The new relation of God with man creates a new relation of man to God. The justified sinner is not only made worthy of righteousness by a

[1] *Luther und Luthertum*, pp. 860 ff.

forensic declaration, but is also made capable of righteousness because he is regenerated by the Divine righteousness. Just as grace and righteousness cannot be separated in essence in God, so neither can they be separated in effect in man.

As we have shown, Luther does not think of God's righteousness simply as an attribute unrelated to man. His conception of the Divine righteousness is positive and active. It is this righteousness which God imputes to man in forgiveness and imparts to him in regeneration. The process of Justification implies more than the imputation of righteousness. It issues in Sanctification. God actually makes the sinner righteous (226, 227, 262). "His Resurrection is not only the pledge of our righteousness; it also effects it in us, if we believe, and is its cause" (296). Here is no legal fiction. God renders righteous in regeneration; in forgiveness He imputes that real righteousness-which-is-to-be. Only so, indeed, can He remain just in justifying the ungodly. Luther revives the Pauline doctrine of union with Christ. The justified sinner is *ἐν Χριστῷ*. He dwells in Christ and Christ dwells in him. He is buried with Christ in Baptism; he rises with Christ into new life in which Christ becomes incarnate again in him (296). Justification, then, is not a mere cloaking of sin. It is a real conversion. The believer passes from death to life, from sin to holiness (264).

(iii) *Assurance*

Professor Mackinnon distinguishes as a cardinal feature of Luther's theology in the Lectures on Romans "the assurance of salvation in virtue of the truth of God's word and promise in the Gospel and of the consciousness of sonship."[1] But how far does such assurance extend? All who have sought to fathom Luther's doctrine of assurance have, like Mackinnon, been compelled to face this direct question. There are portions of the Lectures where Luther speaks joyfully of the believer's confidence that God will implement His promise in the Gospel. But, on the other hand, he insists that humility and self-distrust must always temper such assurance and guard against the false security that relies on work-righteousness for acceptance with God (276, 280).

This apparent hesitancy springs from two sources. In the

[1] *Luther and the Reformation*, Vol. I, p. 200.

first place, Luther regards evil as ever painfully active even in the believer (282). Sin no longer holds sway, but it continues to agitate. The Christian is not exempt from temptation. The devil still goes about as a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour. And, secondly, Luther does not view Justification as a single act but rather as a continuous process, merging almost imperceptibly into Sanctification. Man is always a sinner in need of grace. This paradox finds expression in the dictum, "Man is always in sin, in Justification, in Righteousness, i.e. always a sinner, always penitent, always righteous" (442). He is at the same time sick and healthy (272). For Luther, then, assurance is not retrospective, as it was for Wesley. He cannot fix his confidence on a moment of deliverance in the past. Neither is assurance prospective. Luther does not suggest the possibility of any certainty with regard to predestination. It is essentially a present assurance based on the promises of the Gospel. Yet even here he seems to halt between two opinions. Certainty is there, and yet it is not there—that is the tantalising situation, according to Ficker.[1]

Is there any way of clarifying this complicated issue? Must we conclude that Luther inherited something of the Scholastic dubiety on the subject? F. W. Schmidt[2] has attempted a solution by distinguishing between the objective and subjective aspects of assurance. From the objective viewpoint (i.e. looked at through the eyes of God) Luther recognises a direct, present assurance of salvation. But from the subjective viewpoint (i.e. looked at through the eyes of the sinner) Luther cannot so firmly assert it. Perhaps that is as much as can be said on the subject.

(iv) *The Word of God*

Jundt[3] emphasises the part played by the Word of God in Luther's doctrine of Sanctification. For Luther, as for Paul, the Word of God is not solely a Divine declaration but an effective force which enters by faith into the heart and life of the believer. It is the manifestation of God's righteousness and effects a new righteousness in man. It is at once revelatory and creative. By His Word God reveals what He Himself is and

[1] *Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief*, Introduction, p. lxxvii.
[2] op. cit., pp. 221 ff.
[3] *Le Développement de la Pensée Religieuse de Luther jusqu'en* 1517, pp. 182 ff.

what we ourselves are. We cannot indeed know what we really are until we realise what we are before God. If the Word of God did not condemn us, we should think ourselves always righteous, sincere and wise, which, in fact, we appear to be in our own eyes and before others. But God has revealed His judgment of us. That judgment should become for us an object of faith. We must cling to the Word of God by which He affirms that we are unrighteous, lest He be made a liar. We must deem ourselves unrighteous, although our unrighteousness is not apparent. Faith is the evidence of things not seen and rests solely on the Word of God (409). Once the truth is recognised it must be allowed to triumph in us. We cannot believe that the Word of God is true unless at the same time we acknowledge ourselves as sinners. Thus we "justify God" and condemn ourselves.

To "justify God in His sayings" (Rom. 3.4) is to believe that His words are righteous and true. But we cannot truly believe unless every illusion of self-righteousness has been abandoned. Then we acknowledge that we are sinners and that our virtue and righteousness are as nothing before God. We become thus in ourselves such as we are in God's sight (212, 213, 225, 226, 229). The means of participation in the righteousness of God is to submit ourselves to it. As we condemn ourselves, we declare that God is righteous and truthful and are reborn to a new life. We cease to deceive ourselves. Enlightened by the Word we become what the Word makes us. The qualities of the Word—righteousness and truth—become evident in us. We are changed by the Word, for it is no longer we who live, but the Word dwelling in us. It is then "in justifying God that we are justified by Him. That passive Justification by which God is recognised as righteous corresponds to our active Justification which God effects in us" (226). Here, as elsewhere, we find Luther dealing with Sanctification in such close relationship to Justification that they seem almost to be two aspects of the same thing.

Luther's doctrine of the Word as Law and Gospel in Christ[1] has already assumed the shape in which it appears, more fully

[1] P. S. Watson, *Let God be God!* p. 151: "When Luther speaks of the Word of God, therefore, he means, on the one hand, the Law as interpreted by Christ, and on the other, the Gospel as constituted by Christ, who is Himself the Word."

clothed, in his later writings. The function of the Word in Sanctification is clearly defined. The underlying motive is equally evident. "The righteousness of God is not commended because I do what is unrighteous but rather because I know that I do what is unrighteous and cease to do it. Thus I understand that the righteousness is from God, when even my righteousnesses appear in His presence as unrighteousnesses. Wherefore I do not boast, but am covered with shame. This righteousness by which He justifies me glorifies Him alone, justifies Him alone (that is to say reveals Him alone as righteous). It is the same with the truth of God. It is not glorified because I lie, but because I recognise myself as a liar and cease to be one, when I apprehend the truth which comes from God and become truthful by that truth and not my own, so that all self-adulation is excluded. Thus God alone is glorified in me, since He alone fills me with truth and makes me truthful, when my own truth is turned to falsehood in His presence. What has here been said about truth and falsehood, righteousness and unrighteousness, is applicable to all the other perfections of God—His strength and my weakness, His wisdom and my folly, His purity and my sin (216). . . . We will say in conclusion: God cannot be taken as wise, righteous, truthful, strong and good in His sayings unless we, believing in Him and yielding to Him, confess that we are unwise, unrighteous, liars, weak and wicked (218). . . . Therefore we say to God, O that we were willingly emptied, so that we might be filled with Thee; willingly weak that Thy strength might dwell in us; willingly sinners that Thou mightest be justified in us, unwise that Thou mightest be our wisdom; willingly unrighteous that Thou mightest be our righteousness! This is what is meant by the Psalmist, Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned . . . that Thou mightest be justified when Thou speakest (Ps. 51.4)" (219).

(v) *Good Works*

We have noted in a previous section (I. iv) how sternly Luther excludes the possibility of salvation by works. Works without faith are futile. But Luther is equally ready to allow that faith without works is dead. He cannot fairly be convicted of antinomianism. Some passages in his Commentary

on Romans are startling in their assertion of the necessity of good works. "No one is reputed righteous except him who by his works fulfils the Law" (22). "Only the doers of the Law will be justified in the sight of God." Is not this a flat contradiction of his basic principle of *sola fide*? Far from it. Luther goes on to explain that "no one fulfils the Law except him who believes in Christ", and that "the doers of the Law who will be justified are those alone who have grace to conquer the evil within them" (22, 23). What Luther is urging here is the necessity of good works not as the means of Justification, but as the evidence of it. The sinner cannot obey the Law as God requires because of his concupiscence. But what man cannot do himself, God does in him by imparting His righteousness in Sanctification. Augustine's[1] epigram is quoted by Luther with full approval, "Therefore the Law was given that grace might be sought and grace was given that the Law might be fulfilled" (257).

Good works, then, are the sign of Justification. They testify to the grace of God in us. All suggestion of merit is ruled out. "Our works do not make us good, but the goodness of God makes us good and our works good" (394). "God does not accept the person on account of the works, but the works on account of the person" (268). The layman who imitates the priest, argues Luther, does not become a priest by that fact; he can only become a priest by ordination. In the same way, man does not become righteous by the works of the Law, but by faith in Christ, by which he is justified and, as it were, ordained to be righteous and perform the works of the Law as the priest is consecrated with a view to fulfilling his sacerdotal mission (324, 333).

In the gloss on Romans 12 (the key chapter in Paul's exposition of good works), Luther differentiates between the futility of good works as a foundation and the necessity of good works as an edifice reared on the foundation of faith.

> [Paul] now begins to build on a foundation of gold, silver and precious stones (1 Cor. 3.12). Before performing the good works, which are the edifice, a man must have a sure and safe foundation upon which the heart can lean with eternal confidence, so that, even if he builds nothing else, nevertheless the site on which he should so do will be evident. Against

[1] *De Spiritu et Littera*, cap. 19. "Lex ergo data est, ut gratia quaereretur: gratia data est, ut lex impleretur."

this the *Iustitiari* (Luther's name for the merit-mongers) agitate, who by their works seek to put their trust in conscience and then grow self-satisfied and complacent after they have performed, as they deem, many good works. This is to build on the sand in rejecting Christ. In all his epistles the Apostle endeavours to combat this error. For it is a superficial and unsatisfactory interpretation to regard sand as the riches of the world. Christ here speaks of those who build their house (i.e. those who perform good works) and not of the covetous and worldly who destroy themselves rather than build themselves up. He calls sand, therefore, those good works which these people want to make the foundation of their righteousness, to be an habitation for their conscience, a refuge for their heart, when Christ alone is before all works; He freely provides the foundation, the refuge for the conscience and assurance to the heart, prior to all attempts to make satisfaction or to build our own righteousness. What builder would be so foolish as to try to make the foundation? Does he not seek a suitable site and then accept it as a gift? Therefore, just as the earth provides a foundation apart from our endeavour, so Christ, without our aid, offers us righteousness, peace and security of conscience so that like good workmen we may always build more and more upon it (117).

(vi) *Perfect Love*

Luther's doctrine of Sanctification is thoroughly Pauline; that is, he makes perfection the goal without claiming to have achieved it. "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect: but I follow after . . . " (Phil. 3.12). The Christian can never rest on his oars: he must continually press on to perfection. Commenting on Romans 12.2, Luther writes: "He [Paul] is speaking to those who have started on the Christian way. Their life is not to consist in repose but in a movement from good to better, just as an invalid passes from sickness to health, as the Master indicated by the half-dead man who was cared for by the Samaritan" (441). Luther follows this favourite illustration with proof-texts from Gen. 1.2, Deut. 32.11 and Ps. 18.10. Then he quotes the saying of St. Bernard,[1] "When you start losing your desire to be better, you stop being good," and adds: "It is no use for a tree to grow green and flower unless it also fructifies from the flower. Therefore many perish in full bloom" (441). Elsewhere he declares: "He who does not advance in the life of God, retreats. And he who does not keep on seeking, abandons his quest, since there is no standing still in the life of God" (239).

But whilst Luther never wearies of urging the Christian to

[1] *Epistola*, 385. "Ubi incipis nolle fieri melior, desinis esse bonus."

"press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus" (Phil. 3.14), he scrupulously avoids any suggestion of sinless perfection. For him sin is neither suspended nor extinguished. It continues to subsist even in the regenerated man. It remains so that grace may be exercised, pride subdued and presumption repressed. It is the perpetual enemy which we must fight. God does not call us to rest but to action. Whoever does not engage in this struggle for moral existence is already deserving of punishment (350).

It is in his exegesis of Romans 7 that Luther draws out the implications of his famous paradox *simul iustus est et peccat* (347).[1] In this perplexing piece of spiritual autobiography (for Luther rejects the theory that Paul is assuming the role of another) Paul is not referring to his pre-conversion life (339). It is only "those modern theologians who read him through the spectacles of their own piety"[2] who are guilty of such misunderstanding. Paul speaks here as a spiritual, not as a carnal man, as Augustine repeatedly asserts.[3] Luther substantiates his interpretation from the Apostle's own language. He marshals no less than twelve such linguistic arguments to defend his assertion (340-347) and concludes: "See, then, what I have said above, namely, that the saints, even though they are justified, are at the same time sinners; they are justified because they believe in Christ, whose righteousness covers them and is imputed to them, but they are sinners, too, because they do not fulfil the law and are not without concupiscence" (347). Even Paul himself, the holiest of all the Apostles, does evil, Luther reminds us (71). He loathes evil, he longs to do good, and yet he is incapable of the good he desires and driven by the evil he hates. He is at the same time a sinner and righteous: he does evil and hates what he does. "It is comforting", writes Luther, from personal experience one suspects, "to hear that such a great Apostle was a prey to these sighs and sorrows which oppress us also whilst we long to obey God" (346).

Perfection is therefore a mark to be aimed at rather than

[1] Similar expressions recur in Luther: cf. "Semper peccator, semper penitens, semper iustus" (442); "simul peccator et iustus" (272); ". . . . iustus semper in peccato . . . et in gratia" (W.A. I.42).

[2] K. Barth, *Romans*, p. 270.

[3] Cf. *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, I.10 (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, XLIV, 318).

an achievement to be advertised. Man partly is and wholly hopes to be. The believer is always looking forward to perfection, but knowing his own proneness to backsliding he does not presume to claim it. He is only too conscious that a gracious soul may fall from grace. Present perfection for Luther, as indeed for the Reformers generally, is perfection in faith. Regeneration brings with it moral renewal, but that renewal, though genuine and ever widening in scope, is never complete. Luther has often been sadly misrepresented in this matter. He is accused of neglecting Sanctification when actually he is trying to avoid some of the more extravagant extremes of perfectionism. For him Sanctification is a present necessity: entire Sanctification is a future possibility. The believer is only entirely sanctified now potentially in Christ, in the sense that he has received the earnest of full holiness to come. His perfection is proleptic.[1]

There is, however, no mistaking the mark towards which Luther would have us press. It is nothing less than perfect love —"the desire to please God alone" (445). Christian perfection consists of a perfect hatred of evil and a perfect love for God. "Not to do good is not to seek God" (241). True love for God will express itself in an abhorrence of sin and a love of good. And this love of good must be altogether disinterested. The highest righteousness consists in loving good for its own sake and God for His own sake. Every element of calculation must be eliminated from the moral life. The Christian should look for no reward in his performance of the good. He ought to love the good with a single eye, because it is the will of God. Luther discovered this same conception of disinterested love in the *Theologia Germanica* and gave prominence to it in his own works. "There are many," he writes, "who do good outwardly, but not from the heart and they do not seek God through it, but rather their own glory and interest, or perhaps wish to escape punishment. . . . But those who love God do good freely and joyfully, solely to please God, and not to obtain any reward whatsoever, whether it be a spiritual or material benefit. But this is not the work of nature; it is the work of God's grace" (24). Luther counters the opinion of those who find that "a well

[1] Cf. H. Lindström, *Wesley and Sanctification*, p. 136, for a statement of Luther's view of perfection as it differs from that of Wesley.

ordered love begins with itself", and who say "that everyone should desire his own salvation first and then that of his neighbour." "This is the opinion of those who do not know what it is to be blessed and saved. . . . Here is what it is to be blessed: in all things to desire the will and glory of God, and nothing for itself, either here below or in the hereafter" (391).

This emphasis upon disinterested love is the peak point of Luther's theocentric theology. It is the logical conclusion of his whole outlook. At the same time it represents his distinctive contribution to the doctrine of Sanctification. He raised the conception from the obscurity of its occurrence in the writings of the German mystics and set it in the context of a full-orbed theological system. It is in the doctrine of perfect love that Luther's theology reaches its sublimest expression. That has not always been properly recognised. Luther has too often been charged with replacing the religion of love by the religion of faith. That is to misread him completely. Certainly he opposed the Catholic conception of *fides caritate formata*; in the matter of Justification love has no place; Justification must be *sola fide*. But whilst Luther reserves Justification for faith, he is equally anxious to reserve Sanctification for love. As Nygren[1] argues, love *in loco iustificationis* cannot be anything but *Eros*; in Sanctification it is *Agape*. The perfect love of which Luther speaks is wholly other than human love; it is rooted and grounded in God. Like the love of God Himself it is spontaneous, unpossessive, undiscriminating and redemptive. "The children of God serve God joyfully, willingly, freely, neither fearing punishment nor seeking glory, but simply wishing to do His will" (308).[2]

[1] *Agape and Eros*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 502.

[2] In his recent survey of Swedish Luther research, *The Reinterpretation of Luther*, Dr Edgar M. Carlson questions Nygren's assertion that Luther's view of love "is wholly determined by the Christian *agape* motif. We look in vain here for any single feature of *eros*" (Nygren, op. cit., p. 521). He claims that there is a line of thought in Luther not easily included under the idea of *agape*. And, according to Dr Carlson, it is in the *Lectures on Romans* that this contrary strain is found. "Alongside of the emphasis upon the movement from God to man there is an unutterable yearning from the side of man toward God" (p. 188). Dr Carlson admits that in Luther's view this upward movement of the human spirit has its source in God's own loving activity, but he inclines to see in it the cloven hoof of *eros* rather than the purity of *agape*. "It is humanity's prayer for fulfilment, egocentrically conceived by man as a sinner, theocentrically conceived by man as a believer. In the latter case its character is radically changed but it still represents a responsive movement from man to God" (p. 189). But even if Dr Carlson's corrective be accepted the fundamental importance of Luther's theocentric prin-

Luther's theology, as exemplified in his Lectures on Romans, maintains the due balance between Justification and Sanctification. In the one faith is foremost; in the other, love. The one must complement the other. Faith divorced from love will perish through its self-imposed poverty. Love cannot live apart from its basis of faith. Faith and love must join hand in hand. Christian faith is the faith that sweetly works by love and Christian love is the love that only lives by faith. But, in Luther's mind, the tie that binds these two indispensable elements of Christian experience is no formal one. The theological expression of this synthesis must necessarily prove inadequate: it cannot hope to satisfy the intellectually precise. But for Luther the link is living. It is Christ. Justification and Sanctification are both the work of God in Christ. The faith of Justification is faith in Christ. The love of Sanctification is the love of Christ in the believer. Luther's theology is theocentric because it is Christocentric. "Only Christocentric theology is theocentric," says Obendiek, "because it takes seriously the revelation of God in Christ, and renounces the theoretical (*gedankliche*) construction of a conception of God."[1]

The idea of God contained in these Lectures is fully consistent with the New Testament. He is "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Eph. 1.17). "What constitutes the originality of Luther," writes Henri Strohl,[2] "is that he renounces every conception of God borrowed from natural theology, that he abjures all natural speculation on the essence, power and righteousness of God, and resolutely sees only in God the God of love." This originality arises from Luther's Christocentric conception of God. His theology does not include two stages, like that of the Schoolmen—philosophy and revelation. Christ is for him the unique manifestation of God, of His love, of His power, of His justifying grace. Christ is the one Mediator. "We have a God and God Himself is ours because He has given Himself to us in our Saviour Jesus Christ" (51). In Christ the hidden

ciple is not invalidated. Dr Carlson is only anxious to leave room for man's yearning for God and his joyful response to the Divine love. He concludes: "It may be that there is some tension-filled unity even between these apparently conflicting motifs. Aulén's dynamic synthesis suggests a fruitful approach also here. Perhaps it is just in the meeting between God's unmotivated search for man and man's bungling search for God that vital religion is to be found" (p. 190).

[1] *Der Teufel bei Martin Luther*, p. 30. Quoted in P. S. Watson, op. cit., p. 101.

[2] *L'Épanouissement de la Pensée Religieuse de Luther*, p. 62.

God is revealed. "Christ alone is the righteousness and truth of God" (247). Luther employs as synonyms "God", "Christ", "Spirit", "grace" (327, 328). Scholastic theology, on the other hand, carefully distinguished between these terms. But, as Strohl points out,[1] if Luther neglected these subtle distinctions it was not through indifference, ignorance or incapacity, but because Christ was for him all in all. The whole work of grace is *per Christum et propter Christum.*

Here, then, is the ultimate clue to Luther's thought. He sees all his theology summed up in Christ. The God at the heart of his gospel is always God in Christ. The tension between Justification and Sanctification is resolved in Christ. The theocentricity of theology is safeguarded in Christ. The only adequate theology is *theologia crucis.* "It is before Christ crucified that all true theology and all true knowledge of God expands."[2]

The *Römerbriefvorlesung* are of first importance in the development of Reformation doctrine. They represent a theological revolt which found its public and dramatic expression in the posting of the ninety-five Wittenberg Theses. Too much can be made of the distinction between the earlier and later Luther, for even in these early lectures he lays foundations that are firmly Protestant. We may repeat with approval the judgment of Heinrich Boehmer: "Almost all the themes of Luther's later teaching had, therefore, been touched upon in his early lecture notes on the Psalms and on the Epistle to the Romans. The new religious and ethical principles which he was destined to herald were already complete in their major outlines when he wrote the last words of his lectures on Romans."[3]

[1] ibid. For a fuller discussion of this subject, cf. F. Huck, *Die Entwicklung der Christologie Luthers von der Psalmen- zur Römervorlesung* (in *Studien und Kritiken*, Lutherana VI), pp. 61-142.

[2] W. A. Bd. I, p. 362. Heidelberg Thesis XX.

[3] *Road to Reformation*, p. 136.

MAN IN HIS TIME

by The Late Rev. F. W. CAMFIELD

In a recent excellent review of Barth's *Dogmatik* III/2 (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, March 1949) the Rev. W. A. Whitehouse found himself unable through the exigencies of space to deal, save in the briefest way, with that great section of the book which treats of man in his time. Very rightly he appealed for a speedy translation, for only thus could the scope and richness of the treatment of this theme become apparent to those who do not read German. It is indeed the case that any summary of this section which extends to over two hundred and fifty large pages, and in which the thought moves forward with the most careful precision while continually opening out new perspectives, must appear somewhat jejune and lifeless. In responding therefore to the request of the editors to provide such a summary I find myself confronted with a most difficult task. I can only request readers to read what I have written in conjunction with Mr Whitehouse's article and with that of Professor Souček which follows it. In that way a summary, unsatisfactory as it must be, may not be entirely useless.

The answer given by the Word of God to the question concerning the nature and being of man is a twofold one. First, man is the soul of his body. Man is not a timeless spirit which has become entangled in a temporary and perishing body. As a created being he is constituted, through the inbreathing of the divine spirit into the material of his earthly frame, as the soul of his body. But that means that man is temporal. Time is the condition under which his being exists. Since his life is a succession of actions and apprehensions he is in the situation of stepping out of his "before" through his "now" into his "after" while remaining identical with himself. In fact we must say that life and time are inseparable from one another. Even the life of the eternal God is not timeless, but the true and original and proper time. But whereas with us time is spread out in a succession of past, present and future, so that our present is only ours as our past ceases to be, and our future as

our present is no more, so that in fact we only have time as it is *given* us, only possess it as we *get* it, with God, past, present and future are ever involved in one another, exist in and through each other; so that there is no past of God which does not contain His present and His future, no present and no future which does not contain His past. God does not need time as something outside Himself in order to live His life. It is *His life itself* in its decisions and determinations which constitutes time. Time is therefore bound up with the divine being which, be it remembered, is ever a *being in action.* And the time which is given us as the condition of our life, the time which is ours only as we get it, the time which, unlike the time of God, is a succession, is the form of the created world whereby it can become the arena of free divine acts and of the human and creaturely responses and reactions to those acts. Time therefore as we know it and have it is a created thing, a finite thing, a thing conditioned by and governed by the being of God in action. And the time which is the condition under which man's being exists is an *allotted* time, a time in which man's past, present and future are preceded and followed by the life, being and action of God.

But it is now necessary to make clear the method which we adopt in our investigation of the problems connected with man's being in time. What we have to establish is the reality of man's time, the fact that his past, present and future really exist and abide, that they are no mere appearances, no mere fleeting shadows in which man's being, which *is* temporal being, must sink. And here too we pursue a strictly theological anthropology. We take our bearings, that is, exclusively from the Word of God made manifest in the event of Jesus Christ. The man whose temporality we have to understand is the creature whose being is the history in which he is chosen and called by God through God's meeting with him in grace and covenant in this his temporal existence, and the history therefore in which this man is confronted with his fellow-man. We have therefore to give our first attention not to this man in himself, but to the man Jesus in whom this grace and calling were *effectuated.* We begin then with an investigation into the New Testament witness to Jesus as the *Lord of Time.*

We note first that the man Jesus like all other men has His

time. He is born, He grows up, and He dies. His earthly career is like that of all men a temporal history. It is no docetic Christ that is portrayed for us in the pages of the New Testament, no eternal or non-temporal spirit taking the mere form of human existence. But this man, verily a man, is portrayed as living through His unity with God, for God in His time—living that is as God's representative before men—and living also for man as man's representative before God. His life therefore is not exclusively His own. It belongs to God and it belongs to man. Thus the limits which belong to human temporality in general cease to be mere limits; they become doors. That is to say, His time is not confined to His earthly history, but is a time which always was where men have lived and always will be where men shall live. His time is God's time, the ever-existing crisis of all time, so that though living in His own allotted space of time, He is none the less always time's contemporary, present in one way in the time before Him, in another in His own particular time, and in another still in the time ahead of Him. He is in fact God's time becoming our time.

Now all this will simply hang in the air for us, will be in fact a flimsy piece of speculation, unless we keep our eyes doggedly on the New Testament witness to the resurrection of Jesus from the dead as a new chapter, so to speak, *in His history*. And the resurrection will not be credible unless we become thoroughly alive to the fact that wherever Jesus is spoken of in the New Testament it is always in terms of real history. Nowhere is it even faintly suggested that the significance of Jesus consists in His being the embodiment of mere timeless truth and reality. Always and everywhere Jesus meant a history, and all the truths and illuminations that flowed from Him were the effects of the impact of that history. Revelation throughout the Bible is not the communication of timeless truth; it is at all times salvation history. The New Testament therefore speaks of an Easter history, a time after the ending of the Lord's own temporal existence, and it is in this Easter history that the meaning and significance of His temporal existence emerges into manifestation. This manifestation is itself history, real event. The situation is not that men were enabled, through some spiritual intuition, to discover this meaning and significance. Here Barth vigorously breaks a lance with Bultmann. Bultmann interprets

the belief of the early disciples in the resurrection of Jesus as the result of a spiritual awakening to the meaning of His death. The resurrection faith was not the result of a resurrection history; it was the result of a new and deeper understanding of the Cross as life's victory over death. The resurrection was the fruit of faith; faith was not the fruit of the resurrection. Bultmann realises that in representing the matter after this fashion he is turning his back on the New Testament witness. In fact he is making a leap from the whole Biblical conception of revelation as salvation history and making it a matter of timeless truth, especially the truth of life's lordship over death. But this is to surrender the whole Biblical conception of time and man's life in time. What happened in the resurrection of Jesus Christ was the manifestation of the Godhead hidden in His earthly life; but this manifestation was real happening and not some leap of human intuition. God's time burst through the limits of our time in entering that time. The Word became flesh and we saw His glory. It is certainly the case that the Easter history is not history in the currently accepted use of that term. It does not belong to the framework of what the historian as such with his methods and canons of credibility can establish as history. It bursts through that framework and will take *for him* the form of saga or legend. But it is an unwarrantable assumption that nothing which does not fit into the accepted canons of historical credibility may be accepted as real happening. Such an assumption would deny *ab initio* the whole Biblical conception of revelation as salvation history. It is also an unwarrantable assumption that the acceptance of such real happening can only be a blind act of faith involving a sacrifice of the intellect. How should that be if salvation history be a reality and can reach us? The question is, are we going to follow the Biblical conception of the nature of revelation to the end, or are we at some point going to depart from it and set up one of our own, one moreover radically irreconcilable with it? Barth's criticism of Bultmann is a most penetrating piece of theological writing and a powerful vindication of the Easter history.

What then does it mean for our inquiry that there was this Easter history? It means that the man Jesus was among the disciples after the manner of God. That became manifest in the Easter history, and because it became manifest there, the

disciples learned that so it was, though in a hidden way, in the Lord's earthly life. There Jesus was the concrete proof of the gracious God who delivers men from the power of death, brings to full realisation His covenant with them and will give them part and lot in His own eternal life. The time of Jesus is therefore the time of all times. It establishes the reality of our time, shows it to be no mere appearance or illusion. But it demonstrates also that time as we know it is no absolute. There is no god *Chronos*. The limits of our time are no fixed and fated things, but determinations of the God who in His grace has entered our time and established His lordship over them.

The time of the man Jesus on the earth was, as we have said, a definite period with a beginning and an end. But since it was the time which God has taken for us, we have to say that both the time before and the time after the appearance was also His time.

Let us think first of the time after. We note that the New Testament community after Easter and Pentecost reckons with a real and superior presence of Jesus amongst them. Where the Holy Spirit is, there is much more than tradition, much more than memory of an historical past; there is real presence. But the past of Jesus is not abrogated through His presence. His earthly life and work are not banished as if now they were somehow irrelevant to His present reality. On the contrary this past is interpreted, illumined, brought near through His present reality. What, however, is excluded is a mere historical relation to Him. A community gathering round a mere historic tradition or memory or influence could only be a community without the Spirit. And the presence of Jesus in the Spirit with the community is full of His future. It presses forward to a general and final revelation, to a return in glory of which the resurrection is an anticipation. But He who comes again in glory is the same as He who is even now present with His community. A "consistent eschatology" which would regard the present as a time of emptiness and lack, is not the eschatology of the New Testament. Once again one must think of a community without the Spirit if one thinks in terms of such an eschatology.

The being of Jesus in time is not, however, a being only in the present. It is also a being in the past. We think first of the

events of His earthly life and of His death on the Cross. The past time of Jesus could not be less real than His present time with His community. The apostolic "to-day" possesses its secret and its power from that "yesterday". Thus we reach the great confession "He was incarnate". But the look back into the past cannot halt at the limit of His birth and entry into our time. The appearance of the man Jesus was not an act of the divine caprice and not an historical *novum*. We speak of the prophetic history of the people of Israel grounded in the divine covenant which was realised and consummated in the event of Jesus of Nazareth, and we learn that this history was His time also. But our thought must travel further still. This prophetic history also was due to no divine caprice, and was not an historical *novum*. We have to think of creation as the presupposition of the divine covenant, as constituted for the establishment of a kingdom of grace and of fellowship between God and man, man and his fellow-man. The time of the beginning was His time, no less than the time of the covenant people. And our thought cannot halt even at the limit of the world's beginning. Since He manifested Himself in the resurrection as the appearance of God among men, since His time is the time which God Himself has for men, His past goes right back to the eternity of God.

We must now develop the third and final attestation of the New Testament witness. The being of Jesus is not only a being in the present and in the past; it is also a being in the future. In the same reality as He is and was, He will be. In the same reality, no more and no less. Time and history are in no way emptied of meaning and importance by the fact that He is to come. The significance of the Lord's *Parousia* must, however, in no wise be lost sight of. Certainly apart from the Easter history and its meaning as promise, it would not be unthinkable that the future should unfold itself as a development of what we call "Christianity". That is to say, it would consist in the realisation, perhaps here, perhaps yonder of a Christian ideal. Such a conception is, however, entirely foreign to the thought of the New Testament. It is not some idea or ideal that is to be realised in the slow passage of time or in eternity. It is Christ Himself as the fulfilment of the divine covenant and as man's judge and redeemer who is to become manifest to all men. The

Christian life therefore is not only a life of faith in a revelation once given, and not only a life of love of Christ now present, it is also a life of hope in a Christ to come; and the faith, the love and the hope stand on the same plane and rest on the same foundation. This third dimension, the dimension indicated by the *Parousia*, cannot be dropped from view without endangering the dimensions of His present and His past. When it is dropped, the relation to Jesus will inevitably become a mere historical relation, His presence among His people will be interpreted psychologically, and His being at the beginning of the creation and in eternity will be regarded in the light of an over-stress and exaggeration due to man's sense of the importance of the truths and values for which He stood. In Himself He will cease to be of cardinal importance.

Barth acutely observes that the expectation of the second coming of Christ could not and cannot but have the character of a near at hand expectation. How could He who had realised and fulfilled the divine covenant, and who in His sacrifice and death was pressing forward to the goal of His vocation and work be thought of except as imminent? It is He who stands at the door and knocks, He who as the grace and judgment of God advances into human life and history. His life, death, resurrection and *Parousia* belong together as parts of an indivisible whole, as moments in the great and all-decisive movement of God to man now breaking into the world. But it is no less true that the fact that this near at hand expectation was not realised could not become occasion of disillusion and scepticism. For He who is to come, is also to-day; each day is a day of Christ, each day a day of grace, and therefore each day a day of hope. The Christian therefore advances from faith to faith, from a faith realised and confessed to a faith renewed. His waiting for the Lord will be a patient waiting, his hope a filled hope and no mere vague expectation of some ideal to be realised through the long process of man's unfolding time. Every true and rightful idea or ideal of good is comprised in Him who was and who is and who is to come.

Jesus, then, is the Lord of time. His temporal and particular time is the time which God has for us, the day of the Lord which covers, sustains, gives meaning and reality to all our human days. God, who is Himself and in the decisions and determina-

tions of His own being and life pure beginning, pure continuance and pure end takes our time which exists in a succession of days and years, events and experiences into His own life. His time, His eternity becomes in Jesus our time and so breaks through the limits of that time. And all this is grace; all this rests upon the turning of God to man in mercy and condescension; all this flows from that divine choice and election which sets up a covenant with man and which has created man and his world as the sphere of that covenant. It is no natural or supernatural process which we might take and so to speak integrate into a world philosophically conceived and interpreted. Its manifestation, sign, and promise, is the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, a divine event which breaks through every process conceivable by man.

We address ourselves now to the consideration of man and time in general. This can be truly undertaken only from the standpoint of the man Jesus in His time. We may not, however, apply to man in general what we have established concerning the man Jesus. Jesus was what no other man is or can be, one with God. The time of Jesus was therefore filled time, the time in which past, present and future were established in full reality. This we cannot say of our time, and indeed if we confine our attention to this our time in itself, apart from the light thrown upon it by God's revelation in Christ, we are driven irresistibly to the conclusion that we have no real time and therefore no real being. The past, for example, exists no longer. Doubtless we preserve certain memories which enable us in some sense to reconstruct it. But what we recall is not the past itself, but only certain pictures of it. We no longer possess the past, no longer have it at our disposal. And so the identity of the self to-day with the self yesterday becomes a supposition and a threatened one.

The same may be said with even greater decisiveness of the future. Here expectation takes the place of memory, but it is the expectation of that which is not yet and which may never be. We may fill the thought of the future with plans and purposes, but we do not in this way give it reality. All we do is to form pictures of it, but that is a very different thing from having it and disposing of it.

The situation becomes even more disturbing when we turn

to consideration of the present. Here, it might be thought, is something which we really have, and of which we are the masters. In point of fact, however, the present is a step out of darkness into darkness, out of the "no more" into the "not yet". We cannot arrest the present and make it our own. We cannot dwell in it. We can only hurry forward out of it. Just where time may be supposed to be most real, it slips through our fingers. Just when we feel ourselves to be most real, we find ourselves slipping into the void.

Man in himself has no time. Time is that which he never possesses. And subconsciously at least he knows that this is so. He may of course, and he does, endeavour to hide himself from that fact. He may for example take the metaphysical way, and, instead of recognising that time is something which must be *given* him and which therefore he does not in himself possess, postulate an infinite time without beginning or end or limits of any kind. But what is this limitless time but a vast abyss in which the reality of time is swallowed up; an infinite past in which our being that once was sinks absolutely, and an infinite future to which everything is pressing forward but which ever eludes our grasp? The man Jesus stands in time as the Lord of time; but where do we stand? Apparently as those who have no real past, no real present, and no real future. Wherein lies the reality and identity of our being under such conditions?

But the last word cannot rest with this contrast between the man Jesus and other men. For Jesus was not only God and so wholly other than we; He was also man and therefore like ourselves; not only creator but also creature, not only eternal but also temporal. If then we may speak not only of an opposition between the time of the man Jesus and ours but also of a comparison and a likeness, this means that the opposition is a revelation of God's judgment upon our life. We are confronted not only with a contrast between the divine nature and the human, between the creator and the creature, but with an accusation. What we have described as the being of man who has no time, whose life is a passage from darkness into darkness, is not man's true being as the creation of God. It is his being as sinful man, as man who lives in contradiction to his true being, whose existence therefore is not a truly natural existence but a highly unnatural one. A protest from the side of the creator against

the creature is therefore raised. The existence of the man Jesus in time means that God will in no wise recognise as valid this empty being of man in man's own time. He will vindicate His right over man as His creator and therefore man's right as His creature. In Christ the opposition of which we have spoken is overcome. God will give us not indeed time's lordship, but a real and genuine time corresponding to our nature as His creatures. We must understand that there is no righteousness apart from that merciful turning of the gracious God to man which assures him of his status as God's creation, and therefore of the reality of the time given by the creator to the creature.

It is necessary to emphasise the fact that our time is a *given* time. It implies a setting from a superior source. Man has it because he is not without God, and for no other reason whatever. Whoever says time says God, whether he knows it or not. Without God no time, and without time no human existence. God has willed and created time as space for the life to which He has determined us, for a life in relation to Him and therefore to our fellow-man.

From the point of view of time as given, assigned, set by God, we may proceed to develop the insight that to man is given a real present, a real past, and a real future. Not that man can claim these for himself. As we have seen his present, past and future are all, apart from God, problematic. The present becomes a mere transition from a "no more" to a "not yet". It lacks extension and continuance. And if that be true about the present, it is certainly true about the past and the future. For if we have being at all, we have it in the "now". If man be really in time, he is so now. The whole of his life is involved in the fact that it is above all a "now". The question therefore becomes acute: are we real in the "now"? is the "now" a reality? And the question can be answered in the affirmative only from the side of revelation; but from that side it is answered. For there it is established that God Himself is the real now, God the creator, who precisely as creator accomplishes the transition from the past to the future while remaining eternally identical with Himself. His present accordingly possesses endurance and extension since it is identical with His own being. And this God has set Himself in relationship with us. He is the God who loves us with an eternal love and who will not let

His love for us be abrogated by our sin. Therefore His present confers upon us a real present. In relation to Him our "now" possesses a reality which has endurance and extension. But only in relation to Him. Because He is eternally now, we are really now in the time which He has given us. And the meaning of our "now" is that it is opportunity to fulfil our relationship to God and to our fellow-men.

Just as time, as given by God, assures to man a real present, so also a real past. Apart from God man has no past. His past lies outside of him and his control. There are two ways in which men seek to evade this conclusion; the way of recollection and the way of forgetting. In recollection, man who has come to see how problematic his being in the present is, begins to rummage about in memory. There, at any rate, he feels that real time belongs to him. And when a whole generation begins to lose faith in its future it becomes increasingly immersed in history. More and more does it seek to reconstruct the past as the sphere in which it can truly live and find the true guiding principles of its existence. It loses creativeness and becomes reactionary. Doubtless the way of recollection can attain some measure of success. Nevertheless it remains true that not the past is brought into the present, but only certain pictures of the past. The past cannot be recovered, cannot be lived in, has no real extension. Life is swept irresistibly into the future.

The way of forgetting proceeds differently. This way perceives how problematic is the past, feels that it must simply be let go, and so it presses forward to find reality in the present and the future. It is led by the "spirit of the times". It finds its life in the energetic pursuit of programmes which it projects into the future as if the future were at its disposal. Man, however, cannot escape from his past. He cannot leave his past behind him. His picture of the future in which he would find reality is again only a picture; not the real future, for in this the past still lives on. He is compelled to live in a present largely moulded by a past which exists no longer.

The whole situation, however, changes if it be true that our time is a given time, given by God, the God who has established our being in a covenant relationship with Himself. Because of this relationship our past stands before God and is therefore established in reality. It stands under His judgment. *We are,*

in our whole time, in the succession of its events, experiences and decisions. This lends a relative right to our activity of recollection, and so to the historical temper. We cannot indeed dwell in the past as if it were our true home, as if our present and our future were a kind of foreign country. We may be conservative but we must not be reactionary. We cannot restore the past, but we can be taught, guided, warned, and sometimes encouraged and inspired by the pictures which our memory and historical sense form of it. Just because the past is so utterly in the hands of God, so absolutely under His *judgment*, we cannot be indifferent to it. But even our forgetting is not without justification. Once more because our past is so entirely in the hands of God, so utterly beyond our control, we can press forward in expectation of the opportunities which the present and the future may have in store for us.

Of all the dimensions of our time, that of the future is obviously the most problematic. For the future as the "not yet" is so utterly non-existent. There may be no future at all, and even should there be one, it is in no wise at our disposal until it has ceased to be future and has become present. And no way of escape from the problematic is possible either along the way of ignoring it or by anxious preoccupation with it. We may indeed try to ignore it, and set ourselves without more ado to the programmes and ends which seem to us to belong to the future. And of course along this line we may achieve some measure of success. But the fact remains that the future which we envisage with our aims and ends is only a picture. On the other hand our attempt to evade the problematic of the future by way of preoccupation cannot succeed. We may tell ourselves that we have no future. We may, that is, acquiesce in a mood of pessimism or resignation. But we can do this only partially. We cannot but take the step which leads us out of the present into the future and strive after goods to be realised therein. There never has been and never can be a consistent pessimist. The future holds for us, at all times, the lure of possibility. Neither of these two ways then is in fact viable, though each one has its relative justification. The only true way appears when we recognise that it is God Himself who is the real future, the God who will for ever be what now He is and what in the past He was; the God whose love for man is

rooted in an eternal decision which determines His very being. To this God we stand in relation, and our created being is constituted in this relation. We can therefore take the step out of the present into the future, knowing that this step leads not into the void but to God whose eternal righteousness consists in His maintaining His right over man as his creator and man's right as His creature. And this knowledge will bring us both responsibility and freedom, the responsibility and freedom which arise from the perception that the future is not the sphere of disillusionment and the void, but a *filled* future, the sphere of the eternal righteousness of God.

Our time then is something given, something assigned to us as the creation of God. Only so is it real. Only so is it ours. It is the form of our creaturely existence. And we must add explicitly, the form of our *human* creaturely existence. We do not know what time may mean for beings other than ourselves, the lower creation for example. We could not make with confidence the assertions about them which we have made for ourselves. But we do know what time means for us. And inasmuch as time is rooted in the creative action of God who has established relations with us, we know that what time means for us, that it is in itself. We may not therefore think of time in any abstract way. There is no abstract time, no time existing simply in itself, no time which might be thought of apart from the willing and giving of God. God Himself in His own being and life is the reality of time. Here again we must be brought in sight of a theological anthropology if the meaning of man's being in time is to be understood. Every non-theological anthropology will sooner or later call in question the reality of time and therefore the reality of the being of man.

We must, however, be clear about what we mean when we speak of a theological anthropology. The reality of our time and of our being in time cannot be established by any theory, even when the idea of God is made the systematic principle of that theory. The vocable "God" in itself leads us nowhere. God as an idea, as the principle of a system of interpretation, even if decked out with all the qualities and properties of the Christian conception of God, could only lead to the spinning of a theoretic web which the slightest breath of wind would reveal as such. The new factor which we take into reckoning is

not the God idea, the God principle; it is God as *event*, as real *happening*, God as actually meeting with men. In brief the new factor is Jesus Christ who in His resurrection stands before us as the Lord of time.

Having established the reality of man's time, and demonstrated on what foundations this reality rests, we may now turn to the consideration of the special problems connected with the fact that this time is an *allotted* time, a time to which limits are assigned, a time which begins and which ends. We survey time now in its outward aspect, not as hitherto from within; not as a movement and a transition in which our being possesses the form of its existence. We look upon it in its wholeness, so to speak, and we are at once faced by the fact that it is bounded and finite, that in itself it does not possess duration and continuance. And immediately we are confronted with a great riddle. For man's being cries out, and cries out with fundamental rightfulness, against this limitation and boundedness of his time. Man longs for time which *abides*, which is no mere span but which is inexhaustible. He would live and not die, be and not cease to be. And the ultimate reason for this longing is not a mere life hunger, a mere will to be, powerful though no doubt this is. Man possesses in himself no claim whatever to an ever-enduring existence. His will to live out his life without limits constitutes in itself no right which calls to be honoured. Moreover time which has before it no goal to be reached, no fulfilment to be attained, time which is continuance and nothing more, is an abstraction and a delusion. No, the real and legitimate ground for man's revolt against the limitations of his time is that time is given to man by God for the fulfilment of that whereunto his being is determined. Man is God's covenant partner. To that end he was created. His particular nature as human was formed with that end in view. He is truly human as the course of his life is the unfolding of that nature. That means that his life is so determined as to be lived for God and for his fellow-men. But a life so determined seems to call for unbounded time. How can man within the limits of a span of years, be they few or many, exhaust the claims laid upon his life by this determination of his being? What man has ever come within measurable distance of truly and fully realising this end set before him? Must not the limits set to his life be

pushed ever further and further back until they vanish altogether if a determination, which by its very nature is immeasurable and inexhaustible, is to reach fulfilment? Is it not a contradiction to assert on the one hand a determination which transcends all finite boundaries, and on the other that man's time is necessarily limited and assigned?

We shall not escape the dilemma by pointing to the difference between God's being and man's, by asserting that to the creator belongs, as of right, an unending existence, while it would be inconsistent to claim more than a limited and bounded time for the creature. The principle of *suum cuique* is not here conclusive, though it may open up the direction which we must follow if we are to find the answer to our question. It is not, however, itself the true answer. For God's life and man's cannot here be thought of in abstraction from one another. God has made the relationship into which He has entered with man determinative of man's being, and this relationship since it is the relationship of *God*, since it is in fact God Himself in relationship, is necessarily a boundless one.

The question may, however, be put whether an ever-enduring time would satisfy the conditions which are necessary for man's fulfilment of his determination and destiny. Would an infinite *quantum* of time as such correspond to the nature of the claims laid upon man's life through his covenant relation with God? The answer must be No. For time is only the *conditio sine qua non*, the indispensable *opportunity*. In itself, any extension of the limits placed upon man's time, could only mean an increase of his opportunities, and an endless time the increase of these opportunities *ad infinitum*. But opportunity is not actualisation, and an infinite time would simply, in itself, be the perpetual postponement of actualisation. What life really cries out for is not an extension of time as such, though it is understandable that a long life rather than a short one should be regarded as the greater good, but a removal of that which stands between it and this actualisation. And it makes all the difference whether we look upon our life in an abstract way as limited, or whether we see it concretely as bounded and encompassed by God. If the former, then our longing after life's fulfilment is a stretching out of our hands into the void. But let us assume that we have ground and occasion for seeing that the time in which we live

stands in direct relation to God. In that case there can be no talk of a void. What lies behind and before our time is no void but the God who as Creator has annihilated all void. Limit now loses its character as mere limit and becomes characterisation, description, definition. It indicates a history. Man would not be the subject of a real history, if his time, instead of being an allotted time, were an ever-flowing, ever-continuous stream without shape or form or character. But it is God who surrounds us on every side, God who Himself stands at the temporal limits of our existence, God who is Himself the actualisation and fulfilment of our lives. He gives us our time that we may answer to Him, not that we may fulfil some life programme. He who is Himself not timeless, but in His eternal being pure beginning, pure continuance and pure end, makes our time, different as it is from His, the creaturely correspondence to His own and therefore the promise to us of a participation in the fulness of His own life.

It is necessary here once again to stress the fact that the God of whom we speak is the gracious God; so to stress it that any other thought which we may associate with the being of God fades away. He who makes man's time an allotted time is He who has eternally chosen man for fellowship with Himself, whose will and choice are here sovereign, and who has created man in correspondence with this will and choice. The grace of God is no mere friendly and kindly disposition directed towards man, but the person of God turned to him. In the time which is assigned to him man is entirely dependent upon, entirely thrown upon that gracious God. This can certainly be hidden from us as we pursue our way on the line which stretches between our beginning and our end. In that betweentime, many other factors and elements can appear to us as the real upholders and maintainers of our life. We can even come to look upon ourselves and our own natural powers and resources as the chief of these factors and elements. The question can arise, is not man himself his own gracious Lord God? But in view of our beginning and our ending, every such illusion must fall away. Here it is either the gracious God in whom our being is grounded or it is simply nothing at all. If it is not nothing, we are confronted by nature at our beginning and end with this gracious God with a clearness of which we could

not speak when we consider the time between this beginning and end. So the fact that our time is an allotted time betokens the *natural nearness* of God's grace in its *clearness*. But again we must say explicitly that only in view of Jesus Christ as the Lord of time, the man Jesus whose time like ours was an allotted time, but unlike ours filled with the eternity of God, does this become manifest. Here again the true anthropology springs out of Christology.

The problem of the bounded nature of our time has two aspects, that of its beginning and that of its ending. It is natural enough that the latter should be felt to be the more disturbing. On the whole it does not seriously perturb us that once we were not; but the realisation that there will come a time when we shall be no longer brings to our life a heavy burden and distress. And yet our beginning, our emergence from non-being into being, is in fact just as acute a problem, though actually less disturbing, as that of our ending. It means that our being right from its start is threatened by nothingness, and it awakens the apprehension, whether directly felt or not, that our life is a mere appearance, a shadow, an absolutely collapsing existence. From one point of view we might almost say that the problem of our beginning is even more acute than that of our ending. For our ending, our plunge into non-being, is yet in the future. We know that it is ever advancing towards us, but it is not yet, and so the thought of it can long be evaded. Our emergence from non-being is, however, something which has already taken place. Once we were not, that is undeniable fact. And the only sufficient answer, but the all sufficient answer, to the problem which that fact brings us, is given to us in the Word of God by which we learn that what was before us was not nothingness, not non-being, but the being of God. He was before we were. And because He was we were. In His turning to us in grace He has made Himself the guardian and guarantor of our existence. We came from God, not out of the void. He is Himself through that determination of His being whereby He became creator, our beginning; not indeed as if we were outflows and emanations of His being, but through His action in grace in binding His life with ours. Thus from our beginning there attaches itself a promise to our continuing existence in the world and to our ending. We can therefore go forward in our

life without anxious mistrust lest our way should turn out to be an impossible way, a way that cannot be travelled.

The conclusion which we have hitherto reached that our time as an allotted span belongs to our nature as created by God, the God of grace and covenant, and therefore as such must be acclaimed not as an evil but as a good, seems gravely to be threatened when we turn to the consideration of our time as ending. That our life is irresistibly carried forward to a point at which it must cease to be seems to make it a threatened existence all along the line. Our beginning did at least mark something positive. It marked the emergence from non-existence into existence. Our ending appears on the other hand to be purely negative. From existence we plunge into non-existence. Life is everywhere in protest and revolt against its ending. It strives ever after more life, and cannot but regard death as abnormal and unnatural. Death is man's enemy. It is not just a natural fact but a dynamic might overshadowing man's whole existence. So it is thought of in the Bible, and especially in the Old Testament where its overcoming in resurrection has not yet become manifest. If therefore our death be placed in immediate relation to God, the God from whom we had our beginning, if we on our way through life are advancing to meet Him, then the ending of our life is placed in a different light from its beginning. It is a sign of the judgment of God. It points to our guilt. The life which stretches between the two termini of our beginning and ending has, as we have seen, been determined for God and the fellow-man; but it has not been lived in accordance with this its determination. It is a life ever, so to speak, in arrears. With this arrears we go forward to meet the God who stands at the end of our way, even as He stood at the beginning. What can be the result of that meeting but judgment and rejection? What can our death portend but the divine "no" to our existence? What can correspond to this our being but its negativing? We may not indeed announce as a general and universal truth that this judgment is actually *accomplished*, that the end of our life is in fact our rejection. It could be that this radical judgment is spared us because it was endured by another on our behalf. And this is the presupposition of the New Testament. In that case what can be universally asserted is that our death, while not in itself being our

rejection by God, is a sign, an indication, a portrayal so to speak of the divine judgment on the guilt of our human existence. Apart from this intervention of another on our behalf it *is* the actual execution of this judgment. We cannot therefore say of death, as it actually stands over our life, that it belongs to the true nature of our existence as God's creation. We cannot glorify our death, make it out to be man's good friend, tell ourselves that it is not to be feared. Nor can we regard it as a mere natural occurrence with which we can readily come to terms. In death we are confronted not only with natural process but with God, not only with a temporal limit but with judgment.

And now once more we recall the great word of divine revelation that the God with whom we are directly confronted at the end of our way is the gracious God, the God who is *for* man and not against him in spite of his guilt, the God who will uphold His covenant with man and maintain his right as His creation. Again we must insist that the God who is not the gracious God is not the true God but an idol. The true God is therefore not simply the limit of our life; He is also and above all the limit of our death. He takes from death its power of finality, makes it to become for us not the execution of judgment but the sign of judgment, and therefore the call to us to recognise ourselves as the objects of His grace. We may not indeed presume upon an immortality which does not belong to us. But the hope which is ours because of this gracious God, whose grace has become event in the atoning death of Jesus Christ and been made manifest in his resurrection, is a hope to which we are not only invited but to which we are bidden.

We are now in a position to face and answer the difficult question whether the ending of our time belongs to the creative ordinance of God and may therefore be acclaimed not as an evil but as a good. Implicitly the answer has already been suggested but the suggestion must now be made clear and explicit. Hitherto we have not been able to see our death, even in the light of the death of Christ, as anything but an evil. The fact that Jesus had to die in order to redeem us from the power of death would seem to proclaim the unnaturalness of death, its opposition to the will of God in His purpose of creation. It still remains as the sign of God's judgment, God's rejection,

God's opposition to our life. If this be all that there is to say about it, if it be indeed the last word, we should be landed in a strange quandary. Should we not have to revise our earlier conclusion that our time as an *allotted* time, as a span which begins and ends is the creation of God? Would not our beginning, and not our end only, our emergence from non-being be exposed as an evil? Should we not be driven to the conclusion that a time without limits, an ever-enduring time, is the only time which would correspond with the gracious will of God?

We come in sight of a solution of our problem as we realise that in our discussions hitherto we have assumed an equivalence between death as the terminus of our allotted time, and death as the negation of man's being through the judgment of God upon his guilt. This equivalence, however, though it is actual and factual, does not arise out of necessity. In the light of Christ's acceptance of death as God's judgment on man's life we cannot but regard the fact of our death as God's "no" to our actual human existence. But we cannot stop there. The man Jesus suffered death as an atonement for human sin. The death which He endured on the Cross, the death which is God's radical judgment on man's existence was not the necessary but the freely accepted end of His life. It happened not out of anthropological necessity but as manifestation and proof of the free grace of God to a humanity living in contradiction to the divine determination of its being. Had He not endured this death He would have been none the less true, real, and natural man. From the anthropological point of view His life would have ended quite differently. But in order that He might endure death in this dark and negative sense, His life must be a life with a temporal end, His time must be a bounded, an allotted time. Were that not the case, were His human existence by nature and through the creation of God an ever-enduring existence, how could He who was no sinner, who knew no guilt, take upon Himself death as the divine judgment? Is it not then clear that dying as such, dying in the sense of reaching the end of our allotted span of time, is not in itself an evil? Further still: since behind the judgment-death of Christ on our behalf stood the free grace of God, the God who would uphold the covenant for which He had ordained man in creating him, must we not see in our death, understood now simply as the

appointed end of our time, above everything an encounter with this gracious God? Our life goes to meet the judgment of God certainly, and that cannot be too earnestly borne in mind, but above all it goes to meet His grace in judgment. Life's end therefore cannot be in itself an evil, cannot contradict the true nature of man as the creation of God. Man is through the creative ordinance of his life a temporal being. But before his temporal beginning God was, and after his temporal end God will be; the God who in creating man determined him for fellowship with Himself and participation in His own eternal life.

Man as such has no beyond (*Jenseits*) for he has no need of it. God is his beyond. Man's future is not some new temporal existence stretching to infinity which leaves his now existence behind itself. It is the glorification of his temporally-ending being; the redemption of his real and actual self, a redemption to be understood in a fully positive sense as eternal fellowship with God and a sharing in His own divine life. In this redemption a man will be made manifest before God, before himself, and before all others, in the reality of his temporal existence; as a sinner, but as one whose sin is covered and whose being is for ever glorified through God's free grace. The grave is not his goal; God is his goal. Past, present and future are real, for behind, above and beyond past, present and future is God, in whom we and all creation live and move and have our being, and who in His grace has united man's being for ever with the being of His eternal and well-beloved Son.

We have space for only a brief comment as we conclude this very inadequate summary. It becomes more and more evident how wide and far-reaching are the positive positions which are reached by an entire preoccupation with revelation in its Biblical signification to the exclusion of all natural theology. In Barth's work natural theology shows itself ever more clearly as an intrusion into genuine theological thinking, an intrusion moreover which threatens to bring to the ground confidence in the great truths established by the Word of God. We make, for example, no advance in reaching the reality either of God or man by working with the idea of being in general. All we succeed in doing, even if we pursue the way of the *analogia entis* with the utmost circumspection and even if we

call revelation to our aid, is to produce a vast and imposing theory whose foundations are conspicuously lacking. Jacques Maritain has declared that the apprehension of being rests on an intellectual intuition. But an intellectual intuition itself presupposes being, and the argument moves in a circle. Who or what entitles us to make this presupposition? We must of course begin our thinking somewhere; but if we are to reach the great truths and confidences we must begin with our beginning, with God. Only so can the reality of man's being and man's time be established on an indestructible foundation. And God is the God of grace. Any other deity than this God is a rival god, and the association of any such other with the God of grace is a threat to His essential Godhead. We further learn how vast are the implications of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead understood as real event and history. The utter convincingness of these implications will lend to *thought* a convincingness concerning the New Testament witness of the resurrection which it could scarcely have if treated in isolation and apart from these implications. Here the solidity of the superstructure attests the solidity of the foundation on which it is reared.

There are doubtless many questions which remain unanswered in Barth's mighty treatment of his theme; or perhaps, more accurately, which *appear* to remain unanswered. But anyone who has worked his way carefully through the long discussion, a discussion buttressed by a massive exegesis which we have had to leave entirely on one side, will scarcely fail to be convinced that a contribution to theological thinking has been made, the depth and richness of which will not be exhausted for many a long day to come.

DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE

by The Rev. C. R. WALKER

In one of the "Ghost Stories of an Antiquary" by Montagu James, there is a pathetic tale of the sacristan of a certain cathedral near the Pyrenees, whose life was made miserable through the unwelcome presence of a ghostly figure which was liable to appear while the sacristan was engaged in his lawful duties, and to fill his mind with apprehension. Almost the only time the poor sacristan was free from the menace was when he was ringing the great cathedral bell, but especially in the evening, when he rang the Angelus. "He heaved a sigh of relief", writes the author, "for it was time to ring the Angelus. A few pulls at the reluctant rope, and the great bell, Bertrande, high in the tower, began to speak and swung her voice up among the pines and down to the valleys loud with mountain streams, calling the dwellers on those lonely hills to remember and repeat the salutation of the angel to her whom he called Blessed among women. With that a profound quiet seemed to fall for the first time that day upon the little town, and the sacristan went out of the church."

The literature of Devotion in its effect upon the spirit of a preacher of the Gospel might be compared to the soothing influence of the bell Bertrande upon the troubled spirit of the sacristan in the story. For we too are liable to be haunted; haunted by dim shapes of our own fears and doubts and failings. In addition, we may have to fight against sloth—not slothfulness of body or mind so much as slothfulness of spirit, shown in our reluctance to spend time in private prayer and spiritual reading—and lukewarmness or *accidie* (to use the old monkish term) which deprives us of a sense of God's Presence, and breeds doubts in our souls.

A powerful antidote to these unwelcome ghosts is provided for us by the saints of all ages who have written out of the fulness of their spiritual experiences, and who give us confidence to tread in paths which the use and wont of the world makes strange and difficult for inexperienced feet.

For that reason *we* probably ought to have a book of Devotion on our desk at all times. There are some who say it ought always to be the same book; that we should choose early in our careers which master of the soul's quest suits us best, whether it be Bunyan or A Kempis or Pascal, or whoever it may be—and never deviate from that one. Whether we keep to one master all through life, or take several by turns, it is certainly advisable to have a book of devotion always in train, just as A. S. Peake held we ought always to be making a close study with commentary of one or other of the books of the Bible.

When we turn to the catalogues of devotional literature, however, we are apt to be embarrassed by their riches. Furthermore it is difficult to define devotional literature satisfactorily or even to be sure where devotional literature ends and secular literature begins.

Take a book like Amiel's *Journal*, for example. No list of devotional classics, it is likely, will ever include Amiel's *Journal*. Nevertheless, it is certain that the *Journal Intime* has meant more to some men in the way of spiritual inspiration than such an universally accepted work of devotion as say Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Living and Holy Dying*. The closely packed pages of Taylor with their ornate periods and somewhat stilted prayers—though they have stood the test of time—offer a sharp contrast to the literary charm of Amiel, with his exquisite descriptions of Alpine scenery, and of life in Geneva as seen through the eyes of a university professor, and through a mind singularly noble and spiritual. The long drawn conflict of the soul of Amiel with a fate which seemed to give no outlet for his genius, and with a strange lack of will power which stultified his best efforts—"resolution sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought"—and that in spite of constant reference to the will of God, cannot fail to move us and make us ponder God's mysterious ways. The opening sentence in the first entry of Mrs Humphrey Ward's edition of the *Journal* is: "There is but one thing needful—to possess God." And the closing entry but one—written on his deathbed—is equally significant. "To-morrow is Good Friday, the festival of pain. I know what it is to spend days of anguish and nights of agony. Let me bear my cross humbly. I have no more future."

A book like Amiel's *Journal* tends to remind us that we

ought not to limit ourselves too rigidly in our devotional reading to books neatly catalogued under a "Library of Devotion".

Many biographies will leap to mind which at some point have sent us to our knees, such as, to name only one, the life of Temple Gairdner of Cairo. And these biographies ought doubtless to be classed as works of devotion.

So too with certain books of poetry such as the works of the "Metaphysical" poets Crashaw, Vaughan and Herbert and the *Christian Year* of Keble. These may not appeal to all in the quiet hour, but some men do find it easier to rise to God on the wings of poetry than by following the more pedestrian paths of prose.

If we were to limit ourselves, however, to those books which are universally regarded as the product of devout minds, the works of the saints and of men and women of acknowledged piety and spiritual insight, we might find it convenient to divide them into three categories: first, books of prayer and meditation; second, books of practical spiritual counsel; third, the spiritual autobiographies of the great mystics.

(1) First then, there are books of prayer and meditation. Every minister's library, of course, includes books of prayer, those useful for public worship, besides various anthologies, like Fox's *Chain of Prayer through the Ages*, which are valuable for private devotions. In this connexion however a criticism by Bede Frost may not be out of place, even though directed at another communion. Writing of the contents of the bookshelves of the average modern priest, he states: "Whatever may be found there, it is comparatively rare to find any of those solid enduring, indispensable books on the spiritual life and the practice of prayer which exist in so rich an abundance that it is almost incredible that they should be so ignored."[1]

I would like to single out two books which have been found particularly helpful.

The first of these is Lancelot Andrewes' *Preces Privatae*, a book known by name at least to very many, but which comparatively few ministers have used intensively. Alexander Whyte, who was largely responsible for resurrecting Andrewes' prayer book from oblivion, is not always the safest guide, inasmuch

[1] Bede Frost: *The Art of Mental Prayer*, chap. I.

as his enthusiasm is apt to outweigh his judgment, but when Whyte wrote in his Introduction: "There is nothing in the whole range of devotional literature to be set beside Andrewes' incomparable Devotions", he used words which have been echoed by those who have applied themselves to Andrewes over a period of years. Andrewes' book of prayer, it is well known, was never intended for publication, or even for the eyes of any but himself, and was found in manuscript form, all blurred with his tears. Such facts make the book all the more precious for private prayers. So also does the curiously abbreviated form of some of the prayers, suggesting lines of thought rather than providing prayers ready made, a boon to the suppliant who likes to use manuals of prayer as aids to personal petitions rather than as substitutes.

Moreover Andrewes interspersed his prayers with a few Reflections and Admonitions which are weighty and valuable. Thus in his "Reflections before Intercession" he says:

> "The Spirit maketh intercession for us with groanings which are unutterable"—is thy spirit or mine "unutterable" which oftentimes is naught, oftentimes is cold? Nay, but forasmuch as there is no day no moment when supplication is not being made to God by the saints, by one in more fervent sort, by another more lukewarmly; and forasmuch as all go to make up one Dove, it is herefrom that the groanings proceed which cannot be uttered, to wit from all the groanings in common, which are of advantage to all who are constituted in the body of the Church.
>
> Who prayeth for others, laboureth for himself.
>
> If thou make request for thyself alone, alone wilt thou make request for thyself;
>
> If thou pray for all, they will pray for thee.

And in his Admonition before Preaching, he says, quoting from Fulgentius:

> Let the preacher labour to be heard gladly, intelligently, obediently. And let him not question that he can do this better by the piety of his prayers, than by the fluency of his speech. By praying for himself and for them he is going to address, let him be a bedesman or ever he be a teacher; and approaching devoutly, before he put forth a speaking tongue, let him lift up to God a thirsty soul, so that he may give out what from Him he hath drunk in, and empty out what he hath first replenished.

Finally, beneath the immense but half concealed erudition of the author and the quaint charm of his seventeenth century English, there is a smouldering fire of passionate devotion which can hardly fail to kindle a kindred flame in the constant

reader's soul. But constant use is necessary to get the best out of Andrewes.

Of modern books of private prayer, which bear some relation to Andrewes' great classic, special mention ought to be made of Wotherspoon's *Kyrie Eleison*, "adapted mainly for those who have little leisure", and Professor John Baillie's *Diary* with its inducements to compose our own most personal prayers.

The other work in this category is of an entirely different type. It is Bede Frost's *Art of Mental Prayer*, being a full and careful treatise on the whole subject of mental prayer. The second part of this book is particularly useful including as it does the accepted, historical methods of prayer—the Ignatian, Franciscan, Carmelite, Salesian, Liguorian and Oratorian. The methods are fully described, and the novice is invited to practise them. Some of the methods are obviously too elaborate for the ordinary working minister, especially if he be subject to the unpredictable interruptions of family life; but you cannot doubt their practical wisdom. It is good, for example, to make definite mental pictures of some incident in our Lord's earthly life, together with an act of contrition at night, and to resume the meditation with an act of thanksgiving on awakening in the morning; and so forth. Such methods, begotten of course in monasteries and hermitages, do create a settled and devout frame of mind, and show how it is possible to "pray without ceasing".

(2) Regarding spiritual meditation, there is a wide choice of books, and we all have our favourites.

Probably the book in this section still in greatest vogue is A Kempis' *Imitation of Christ*, of which new editions are still being published, and which appeals to a great variety of temperaments. A recent broadcast on the eminent jurist, Lord Russell stated that when he packed his bag he invariably put into it two books, Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* and the *Imitation*. A very different man, Baron von Hügel, who could truly say he was "thoroughly at home in these writings", wrote in a letter: "I have been so hard worked that, for this kind of reading, I can only find my usual quarter of an hour, which has to go to those few books (Bible and *Imitation* and *Confessions*) which have been my staple food hitherto."

Along with the *Imitation* and the *Confessions* and Pascal's *Pensées* (which the late Principal Macgregor thought the

"mightiest of them all")—and on a somewhat lower plane the Letters of Fenelon and Von Hügel himself—I would make bold to place two books which do not have the currency of these master spirits but which have rewarded diligent readers. The first is the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius, and the second, the *Meditations* of St. Anselm.

Both of these books bring forcibly to our minds that meditation as understood by the great masters of the soul is far removed from idle day dreaming, and that it taxes both the will and the mind to the uttermost. Ignatius' *Exercises* are exercises indeed, demanding a concentration of spirit over a length of time, which not everyone would be prepared to give, but which those who have the cure of souls might well be asked to consider. The name of "Spiritual Exercises" indicates that the faithful who come to the school of St. Ignatius to make a retreat are called upon to use the faculties of their understanding and their heart. "They come to act for themselves, not to see another act; in acting they come to exert themselves, not to give themselves up to barren contemplation." So runs the preface, and so everyone who has made an honest attempt to follow the exercises—designed to change a sinner into a saint forever —no less—has discovered for himself.

As for the *Meditations* of St. Anselm, to which one would add his prayers, there is about them a certain austere charm almost unique in this type of literature. At times as you read, you can almost sense the commanding presence of the Abbot of Bec and the fearless Archbishop of Canterbury who faced and overcame the wrath of King Rufus. They will always appeal most, no doubt, to minds with a philosophic bent, including as they do his celebrated *Proslogion* or *Address to God concerning His Existence.* A danger which besets such minds is the indulgence in contemplation to the point of losing the sense of personal sinfulness. The study of Anselm, a pattern both of indefatigable intellectual curiosity and of humble penitence, should discourage such a tendency, and kindle the spark of genuine devotion at the same time.

Anselm's own preface to his *Meditations* is of considerable value as reminding us how we ought to read all books of meditation and devotion. Most of us who read many books are obsessed with the desire to get through them quickly, so that

they can stand to our credit as books read and mastered. We have to learn the opposite process when we come to books of devotion. We have indeed to become like the bee which returns again and again to the flower bell to suck out its nectar. This is what Anselm says:

> The Meditations and Prayers which follow, since they are published in order to arouse the reader thereof to the love or fear of God, or to self examination, are not to be read in the midst of turmoil, but in stillness, not quickly but slowly, with close and serious consideration. Nor ought the reader to be careful to read through the whole of any one among them, but so much as he perceives may by God's help, do him good in kindling within him the desire of prayer, or so much as may give him pleasure. Nor need he begin any one of them always at the beginning, but wherever shall best please him. For to this end are they divided into paragraphs that any one may begin or leave off where he chooses; so that the length of a prayer or the frequent repetition of one thing may not become wearisome; but the reader may gather thence some taste of devotion, for to that end they were composed.[1]

(3) I come now to the second class of books of devotion, namely, books of practical counsel.

Here again the reader is faced with an embarrassment of riches. The Letters of Fenelon, the great Archbishop of Cambrai, the Letters of Von Hügel, Day Books and Maxims culled from the Saints and Fathers, present themselves in a bewildering array, and all have their devotees. Three books might be singled out, however, as being instinct with spiritual genius. They are St. Francis de Sales' *Introduction to the Devout Life*, Grou's *Manual for Interior Souls*, and William Law's *Serious Call*.

Many ministers have to confess that they have difficulty in keeping up their spiritual temperature while on holiday. When the tension of their work goes, the need for supernatural resources is liable to go also. Now a book like St. Francis de Sales' *Introduction* is a useful antidote to such a tendency. For one thing, most of its chapters are short and can therefore be easily read in such brief intervals as may present themselves even on a strenuous holiday. Moreover St. Francis is an adept in leading one's thoughts very gently into devotional channels, and yet at the same time, pointing out venial faults which might well escape notice, thus making the reader half consciously gird up the loins of his mind for deep resolutions. The very titles of the chapters suggest the manner in which this

[1] *The Devotions of St. Anselm* (Methuen), p. 54.

master of the soul softly insinuates himself into the secret places of the mind and spirit—"Of Gentleness towards Ourselves", "Of Gentleness towards our Neighbours", "Of Obedience", "Of Friendships", "How we ought to Read and Hear the Word of God", "Of Spiritual Dryness". It ought to be added that St. Francis' suggestions regarding Contemplation starting from natural objects are particularly intriguing. There are no doubt still Peter Bells to whom not the "the primrose by the river's brim" merely, but the river itself, suggests no uplifting thought. To St. Francis and any one who cares to follow his directions, a brimming river can elevate the meditative mind to God Himself. And so with other things.

St. Francis acknowledges his indebtedness to the sixteenth century manual of devotion, Scupoli's *Spiritual Combat*, modestly referring to it as "un grand Livre", and his own Introduction, by way of contrast, as "ce pauvre petit livre". But, as a wise critic points out, "It was St. Francis' own saintliness and his great knowledge of the life of the soul amid the trials and temptations of the world, which gives his "little" book a greatness all its own."[1]

Grou's *Manual for Interior Souls* like St. Francis' *Introduction* is a practical book but with a difference. As the title indeed indicates, it is more concerned with the inner life of thought and motive than with its outward expression.

The two central ideas in the *Manual* are the need for self annihilation, and the sovereignty of God in the soul of the believer. In advocating self annihilation, Grou is not treading the well known path of the mystic, but simply following out to its logical conclusion our Lord's declaration that he who loseth his life for His sake shall find it.

> When we are spoken to of dying to ourselves [he writes], of annihilating ourselves, when we are told that that is the foundation of Christian morality, and that in it consists the adoration of God in spirit and in truth, we do not wish to receive this saying; it seems to us hard and even unjust, and we rebel against those who announce it to us on the part of God. Let us convince ourselves once for all that this saying has nothing but what is just and right in itself, and that the practice of it is infinitely sweeter than we think for. Afterwards let us humble ourselves if we have not the courage to put it into practice; and instead of condemning the words of wisdom, let us condemn ourselves.[2]

[1] *The Spiritual Combat* (Methuen), p. 5.
[2] Grou: *Manual for Interior Souls*, chap. XXX.

Concerning the sovereignty of God in the soul, let one statement also suffice, from his chapter on "The Employment of Time".

> The sole object of the interior soul is to glorify God, to love God; to glorify Him by all her actions, and by all her sufferings, which come to her through His choice, and in which she has nothing to do but patiently to submit; to love Him, not by formal acts or by effusions of sensible devotion, but by being effectually and continually devoted to Him, and by an entire resignation of her own will to His.[1]

Grou is strong in his attacks upon every form of egotism, the arch enemy of God in the soul.

> The human "I" [he writes again] is the root of pride, and consequently of all sin. It is the enemy of God whom it attacks in His absolute and universal sovereignty. If we could once annihilate the human "I" the innocent man would pass his days in an unchanging peace, because both from within and without there would be nothing to disturb him.[2]

In its acute and disturbing analysis of human nature, as well as its emphasis upon the antithesis between man's self will and the reign of God in the soul, the *Manual* is a very profitable book of devotion for the average minister of the Gospel, who by his work as minister of a parish is often in danger of becoming not less but more egotistical than his parishioners.

The third and last book in this section which I wish to mention is one of the best known of all our devotional classics, namely William Law's *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.*

Earlier in this paper I spoke of the advisability of having a book of devotion always in train, or even of choosing one classic of the soul's quest and never deviating from that one. For myself at least—and one can only write or talk of such books from personal experience—were I obliged to choose one and one only, I would probably choose Law's *Serious Call.*

Law's sturdy Protestantism may have something to do with such a choice—and how few great Protestant writers there are among the masters of devotional literature!—or it may be our insularity as a people. Here is a man, you feel, who can speak to us in our national idiom, and who not only understands human nature, but understands also the average Englishman, his foibles and little insincerities, as well as his solid virtues, and who therefore has a right to deal with these in his own austere and unsparing manner.

[1] ibid., chap. XV. [2] ibid., chap. XXIX.

Law's inexorable logic, as he proves that the life of devotion is the only life for every Christian and not merely for the professional priest, his felicitous character sketches, his scheme of private devotions, well supplemented by arguments—all combine to form an unique classic of devotion, as fascinating to the student of English literature and manners as to the minister of religion. The faults of the book have long been known. It is a rather joyless kind of Christianity that Law preaches, from which innocent pleasures are ruthlessly expelled; redemption becomes a kind of spiritual drill rather than the gracious gift of God; and the fear of God rather than the love of God seems to be the underlying motive.

Keble summed up the impression the book makes upon the serious reader when he said to Froude: "Froude, you said one day that Law's *Serious Call* was a clever (or pretty, I forget which) book. It seemed to me as if you had said that the Day of Judgment would be a pretty sight."

Canon Overton's *Life* of Law is still of great value in giving Law's intellectual and spiritual background, as well as enabling us to picture his quietly methodical life at King's Cliff—that curious hermit-like but not unhappy existence with the two elderly and eccentric women, his companions in perpetual retreat—and his private life of devotion which never deviated till the day of his death from the lines laid down in his *Serious Call.*

All in all, the *Serious Call* is a work of such solidity and practical devotional value that its merits preponderate over its faults. Neither the passage of time nor its severest critics can detract from its usefulness as a book of daily devotion.

(4) I come now to the Mystics and to spiritual autobiography. Here we are at once introduced to a rarefied atmosphere and to a lofty spiritual realm, where many, try as they may, can never feel at home.

Yet it must be admitted that if the spirits of the acknowledged Mystics were to reappear and remove their works from our bookshelves, there would be serious gaps left in the devotional section. A Kempis would have gone with his *Imitation*, Santa Teresa would have decamped with her *Life* and her *Interior Castle*, Tauler would have gone with his profound and convincing Sermons, St. Julian with her exquisite *Revelations of*

Divine Love, the two unknown mystics with their deeply spiritual *Theologia Germanica* and *Cloud of Unknowing*—to name only a few. Some would go so far as to claim both St. John and St. Paul for Mysticism—"two supreme mystics", Evelyn Underhill calls them: in which case even our Bibles would have suffered severe abridgement.

If, however, you were to confine yourself even to a few of the outstanding mystics, such as the great Spaniards Santa Teresa and St. John of the Cross, and, say, the English mystics of the fourteenth century—Rolle, Hilton and St. Julian—you can readily assess the value of such writers for the life of devotion.

Whether we are "mystical" by nature or otherwise; whether we are attracted or repelled by the Mystic Way and the demand —in certain of the mystical books—for self annihilation, none of us will question that the mystics make us feel the reality of the unseen and spiritual world.

St. Paul, if we may trust the well known passage in Second Corinthians, was rather *afraid* of his beatific visions, and confessed rather *ashamedly* that he was caught up into the third heaven, and heard things not lawful to utter. Neither Santa Teresa nor St. Julian one feels sure, would have felt in the least ashamed of such experiences, but would have gloried in them and described them in great detail. Santa Teresa's *Life* is of course full of her divine "locutions" or heart to heart talks with "His Majesty", Christ, and there are examples of all the various grades of the Mystic Way—union, rapture, transport and trance.

Take a short passage, almost at random, from her spiritual autobiography:

> I wish I could explain with the help of God, wherein union differs from rapture, or from transport, or from the flight of the spirit, as they speak, or from a trance, which are all one. I mean that all these are only names for that one and the same thing, which is also called Ecstasy. It is more excellent than union, the fruits of it are much greater, and its other operations more manifold, for union is uniform in the beginning, the middle, and the end, and is also interiorily. But rapture for the most part, is irresistible. It comes in general as a shock, quick and sharp, before you can collect your thoughts or help yourself in any way, and you see or feel it as a cloud, or a strong eagle rising upwards, and carrying you away on its wings.[1]

[1] *The Life of St. Teresa of Jesus*, chap. XX.

Of what value, you might ask, is a passage of this kind to any but a student of Mysticism or a psychoanalyst?

Or of what value is St. John of the Cross's *Dark Night of the Soul* which, like the *Cloud of Unknowing* describes in the most difficult and tantalisingly obscure manner that stage in the mystic way to God comparable, one supposes, on a lowly human plane, to the sense of Dereliction experienced by our Lord upon the Cross?

Or, finally, to go farther afield, of what value to us is a book like the *Life of Blessed Henry Suso*, which comes to us from the Middle Ages, and is so full of self flagellation and other harsh asceticisms that we would turn from the book with loathing, were it not that we are convinced of the utter sincerity of the "Servitor", and cannot but regard as authentic many of his astounding visions?

The answer is that the Mystics—whether we approve of mysticism or not—do help to strengthen our faith in things unseen and eternal. We who are seekers after a better country meet in them men and women who have had visions of that country, such as come by right to those who forsake all for Christ's sake. To them the spiritual world is indeed more real and tangible than this earthly scene, and because of that they can strengthen our prayer life and our practice of the Presence of God.

Robertson of Brighton, at one period of his life, gave up reading mystical books lest he should be lured into the habit of feeling without acting. That of course is the danger of becoming too absorbed in mystical literature to the exclusion of all else. But Robertson, at a later period of his life, seems to have altered his opinions, for he wrote: "I feel the need of them, and so shall begin them again. Our affections must be nurtured in the highest."[1]

A final word must be said about one aspect of nearly all the great devotional classics, namely, their uplifting view of death. Too often, when we officiate at funerals, the mourners feel, and we ourselves can hardly avoid feeling, that "this is the end". The very words of committal, "Earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust", have an overwhelming air of finality about them. In spite of the succeeding reference to the "sure

[1] Quoted by Philip: *The Devotional Literature of Scotland*, p. 10.

and certain resurrection", we have said a mournful goodbye. But the mystics speak of death joyfully, as but the gateway to that fuller life of which their mystical transports have already given them a foretaste. Certain of their treatises indeed, or large parts of them, might be taken as living illustrations of St. Paul's assertion, "To me to live is Christ, to die is gain".

Let me close by referring to one who not only faced death with a morbid curiosity unique in English literature, but also heard the heavenly music of the Resurrection breaking through, namely, John Donne.

We might do worse, indeed, than add to our list of devotional classics both Donne's *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions* and his *Divine Poems*, for in these two taken together, Donne contemplated both death and the risen life with unforgettable power.

In his *Devotions* we see the dean upon his bed in his all but mortal sickness, now listening to the congregation singing the psalm, now roused from day dreaming by the tolling of the death bell, and thus reflecting upon it. "Here the bells can scarce solemnise the funeral of any person but that I knew him, or knew that he was my neighbour; we dwelt in houses near to one another before, but now he is gone into that house into which I must follow him."

In his *Divine Poems*, however, Donne touches upon the same episode in his life with exultation. The bitterness of death is past; he is now gazing into Heaven itself and seeing the angelic hosts about the throne. So he writes in his "Hymn to God, my God in my Sickness":

> Since I am coming to that holy room,
> Where with Thy choir of saints for evermore
> I shall be made Thy music; As I come
> I tune the instrument here at the door,
> And what I must do then, think here before.

That stanza, rising phoenix-like from the dust and ashes of the poet's morbid broodings upon Death, might be taken as the motto or text for the greater Mystics; for in truth "their hope is full of immortality".

NOTES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF HOLY BAPTISM

by The Rev. J. K. S. REID

The following is offered as a contribution towards the clarification of a matter of first-class theological importance which is undergoing vigorous and widespread debate at the present day. A certain answer to the problem involved is finally given; but the author is not so naïve as to suppose that no other answers have been and are being given, or to believe that the answer here proposed has been rendered entirely secure against all criticism. All that matters in a theme of such importance is that, by free and frank discussion of the issues involved, the Christian Church may ultimately come to a common mind. It certainly cannot to-day afford the luxury of widely divergent views at so fundamental a point.

It is the break-up of the Christian tradition that has brought the subject with such urgency into the forefront of interest and discussion. And since this break-up is visibly present in many countries, the Churches in these countries are sensible of the problem and are applying themselves to its solution. All these Churches face what is in the main a common problem. It would be profoundly regrettable if the solutions to which they came were found at the last to divide them.

It is the administration of Holy Baptism that is the chief concern of this essay. The wise and certainly the easier course to pursue might appear to be to say little or nothing about the nature of Baptism. This would, however, be to win agreement, supposing agreement to be attained, at too superficial a level. The strain of practical application would undoubtedly disclose concealed disagreement concerning the meaning of the Sacrament. It is in any case clearly impossible to discuss the administration of Baptism *in vacuo*, as though the same things would apply to its administration, whatever view one held about its significance. Then indeed the situation would be simpler; but then too it would not in the last resort matter what one believed

about it, and the doctrine of Baptism would be luxury and not necessity. This is evidently not the case.

Two considerations have, therefore, to be taken into account at this point. Something must be said about the theological or essential meaning of Holy Baptism; for this, as has been said, must have a bearing on its administration. And further, something ought to be said about the New Testament practice of Baptism; and it is clear that this will be of paramount importance for the practice of the Church to-day, *if* the New Testament practice is discernible, and *if* the situation today is similar enough to that of New Testament times.

1. The Meaning of Holy Baptism

A real event takes place in Baptism. Something really happens. Moreover what happens is certainly not a mere sign. No more than the elements in the Holy Communion are mere signs, is the water of Baptism or the rite as a whole a mere sign. Of course both Sacraments are symbolic. But to use the familiar distinction, the sign here is not a sign of something absent, but a sign of something really present. On the other hand, it is just as necessary to affirm that Baptism is not an agent. Its efficacy does not proceed *ex opere operato*. The act taking place and the rite being performed do not guarantee *ipso facto* that anything happens at all. If there is efficacy here, it is not the kind of efficacy that is carried simply by the doing of the deed. Nor is it the kind of efficacy that is stored up awaiting only pressure on a trigger for release.

Neither mere sign, then, nor plenipotentiary agent, the outward form of Baptism is a channel through which God, who is the true agent in the matter, is pleased to permit His grace to appear, His benefits to be conferred and His effects to take place. It is still quite possible to call Baptism itself a real event. This will not mean that of itself it effects anything. But it will mean that, rightly administered, it is the locus or covenanted sphere of Divine activity which certainly does effect something. God, remaining Himself entirely free, is pleased normally to accomplish a work of grace by the administration of Holy Baptism.

So Calvin: "Baptism is a sign of initiation, by which we are admitted into the society of the Church, in order that, being incorporated into Christ, we may be numbered among the chil-

dren of God" (*Inst.* 4.15.1). It is "a most certain rule in sacraments, that in corporeal things we contemplate spiritual things, just as if they were placed before our eyes, as it has pleased God to represent them to us by figures; not that such blessings are bound or enclosed in the sacrament, or that it has the power to impart them to us; but only because it is a sign by which the Lord testifies his will, that he is determined to give us all these things: nor does it merely feed our eyes with a bare prospect of the symbols, but conducts us at the same time to the things signified, and efficaciously accomplishes that which it represents" (4.15.14).

The exact definition of what is effected is not for the present purpose of first-class concern. I should myself maintain that there are one or two things of cardinal importance in any definition. But I think it ought to be pointed out that disagreement *at this point* need not imply rejection of the conclusions to be later drawn. (*a*) Without going into matters of guilt and the apportionment of responsibility, we all are members of a fallen race. (*b*) Just as children are born into a community and in virtue of this fact, not of any merit of their own but of their mere birth, become (say) rulers of an Empire and partakers in a Commonwealth, so they are born subjects of sin and partakers in a fallen nature. (*c*) They are thus precluded from that rightness with God in which righteousness consists and which Christ's work restores. (*d*) In Holy Baptism that which stands between them and God is done away, and the covenant of grace is declared available and actually applied to the individual case.[1]

From this brief summary, it appears that the baptised person is not only declared but made a member of the Church of Christ and really incorporated into His Body by Holy Baptism. Whatever impedes the right relation between God and His child is really done away, wiped out and abrogated. Nothing now stands between the individual and God.

That some such view is consonant with and even demanded

[1] This affirmation admits of greater precision. If Christ's death and resurrection is regarded as a *general* Baptism ("for the sins of the whole world"), the baptismal act admits the *individual* to participation in it. Its benefits are then made available for him and applied to him, just as at the conclusion of a successful war the victor country may admit individual members of a conquered people to participation in the fruits of a victory to which they have not contributed and which indeed they may have resisted.

by Reformed doctrine would require a longer justification than is here possible. One or two references are relegated to the footnote, but it is perhaps worth while to quote from the Office of Baptism as contained in the formularies of the Church of Scotland and the Church of England. The *Book of Common Order* 1940 uses firm and explicit language: "ingrafting into Christ, forgiveness of sins by His blood, and regeneration by His Spirit, adoption, and resurrection unto everlasting life"—all this being apparently effected; "and engaged to be the Lord's"—which alone contains any hint of incompleteness. Of all this the Sacrament is not only a sign but a "seal". In the *Book of Common Prayer*, the godparents are said, in bringing a child for Baptism, to "have prayed that our Lord Jesus Christ would vouchsafe to receive him, to release him of his sins, to sanctify him with the Holy Ghost, to give him the Kingdom of heaven and everlasting life". While of course the bringing of the child to Baptism and the prayer are easily distinguishable, it appears that Baptism is regarded as the occasion of the answering of the prayer.

The following may serve to indicate the attitude which Calvin in his more accessible and familiar writings is inclined to assume: "We ought to conclude that at whatever time we were baptised, we are washed and purified for the whole of life. . . . For though when it (i.e. Baptism) has been once administered, it appears to be past, yet it is not abolished by subsequent sins. For the purity of Christ is offered to us in it; and that always retains its virtue, is never overcome by any blemishes, but purifies and obliterates all our defilements" (*Inst.* 4.15.3).[1]

[1] A full discussion of reformed doctrine concerning the exact benefits afforded by Holy Baptism has to reckon very seriously with such passages as the following: *Confessio Scoticana*, Art. 21: "by Baptism we are engrafted into Christ Jesus, to be made partakers of his justice, by which our sins are covered and remitted"; "*Knox's Liturgy*" in the Address and Exhortation after the initial question: "the justice of Jesus Christ is made ours by Baptism", and reference is made to "that pureness and perfection, wherewith we are clad in Baptism"; Calvin's *Catéchisme de l'Eglise de Genève* 1542, where Baptism "as an entry into the Church of God" is said to have a double significance: "Car le Seigneur nous y represente la remission de noz pechez (Eph. 5.26 and 27), et puis nostre regeneration, ou renouvellement spirituel (Rom. 6.4)", this being no mere representation but "c'est tellement figure, que la verité est conioincte avec" (323, 324, 328); Heidelberg Catechism where Q. 73 is formulated: "Warumb nennet denn der heilige Geist den Tauff das bad der widergeburt und die abwaschung der sünden?"; Craig's Catechism which in the section on Baptism declares that the signification of Baptism is "remission of our sins and regeneration" defined as "mortification and newness of life", and that of this the Sacrament is no "bare figure" but (repeating Calvin)

If the charge of "baptismal regeneration" be levelled at what has been said, I should not myself feel unduly alarmed. We must not be intimidated by the mere employment of a catchword, which in the course of controversy has become charged with acrimony and thus at least partially distorted. Whether what has been said implies "baptismal regeneration" or not is to some extent a matter of terminology. Reformed theology was not shy of connecting regeneration with Baptism, as the documents mentioned in the footnote above show. If regeneration is so defined in subjective terms that the characteristics of the new life are looked for, charity, purity of life and the like, there is certainly no regeneration in Baptism. But on the other hand, can anything really be incorporated into Christ without having been made new—anything so distorted as a member of fallen humanity?[1]

The guiding rule here is that God does what is done in Holy Baptism, and He does whatever is required to set a man right with Himself. He is ushered into a status—of which certainly he may later prove unworthy, but of which he yet retains the imprimatur.

The practical bearing upon the matter in hand of what has hitherto been said may be expressed thus. There is something so precious offered in Holy Baptism, that it should in no wise be withheld, except under the most compelling circumstances. It is the plain will of God in this way to offer and confer benefits, and, as we shall see, to increase His Church. It will be only under the gravest and most powerful duress that we shall be right in declining to administer the rite by which they are conveyed. This consideration will later be used with some force.

"hath the verity joined to it"; Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. 28, sect. 6, where "by the right use of this ordinance, the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost"; Larger Catechism which, answering Q. 167 concerning the improvement of Baptism, mentions the "privileges and benefits conferred and sealed thereby"; Westminster Directory for the Publick Worship of God, in which in prayer before the act of Baptism God is besought to "join the inward baptism of his spirit with the outward baptism of water, and make this baptism to the infant a seal of adoption, remission of sin, regeneration, and eternal life, and all other promises of the covenant of grace".

[1] A very elementary point should perhaps be noted here. Objection may not be taken to "baptismal regeneration" on the ground that there is no need for regeneration at all. And yet those who protest against it are often found to have this as a concealed premise in their argument. The real difficulty in "baptismal regeneration" of course concerns the place of faith. But once again those who protest against it should at least observe that the need for faith can be so formulated as to preclude all but adult Baptism.

2. New Testament Practice and Precedent

Is the practice of the New Testament discoverable? If found, does it provide precedent for the administration of Holy Baptism to-day? If these questions were to be answered in the affirmative, we should have at least some standard upon which to judge present day administration. But it is impossible to answer them with entire confidence, since primitive Church practice is at the moment a matter of lively debate.

Professor Oscar Cullmann of Basel and Paris in his *Tauflehre des Neuen Testaments* (Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich 1948, and shortly to appear in English translation by S.C.M. Press) offers an uncommonly penetrating study of what the New Testament really has to say concerning Baptism: (*a*) Against the view that the practice of infant Baptism is not well or even at all attested in the New Testament, Cullmann affirms that it is even more certain that no adult members of already Christian families are reported to be baptised. We all know the vagueness of the New Testament references to the "families" and the "houses" which are baptised, the varieties of view to which the obscurity of the references gives rise, and the arguments for and against infants and children being included. Certainty here may be beyond our reach. But never in all the New Testament is there a case of someone, born into a Christian household, having his Baptism postponed until faith becomes his own professed possession. To state this firmly is a notable clarification of the situation.

(*b*) Cullman affirms that in the New Testament faith is not regarded as a simple precondition of the application of Baptism. The widest statement that can be made, embracing the cases of both adult and infant, places faith at a different point: viz., *after* Baptism faith is demanded of *all* baptised persons without exception (op. cit. p. 49). *Before* Baptism, affirmation of faith is to be taken as a sign of the divine will that the person in question be added to the Church. For adults, this sign takes the form of a requirement: it is demanded of persons who come over from Judaism or heathenism that they make overt profession. But in the case of others, this requirement is not exacted. At the same time, faith is never wholly absent when Baptism is administered. Even when the case is that of an infant, during

the baptismal ceremony it is required that the congregation of fellowship, present and praying, manifest faith.

(*c*) Cullmann adds a limiting consideration. The Baptism of adults, whose parents at their birth were already believing Christians, is not demonstrable in the New Testament. Cullmann emphasises the word "believing"; and he adds: "Where the parents are indeed baptised, but later fall from faith, the case alters; and then the postponement of New Testament Baptism is not only justified but demanded" (op. cit. p. 64, note 1). This, it may be remarked, is of interest and importance for the purpose that is here in view. It hints that our differences about the administration of Baptism are due less to different conceptions of the nature of Baptism as such, than to difference of assessment of a variable and almost incalculable factor within the act of Baptism, namely the faith that is present.

Different views are likely to be held about Karl Barth's recent treatise on *Die kirchliche Lehre von der Taufe*, published in English as *The Teaching of the Church regarding Baptism* (S.C.M. Press, 1948). One thing is, however, beyond dispute: if Cullmann is right in his exposition of the New Testament doctrine of Baptism, Karl Barth is certainly not; and between the two, the honours seem to lie with the former. What is one to make of Barth's complaint that Baptism is now so "decently ordered"? There will clearly always be an immeasurable difference between the elements and the virtue of a Sacrament. Barth seems to suggest that we have too domesticated Holy Baptism, and that it would have more efficacy if we were to do it in a bigger way and perhaps use more water, in order that the element more adequately represent the power of the Sacrament. It is almost as though he would suggest that we should have more bread on the Holy Table at the Communion in order the better to represent the greatness of the benefits we there receive.

This desire that the symbol should adequately symbolise goes back, one must suppose, to Barth's insistence that the essence of Holy Baptism lies in its *declaratory* significance, though this is hardly the way the Reformers construed Holy Writ. If this is all the significance Holy Baptism has, then the "declaration" ought certainly to be as plain and clear as we can make it, so that they who are concerned, the sponsors, the baptised person and the congregation, may have it suitably and ade-

quately declared to them. But it is only because Barth disturbs the balance in Holy Baptism that this inadequacy becomes a question worth raising at all. Let it be supposed that, as said earlier, Holy Baptism really does declare *and apply* some benefit. There can then be no reason for demanding an element of greater representative suitability. How can it be of importance to raise the question of adequacy, when means and benefits are entirely incommensurable? The fact is that, paradoxical though it may sound, just because there is something real conveyed in Baptism, there is no point in trying to secure for the means a form having greater representative value.

It is convenient to note here one of the points which Professor T. W. Manson contributes to the whole discussion in the article, "Baptism in the Church", appearing in the December 1949 issue of the *Journal*. Thought about Baptism, he maintains, has been misled by a false individualism. The whole matter is often debated as if the benefits and virtue of Baptism accrued solely to the individual as such. Its power and its efficacy is regarded as working his personal salvation. There is of course an element of truth in this; but it is not the whole truth. Dr Manson makes the necessary correction. He points out that Baptism in fact is less for the benefit of the individual than for the sake of the Church. It occurs, not that A and B and C may be delivered from final loss, but that there may always be a Church to bear witness to Jesus Christ. Baptism is thus the Divine method of recruitment. It is in this way that Acts 2.47 comes to life in our day: through and by means of Holy Baptism, the Lord adds to the Church daily such as should be saved.[1]

The conclusions to be drawn from what has been said are two at least. First, it is a matter of the greatest importance that Holy Baptism be administered. The reasons for this importance are not in dispute. There is the simple injunction of our Lord that His disciples "go into all the world and preach the gospel, baptising in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the

[1] So Fr. Leenhardt, quoted by O. Cullmann, op. cit., p. 26, note 19, says "le baptême est le sacrement par lequel l'Église *se recrute*". Dr Manson is in fact reminding us of what the *Directory* might have saved us from forgetting, that in Baptism God "daily bringeth some into the bosom of his Church . . . for the continuance and increase of his Church" (from the prayer of thanksgiving following Baptism).

Holy Ghost"—and even if these words should prove to be not certainly dominical, they are evidently near enough to the dominical teaching for the disciples both to use and to be guided by them. There is the benefit which accrues to the person baptised. For the purpose here in mind, it is not needful that all should have exactly the same conception of the nature of this benefit, if only it be allowed that some cardinal boon is really bestowed in the Sacrament. Whatever the exact character of this boon, it is evidently important that no undue impediment be put in the way of its availability. For this reason, the present writer hopes to carry over to the second part of the discussion even those who understand the inner meaning of Baptism differently from himself. There is further the consideration of which Professor Manson reminds us, that the benefit not only of the person baptised, but of the Church itself is here at stake, since Baptism is the means by which God contrives that there be always a Church to witness to His Name.

The second conclusion is that Baptism is applicable to infants. The New Testament ground for this affirmation is partly from inference and partly from silence. There is reason to think that the houses and the families baptised did include infants and children. And on the negative side, no case is reported where members of a family already Christian are required to wait until adult years for Baptism. The administration of Baptism in the case of infants, however, is evidently different from its administration to adults. A different range of circumstances comes into play. Other conditions must be fulfilled before the administration may be regarded as regular or even valid.[1] And it is about these special conditions for the right administration of infant Baptism that the modern question has been raised.

3. Conditions for the Proper Administration of Holy Baptism[2]

It has been generally recognised in Scotland that these require careful statement. I am not sure that the position here

[1] If A. Benoît ("Le Problème du pédobaptisme," in *Revue d'H. et de Phil. relig.*, 1948-49, 2, pp. 139 f.) is right, the difference is not after all quite fundamental. Neither birth within a Christian family, nor even professed adult faith, can be a *guarantee* of subsequent faith; they can only be "une indication de sa probabilité".

[2] In what follows the position in Scotland is specially in mind; but the hope may perhaps be expressed that the situation in England and elsewhere is similar enough to make what is said *mutatis mutandis* applicable.

would justify so liberal a use of the term "indiscriminate Baptism" as the compilers of *Baptism To-day*[1] feel driven to employ in the case of England.

(*a*) Calvin. John Knox evidently found the question arise early in the story of the reformed Church in Scotland, and wrote to Calvin for a ruling in the matter. This is the reply Calvin sent. "We confess that it is indispensable for (the infants baptised) to have sponsors. For nothing is more preposterous than that persons should be incorporated with Christ, of whom we have no hopes of their ever becoming His disciples. Wherefore if none of its relations present himself to pledge his faith to the Church that he will undertake the task of instructing the infant, the rite is a mockery and Baptism is prostituted" (Letter, Calvin to John Knox, 1559).

Three factors are here to be observed, each of them being operative in the whole situation. There is an *incorporation with Christ*; there is a (later) *discipleship of Christ* (evidently expected in the case of the baptised person); and there is a *pledged faith* on the part of a sponsor which (it seems) bridges over the gap between actual incorporation and hoped for discipleship.

The lines are thus early laid down along which, however difficult they may be to follow, a solution must be worked out. Calvin does not demand, it appears, an already completed discipleship—as of course he could not do, while retaining infant Baptism. What he does demand is that the "incorporation with Christ" take place under such conditions as make the expectation a legitimate one, that the infant baptised will subsequently come to what he calls "discipleship", i.e. presumably to profession of the Christian faith and life.

Can we extract from Calvin a narrower definition of the part faith plays among the conditions of the proper administration of Baptism? The answer seems to be that faith for Calvin operates in three ways which are not exactly co-ordinated or defined. Faith is present in others; it may be incipiently present in the child; it is certainly proleptically awaited and expected.

Calvin points out (*Inst.* 4.16.5) that among the Jews the benefits of covenant were *ipso facto* extended to the children of

[1] "The Schedule" presented to the Convocations of Canterbury and York, Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1949.

Jewish families. He argues from this the legitimacy of infant Baptism. "The Lord expressly pronounces that the circumcision of a little infant should serve as a seal for the confirmation of the covenant. But if the covenant remains firm and unmoved, it belongs to the children of Christians now, as much as it did to the infants of the Jews under the Old Testament. But if they are partakers of the thing signified, why shall they be excluded from the sign?" Calvin makes use of the influential idea of family solidarity which characterises Jewish thought to press home the legitimacy of the claims of the "children of Christians" to Baptism. Behind infant Baptism there stands undefined but indispensable the faith of others.

Is there incipient faith in infants? Calvin is very cautious here. His reply amounts to this: we cannot say that there is not. *Inst.* 4.16.19: "What danger can result from our affirming (only over against those that quite deny it) that (infants) already receive some portion of that grace, of which they will ere long enjoy the full abundance? . . . Not that I would hastily affirm them to be endowed with the same faith which we experience in ourselves, or at all to possess a similar knowledge of faith, which I would prefer leaving in suspense." Calvin's disinclination to affirm incipient or inchoate faith disables it from being a ground of the legitimacy of infant Baptism.

But if faith can be only dubiously ascribed to infants, it is "in order to faith", with a view, that is, to eventual faith, that Baptism is administered. *Inst.* 4.16.20: "though infants at the time of their circumcision did not understand the meaning of that sign, they were nevertheless truly circumcised into the mortification of their corrupt and polluted nature, *which they were to pursue in mature years.* In short . . . they are *baptised into future repentance and faith*; for though these graces have not yet been formed in them, the seeds of both are nevertheless implanted in their hearts by the secret operation of the Spirit." What Calvin seems to be saying is this: you may not demand faith in your candidate for Baptism; but you administer Baptism in the expectation that faith will eventually spring up, for in Baptism its seeds are indeed already sown in the heart. The conditions of the proper administration of Baptism will be deeply concerned with this expectation. This proleptic faith must be held to be of cardinal importance in Calvin's view.

(*b*) Church of Scotland Standards. The law of the Church of Scotland as presently stated declares that "a child has a right to Baptism whose parents, one or both, having been themselves baptised, profess the Christian religion" (1933, vii). Calvin's undefined "pledged faith" is here more narrowly described. There appear to be two elements demanded: Baptism of the persons appearing to present the child (whether sponsors or parents); and a "profession of the Christian religion", apparently supplementing the condition of Baptism.[1]

Before discussing the interpretations of which this statement is capable, it is natural that the witness of the New Testament should be called in evidence. In the New Testament there is no case of an infant's Baptism being postponed to adult age, if at his birth at least one of his parents was already Christian. Cullmann (as cited above) adds the limitation that even where the parents are baptised, if they have fallen away from faith, postponement of Baptism is not only legitimate but demanded. One imagines that this case is the nearest parallel to what in later times has become all too frequent. In New Testament times, it may be assumed, those baptised into the faith remained in the faith, unless they contracted out of it, as of course many certainly did in times of persecution and for other reasons. In the main, then, the New Testament position is simple: there are those who, professing the faith and having been themselves baptised, fall away; and this falling away takes such overt form that it is unmistakable. One of our difficulties is, however, that this example cannot be directly applied to the modern case. Our situation is complicated by the emergence of a third type of baptised person—the one who being baptised neither in any discernible way practises the Christian faith nor explicitly contracts out of it. This is, I suppose, the real nerve of the difficulty of administration and the occasion of the perplexity in which all Christian Churches are to-day.

4. To whom is Holy Baptism properly administered?

When the problem is thus stated: To what infants is Holy Baptism properly administered? interest centres upon the

[1] How essentially similar is the problem which Baptism presents to the different Churches may be judged from the following quotation taken from *Baptism To-day* (p. 32): "We should all agree that Baptism is an essential qualification for all sponsors. . . . But we are not agreed as to what more should be demanded."

phrase of Church law in Scotland: "whose parents, one or both, having been themselves baptised, profess the Christian religion". What does the phrase "profess the Christian religion" mean? What does it add to the requirement that parents be baptised? To employ the words of *Baptism To-day*, "what more should be demanded?"

At least three different interpretations of the phrase "professing the Christian religion" are possible.[1] (*a*) The phrase implies full *confirmation*. The case for this possibility is a strong and attractive one. Profession is publicly demanded on the occasion of Confirmation and Admission into the full membership of the Church; and it is this profession to which reference is here made. Besides Baptism itself has this forward-looking aspect, to a day and a time when what is done in Baptism will, on the emergence of faith, receive its completion and fulfilment, its ratification and even justification. There is evidently something anomalous about the case of parents subjecting their children to a rite of this kind who have themselves failed to bring their own Baptism to its completion.

(*b*) The suggestion has been made and advocated that the phrase "professing the Christian religion" cannot imply Confirmation already made and received. The phrase can, however, be construed to mean a "declared intention" so to become confirmed. This view maintains that, in the careful preparation before Baptism (which all are at one in advocating) the parents not already confirmed should give assurance of their own willingness and intention to present themselves for Confirmation—this not necessarily to precede the Baptism desired for their children, but to follow it in reasonable time.

The advantage of this view is to make it possible for the Baptism of children to proceed, without postponement until after the Confirmation of the parents is completed. But otherwise the view is really in sympathy with that mentioned above —that Confirmation is a necessity and must be demanded of parents presenting their children for Baptism, under the rubric "professing the Christian faith". What is demanded is a virtual or crypto-communicant membership of the Church by public profession and Confirmation. One cannot altogether suppress

[1] These three possibilities were all raised and reviewed in an Edinburgh Presbytery Committee set up to consider the meaning of the phrase.

the feeling that any attractiveness which the proposal has lies in a certain, no doubt unconscious, deceit which it practises. It makes a brave appearance: Confirmation is demanded; but it scales down this demand to a "declared intention" of seeking Confirmation. Knowledge of human nature ought to warn us that, if it is to be a matter of *quid pro quo*, it is just as well to have the *quid* and the *quod* changing hands at the same time. Can it be denied that the probability of exacting implementation of the declared intention at a later date in all cases is very remote?

(*c*) The third possible view is the vague and indefinite one that sincere affirmation of adherence to the Christian faith and life be held to satisfy the requirements of that "professing the Christian faith" which is demanded. Of the sincerity of this affirmation, there can be no outward standard or criterion, though of course adherence to atheistic doctrines or flagrant and repeated immorality must be held to disqualify an application for Baptism.

5. Guiding Principles

Holy Baptism is, in obedience to our Lord's command and in view of the evident benefits it confers, to be made as widely available as possible, with due regard to its regular and orderly administration. The conferring of the benefits of Baptism is of primary importance; the definition of the conditions under which it is to be administered is of secondary importance, in the sense that *the conditions are for the sake of Baptism, not Baptism for the sake of the conditions*. And care ought always to be taken not to allow *administrative difficulties* to jeopardise the *validity* of Baptism.

Among the conditions required is the presence of faith. Unless faith is at some point present, there can of course be no administration of Baptism at all. If the question of incipient faith in the infant baptised be left, as Calvin leaves it, in suspense, faith appears in two other forms. It is present in *proleptic* form. Baptism, that is to say, looks forward to its own completion in the emergence of adult faith in the person baptised. And even if it be objected that proleptic faith is not really faith, any more than Kant's imaginary hundred thalers are real thalers, it would be a profound mistake to leave it out of account in the total situation. The other point at which faith is present is in

the parents or sponsors. Faith in this form is sometimes referred to as vicarious. The term is better avoided here. The faith which it describes is not properly speaking attributed to the infant,[1] though it is an essential element in the situation. It might perhaps be designated *altruistic* faith.

The next question is whether the faith present in the act of Baptism can be tested. Can standards be applied to it in order to ascertain its strength or its sincerity? Evidently not in the case of proleptic faith. It has still to come into being and is not subject to tests. Yet one thing can be done: the likelihood of its arising can be tested, and the adequacy of the conditions for permitting the expectation of its arising. This brings us to the third form in which faith is present, what we have called altruistic faith, the faith of sponsors or parents. Here it is indeed possible to demand some kind of test. But while this is true, it should be observed and remembered that faith is also otherwise present, even though it happens that this faith alone is susceptible to tests.

What ought to be the nature of the test applied? Baptism is the occasion on which a "profession of the Christian religion" is demanded. It cannot be right that this profession be erected into a matter of first concern. Its presence here is conditional and circumstantial, and hence of secondary importance. The centre of gravity must not be so shifted as to disturb the proper proportion and balance between benefit and condition of the proper conferring of benefit. In other words, as already said, the profession at this point is for the sake of Baptism, not Baptism for the sake of this profession. It must therefore be wrong to regard Baptism as the occasion for putting faith to an undue test.

It seems to the present writer right in principle, since the faith of which test is demanded at Baptism is of this "altruistic" kind, and may not rank as matter of prime concern but only of conditional importance, that only a general test ought to be applied. Where there is one to one correspondence and an adult presents himself for full membership in the Christian Church, of course a quite specific test must be applied, and a profession demanded in formal terms. Where the faith present

[1] This, I take it, applies also to communions in which sponsors alone, and not parents, take promises at Baptism. "To make a profession of faith in the recipient's name" (M. Sheehan, *Catholic Doctrine*, p. 147) is no doubt a vicarious act, but the faith itself is not, I fancy, necessarily regarded as vicarious.

is of this "altruistic" kind, on behalf of another, a more general profession is to be held adequate. It may clarify the affair if I be allowed to make use of the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect obligation. This, it will be remembered, differentiates the kind of obligation which can be completely discharged and on being so discharged lapses (e.g. a business contract), from the other kind which is undefined and continuing, where complete discharge is inherently impossible and one always remains under its imposition (e.g. the obligation to charity). In his own case, one may of course enter into any perfect obligation he pleases—"it's his own look out", as we say. But it is a different matter and to the mind of the present writer a matter of unfairness that a perfect obligation should be exacted as condition of conferring a benefit upon another.

This is why it appears to me to be wrong to demand Confirmation on the part of parents or sponsors, and why the mediating suggestion of a "declared intention", involving as it does also a perfect obligation though a hitherto unfulfilled one, cannot be more nearly right. When benefit to one party is concerned, the necessary conditional demands made on a second related and necessarily involved party are not rightly made too exacting.

Moreover, to demand more than a general "profession of the Christian religion", to require a specific undertaking such as Confirmation, seems to me to imply a wrong assessment of the part that parents have in fact to play in the provision of those conditions which will finally bring the baptised infant to full profession. Of course their actual training of the child, and above all the example they set, are as important as any human or material factor can possibly be. But it must not be here forgotten that nothing we can do will in the last resort win from anyone's heart the confession that Jesus Christ is Lord. This must finally be left to an agent other than human. Besides, the parents are not even the only human agents in the matter. There is also the believing Church. The congregation, if they (as commonly required) stand at the declaration of reception into membership during the baptismal Service, thereby signify that they too have a part to play. In practice, further, the name of the child goes down upon the Cradle Roll or similar list, and he is thereafter under the constant care of the

Church, receiving in due time the invitation to Sunday School and the like, all of which are the ordinary means through which the Holy Spirit does so operate within the heart as finally to bring it to confession.

Hence the parents' role may be held to have been in part completed in the very act of bringing their child and of depositing him in the arms of the Church. We are not unaware that the decision to do so may in fact be compounded of the most diverse elements. Often the predominant factor will seem to be indolent regard for custom, or mere superstition, or even awe of an unusually formidable mother-in-law. But it is rarely without at least rudimentary elements of faith. This rudimentary faith has so far become conscious of itself and its responsibilities as to desire to share them with the body of the faithful, the Christian congregation.

It need hardly be said that everything possible should be done to see that those more peripheral conditions are provided which are likely to promote the emergence of faith in the infant baptised. It is absolutely obligatory that *instruction* be given to those who bring their children, and especially their first children, for Baptism—and this, despite the almost superhuman task it lays upon those in charge of large and very large parishes —instruction which should take place both before and after Baptism. *Notice* of application for Baptism should always be given. It may be that *Sponsors' Guilds* should be formed, or the Kirk Sessions advised to discharge sponsoral duties where parental indifference is evident. And nothing that has been here said minimises the urgent necessity of using the occasion of Baptism to point out the plain duty of parents themselves completing that "improvement" of Baptism which consists in Confirmation.

6. Conclusion

We revert accordingly to the widest and simplest and also the least explicit definition of the conditions for the proper administration of Baptism. It is that Holy Baptism be administered to the children of believers, or more strictly to children at least one of whose parents is a baptised person.

Within the limits of this definition two wings of opinion will (I suppose always) be manifest. There are the advocates of the

"gathered Church", and there are those who hold a wider view of what the Church is. The first are the "schismatics" (in no derogatory sense). They continually urge the separation of the Church from the world, the ever renewed purgation and expurgation of the membership of the Church, and the constant imposition of tests by which the true members of the Church will appear in clear and evident light. Confirmation will be one of the chief of these tests. The other type will always be more hesitant about the efficacy of tests for descrying and sifting the "real" members of Christ's Church from the "thieves that enter in". He is inclined to permit that growing together to the harvest, when things will be evident in a way which we have no right to demand here. Besides he hesitates to require the Holy Spirit to reveal His operations and His methods of work, and he knows that the Spirit is not least at work where He is most concealed. He is prepared to wait, without surrendering hope that in time the Holy Spirit will indeed perfect the work which in Baptism He has begun.

It thus appears that, as so often in such affairs, a difference of opinion is seen to rest not so much on different views of the immediate subject matter under dispute, but rather on a different assessment of factors that lie concealed behind the immediate issue. We are all at one in deploring the large and alarming discrepancy between baptised infants and eventual communicants; and we unite in deprecating the presentation of children for Baptism by those who failed to improve their own Baptism to the point of public profession of the faith and public membership of the visible Church. In administering the Sacrament, therefore, some of the clergy may feel inclined to accede to the request for Baptism when made, provided that they have assurance that the parents concerned are not flagrantly unchristian in belief and conduct. Others will be disposed to withhold the benefits of Baptism from the child of parents who are unwilling or unable to provide tangible evidence of their faith. The advocates of both views know that in the Sacrament faith must be present; they are divided in their assessment of the faith required. Finally they differ on the question of the administration of Holy Baptism because they differ on the question of what it means to be a believer.

"*KYRIOS*" AS DESIGNATION FOR THE ORAL TRADITION CONCERNING JESUS

(*Paradosis* and *Kyrios*)[1]

by Professor Dr OSCAR CULLMANN

The work of the form-critics on the Gospel has directed our attention more than ever before to the historical development of the material of the tradition, which took place before the fixing of our Gospels in writing. Collections of single or several words of Jesus, and narratives about Jesus, were establishing themselves already in the early Church, and were passed on by it. How far this tradition was already in part written down, or, as with the oldest Jewish traditions, was only orally transmitted, is not a question of importance for us here, but in any case it could never be solved with certainty. That is also true, as M. Dibelius has rightly stressed, of the much quoted "Q source".[2] It is indeed very probable that already before the composition of our Gospels, there were smaller writings, above all collections of words of Jesus, but it is in no way possible to define or demarcate them more exactly. On principle, this whole stream of tradition, whether it is transmitted in written or oral fashion, in so far as it is not yet channelled in our Gospels, can and must be handled as a unit. When in the title we speak of an "oral" tradition concerning Jesus, we mean simply the tradition concerning Jesus which existed before the Gospels. Similarly, in the Jewish tradition of the Old Testament law, the interpretations of the law were at first orally handed down from Rabbi to pupil, and then later written, but neither the fact of this taking place, nor the time when it took place, are of any fundamental importance for this Jewish tradition.

When we speak of the tradition in the early Church in what follows, we shall have to keep constantly before us, the parallel in the Jewish tradition of the Rabbis. We shall see that Paul

[1] Lecture given to the *Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas* in Oxford, 15th September 1949.

[2] M. Dibelius, *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*, 2nd edn., 1933, pp. 234 ff.

used exactly the same Greek word, *παράδοσις*, which to him as the pupil of Rabbi Gamaliel was familiar from his Jewish past. If we consider how, in general, Jesus spoke against the *paradosis* of the Jews, then we are immediately faced with a problem. How could Paul take this notion, apparently discredited by Jesus, and without more ado transfer it to the instruction and teaching which were held to be normative in the Christian Church?

The problem, however, is yet more complicated by the fact that, instead of "tradition", Paul can sometimes say "the Lord" (*ὁ Κύριος*) as for example when he quotes words of Jesus (1 Thess. 4.15; 1 Cor. 7.10, and 7.25; 1 Cor. 9.14). In 1 Cor. 11.23 he joins the two concepts "tradition" and *Kyrios* when he writes: "I have received the tradition from the Lord." There follows the account of the institution of the Lord's Supper: "that the Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed . . ." *Ἐγὼ παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου . . .* Why "from *Kyrios*"? Why not "from the Church"?

This passage, 1 Cor. 11.23, is usually, but falsely, treated alone, and has, as is well known, given rise to two different interpretations. The one maintains that this passage is not concerned with tradition in the usual Jewish sense, whereby a whole chain of successive human members would be presupposed, from whom Paul had received the account of the institution of the Lord's Supper, but that, on the contrary, it is here a question of direct, immediate revelation from the Lord. This has come to Paul in a visionary experience such as that referred to in Galatians 1.12 where he says, he has not received the Gospel from men, but through direct revelation, through *apokalypsis*, and where clearly the moment of Christ's appearing on the road to Damascus is meant.

This interpretation has been given again and again; by Lefèvre d'Étaples, and by Bengel who followed and quoted him approvingly in this same interpretation; then in more recent times with special emphasis by F. Godet,[1] A. Loisy[2] (who erroneously considers this whole passage to be an insertion) and W. Heitmueller.[3] The French deniers of the historical

[1] F. Godet, *Commentaire sur la 1ère ep. aux Corinthiens*, vol. 2, 1887, pp. 160 ff.

[2] A. Loisy, *Les origines de la Cène eucharistique. Congres d'Histoire du Christianisme*, vol. 1, p. 77 ff.

[3] W. Heitmüller, *Zum Problem Paulus und Jesus* (Z.N.W., 1912), p. 321.

existence of Jesus, Couchoud[1] and Alfaric,[2] have made use of the same explanation. They believe that they can make this passage into a sort of test case for showing the one source out of which the material of the Gospel has arisen: Paul has had visions, and he has transferred the matter of these visions into history, while in reality this "Lord Jesus" never lived.

If this is the right way to understand 1 Cor. 11.23, that is, if the words: "I have received the tradition from the Lord" mean: "I have received the account of the institution of the Lord's Supper directly in a vision from the Lord", then this passage will have no bearing upon the problem of "the tradition" which we are discussing. It will not deal at all with the tradition in the Church. However, by far the preponderant majority of scholars, representing all points of view, are agreed that this interpretation is not accurate, and that the words: "I have received the tradition from the Lord", do not exclude the normal tradition which comes through the Church. I name here, for instance, H. Lietzmann,[3] Johannes Weiss,[4] E. B. Allo,[5] Jean Héring[6] (in the latest commentary on 1 Corinthians), R. Bultmann (in his *Theology of the New Testament* which appeared a short time ago).[7] Also M. Goguel has shown, against those who deny the historical existence of Jesus, that in reality those words presume an historical transmission of the facts.[8]

Thus we see that a very wide consensus exists among the scholars of the various schools and even confessions. And if this interpretation is accurate, then the words "I have received the tradition from the Lord" mean nothing else than: "to receive by means of the tradition which comes through the Church". But if this is so, how is Paul's surprising expression, "from the Lord", to be explained? Here the various individual interpretations draw somewhat apart, though all more or less agree that with the preposition ἀπό Paul points to the chrono-

[1] P. L. Couchoud, *Le mystère de Jésus*, 1924, p. 141.
[2] P. Alfaric, *Le Jésus de Paul* (*Revue d'Histoire des Religions*, 1927), pp. 276 ff.
[3] H. Lietzmann, *An die Korinther*, 1-2 (*Handbuch zum N.T.*), 4th edit. by W. G. Kümmel, 1949, p. 57; see also the footnote added by W. G. Kümmel, p. 185.
[4] John. Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (*Krit. exeg. Kommentar N.T.*), 1919, p. 283.
[5] E. B. Allo, *Première épître aux Corinthiens*, 2nd edit., 1934.
[6] J. Héring, *La première épître de S. Paul aux Corinthiens* (*Commentaire du N.T.*), 1949, p. 100.
[7] R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1948, pp. 148 f.
[8] M. Goguel, *La relation du dernier repas de Jésus dans 1 Cor. 11 et la tradition historique chez l'apôtre Paul* (*Revue d'Histoire et de Philos. rel.*, 1930, pp. 61 f.)

logical origin of the whole presupposed chain of tradition: I have received it *from the Lord.* One might reword it thus: I have received it through a chain of tradition, which begins with the Lord.

This answer to our question, Why the designation *Kyrios*? will have to be tested, but it must first be pointed out that we are dealing here with an hypothesis, and that, in the nature of the case, we are forced to use an hypothesis for the answering of this question. Instead of the above hypothesis, however, I should prefer to put forward another which is somewhat different. I agree indeed with the great majority of scholars that 1 Cor. 11.23 deals with a tradition through the Church, and not with a vision; but I should like to explain the fact that Paul refers it back to the *Lord* rather in terms of the whole complex of *paradosis in the New Testament.* I should like to show that, seen in this connexion, the designation *Kyrios* not only points to the historical Jesus as the chronological beginning of the chain of tradition, as the first member of it, but accepts the exalted Lord as the real Author of the whole tradition developing itself in the apostolic Church. Thus the apostolic *paradosis* can be set directly on a level with the exalted *Kyrios.* The *Lord* is Himself at work in the tradition of His words and deeds through the Apostles; He works through the apostolic church. I find this assumption already in Chrysostom's explanation of our passage, when he writes (Hon. 27.4): "For to-day also it is the same one, who produces and delivers everything, even as at that time" (*καὶ γὰρ καὶ σήμερον αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ πάντα ἐργαξόμενος καὶ παραδοὺς ὥσπερ καὶ τότε*). It must be said at once, however, that Chrysostom's conclusion that *all* Church tradition—including the later, till "to-day"—is to be attributed to the authorship of the Lord Himself, by no means follows from the Pauline designation. Nevertheless in what concerns the *apostolic* tradition, Chrysostom seems to have defined properly the importance of the New Testament connexion of *paradosis* and *Kyrios.*

The course of our argument will now be as follows: In the first section, we shall try to demonstrate that for Paul the *paradosis*, in so far as it refers to the formula of faith, and to the words and deeds of Jesus, is really tradition coming through the Church, to which the Jewish *paradosis* is a parallel. In the second

section, we shall show what relation this tradition through the Church has to the direct *apokalypsis* of the Lord to the Apostles. Then in the third section, we shall consider the general background of Pauline theology, and also of St. John's Gospel according to which all apostolic tradition not only began with the Lord, but in its whole dimension is caused by Him and is really to be considered His work. Finally, we shall speak, in the fourth section, of the relation between this tradition and the apostolic office.

I

Jesus and the early Church lived in an atmosphere entirely permeated with the concept of tradition. That means that the rabbinic interpretation of the Scripture was placing itself more and more as a norm alongside of, and ruling over, the Scripture. Jesus rejected this whole *παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων* as the work of men, which instead of explaining the Scripture in reality set it aside (Mark 7.3 ff.; Matt. 15.2). The slogan of the pious Jews was "hold to the tradition" (*κρατεῖν τὴν παράδοσιν*, Mark 7.18). Jesus took it up, when He said, ironically: "Laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men" (Mark 7.8).

In the letters of Paul, on the other hand, we find him using the whole Jewish *paradosis* terminology, and in a thoroughly positive sense, as for example in his admonition to the Thessalonians: "Hold (*κρατεῖτε*) to the *paradosis*" (2 Thess. 2.15). Also we find the other *termini* which belong to the concept of the tradition recurring, and becoming something like *termini technici*: the synonym for *κρατεῖν*: *κατέχειν* (1 Cor. 11.2 and 1 Cor. 15.2); further: "Stand in the tradition" (*στήκετε*, 1 Cor. 15.1 and 2 Thess. 2.15); but especially "receive" (*παραλαμβάνειν*) and "deliver" (*παραδιδόναι*) (1 Cor. 11.2, 11.23, 15.3; 1 Thess. 2.13; 2 Thess. 2.15, 3.6; Rom. 6.17; Gal. 1.9, 1.12; Phil. 4.9; Col. 2.6, 2.8).[1] It is completely misleading to want to see here, as E. Norden does,[2] the influence of the Greek mystery language. On the contrary, it is clear that this entire terminology comes from the Jews. *παραλαμβάνειν* is a translation of the

[1] On the expression *φυλάττειν παραθήκην* (1 Tim. 6.20; 2 Tim. 1.14) see P. C. Spicq, *S. Paul et la loi des dépôts* (*Revue biblique*, 1931), pp. 481 ff.

[2] E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, pp. 267 f.

Hebraic *qibbel min*, παραδιδόναι of the Hebraic *masar le*.[1] And the exact correspondence of the two Pauline passages in the first Corinthian letter shows that it is a matter of purely formal expressions:

1 Cor. 11.23: *(ἐγὼ) παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου ὃ καὶ παρέδωκα ὑμῖν.*

1 Cor. 15.3: *παρέδωκα ὑμῖν (ἐν πρώτοις) ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον.*

The verbs in the primary and secondary clauses are simply interchanged. That this is possible, is characteristic of the nature of the tradition, which forms a chain. At all events it is clear that this is the language of a Jewish formula, by which the Rabbis refer to the *halacha* and the *haggada*. In the other above mentioned passages, it is sometimes Paul, sometimes the Church, which "has received".

The little word καὶ is to be particularly noticed, also, because it certainly belongs to the formula language of the *paradosis* terminology. Not only does it occur in both 1 Cor. 11.23 and 1 Cor. 15.3, but also in 1 Cor. 15.1: *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον . . . ὃ καὶ παρελάβετε*. E. B. Allo[2] has rightly stressed, that in 1 Cor. 11.23 this καὶ must itself refer to the manner of the transmission: I have received the tradition in the same way as I have handed it on to you, and that means: by mediation.

This now throws light on the addition mentioned at the beginning of 1 Cor. 11.23: "from the Lord", because it means that this addition does not exclude the mediation. Although the words "from the Lord" are lacking in 1 Cor. 15.3 ff., the form of expression, in other respects, is completely parallel, and the fact that both passages used the same formula proves that here, as there, a chain of tradition must be presupposed. In his book, *Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu*, recently published in a new edition, J. Jeremias[3] has shown that, in regard to 1 Cor. 15.3 ff., the content of the *paradosis*, which is introduced with this formula, is linguistically un-Pauline. This also, therefore, confirms the assumption that Paul has taken over a text already fixed. The same can be said for 1 Cor. 11.23, even though Paul declares that he has received this account of the institution of the Lord's Supper "from the Lord". And further M. Goguel,[4] and recently also, R. Bultmann,[5] rightly maintain that this ac-

[1] See J. Jeremias, *Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu*, 2nd edn., 1949, pp. 95 f.
[2] op. cit., p. 311. [3] op. cit., p. 96. [4] op. cit., p. 75. [5] op. cit., p. 149.

count could not have been written down by Paul on the basis of a visionary experience, because when compared with the parallel Synoptic narratives of the Lord's Supper, he clearly represents a further, progressive stage in the tradition.

But what *content* does Paul designate as *paradosis*? First, rules which after the fashion of the *halacha* have to do with the conduct of the faithful, as for example 1 Cor. 11.2; 2 Thess. 3.6; Rom. 6.17; Phil. 4.9; Col. 2.6; secondly, a summary of the Christian preaching, fixed after the fashion of a rule of faith, where facts of the life of Jesus are united with their theological interpretation, as in 1 Cor. 15.3 ff.; finally, words and single narratives from the life of Jesus, as in 1 Cor. 11.23.

Very likely R. Bultmann is right when he says that the original thing was the kerygmatic summary of the faith. But, as we have seen, the tradition had gone a stage further by the time of Paul, and now had words of Jesus and narratives from the life of Jesus as its subject. So far as the words of Jesus are concerned, this tradition must have already progressed a long way. Even the relatively small number of words of Jesus quoted by Paul causes us to suspect that they have already played a great role (1 Thess. 4.15; 1 Cor. 7.10; 1. Cor 9.14). The way in which Paul approaches these words of Jesus, especially in 1 Cor. 7, shows that the *paradosis* of such words was very comprehensive and already rather sharply marked out. He distinguishes clearly between the instructions, which he himself as an Apostle gives, and those which the "Lord" gives. Especially instructive is verse 25, where he writes that, for the unmarried, he has no regulations from the Lord. Since Paul particularly remarks, that in this case he has no words from Jesus at his disposal, it is obviously presupposed that, in general, even in regard to the most particular questions of conduct, there were such words in the *paradosis*.

At all events we maintain that the words of Jesus, which Paul quotes from the *paradosis*, belong to the same class as those kerygmatic formulas of faith in 1 Cor. 15.3, and as that narrative from the life of Jesus in 1 Cor. 11.23.

Throughout it is a question of tradition which the Apostle Paul has received from others and hands on further, just as the rabbinic tradition of the interpretation of the law was received and handed on. The authority with which the Rabbi mediates

tradition has here passed over to the Apostle.[1] The *tanna* of the Jews is replaced by the Apostle of Christ. The fact that, according to his own account, Paul is drawn to Jerusalem in order to meet with the Apostle Cephas (Gal. 1.18), at least suggests to us that he wanted to receive tradition from him. Just as one Rabbi could only receive tradition from another Rabbi, so in the same way very likely one Apostle is able to receive tradition *at first hand* from another Apostle. To be sure Paul reports that he first set out for Jerusalem after three years, but it can be assumed as certain that, already previously, he had received apostolic tradition as it was circulated in the Damascus area. More than this we cannot say, for whether the various parts of the traditions of Paul originate in Jerusalem, Damascus or Antioch, cannot with certainty be discovered, and so we must reckon with all three possibilities.[2] Nevertheless it can be affirmed confidently that the authorised tradition is that which comes from the *Apostles*, meaning not only the twelve Apostles but the wider New Testament group, of those who "had seen Jesus". When Marcion struck out the words: ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον in 1 Cor. 15.3, it was because he interpreted them in the sense of a dependence of Paul on the original Apostles, and in principle at least this interpretation should be right.

The analogy of the Jewish tradition suggests that perhaps also in regard to content all those traditions concerning Christ, *kerygma*, words of Jesus, narratives, are to be considered as *the one true* interpretation of the Old Testament law. This is at least indicated by the words κατὰ τὰς γραφάς in the formula of faith which is delivered in 1 Cor. 15.3 ff. Already here then the question emerges *whether Jesus Christ the "Lord", as the fulfilment of the law, does not take the place of all Jewish paradosis.*

On this basis we are able to understand the fact with which we began, and which is by no means understandable in itself, that even in the proclamation of Christ, Paul employed the concept of the *paradosis* which Jesus rejected so sharply. For Christ all *paradosis* of the law was only the tradition of men;

[1] On this see P. Carrington, *The Primitive Christian Catechism*, 1940, pp. 67 f.

[2] J. Jeremias, op. cit., p. 97, for example, thinks of the tradition of 1 Cor. 11.23 f. as that of the community in Antioch; J. Héring, op. cit., p. 100, as that of the community in Damascus.

but now from Christ there can be *paradosis* which is not *παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

This brings us to our main problem: How is Paul able to designate the tradition from Christ as *Kyrios*?

II

The contradiction between Paul's emphatic stressing that he "has not received his gospel from men" (Gal. 1.12), and, at the same time, his appealing to *paradosis*, which he can only have received through the mediation of tradition, is a continual cause of perplexity. In regard to Acts 9.10 ff., Calvin sought to answer the objection that Ananias had played the role of a human mediator by indicating, on the basis of this passage, that direct divine revelation and human transmission, which God Himself uses, go hand in hand. The more recent explanations solve the apparent contradiction by distinguishing between historical facts and their theological understanding. According to this solution Paul was able to receive the *facts* only through human mediation; what was revealed to him in direct *apokalypsis* from the Lord is the theological understanding of these facts, in other words, the "Gospel" of which he speaks in Gal. 1.12.

This distinction may be right in itself. In the previous section we gave the formula of faith, words of Jesus, and single narratives, as the content of the *paradosis*, and now we are able to add the Gospel, *euaggelion*, as "understanding" of the facts in the sense of Gal. 1.12. This, however, is not to be regarded as one element alongside the others, for Paul and the early Church did not consciously distinguish between the various contents of the *paradosis*. This is demonstrated by the mixture of fact and theological interpretation in the faith formula of 1 Cor. 15.3 ff., for example. Both are involved here, and we cannot say that Paul received the one through direct revelation, and the other through mediation.

It is, however, to be particularly noticed that this very *paradosis*, to which Paul expressly adds that he has received it "from the Lord", namely 1 Cor. 11.23, consists mainly of a factual account of the last meal of Jesus. Only with great effort can the foregoing distinction be applied here, so that one could perhaps say with H. Lietzmann: "In the consciousness of Paul,

everything that he has heard concerning Jesus before and after the conversion, flows out of the revelation at Damascus as the originating source."[1] Or, on the other hand—and this is the usual explanation already mentioned—one understands this reference to the *Kyrios* merely to mean that the Lord is the first chronological member of a chain of tradition, to whom others have succeeded up to Paul. According to this explanation, in spite of the reference to the *Kyrios*, it is a question of the human transmission of a fact, and not as in Gal. 1.12 of the direct revelation of its evangelical understanding.

In support of this explanation, which is at present the most popular one, it is generally argued that Paul does not employ the preposition *παρά*, as is usual with this verb, but *ἀπό*. But this argument does not have the weight usually attributed to it, for the difference between *παρά* and *ἀπό* in this case does not appear to be fundamental. If it is said that *ἀπό* indicates only the *direction* of the origin, and not the *immediate* origin itself, this could also be valid of *παρά*. Further there is at least *one* example in Paul where *ἀπό* unambiguously designates the *immediate* origin of a communication: Col. 1.7 "as ye also learned of Epaphras" (*ἐμάθετε ἀπὸ Ἐπαφρα*).

But even independently of the use of the preposition, the words *ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου* in 1 Cor. 11.23, refer back to Christ as the One who stands, not only at the beginning, but also behind the transmission of the tradition, that is, the One who is at work *in* it. *ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου* can mean a direct receiving from the Lord, without it being necessary to think of a vision or of excluding middle members through whom the Lord Himself imparts the *paradosis*. Our last section will show that the Apostles are these middle men, and that their reality as Apostles lies in their being bearers of direct revelation. One is concerned with this, the other with that fact of the Christian history, so that they are dependent one upon the other. But above all the testimony of the Apostles together constitutes the *paradosis* of Christ, in which the *Kyrios* Himself is at work.

This explanation helps us to understand how both the tradition of the words of Jesus and those of narratives of His life are to be attributed to the exalted Lord Himself. And *Kyrios* in the introductory formula to the quoted words of Jesus, is not

[1] op. cit., p. 57. See also *Messe und Herrenmahl*, 1926, p. 255.

to be understood otherwise than as in 1 Cor. 11.23, which is a narrative. This is corroborated also by Col. 2.6, where Paul exhorts: "as ye have therefore received Christ Jesus the Lord" (by tradition, παρελάβετε). The context indicates that the instructions meant are those according to which the faithful should "walk", and in verse 8 this *paradosis* is expressly distinguished from all "tradition of men" (παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων) as it is spread abroad by the false teachers. In Col. 2.6 the *Kyrios* is designated as content of the *paradosis*, but He is *content and author of the paradosis at the same time.*

This conclusion is especially indicated by the present tense which stands in 1 Cor. 7.10: "unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord" (παραγγέλλω). Chr. F. Baur has already pointed to this present tense. *It is the exalted Lord who now preaches to the Corinthians that which He had taught His disciples during His Incarnation on earth.*

To be sure the historical tense, the aorist, διέταξεν, is found in 1 Cor. 9.14 (in Thess. 4.15 the question cannot be definitely decided, but the expression λέγομεν ἐν λόγῳ Κυρίου presupposes rather the present tense). The change between the present and aorist indicates, in this case also, that the exalted Lord and the Jesus who walked on earth, are one and the same. The exalted One Himself after His resurrection delivers the words which He has spoken. One could mention in addition, that in 1 Cor. 7.10 the verb παραγγέλλω contains within it the preposition παρά which points to the tradition, and that perhaps this verb is here chosen intentionally with this in mind.

In a study of *Euaggelion*, which is important for our discussion, E. Molland[1] in referring to J. Schniewind[2] shows that in the expression εὐαγγέλιον Χριστοῦ in Rom. 15.19 and other passages, the genitive Χριστοῦ is a *genitivus subjectivus*, so that here also the same complex fact of which we are speaking is apparent: the exalted Christ is Himself originator of the Gospel, of which He is also the object. He is at the same time subject and object.

We conclude that the reconciliation of Paul's assertion that he has received the Gospel direct from the Lord, with the fact

[1] E. Molland, *Das paulinische Evangelium*, 1934, p. 100.

[2] J. Schniewind, *Die Begriffe Wort und Evangelium bei Paulus*, 1910, p. 110. See also *Euanggelion. Ursprung und erste Gestalt des Begriffs Evangelium*, 1927.

established in the first section of this paper, that he has taken over *paradosis* from others, is that the exalted Christ Himself, as transmitter of His words and deeds, stands behind the transmitting Apostles.

III

We have yet to inquire whether this conception of the *Kyrios* as the originator of the *paradosis* of Christ, can be confirmed in the theology of Paul, and established in the rest of the New Testament.

First of all it must be remembered that, according to the testimony of the evangelist, Jesus Himself had a definite conception of the παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων in its relation to the Scripture. He contrasted it as παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων to the commandment of God, ἐντολὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ (Mark 7.8). Does Jesus wish to condemn all exposition of the Scripture by this? The antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount show on the contrary that, in place of the expositions of the πρεσβύτεροι He puts His own, which fulfilled in radical fashion the real intention of the divine will in each commandment. W. G. Kümmel has rightly stressed in a paper for the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*,[1] that with the words ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν Jesus opposes the definitive and only valid Messianic *paradosis* to the *paradosis* of the Rabbis which He rejected. This latter is *paradosis* of men; the former, on the other hand, for which He Himself lays the basis in the Sermon on the Mount, has as its originator the one who speaks as "Ego" in the full authority of the *Messiah*. As the Fulfiller of the law, He, the Messiah, took the place of the παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων One can say quite pointedly: Jesus Himself is the only *paradosis* according to the Synoptic testimony.

In the letters which we have received, Paul has nowhere drawn this conclusion from Jesus' own attitude to the law, but nevertheless a direct line can be drawn from that attitude of Jesus to Paul's conception of Jesus as the end (τέλος) of the law. In the important book by W. D. Davies on *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*,[2] which appeared recently, the Pauline thought

[1] W. G. Kümmel, *Jesus und der jüdische Traditionsgedanke* (Z.N.W., 1934), pp. 105 ff.

[2] W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, 1948. See especially pp. 147 ff.

of Christ as the new law is moved to the forefront in a very clarifying fashion. Christ the Lord takes the place of the law for Paul. It is not as if Jesus were for him *first of all* the lawgiver or the law-interpreter, and then as if on the basis of this He became in His own *person* the incarnation of the new Messianic law. On the contrary, for Paul Christ is the fulfilled new law *above all* in His *person* and His work, and as already indicated His importance as lawgiver is derived from this and based on it, in so far as He in His words gives new *halachot*, and by the example of His life gives instruction (Phil. 2.5). The second thought is subordinated to the first, but in such a way that there is no opposition existing between the two.[1]

Paul has developed the fundamental interpretation of Jesus as the new law in 2 Cor. 3.4 ff. Here it is not Christ, but Paul, who is set in a parallel relation to Moses. Paul is the "minister of the new testament", just as Moses was the minister of the old, and in place of the law in the old covenant, is Christ in the new. To be sure already from the old covenant the divine glory radiated through the law, so that the countenance of its transmitter, Moses, truly reflected that glory, though only momentarily, and he had to place a veil over his face so that the children of Israel would not see this glory passing. In Christ the evil is done away (verse 14); in His person the divine glory is open for all to see. The ministers of this new covenant reflect the divine glory which is not passing away, with unveiled countenance (verse 18), and this happens "by the Spirit of the Lord" (*ἀπὸ Κυρίου πνεύματος*, verse 18).

The relation to the *Spirit* which lies at the basis of this whole contrast of the old and new covenants in 2 Cor. 3 (letter-spirit) is important for our question. It points to the end-time which is fulfilled in Christ. Ultimately, according to Jer. 31.33, the law shall be written in men's hearts. Ultimately also the Holy Spirit will come. Both are realised in Christ; He is the new law and He is the Spirit.[2] It is not by chance that this bold assertion: *the Lord Himself is the Spirit*, stands precisely in this section concerning the law (verse 17). Because the Holy Spirit imparts Himself, the law can now be inscribed in the heart.

[1] H. Windisch, *Der Sinn der Bergpredigt*, 1929, erroneously opposes Matthew to St. Paul on this point.

[2] C. H. Dodd, *History and the Gospel*, 1943, pp. 55 f. has seen this very clearly. See also *The Apostolic Preaching and its Development*, 1936, *passim*.

The place of the paradosis of the law is taken now by the Holy Spirit, who is identical with the Lord. The revelation of the divine glory (ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, verse 18), takes place καθάπερ ἀπὸ Κυρίου πνεύματος. Of course, this passage is only concerned with the tradition of the law, but there is a line running from this tradition to that of the early Church. This becomes apparent when we consider that everything which concerns Christ is on the whole fulfilment of the Old Testament, and when we recall the exact analogy, even in terminology, between the tradition of the Church to the rabbinic tradition. This then may be considered as the theological background for the interpretation of the relation between *Kyrios* and *paradosis*, which I have suggested above: the *Kyrios* Christ has taken the place of the *paradosis* of the law, and has imparted Himself also, in regard to this function, as Holy Spirit. It now becomes clear how the exalted Lord as the real Bearer of tradition can be at work in the apostolic tradition about His words and deeds which comes through the apostolic Church.

Though Paul has not applied this line of argument in 2 Cor. 3 to the tradition concerning the words and the life of Jesus, the case is otherwise in the Gospel according to John; for this is precisely the real subject of this Gospel, the connexion between the earthly life of Jesus and the exalted Lord. The closing discourse of St. John's Gospel develops the train of thought which I see in Paul, though with Paul it is rather like an undeveloped assumption. *The conception of the apostolic tradition concerning the earthly Jesus which the Spirit has created* is present most clearly in John 16.13 and 14.26: "the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring *all things* to your remembrance, *whatsoever I have said unto you.*"

If my interpretation of the Pauline conception of the connexion between *Kyrios* and *paradosis* is right, we are dealing with an original Christian thought, which, it is true, is not everywhere brought to a head in the same way, but which, nevertheless, can be considered as a common and far-reaching presupposition.

IV

Several times already in this paper, we have met with the

role belonging to the Apostle in his unique function as the witness entrusted with the transmission of the *paradosis*, behind which the *Kyrios* Himself stands. In the previously mentioned third chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians, the Apostles and Holy Spirit are spoken of together. They both take the place of the law-mediator and law-interpreter of the Old Testament. Certainly the Holy Spirit is not reserved for the Apostles alone, but over against the rabbinic principle of tradition in Judaism, the characteristic and distinctive mark of the transmission of the *paradosis* concerning Christ is a twofold fact: firstly, that the mediator of the tradition is not the teacher, but the *Apostle* as direct witness; secondly, the principle of succession does not operate mechanically as with the Rabbis, but is bound to the *Holy Spirit*; and we shall now speak of this two-sided fact.

We have seen that Paul in Gal. 1.12 expressly denies having received the Gospel from men. That is fundamental for his apostolic authority. As Apostle, as witness, he must stand in direct connexion with the Lord. That is the unique honour of the Apostle; that he has been given direct *apokalypsis*. This includes not only the theological understanding of the events of salvation, but also the fact of these events as such. Consider the resurrection, which is to be transmitted by the Apostles, as direct evidence of the facts (Acts 1.22; 1 Cor. 9.1). But beyond that there are also those facts experienced by the Twelve in the time that the incarnate Jesus "went in and out among us" (Acts 1.21). In the light of this, the above-mentioned distinction between the impartation of facts and the impartation of their theological understanding loses still more its significance; for both are revealed to the Apostles by the Lord, and for both He is direct witness.

At this point it is necessary to recall that in early Christianity there is the Apostle in the wider and in the narrower sense: in the wider sense as eye-witness of the resurrection of Christ, in the narrower sense as a member of the circle of the Twelve who has to bear witness not only to the resurrection but also to the Incarnation of Christ on earth. To this distinction belongs the fact that not *every* Apostle is able, as direct eye-witness, to pass on the information regarding *all* facts. Indeed Paul himself is not able to report as an eye-witness the facts of the

earthly life of Jesus, at all events in the chief things. And yet he is an Apostle in so far as he can give direct eye-witness evidence of the exalted Lord, whom he has seen and heard on the road to Damascus. For the other facts he is dependent on the *eye-witness evidence of the other Apostles*. His meeting with Cephas in Jerusalem may be recalled in this connexion (Gal. 1.18), but also the *paradosis* of 1 Cor. 15.3 ff., where he clearly distinguishes the Easter events in the narrower sense of the eye-witness evidence of others, from the appearance which has been granted to him. It has not been sufficiently noticed that in this very passage, after the quotation of the *paradosis*, he emphasises, in verse 11, his harmony with the original Apostles.

It is now clear how, on the basis of a deep sense of community which is created by the witness-function of the Apostles, all tradition, in so far as it is passed on by the Apostle, could be considered as revealed directly by Christ. So Paul is able to say he has received a tradition "from the Lord", when in reality he has received it by means of other Apostles. *By means of the Apostles is not by means of men, but by means of Christ the Lord Himself, from whom this Revelation is imparted.* All the knowledge that is in the Church, whether it be knowledge of words of Jesus, of narratives of His life, or of their understanding, comes from the Apostles. To one this, and to another that, has been directly imparted. The essence of the Apostle is in his being a bearer of direct Revelation. Since however everything has not been revealed to each individual Apostle, one Apostle must at some time pass on his testimony to another (Gal. 1.18; 1 Cor. 15.11), and the *paradosis* in its entirety, to which all the Apostles contribute, constitutes the Revelation of Christ.

In derivative fashion, then, the whole *apostolic Church* is turned into a bearer of tradition, as, historically speaking, must actually have been the case. But for all that, it must nevertheless be firmly maintained that the theological foundation of the tradition rests on the office of the Apostles. In his *Theologie*,[1] R. Bultmann writes correctly and to the point: the conception of Apostle was determined by the thought of the tradition.

Just as the Jewish tradition comes *through* the *Tannaim*, so the tradition from Jesus comes *through* the Apostles. It is indeed no accident that in the passages which are the chief evidence

[1] p. 61.

for the *paradosis* of Christ, above all Gal. 1.12 and 1 Cor. 15.3 ff., but also elsewhere, the apostolic office is always dealt with at the same time.

Moreover, this is the way in which the ἐγώ, emphasised in 1 Cor. 11.23, is to be understood: "I (the Apostle) have received from the Lord . . . ". It is right that frequently this *ego* has attention drawn to itself, but it has seldom found the right interpretation. Paul would certainly have been able to set this *ego* in the exactly parallel passage, 1 Cor. 15.3. He has done it, however, only in 1 Cor. 11.23, because especially against the Corinthians' false conception of the Lord's Supper all depended on stressing his apostolic *role as bearer of tradition.*

Quite different is the use of the *ego* in 1 Cor. 7.10 where it is contrasted with the *Kyrios*, and yet it is here the same *ego* of the apostolic consciousness. In 1 Cor. 7.10, Paul points to the fact that, even where the *Kyrios* Himself gives no direct instruction in a transmitted *logion* of Jesus, the Apostle is allowed to give his own judgment. Verse 5 shows that this *ego* includes the apostolic claim: "concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my judgment, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord *to be faithful*". This grace to be faithful refers to the apostolic office.

This apostolic role, to be faithful, manifests itself in a double function: on the one side, to transmit the *paradosis* about Jesus, faithfully—that is the meaning of the *ego* of 1 Cor. 11.23; on the other side, beyond this *paradosis*, but in the sense of it, to give judgments, though to be sure these are expressly subordinated to the *paradosis*—that is the meaning of *ego* in 1 Cor. 7.10. This last named *ego* certainly owes its claim entirely to the first named, where it proves the identity of the Apostle as the bearer of the tradition of Christ.

The Jewish Rabbis pass on the παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβύτερων in what we might call a mechanical, teaching chain, which just on that account is only "tradition of men", as Jesus says (Mark 7.8). But the function of bearing the tradition with the Apostles is performed by the Spirit, and takes place on the basis of election. In apostolic times succession and Holy Spirit formed as yet no contradiction. In Judaism the activity of the Rabbi indicated the end of prophecy, the end of the working of the Spirit. The Rabbi here relieved the prophet. The

Apostle on the other hand is also a transmitter of tradition like the Rabbi, but here the Holy Spirit is added to the office.

For this reason the function of the Apostles as bearers of tradition can be traced back finally to the *Kyrios* Himself, who indeed is the *Pneuma* (2 Cor. 3.17). We asked ourselves at the beginning of this paper how Paul could grant such great honour to the concept of *paradosis* after Jesus had rejected the tradition as a work of men, running counter to the commandment of God (Mark 7.8). Jesus made His judgment in such a way that even in regard to form it appeared to include a condemnation of all Revelation which took place through the transmission of tradition. We see now that a *παράδοσις τῶν ἀποστόλων* according to the early Christian view is not just *παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. On the contrary the *Kyrios* Himself is at work in it, so that apostolic transmission of tradition constitutes no opposition to direct Revelation. In Col. 2.6-8, Paul distinguishes between legitimate *paradosis* of Christ Jesus the Lord (verse 6, *παρελάβετε τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν τὸν Κύριον*) and tradition of men, since he applies the expression used by Jesus *παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων* to the gnostic traditions.

Here it becomes clear again that on the ground of the New Testament legitimate tradition can only be the *paradosis* which is designated by *Kyrios* and passed on through the Apostles. At the same time this high estimation of the apostolic tradition in no way means that all later Church *paradosis* is justified, and could be perhaps attributed in some way to the *Kyrios* Himself. For the apostolic office is a unique one. But with this question we do not have to deal in this paper.

Correction in last issue:
p. 96, line 10: for "futility" read "ability."

BOOK REVIEWS

The Christian Understanding of History. By E. C. Rust. Lutterworth Press, 1947. 17s. 6d.

This book possesses three great merits. It discusses a living issue of our time; it provides the reader with an account of the writings of many contemporary thinkers, whose opinions we all want to know, but whose books we have not always the time—or the opportunity—to read; and it interprets its whole subject from a Biblical standpoint which is akin to those of Barth, Brunner and Niebuhr, but which is no slavish echo of them. The book's principal defect—a lack of charm and lucidity of style—is not really fatal. The attentive reader will be rewarded.

The fundamental question which the book faces is the meaning of our world and its changing history. What is the significance of the rise and fall of the great cultures? Does their rise and fall follow a pattern? Is there real progress in world history? We live in times when we cannot but be interested in the fate of *our* culture, if we are alive at all. What, then, does the Bible teach about civilisation and the relation of the Church to it? What duties has a Christian towards the culture of his time? Does the Bible contain the key to the meaning of the rise and fall of Empires? What light and hope does it give us in the remarkable times in which we are living?

1. The first of the three sections into which the book is divided offers us a survey of those views of history most influential in our time. Rust does not simply indulge in another diagnosis of our world, but gives us a critique of the principal philosophies of history from a Biblical point of view. Thus he outlines the theories of Spengler and Mannheim with their teaching on the rise and inevitable decline of civilisation through lack of life-force or of will power. He examines the view that Reality must be consistent as Process, the philosophy associated with Croce and Gentile. He discusses Buber and Heim's claim that persons in history cannot be reduced to media of unconscious forces. He considers shortly, but not incompetently, Marxist views, as well as the views of the Idealists with their absorption of human personality with an element in the Absolute. Here Rust makes an interesting comment on the difference Christian influence made to Hegel's outlook when it is compared with that of the Greek Idealists.

He next turns to the traditional theistic proofs and their claim to explain the meaning of History, and insists that the weakness of the whole argument from nature to its author—the whole assumption of the *analogia entis*—is that it does not realise that sin has affected our ultimate insights. We have now reached the point where a statement can be made—over against all these other views —on the specifically Christian understanding of History. This blindness of man in sin prevents man from seeing the meaning of life unless he is given a *divine Revelation*; and such a revelation has to be received by faith in the Biblical sense, that total response which enables a man to recognise that *God* is dealing with him, and that here the eternal is reaching him in time. But just because such a Revelation involves the coming of the supra-temporal into time, we can only describe it and its relation to history in inadequate spatial and temporal terms—in historical "myth". Therefore we can never produce a complete philosophy of History. For to do so would require us to explain God and His eternal purposes *fully* in terms of space and time. Thus our attempt to explain the meaning of History involves paradoxes, when for example we are forced to speak of the eternal "becoming" or of something existing "before" creation.

There are men, however, who deny that there is any such special Revelation. They do so because they fail to recognise the uniqueness of Christ and because they assume that all religions are species of one genus. They put Zoroastrian ethics beside Christian ethics on the false assumption that in both man of his own accord can pass final valid judgments without grace. They equate grace in the New Testament and the Bhagavadgita. But in the former it is the personal approach of Saviour to sinner, in the latter a grace infused into the saint that he may be absorbed into deity.

In criticising these critics of Revelation, Rust is not attacking Biblical criticism. There must be historical criticism of documents. But this should be sharply distinguished from theories about the Bible based on unexamined assumptions. These men assume that the history of Israel *must* be a part of general history, in no way unique. They assume that Paul or John drew their ideas wholly from Hellenistic sources. They take for granted that Jesus taught only the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. To do this they have to twist the records—they have to explain away the special divine acts in Israel's history.

2. It is with the *special History of Israel* that the central section of the book deals. It is this special history which is the key to all history. This is a unique history, unlike that of any other race, not because the Jews are a particularly gifted people by nature, but

because God chose them for a special purpose. Israel does not make steady progress in religion. There are periods of decline. The prophets are not the real creators of Israel's religion, but the interpreters of a faith older than their day. They do not primarily teach monotheism as a new conception of God. It is not an idea of God, but certain definite historical acts of God, beginning for the nation with the Deliverance at the Red Sea, to which they bear witness. Therefore they point not so much to man's religious advance as to God's plan.

In this whole section Rust examines in detail the history of the two Kingdoms, the meaning of the Remnant, and of Sacrifice, the Law, belief in individual survival. He then seeks to show how the coming of Christ was not only the fulfilment of and judgment on Israel's hopes, but how Christ also fulfilled and judged the hopes of the whole Graeco-Roman civilisation. It yearned for unity but lacked unifying faith.

The section closes with a discussion on the all important theme: the New Testament's interpretation of the meaning of History. In it the Messiah becomes central for the understanding of History. There the Church is seen as part of Christ's intention in His redemption of human History. Now sin's blindness is overcome, sin's power broken, sin's guilt forgiven. Now there is a new power in history, but history is not yet at an end. That end is to come and it is not far off. We see in St. Paul's statement of this, in which he follows his Master, several unresolved tensions. He tends towards belief in universal salvation, yet knows the danger of rejection. He thinks of believers after death as both awaiting this consummation (asleep) and already in glory. St. John, on the other hand, stresses the later side of this antinomy—and thinks of judgment as wholly present.

3. Finally, how are we to interpret the general history of the world, its civilisations and cultures, in the light of this special history of Israel? Biblical Revelation gives us the key to the meaning of time and so of history. Life in time is real, not illusory, but it is also never complete. It looks forward to a real completion which it has inadequate terms to describe. Still within time God continues to reveal Himself in hours of judgment and crisis which point forward to the final judgment and victory.

Time and history can only be understood, therefore, in relation to the plan of their Creator. Human society in time is a form of life willed by God, but always in bondage to the powers of evil—demonic powers that may well be personal—from which it is liberated now more, now less, by its response to the Voice of God. Such response, however, is broken and very imperfect and quite insuffi-

cient to restore society to God's intention for it. Yet God does not abandon human society—He has given them marriage, family life, daily work, and the State to preserve them from utter dissolution, though sin has perverted all of these.

Into this human society God has come in Christ and provided a means for sin to be forgiven, its power broken. God is active in a new way. Men can now die to sin and live to God as never before. But here too they can fall victims to sin, especially to spiritual pride. Men are here elected into a new society—the Church—itself a sign of the restoration of all human society. This society is itself both redeemed and sinful. The Church is not the Kingdom, but the place in which the King receives obedience of varying depth.

Is the Church then a place of escape from secular history or has secular history still some value in itself? It is not wholly in the power of the evil one, Rust believes. In their cultures men are permitted by God to act creatively. Greece, Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, all made valuable, if limited, contributions to human life. But with Christ's coming cultures too are altered. From now on Christ's influence is seen in the respect shown to personality, and in the belief that history has a purpose. Yet these truths are often separated from their source in Him. From now on resistance to God also becomes fiercer. There is now an Anti-Christ seen in men and movements. From now on men have to choose or reject Him.

In this new era the Church has to bear witness to God's will for society and the various divine orderings of society. In doing so she is always tempted to identify the achievement of her task with the final coming of the Kingdom.

The final chapter—itself one of the best—seeks to interpret the meaning of this final consummation. Men have used various symbols—true and important symbols to describe aspects of this final form of life. Men speak of *the resurrection of the body* to emphasise the reality of personal relations hereafter. They say *Parousia* to show that Christ must be seen finally as the centre of all. They think of a *Last Judgment* to indicate God's final victory over evil. Equally they speak of *Final Resurrection* to show that what is of real value on earth does not perish, but is transformed.

The reader, who has persevered to this point, will have noticed how Rust touches on almost every Christian doctrine. This is as it should be. All Christian truth holds together. At times he introduces details whose relevance is not very obvious. But he does offer a complete Christian view of History, which is in harmony with the teaching of the Revelation of God.

J. L. M. Haire

An Introduction to Jesus for the Twentieth Century. By R. W. Stewart. James Clarke & Co. 6s.

This little book from a Scottish manse is one more sign among many of a growing desire to come to grips again with the problem of the historical Jesus. A good many years have passed since Mr Stewart put theological thinking in this country in his debt by giving English readers his translation of Herrmann's great book on *Communion with God*; and his early sympathy with the general outlook of the Ritschlian School in part explains the passionate conviction with which he here develops the thesis that "the essential clues to the right estimate of Jesus are to be found not in what happened to Him in being born and being killed, but in what He did with all His power and will in the course of His career".

Sentences of this uncompromising type are characteristic of the author's attitude to his subject. Though he knows the critical problems he prefers not to dwell on them; and instead of weighing evidence and balancing probabilities he proceeds to a vigorous presentation of his own case. The method has its dangers; there are sweeping assertions for which one would like to have authority, and positions are rejected out-and-out where a more sympathetic critic might have found grounds for a synthesis. But there are also compensations, for every page is a challenge to rethinking and restatement. In an introductory chapter Mr Stewart boldly maintains that the vital issue in the Judaism of Jesus' day was the place which the heathen might have in the divine economy. The issue was brought prominently to the fore in the preaching of the Baptist; and in the ministry of Jesus few things served more to create a breach between him and the Pharisees than his uncompromising repudiation of the idea that the privileges and claims of true religion were in any way bound up with nationality. While denying that from the time of His baptism Jesus was aware of a unique status or a supernatural equipment, the author recognises that at some point Jesus must have come to see that the movement to which He was committed could only come to triumph through personal action that would involve suffering and death; but he reacts strongly against the view that the death of Jesus is to be interpreted in terms drawn from the Hebrew sacrificial system (sacrifice for Jesus and His followers means the sacrifice of self), and he holds that the Church "went sadly astray when it began to make its Table also in some sense an altar". Both the life and the death of Jesus must be seen as "purposeful activity".

The book is unfortunate in its title. It is not a useful "Introduction" for beginners, though it is admirably adapted (within limits)

to clarify and stimulate the thoughts of those who, no longer finding meaning in the terminology of the Creeds, are eager to rediscover something of the dynamic power of the person of Jesus. Did Mr Stewart also mean it to be in a sense an Introduction for the use of scholars—a challenge to them to get behind "interpretation" to "history"? It would be most unfortunate and unjust if the book were to be construed as a mere reversion to a discredited liberalism; and any attempt so to dismiss it would only serve to demonstrate how necessary and timely its main contentions are. The book has undoubted limitations. Perhaps because it is merely an "Introduction", it fails to do justice to the Christological side of the problem, or even to the evidence that Jesus Himself, wholly devoted though He was to "reality and action", recognised that "meaning" must be attached to His person and mission. Nor is the attempt in a closing chapter to give a Christological restatement in some of the categories of modern philosophy (with reality interpreted as change) either comprehensive or searching enough to be convincing. But here again (as in the book as a whole) there are sentences that indicate clearly the direction of thought and challenge acceptance or rejection. "The objection to much Christology is that it makes Jesus a figure in drama instead of in history. The creeds dramatise Jesus, and when a character is dramatised it is crystallised, defined, made unalterable." "The philosophy of the future, even if it be a Christian philosophy, will derive as much from Marx or Lenin as from Plato, and if the creeds of the Church are ever written again it will be in new terms and with a new modesty about their permanent value." It is a profoundly honest book, and a powerful plea for a fresh approach to the whole problem of the life story and mission of Jesus and of His meaning for the Church and for the world.

G. S. Duncan

The New Testament Doctrine of the "Last Things". By H. A. Guy. Oxford University Press, 1948. 10s. 6d.

The purpose of this little book of some 180 pages is to provide a summary of the eschatological teaching of the New Testament which shall be useful both to "the student or scholar in Christian theology" and to "the general reader who is interested in the topic". But Mr Guy seems to underestimate the difficulty of this task. For more than fifty years New Testament scholars have been more concerned with eschatology than with any other part of New Testament doctrine, but the long discussion has not led to any generally accepted conclusions; there are still as many different views as there are

scholars. Yet Mr Guy assures his readers that "where there are different views regarding this teaching or its interpretation, the divergent opinions are set forth". Needless to say, this has not been done with any completeness; it could not be done in the space at his disposal. Nor is Mr Guy able to set forth adequately even those divergent opinions which he has selected for mention. He seldom can stay to explain just why different opinions are possible or give his readers any guidance in choosing between them. For instance, on the *crux interpretum* in Luke 17.21 he says that it has never been finally settled whether the correct translation is, "The Kingdom of God is within you", or "in your midst"; Jesus may be proclaiming either the inward, spiritual nature of the Kingdom, or its actual presence in his own words and works. But he does not give any explanation of how two such different interpretations are possible. He does suggest that the difference is not really important, for "the significant point of the saying is that the Kingdom is regarded as a present reality". He does not mention the contrary opinion held by some scholars, that the saying refers to the future coming of the Kingdom, or that this is almost certainly how the evangelist understood it—although this would plainly settle the question of the correct translation. Moreover, on an earlier page he has already remarked that the saying "has preserved a distinctive note in Jesus's (*sic!*) eschatological teaching"—is the "distinctive note" the inward, spiritual nature of the Kingdom? And if not, what is it?

The most difficult eschatological teaching in the New Testament is, unfortunately, also the most important—that of Jesus Himself as it is recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. What Mr Guy has to say about "the importance and validity of Jesus's (*sic!*) eschatology", at the end of his discussion of it, is far from helpful. Jesus "evidently shared many of the views of the Jews of his time—views which in some instances are now seen to be erroneous. This may be the case with the eschatological teaching of Jesus, or at least with the form in which it is presented." Many of his eschatological references are incidental and mainly for purposes of illustration. His "eschatology has throughout a practical interest. He was using the thought forms and language of His day as a vehicle for permanent spiritual and ethical truth." Yet "there are certainly true eschatological sayings" in His genuine teaching, and these "cannot be lightly dismissed". "But we must remember that inevitably Jesus had to use the language of His day, if He was to be understood by His contemporaries", and when He used their own expressions He was often "giving them a different content". But the only natural result, surely, of using their own expressions with a different content, but without explanation, would be that Jesus would be *mis*understood by His contem-

poraries, and that there can be little hope that modern scholars can understand Him either.

The treatment of the eschatological teaching of the other New Testament books is much more satisfactory. But if we can learn so little that has any value for us from the eschatological teaching of Jesus, we need not expect that we shall learn much more from that of His early followers. They too "were limited by the thought-forms of their own time, which they had perforce to use. But, although we may reject many of the ways in which they expressed themselves, we may unite with them in insisting on the main articles of their faith and expectation." From the last sentence in the book it would appear that these main articles amount to no more than that Jesus "inaugurated a new era in the world's history, that His will must triumph over the affairs of men, that eternal life is something which begins here and now, in the experience of Christians, and will continue after the death of the body, and that the final meaning of the universe will not become clear until the time comes when God will be 'all in all', the kingdoms of this world become the Kingdom of God and his Christ and 'he shall reign for ever and ever'."

J. Y. Campbell

The Cross over Asia. By Bishop Stephen Neill. The Canterbury Press. 8s. 6d.

Many retired missionaries have a dream that one day they may revisit the Churches in which they laboured overseas and, in St. Paul's words, "see how they do". Others, still more ambitious, would like with appraising eye to see other mission-fields as well and compare them with their own. Few are privileged to do either of these things, but the opportunity was given to Bishop Neill in the spring of 1948 to make a rapid tour of the younger Churches of Eastern Asia. How literally the view of Bishop Neill was for the most part a bird's eye view can be judged from the fact that in a fourteen weeks' absence from England, he visited the Philippines, China, Formosa, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaya, Siam, Burma, India and Pakistan, including the two "keys of the East", Hongkong and Singapore. For most men to write a book on the state of the Churches in so many lands would be an unseemly arrogance, but Bishop Neill obviously knew what to look for and knew the right people of whom to ask questions, with the result that most of his views are corroborated both by what has happened since in these countries and by the opinions of those with larger experience of one or other

of the lands in which he has travelled. And Bishop Neill writes in such an easy and well-informed style that his book gives an impression of a greater mastery of his subject than even he could have attained in such a short time.

Among his impressions, there are some that seem to recur in many countries, and the present writer can testify how true they are of his own old field in Pakistan, the country that seems to have had the briefest of Bishop Neill's many brief visits. (*a*) There is the marvel that the Church is there at all, "the miracle of the existence of the younger Churches in the East", resulting from "undermanned and ill-supported" missions, whose leaders were for the most part "Christians of very ordinary gifts". Bishop Neill has not the space for the theological speculations he is so well qualified to make, but he does point out that this is "what God has done". We might add that God has done it through humble men and women of no great vision but of great obedience, rather than through the plannings of councils and conferences; the best organised mission with the most clearly defined policy has not always been the most effective mission. (*b*) There is the call for new missionaries, who are convinced that the passing of Western rule with its attendant disturbances and loss of human protection for missionaries is the sign of an opening and not a closing door. This call has one condition: the missionary must come "as one that serveth" accepting the leadership of the national Church, and Bishop Neill wisely indicates the real difficulty of this position, for there can only be bitter frustration if, when the younger Churches have got colleagues from the West, "they have no idea what to do with them". (*c*) In almost every Eastern land there is a recognised need for a more educated ministry and the work of theological colleges is one to which help from the West is especially invited. Indeed our failure to get the right kind of minister in sufficient numbers makes us wonder whether the whole conception of both pastoral and evangelistic work does not require complete rethinking for the circumstances of Eastern Churches. The solution is surely not the mere planting of Anglican Houses or American Seminaries in Asiatic countries; of all our mission institutions they often appear the most unsuited to their surroundings. The Indian probably would have felt more at home in one of the great Irish monasteries of the Celtic Church than he does in the modern type of theological school. Even if we get the right theological teachers, we have still the greater difficulty of getting the right candidates. (*d*) Bishop Neill came away from Indonesia, and one may suspect from other countries, "much more strongly convinced than ever before of the divine appointment of episcopacy and its place as an indispensable element in the life of the Church".

A reluctant Presbyterian has to admit that in his missionary experience episcopacy is in almost every case for the *bene esse* of the younger Churches; it may be that Presbyterianism demands a background of long experience and certainly a more widespread leadership than is found so far in the younger Churches.

The author and his publishers are to be congratulated on producing such a well-printed book within such a short time of the events recorded in it. To do so was necessary, for Bishop Neill's descriptions and analysis may soon be out of date in lands where changes are taking place so rapidly. Yet this book confirms our confidence that with all these rapid changes, "the City of God remaineth".

WILLIAM LILLIE

The Cost of Discipleship. By DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. S.C.M. Press. 9s.

OF Buchenwald concentration-camp a distinguished French political prisoner has said that the hardest thing to bear was the spiritual loneliness. No gesture of sympathy lightened the darkness; over all was brutality and the lust of power. Dietrich Bonhoeffer spent part of his long agony in that prison, and one of the poems which he wrote about that time has in it the same longing for fellowship.

> Outstretched upon my mattress,
> I stare where great walls stand.
> Outside a summer evening that knows me not
> Goes singing into the land. . . .
>
> If this dawn shall my last dawn be,
> Brother, brother, pray for me.

Such was the loftiness of his spirit that even his guards respected him and helped to smuggle some of his poems out of prison. There is an ironic sadness about the chapter of this book entitled "The Enemy", a meditation on Matthew 5.43-48. It was written before the outbreak of war but it contains these prophetic passages: "In the New Testament our enemies are those who cherish hostility against us, not those against whom we cherish hostility, for Jesus refuses to reckon with such a possibility. . . . By our enemies Jesus means those who are quite intractable and utterly unresponsive to our love, who forgive us nothing when we forgive them all, who requite our love with hatred and our service with derision. . . . Love asks nothing in return, but seeks those who need it. And who needs our love more than those who are consumed with hatred and are utterly devoid of love? . . . What makes the Christian different from other men is the 'peculiar', the 'extraordinary', the 'unusual', that

which is not 'a matter of course'. This is the quality whereby the better righteousness exceeds the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees."

As a young man he was already reckoned among the outstanding theologians of his time, in particular as a constructive critic of the Christian metaphysics of Karl Heim. Heim's references to him are much more than the kindly encouragement commonly extended by a more hardened writer to a young scholar, and are a remarkable tribute to Bonhoeffer's penetrating mind. When the third edition of Heim's *Glaube und Denken* was done into English (as *God Transcendent*) it was not possible to print all the criticisms evoked by earlier editions and the author's replies to them in the German text, but when a selection was made I considered that Bonhoeffer's contribution should certainly be one of those retained.

He studied at Tübingen in 1923 and later at Berlin. In 1930 he was appointed lecturer in Systematic Theology in Berlin, but chose, before taking up duty, to visit Union Seminary, New York. Even before Hitler came to power he was one of those who realised that National Socialism was an attempt to "make history without God". After a pastorate in London he returned to Germany, and, being forbidden by the Gestapo to preach or to enter Berlin, he established an illicit theological training college. Friends persuaded him to leave for the United States in the summer of 1939, but after a very short interval he insisted on returning to his own land, acting, as Reinhold Niebuhr has said, on "the finest logic of Christian martyrdom". The trap closed round him. He was able to work for the Confessional Church and in the underground movement, but it could not be for long. He had decided not only to join with all the other clandestine workers in opposing National Socialism, but to break altogether with the strongest position of underground movements and to work for the defeat of his own country. He was arrested in April 1943, taken to various concentration camps; and at Flossenburg he was hanged, by special order of Himmler, on the 9th of April, just a few days before the American advanced patrols liberated the place. He has no memorial, for his grave was never identified; but it is known from the testimony of a British officer, a fellow prisoner, that all who attended the service taken by him on the day before his execution were deeply moved.

He had never been a pacifist, yet he insists that "the only way to overcome evil is to let it run its course, so that it does not find the resistance it is looking for. Resistance merely creates further evil and adds fuel to the flames" (p. 122); and he rejects the Reformers' distinction between personal sufferings and those endured by Christians in the performance of duty as bearers of an office

ordained by God. This distinction between person and office he believes to be quite unjustified and wholly alien to the teaching of Jesus, and to produce, in practice, insoluble difficulties. "Am I ever acting only as a private person or only in an official capacity? If I am attacked am I not at once the father of my children, the pastor of my flock, and the ruler of my people? And am I not always an individual, face to face with Jesus, even in the performance of my official duties? Am I not therefore obliged to resist every attack just because of my responsibility for my office? Is it right to forget that the follower of Jesus is always utterly alone, always the individual, who in the last resort can only decide and act for himself, and that in each specific action the most serious responsibility rests upon him for those who are entrusted to his care?" "The Cross is the only justification for the precept of non-violence, for it alone can kindle a faith in the victory over evil which will enable men to obey that precept." The further difficulty he passes over, that in refusing to play his part in halting the aggressor, a man may inevitably bring suffering not on himself only but also on others, for whom he is responsible, and who may not hold his own pacifist position. While he was careful not to appear as one who spoke in the name of the Church, and therefore in his imprisonment and death involved no one else but himself, he was, we are told, filled with increasing sorrow at the part played by the Confessional Church. He felt that it was more concerned with its own existence and inherited rights than with preaching against the war and with the fate of the persecuted and oppressed.

The greater part of this book is given to short expositions of the Sermon on the Mount in St. Matthew's Gospel. The cost of discipleship is indicated by his words (p. 38): "Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness without requiring repentance, baptism without Church discipline, Communion without confession, absolution without contrition. Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the Cross, grace without Jesus Christ, living and incarnate." Monasticism was a protest against the cheapening of grace, but it was a wrong protest, for it had the fatal conception of a double standard of Christian obedience; and thus its real error was not its rigorism but the extent to which it departed from genuine Christianity by setting up itself as the private achievement of a select few, and so claiming a special merit of its own. When Luther left the cloister and returned to the world, he made a renunciation far greater than that involved in becoming a monk. Now the world suffered the worst blow it had received since the first days of Christianity. This was the frontal assault. It was realised that the only way to follow Jesus was by living in the world. Unhappily, it is

true that Luther's followers, repeating his doctrine faithfully word for word, omitted its essential corollary, the obligation of discipleship. Grace without discipleship has sapped the life of nations and it is fair to say that "the word of cheap grace has been the ruin of more Christians than any commandment of works" (p. 48).

He makes much of the Gospel testimony that the call of Jesus comes to a man with an authority which is "absolute, direct, and unaccountable". There is no word of intervening confession of faith in Jesus or even of previous knowledge of Him. "To follow in His steps is something which is void of all content." "It is not a cause which human calculation might deem worthy of our devotion, even the devotion of ourselves." "The disciple simply burns his boats and gets ahead." Bonhoeffer wrote these words at the time when Heim was examining the Führer-Prinzip and asking whether the readiness of mankind to follow a dictator, on the strength of his magnetism and without regard to the programme which he offered, did not give our age a better chance of understanding the situation of the first Christians than any age since then. These two writers, the young and the mature, were both seeking to drive home the point that absolute obedience was due to God and to God alone. This is not therefore to be taken as a final pronouncement, any more than Kierkegaard's speculation on the Binding of Isaac whether there may not be such a thing as the temporary suspension of the ethical; but it was in this case a pronouncement sealed by the example of faithfulness to the end.

Nachfolge, of which this volume is the English translation, was first published in 1937. (This is an abridged translation by R. H. Fuller, with a foreword by the Bishop of Chichester, who conducted the memorial service for Bonhoeffer at Holy Trinity in London on 27th July 1947, and a moving tribute and memoir by Dr G. Leibholz.) The treatment in Chapter III of the sufferings of the Christian has the clarity and precision of one who already foresaw the end. "Each must endure his allotted share of suffering and rejection. But each has a different share: some God deems worthy of the highest form of suffering, and gives them the grace of martyrdom, while others He does not allow to be tempted above that they are able to bear. But it is one and the same cross in every case, whether it leads to martyrdom or not. . . . As we embark upon discipleship we surrender ourselves to Christ in union with His death—we give over our lives to death. Since this happens at the beginning of the Christian life, the cross can never be merely a tragic ending to an otherwise happy religious life. When Christ calls a man, He bids him come and die" (p. 73).

Three other themes stand out with prophetic significance. The

first is Christian *witness*. When Jesus called men to follow Him He "was summoning them to a *visible act of obedience*. To follow Jesus was a public event." (Bonhoeffer is here applying the thought to the Sacrament of Baptism—Baptism is a public event, for it is the means whereby a member is grafted on to the visible body of Christ; and therefore (p. 178) "the sacrament should be administered only where there is a reasonable chance of the child's growing up to renew his faith in the *opus dei* which was accomplished once and for all when he was baptised. That can only happen in a Christian community which is really alive.") All faith is confession. True faith cannot refuse to become public. Elsewhere, in a chapter on "The Visible Community", we read "Flight into the invisible is a denial of the call. A community of Jesus which seeks to hide itself has ceased to follow Him." Second, *assurance*. That certainty which the disciples possessed during their earthly intercourse with Jesus is perpetuated by the Holy Spirit and even strengthened and increased, so intimate is the fellowship of the Spirit. Third, *fellowship* in the Spirit. We see in Bonhoeffer's poems from prison how he longed for human affection, and we know how he was enabled to supply it to others in their greatest need. Many others, like Savouret of the French Resistance, have testified with impressive unanimity that one of the hardest tests under interrogation was to deny all knowledge of loyal friends when suddenly confronted with them. Even the obvious fact that to acknowledge them would be to endanger their lives and the lives of many others did not take away the sense of this public denial being unnatural. In one sense it is reassuring, indicating that the legalised illegality to which members of the resistance in all occupied countries had to abandon themselves did not, at least in the case of mature persons (the experience of children may be different: time alone will tell whether they could make the distinction between dishonesty to Germans and dishonesty to honest men) undermine or sap the foundations of a healthy conscience. Bonhoeffer was convinced that we do not have direct relations of friendship with others. To think that we have is to strike at the roots of faith and obedience. Every I-Thou relationship passes through Christ. (There is a development of this thought in his criticism of Heim.) "In the most intimate relationships of life, in our kinship with father and mother, brothers and sisters, in our love for our wives, and in our duty to the community, direct relationships are impossible. Since the coming of Christ, His followers have been unable to enjoy a direct relationship with any of these, whether they belong to history, nature, or experience. Between father and son, husband and wife, the individual and the community, stands Christ the Mediator."

When a young theologian is martyred, as when a poet's life is prematurely cut off, the world may be inclined to read into the promise of their work more than is justified. That is not really a danger in this case, for there are seed-thoughts here which are permanently valuable; and it is to be hoped that *The Cost of Discipleship* will soon be followed by a translation of his *Ethics*, written while Bonhoeffer was in prison.

EDGAR P. DICKIE

Die Botschaft von der freien Gnade Gottes. By KARL BARTH. Evangelischer Verlag A. G. Zollikon-Zürich.

IT would be impossible in a brief review to do justice to the range and scope of this mighty utterance. Taking as his text the sixth thesis of the Barmen declaration: "The commission of the Church in which her freedom is established consists in this, in Christ's stead and thus in the service of His own word and work, to declare to all people by means of preaching and sacrament the message of the free grace of God", Barth draws out in kindling and eloquent language some of the wide and deep implications of the two words "free grace". Here the theologian joins hands with the evangelist. Calvin and Wesley meet. The address opens with the liberating insistence that the words "free grace" denote nothing less than the very nature and essence of Him who in Holy Scripture is called "God". God is free and God is grace. The free grace of God is no mere property of God which might be qualified by others. It is the mystery of God's own being which becomes revelation at one point only, the event of Jesus Christ. All men and ultimately the whole created universe stand within the operation, under the judgment, and under the promise, of this free grace. The message of the Church to the world cannot therefore start from, or be directed by, the consideration of human problems, concerns and needs as such, for into the world which abounds in these has come as mighty happening the free grace of God; and it is this free grace and this alone which discloses the depths and unfolds the nature of all human need and problems, and in such disclosing and unfolding meets them. Nor may the Church in any way thrust herself forward as representative or vicegerent of the Christ in whom alone the free grace of God is real and effective. "The message of the Church must be the message of Christ and nothing else. . . . He is the prophet and the word, the priest and the sacrifice, the king and the kingdom." The old Reformation "wrath" bursts out at this point. "It is and remains a denial of His work, and 'an accursed remnant of idolatry' to wish to repeat His sacrifice in a sacrifice offered by

human hands, to revere and adore Him, the true God and the true man, under any other form than His own, to place beside Him a Mary as mediatrix of all grace and then also a whole chorus of such grace mediators, to provide Him, the Lord of His Church, with a human vicar, to ascribe to man a condition of grace through which he may acquire further grace for himself and for others. Man is and man becomes no co-redeemer, no subsidiary centre, no secondary source of grace." Moreover the grace of God, being free grace, is in no way dependent on or conditioned by any human capacities, qualities or merits, nor does it require points of connexion in human nature by means of which it may become effective. It is effective in the operation of its own power and freedom. Again, it is not bound to any established and prescribed ways or means. "The space of the Church" is not the prison but the platform, open on all sides, of the word of God's grace. The Church has not to keep guard over positions or to secure them. It is therefore not essential in every case to bring old controversies to a successful issue. God may be addressing new questions to His Church, and only as the Church gives heed to these will the old controversies fall into true perspective and disclose their true significance. And ever must it be remembered that God's free grace points beyond the present order to a great future in which all will be made new; for grace in its freedom and sovereignty establishes the provisional and evanescent character of all that belongs to the here and now. At this point the address reaches majestic heights of eloquence, as the speaker points to Christ alone as our future and our hope. At this point also, the old Protestant anger flames out anew in a repudiation of the trivialising view that the free grace of God is somehow bound and limited by a purgatory or process of purification in the world beyond.

The commission of the Church then consists solely in this, to set forth the message of the free grace of God. In the carrying out of this commission the Church lives her life. The Church has no life of her own into which she might withdraw herself, and which she might foster for its own sake. She lives only as she witnesses by preaching, sacrament, prayer, and whatever forms of active service she may undertake, to the free grace of God. She is wholly bound to her commission, and therefore she is set free from every other bond. Accordingly in the fulfilment of her commission the Church discovers and maintains her freedom in the midst of the world. Because her message is in no way dependent on any world dominants whether of thought or action, she is free from all such world dominants; for the free grace of God is no mere idea but mighty and effective reality. She will certainly lose her freedom if she regards it as a possession to be guarded against attack. She will have

it and keep it only as she is herself ever on the offensive with her message of free grace.

Such in briefest sketch is the scope of this great utterance. It is fittingly followed by a brief but strangely complete and satisfying address on the subject of Christian Ethics. Christian Ethics is the form of human behaviour and action which corresponds to God's action in free grace to men. Once that is recognised, the lines which the true ethic must follow open out forthwith.

A brief comment may serve to complete this review. Barth is clearly pressing for a decision on the part of the whole Church, that the nature and content of the Christian revelation is *message*, and not interpretation of existence. Certainly the message will lead to much fruitful and illumining interpretation. But always it remains in its essence message; and message which itself confers freedom to accept it. Thus does it liberate man from subjection to the necessity of founding his life on such a dubious possibility as the existence, attainable by him, of a valid interpretation of the confused and contradictory facts of life. Bound to such a necessity his mind must ever be enslaved. He can never say out of a full heart, "I believe". Moreover his active existence will ever be held captive by the powers of the world around him. It will remain part of the general scheme of things in which he is involved. But, says Barth, God has revealed Himself as free grace, and therefore that free grace is over all His works. Let the Church give herself to making the message "clear and plain". Then she will be the agent and instrument of true human freedom.

F. W. Camfield

Prophet und Tempel. By Martin Schmidt. Evangelischer Verlag A. G. Zollikou-Zürich. Fr. 14.50.

The setting of this "Study of the Problem of the Nearness of God in the Old Testament", as the sub-title describes it, is that the Temple stood at the heart of the battle with which the prophets were concerned, about the right way in which God's Nearness to Israel was to be understood, namely as Revelation.

The Temple was never just a "symbol" of God—that is, a human representation of His Presence which might be altered as the idea of Him became more spiritualised: but it was always a "sign", a sign—and the one sign—of Him who had of His own free choice entered into Israel's history, and who, as Lord of History, was guiding it to its appointed end. And the Temple stands as a sign until it is done away with: not in the sense that through the spiritualisation of religion it becomes unnecessary, but done away with at that point where the Nearness of God to men is realised completely, that is, in Christ, who, as Himself God's Nearness, is the "new

Temple". When that has happened and Christ has, as Schmidt puts it, "carried the salvation-in-history over to the eternal world", the place of the Temple made with hands is taken by the new Israel, the Church. The Church now becomes the Sign of God to the world which the Temple has previously been, taking over the functions of the old Israel which, when confronted by the Sign, had rejected it.

In this process what was the part played by the prophets? This is the question to which Schmidt addresses himself, and the bulk of the book is occupied by a full and careful analysis of what the Temple, as the Sign of the God who was active in Israel's history, signified for each of the prophets from Isaiah to Zechariah (the pre-Isaianic prophets are treated less fully). The conclusion to which he comes is, that while aspects of the Temple's significance varied from individual to individual, the main conception of it was the same: "where the concern is the true Presence of God, the dealings of God (*Gottesgeschichte*), and actual decision, or when it is the People of God, the Plan of God and the Lordship of God, there stands the Temple set up as a Sign" (p. 38). And it is about the Temple that all experience of salvation and all eschatological expectation, as well as all judgment, gather.

An example of the exposition of Schmidt's thesis may be given from the section on Ezekiel. It was in connexion with the Temple that Israel showed that unholiness which brought them to ruin. The reaction of God's Nearness to that sin was the destruction of the Temple, which was therefore equivalent to the destruction of the nation. But that Ezekiel in the Temple received an experience of the Nearness of God meant that the fate of the Temple, and so the fate of the nation, remained in His hands. And when the future new Israel was contemplated, it was symbolised by the building of the new Temple. Thus for Ezekiel the Temple is *the* place where the Nearness of God makes itself felt, as it serves also to show God's transcendence and His control of history, as well as the death-dealing and quickening power of His truth.

Justice cannot be done to the book in a short review, and it is not one which the reader who has only a moderate knowledge of German will find easy to follow. The wide range of the subject, for all the modesty of the title, and the detail which is entered into, tend to make it difficult to follow always the main line of the arguments, a fact which Schmidt himself appears to appreciate, since from time to time he gives summaries. But may there not be something more? It is a truism to say that transitions are always difficult, and our present change in Biblical scholarship from "the history of religion" to "the theology of Revelation" is involving us in an almost

new world of thought. Especially is it leading us to reconsider, and perhaps reconsider radically, the view of the Old Testament in which most of us were brought up. Few any longer now regard the critical study of the Old Testament as an end in itself, just as all are realising anew the close connexion between it and the Testament which follows, the Old Testament finding its full meaning only in the central figure of the New, and the New being without the Old "but a torso, magnificent indeed, but nevertheless incomplete" (C. R. North, *The Old Testament Interpretation of History*). But is there not a danger? May not a too radically Christocentric approach to the Old Testament end in making unreal a reality, the reality of the "*Heilsgeschichte*" itself? We may put it this way. To see a "Christ-witness" in every part of the Old Testament is to be obliged to use mystical and allegorical interpretations. But once these are given any large room—except in the few places where they were clearly meant to be employed—then, as far as concerns the New Testament, the reality of the Incarnation—that the Word became actual flesh and lived a real human life—is endangered, while, on the Old Testament side, Israel's history becomes, instead of the stage on which a historical nation composed of men of like parts and passions with ourselves struggled, fought against and finally rejected its God, something more like the screen on which those who have been given the Christian revelation may witness the scenes, as they come, of a divine drama being guided inevitably to its dénouement. It is not suggested that Schmidt in any way consciously forces his subject to accord with preconceived ideas of the content of Scriptural revelation, though the present writer feels that he reads a good deal more into the significance of the Temple in Israel and the prophets' relations to it than the data surviving about it warrant. But the impression is left that the school of interpretation to which he belongs —to which Biblical scholarship and theology already owe so much— may be running the risk of being brought, by its very eagerness to stress that which is so vital in Scripture, to a way of looking at it which is precarious, if not indeed unsound. But *Prophet und Tempel* is none the less well worthy to have gained the Doctorate in Theology of Basel which it did. Martin Schmidt is the son of Karl Ludwig Schmidt, and we shall look for him to put Biblical Studies under as great a debt to him as they are to his father.

D. M. G. Stalker

Essentials of Demonology, a Study of Jewish and Christian Doctrine, its Origin and Development. By Edward Langton, D.D., F.R.Hist.S., F.R.A.S. London, The Epworth Press, 1949. 229 pp. 15s.

In an earlier work, viz. *Good and Evil Spirits: a Study of the Jewish and*

Christian Doctrine, its Origin and Development (S.P.C.K., London, 1942) Dr Langton presented a number of clear and succinct studies upon, *inter alia*, the belief in the spirit of man, animism, the place of departed spirits, survival beliefs in the O.T., and demons. Here in this present work we have a continuation of the same study giving a patient, lucid and instructive account of the demonological beliefs which flourished among the Arabs, Babylonians, Assyrians, and in Greece and Persia, and assessing the contribution which these beliefs made to Jewish and Christian thought.

Two features of Dr Langton's work are strikingly apparent: first, the satisfactory fulness with which he adduces the relevant data of demonology which appear in the records of the above-mentioned peoples, and, secondly, the clear line of influence which is traced from these peoples upon Judaism and Christianity, as well as the well-marked development of thought in the O.T., in Judaism (apocryphal literature and Rabbinic), and in Christianity regarding the work and functions of evil spirits, fallen angels, Satans and Satan. The study of the primitive conceptions associated with the demonic creatures mentioned in the O.T., such as serpents, seraphim, se'irim (hairy ones; he-goats?), Lilith, Azazel, Alukah, or with the belief in demonic powers, the dread and awe of whom pervade the extra-canonical literature, e.g. Beliar, Mastema, Sammael, Satan, the Devil, from the time of the second century B.C. to the time of the composition of the N.T., is more than of archaeological interest. For if investigation into demonology seems to concentrate upon a side-path of thought, fraught with error and misery, folly and superstition, this side-path has none the less been of much consequence in man's intellectual and religious history in his attempt to solve the problem of evil.

Dr Langton's book allows us to observe how from the slender and reserved narrative in Gen. 6.1-4—a mythological fragment as it has been called—which tells how "the sons of God" chose for themselves wives from the "daughters of men", there has been formed in the apocryphal writings a full-blown tradition of the "fall of the angels" in which the chiefs of the rebellious angels play an important part. In this literature angelology and demonology blend. In the *Martyrdom of Isaiah* (*c.* A.D. 50) Beliar "the angel of lawlessness" is the "ruler of this world", as Satan is in the N.T. (cf. John 12.31). Satan himself is only one of the powers of evil and is even overshadowed by certain of them, e.g. by Azazel, but eventually he gains the highest place. The Satan of the O.T. who in the book of Job is a ministering angel has become in the first century A.D. a more sinister person, the enemy not only of man but of God, and is equated with the Devil. This is his rank in the N.T. That

from Semitic sources such as Babylonia and Assyria, the Hebrews assimilated many ideas upon the nature and work of evil spirits will not seem surprising. But Dr Langton follows up the question of Persian and Greek influence upon Israel in this sphere. The notion that certain demons have their *habitat* in the air—cf. Eph. 2.2 "the prince of the power of the air", 6.12 "the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places"—he adjudges to have come from Greek demonology. Persian influence upon Hebrew thought after the O.T. period has been considerable and, already in the O.T., influence from this source has been detected by some scholars. Dr Langton's view is that "even though it cannot be proved that the original conception of Satan was borrowed from the Persians, there is good reason to believe that the more fully developed character of Satan drew many of its features from the Persian conception of *Ahriman*".

On the demonology of the N.T. the author writes some illuminating pages. There emerges the fact that while in the apocryphal writings the main emphasis is upon the *moral* evil worked by evil spirits, in the Synoptic Gospels the demons are usually regarded as causing physical (deafness, dumbness, epilepsy), rather than moral, evil. Further, in the Gospels a distinction seems to be drawn between ordinary kinds of sickness and maladies which were caused by demon-possession (cf. Mark 1.32). The question whether phenomena designated as demon-possession are to be explained as the result of hysterical or other abnormal physical conditions, is faithfully dealt with. We must conclude, Dr Langton remarks, that Jesus, under the limitations which the Incarnation imposed upon Him, shared the popular demonological conceptions of His time and did not simply accommodate Himself to them. The belief in demons, their existence and operations—to be distinguished from the Christian belief in the existence of the good or evil spirits of the departed—and a belief in Satan cannot be held, the writer states, "to correspond to reality" and man is left free to find a solution of the problem of evil in any manner that best accords with "the total facts of life". In Christian theology and in sermons until the modern period such beliefs held a place near the centre of the picture but now their place is only on the fringe, as out-of-date conceptions. The treatment of the theme of this study and of its various cross-currents of thought, and especially its close contact with the sources, should make this book rank high in the estimate of students of Jewish and Christian teaching. In the "selected bibliography" it might seem that reference should have been made to Eduard Meyer's *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, Vol. II, because of its importance upon the question of Persian influence on the O.T. and Judaism.

O. S. Rankin

The Earliest Gospel: The Gospel according to Saint Mark. By A. M. Hunter, B.D., Ph.D., D.Phil. The Torch Bible Commentaries. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

Notes on the Gospel according to St. Mark. By J. E. Fison, M.A. S.P.C.K. 1s. 3d.

It is probably agreed, that, of the four Gospels, St. Mark has been least well served with good English commentaries. *The Earliest Gospel*, by Professor Allan Menzies (1901), is a masterpiece of exegetical and homiletic insight, but there has been a dearth of really convincing contributions to Marcan study since that publication, although Professor Hunter acknowledges that he has "derived most stimulus from Dr Walter Lawrie's *Jesus according to St. Mark*, a book not well known in this country, but replete with theological insight".

This real need assures a grateful welcome for Professor Hunter's popular study of the oldest of our Gospels, published as the first of a new series of commentaries from the S.C.M. Press. It is sufficient proof of the writer's scholarship and competence that so much material is so effectively handled in one hundred and fifty-three pages.

In his Preface, Menzies wrote of his own Commentary forty-eight years ago: "It is written with a profound conviction that as criticism declares the second Gospel to be the porch by which we must go in to find the Saviour as He was and is, the earnest reader of that Gospel may indeed find Him here." True, it is the Person of Jesus Christ that is the real subject of St. Mark's Gospel. Dr Hunter has chosen a definitely Christological approach to this Gospel. Believing that "the day of the avidly critical commentary is past", and that "the demand is for a 'theological' commentary", he deals with the Gospel as a living whole, and succeeds in clarifying the picture of the Messiah in which St. Mark is interested.

The emphasis on Jesus as "the Messiah" is ably presented in a useful essay on "The Son of Man". Dr Hunter agrees that the use of the title in the Synoptic Gospels is derived from Daniel 7, and he finds two dominant ideas in it—the idea of sovereignty, as found in Daniel, and the idea of suffering, "the new, original and startling thing".

The writer notes that "artless though Mark's Christology may be, there is no doubt that he believes Jesus to be supernatural and divine", and working through this Christological interest, he sketches a very penetrating parallel between our Lord's Baptism and Transfiguration: "We may regard the Transfiguration as the *counterpart in the disciples' experience of the Baptism in the experience of our Lord.*" The commentary on Mark 9.2-13 is very helpful. We are also given

a Christological exposition of the Cleansing of the Temple and of the Betrayal of Jesus by Judas. With these and other points in mind, the present writer would have no hesitation in saying that the chief value of this popular commentary is just that here at last is a book which gives the ordinary Bible reader an understanding of the Christological interest and concern of St. Mark's Gospel.

In view of this, I am surprised that Dr Hunter is of the opinion that St. Mark intended the title verse, "the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ", to refer only to the opening verses of the first chapter and not to his writing as a whole. Again, when the commentator so frequently shows his fine gift of simplification as, for example, when he says in regard to Mark 3.29: "The context makes it clear that the unforgivable sin is to ascribe to the devil works which are manifestly of God", it is unfortunate that he should even introduce such a technical and, to the popular reader, bewildering a phrase as "*realised eschatology*" (p. 58), as a comment on the parable of the Seed growing secretly.

Although this is a popular *English* commentary, one is continually aware that Dr Hunter is a master of the Greek original, and his readers benefit from this linguistic mastery. Examples of his penetrating Greek scholarship are his translations of *μετάνοια* as "a radical return to God" (1.4), *στυγνάσας* as "with a lowering face" (10.22), and *καινός* as "new in quality, not in time" (14.25).

Special mention should be made of the valuable section on "The Gospel before the Gospels" in the Introduction. This contains a most useful and clear presentation of all the positive gains from the *Formgeschichte* method of Gospel criticism. "Preached message" is a helpful term for the *Kerygma*.

We may regret the absence from this little volume of any kind of word or other index, but chapter and verse references at the head of the pages are clearly printed, and the inclusion of the Synoptic parallel references at each section is of particular merit. The general form of this commentary promises well for the series of *Torch Bible Commentaries*, aimed at providing "the general reader with the soundest possible assistance in understanding the message of each book considered as a whole and as a part of the Bible".

Professor Hunter is to be particularly thanked for his succinct and competent exposition of Jesus' teaching on Divorce (pp. 99-100); and for his clearly tabulated distinction between the ecclesiastical and civil trials of our Lord (p. 136). Striking, too, are his use of Romans 16.13 as a commentary on Mark 10.30, and his description of Mark 14.65 as "a grim game of blind man's buff". This commentary places Dr Hunter in the front rank of Scottish New Testament scholars.

Canon Fison's *Notes*, edited by Eric E. Yelverton, come to us from the tense atmosphere of war service, an atmosphere which some of us recognise so well and now find a little unreal and difficult to recapture. The notes reveal their origin in Middle-East Chaplaincy work more than they fulfil the intention of their sub-title, which is *A fresh correlation of the Gospel and the post-war world.* Despite this limitation, there is a freshness about the writer's approach which shows itself in such telling phrases as "into the noise of men came the unforgettable Silence of God", which is a comment on Mark 5.38-40; and "A double standard of sexual morality is inevitable; not for men and women, but for the Church and the world", which is a comment on Mark 10.10-12.

One wonders if these notes have been improved by their editing. Not many will accept the editor's exposition of the meaning of love (*φιλιά, ἀγάπη*) in the New Testament (pp. 29-30); nor the allegorical interpretation of the cursing of the fig tree (pp. 34-35).

This booklet deals with St. Mark's Gospel as "*The New Order of the Kingdom of God*", but it appears to me that the author fails to keep quite clear the distinction between a *political* New Order and a *spiritual* New Order. No one, however, will doubt the writer's own sincerity and evangelical zeal. The very absence of a technical and theological approach and the excellence of the many carefully culled quotations from such a large variety of writers, will ensure the wide use of these notes, particularly in men's societies and youth groups.

R. Stuart Louden

St. Paul's Gospel to the Romans. By Gwilym O. Griffith. Blackwell. 10s. 6d.

In this book the author first considers the background of the Epistle and briefly sketches the life of the Apostle, his correspondents, various terms employed, his use of the O.T., and then, equating "gospel" with "*kerygma*", dwells on its central theme as found in Romans—the moral purpose of cosmic redemption. The endeavour, with the backing of P. T. Forsyth, to bring this into its right perspective is the main purpose of this "modern interpretation of a great Christian classic".

The study proper opens with a paraphrase of the Epistle with interpolations to expand the argument. In his subsequent interpretation the author draws out the parallels to Paul's thoughts in the writings of the ancient world, considers their importance for modern life and indicates the frequently overlooked close agreement and "continuity" between Paul and Christ as regards teaching. In

his anxiety to heed Professor J. S. Stewart's warning against attempts at paring down Paul's thoughts and affirmations to fit them into any preconceived scheme, Mr Griffith has been hard put to it to keep the various topics with which he has to deal in their own pigeon holes; but such chapters as "Man and the Law", "Justification and Atonement", "Christ and the Spirit", "God in History", "Churchmanship", "Church and State" do give us the leading notes in Paul's letter.

The author reaffirms Dr Dodd's emphasis on the importance of the preaching of the apostles as prior to the Gospel records. He sees in Rom. 8.18-25 the "peak passage" of the whole Epistle. The Hebrews had a better chance than anyone to prove the efficacy of a "religion of duty and of human effort", but for Paul "the world is estranged from the life of God and is incapable of self-renewal—and man's incapacity is not due to ignorance; the human problem lies in the moral warp in human nature as a whole". "He never suggests that Revelation (equals 'instruction') as such can meet man's need." This brings us to Paul's claim that an adequate gospel is not "something excogitated by religious men", but is "God's Act, God's Word, God's Gift", which gives rise to faith—"the personal voluntary response of the whole man to God Himself".

When we turn to "Justification and Atonement" we have to realise that "apart from redemption Paul's Gospel has no meaning"; for "sin, as Paul sees it, is not mere delinquency—but man's self-will in rebellion against the holy God". Redemption must therefore include the justification of God in pardoning the sinner. Paul, like his successors, nowhere "ever formulated a fixed and definite dogma of Atonement". He speaks the language of poetry but not of mysticism when he contends that the effect of this Gospel is the production not of a sinless man but of one who is conscious that "the down-shining revelation of the living Christ Himself has penetrated to the core of his being".

In Paul's teaching with respect to the Spirit, the author finds that "what is presented is a new conception of the Godhead. The 'unitarian' emphasis remains, for God is One; but the 'solitarian' emphasis disappears".

The study of history shows how God acts but never why He acts thus. He is, however, no mere controller of puppets and even the prophetic illustration of the "Divine Potter" is hardly adequate to express Paul's own thoughts.

Paul's basic doctrine of the Church affirms its "fundamental and vital unity" based on the "common denominator of the Lordship of Christ". Without a recognition of this the Church has no existence. Moreover room is left for diversities of conscientious con-

viction, since Christ and not individual conscience is the "password of the faithful". After a discussion of Paul's views on the relationship of Church and State we are brought back to the conclusion that "the whole massive Christology and soteriology of Paul works out at last into the pure ethic of the teachings of Jesus as the Gospels report them".

This work is addressed to "lay readers" and makes no claim to cater for the specialist. It may well find a place in the thin ranks of literature suitable for Arts Faculty courses in Bible study. It seems to call for critical mention of one or two details.

A reminder that the New Testament is far and away the best vouched for of all ancient documents should accompany the statement that "No claim of absolute textual purity can be made for any New Testament document".

One would agree that "the life of the Church began with an experience of the Holy Spirit". But to deduce from this categorically that "Jesus Himself, through His ministry of teaching and healing, established no church", as though we were dealing with mutually exclusive propositions, seems almost equivalent to saying that Marconi did not invent radio because he failed to produce a television set.

The implication of p. 183 that Paul uses *suneidēsis* in the classical sense of "consciousness" would require a much more detailed treatment to carry conviction.

The provision of a detailed index would perhaps have corrected the impression that the term "grace" receives less adequate treatment than its use in the Epistle seems to demand.

The style is very readable but one feels a needless tendency to seek for unusual word-forms. "Certificature", "agapaic" and "personhood" are among those which call for justification.

The final "Questionnaire", through which at times the bare bones of the discussion-group method protrude rather distractingly, indicates the wide range of subjects which such a study can open up. Because of this very width, some of the space so allocated might well have been devoted to giving readers a guide to that further study of Paul's great work which the book aims at encouraging.

IAN A. MOIR

Heroes of the Way. By ERNEST H. HAYES AND F. S. POPHAM. Religious Education Press Ltd. 5s.

THIS book is the fourth Junior volume in the series of *Teachers' Guides to the Agreed Syllabuses*. It is well printed, and is furnished with adequate maps.

It begins with a section "Jesus the Friend of All", which is a con-

tinuation from the previous volumes. This is followed by "Friends who followed Him", i.e. eight Saints, including St. George, St. Andrew, St. Patrick and St. David.

There is too much of the miraculous and the improbable in this section.

The "Stories of St. Paul the Missionary" form the best part of the book. They are well arranged, and told with considerable verve.

This is followed by four modern missionary lessons on China, entitled "In the footsteps of St. Paul".

The Old Testament is represented by the eight closing lessons on Elijah and Elisha.

Used wisely as a "refresher" book by the average teacher, this volume will be very helpful.

D. A. McRury

The following have been received:

The Church Intelligencer (London)
Turkish Translation (United Bible Societies, London)
Y Goleuad (Caernarvon)
Biblica (Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Rome)
Studia Anselmiana (Pontificio Instituto St. Anselmo, Rome)
Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses (Strasbourg)
Verbum Caro, Revue théologique et ecclésiastique (Neuchatel)
Theologische Literaturzeitung (Halle, Berlin)
Evangelische-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung (München)
Evangelische Theologie (Göttingen and München)
Verkündigung und Forschung (München)
Reformierte Kirchenzeitung (Wüppertal, Barmen)
Theologische Zeitschrift (Basel)
Kirchenblatt für die reformierte Schweiz (Basel)
The Ecumenical Review (Geneva)
The Presbyterian World (Geneva)
The Expository Times (Aberdeen and Edinburgh)
The Evangelical Quarterly (Edinburgh)
The Scottish Congregationalist (Edinburgh)
Manse Mail (Edinburgh)
The Eastern Churches Quarterly (Ramsgate)
Sobornost, The Journal of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (London)
Theology, A Monthly Review (London)
The Churchman, A Quarterly Journal of Evangelical Theology (London)
The Presbyter, A Journal of Reformed Churchmanship (London)
The Church Intelligencer (Church Association, London)
The Harvard Theological Review (Cambridge, Massachusetts)
The Crozer Quarterly (Chester, Pennsylvania)
Theology To-day (Princeton, New Jersey)
The Reformed Theological Review (Melbourne)

SOME LEADING TRENDS OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

by The Rev. Canon T. W. ISHERWOOD

Any attempt to examine the main trends of contemporary theology may well open with the salutary reflection that history always has its own way of defying our efforts at exact analysis. The events which seem to have the quality of new departures are inexplicably linked with the past out of which they have grown and to which, in some sense and degree, they are related as effect to cause. This is especially true when we find ourselves in the realm of ideas, and Christian theology must not be supposed, even by those who are convinced that it takes its rise from a "revelatum", to be of such a nature as to provide, or allow, an exception to the general rule. Only when we compare the broad features of periods sufficiently separate in point of time and temper can we recognise differences so sharp as to be unmistakable.

We must, nevertheless, find some starting-point distinct enough to stand in contrast to the immediate past, influential enough to indicate a change in the direction of thought, and, perhaps, creative enough to mould, in part, the future. A strong case could be made for 1918, the year in which Karl Barth published his now famous commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. This observation need not be held to imply any judgment, favourable or hostile, as to the teaching of Barth. But the simple and significant fact remains that during the past twenty-five years no theologian of serious repute or intention has been able to escape the duty of coming to grips with the Barthian challenge.

When we turn to theological development in the English-speaking world it is less easy to find a convincing point for the opening of the present period. Especially is this so in the case of the British Isles, and for the obvious and sufficient reason that the thought-climate does not encourage extremes or, consequently, violent changes of temperature and outlook. That there have been considerable changes, gradually effected, will

be made clear as this article proceeds. In America a change is to be noted about 1935, as Dr Hillyer H. Straton pointed out in an article "Tide and Trend in Theology" written for the Autumn 1943 number of *Christendom*. Both a theologian and a preacher bear their independent witness to a change of attitude, alike in and beyond themselves. In 1934, Professor Edwin Lewis' *A Christian Manifesto* was published and immediately proved itself one of the more notable and influential theological treatises of recent years. It was, from one point of view, the apologia of an American scholar for his repudiation of "liberalism" and for his acceptance of the dogmatic essentials of the Catholic faith. It called forth vigorous protest from those who regarded the author as little better than a traitor to light and truth, and jubilation—some of it rather unreflecting and undiscriminating jubilation!—on the part of those who hailed a case of convincing conversion to conservatism. Almost more surprising was a sermon preached by Dr Harry Emerson Fosdick in 1935. The sermon—with the striking title "A Fundamentalist Sermon by a Modernist Preacher"—did not, in its entirety, allow anyone to imagine that Dr Fosdick was forsaking all his long-held liberal views and attitudes. But towards its close is the following frank confession. "You see, we modernists have often gotten at our faith by a negative process. We do not believe this. We do not believe that. We have given up this incredible idea or that obsolete doctrine. So we pare down and dim out our faith by negative abstractions until we have left only the ghostly remainder of what was once a great religion. Then seeing how few our positive convictions are and how little they matter, we grow easy-going about everybody else's convictions, and end in a mush of general concession. Then a crisis falls upon the individual soul, upon the family, upon the world at large, where a religion that is going to amount to anything must have deep conviction in it. 'The rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon the rock'—how much we need that!"[1]

"Then a crisis falls"—and it has fallen upon the whole world of ideas and values inherited from the nineteenth century. What was clear and compelling for Barth, by the logic of harsh ex-

[1] H. E. Fosdick, *The Power to See it Through* (Harper & Sons), p. 199.

perience and disillusionment, a quarter of a century ago, is a fact which every responsible exponent of the Christian Gospel and programme has been forced to face. To begin with, no one to-day can retain a complacent faith in the concept of inevitable unchallenged progress. No one can take it for granted that the victory is with the Kingdom as theological liberalism interpreted either the Kingdom or the victory. Further, the attack has come not only by the pressure of political movements with determined leaders and massive armaments behind them. It has come by the fact that the enemy has developed his own ideology and his own dogma, thereby giving to his followers a system of thought which has the driving power of a perverted crusade. Little wonder that theological liberalism was no match for the demands of such an hour. As another "erstwhile liberal" has recently put it "Liberalism is in decline. As a movement it has lost its creative drive, as a social climate it belongs to an era that is past, as a creed it is vague and no match for the dynamic dogmas of the day."

Our estimate of the situation will be seriously inadequate if we do not also recognise that the fate which has befallen theological liberalism is shared by the broader movement which both within and outside the Christian Church, but chiefly outside it, is known as Humanism. In its extreme form Humanism has not inaptly been described as "a philosophy of life which is held by people who believe that it is possible to conserve all the values of religion without believing in the kind of God in whom Christians believe, and who are trying to do it". Our present world impasse is, at least, a deterrent against assuming that there is any likelihood of achieving, independently of Christian agencies, an order of life in which the Christian conception of community and personality will have justice done to it. Humanists within the Christian Church are, however, not unnaturally indignant when they find themselves forcibly and gratuitously classed with non-Christian Humanists. It is worthy of note that, in this connexion, complaint has been made against the allegedly undiscriminating tone of the strictures contained in the well-known report of the Archbishops' Commission on Evangelism, *Towards the Conversion of England*. What Christian Humanists are inclined to forget is that they have themselves chiefly to blame if, having for the most part decided to retain only the

most tenuous connexion with historic Christianity and, more particularly, to sever the fine flower of a humanitarian programme from the original root of obedient faith in the purpose of God, they find themselves involved in embarrassment and frustration.

Before we turn to that revival of dogmatic mood which, in such an age as this, was both spiritually and psychologically inevitable for the Christian Church as a whole, it will be well to make clear three other important points. Of them the first is the simple fact that theological liberalism is by no means dead, though, for the present at any rate, it is widely discredited. It has its convinced and doughty representatives on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The Bishop of Birmingham's latest book, *The Rise of Christianity*, published in 1947, must not be held to be the swan-song of theological liberalism or regarded only as an abnormal example of heresy in high places. Certainly its detailed conclusions would be accepted and approved only by a negligible minority within the Christian Churches. Of its attitude and approach to the issues considered we may, however, say that they are elsewhere not so much dead as hibernating. And from a quite different direction Dr Rufus Jones—a well-known American Quaker—writes in a recent issue of *The Atlantic* to indicate the content of the religious belief of "the modern man". What he offers is, in effect, the liberal interpretation of the religious attitude to life and there can be no doubt that, in America at any rate, there are many for whom it will seem both normal and adequate. For the present writer it seemed both inadequate and curiously ignorant of the direction taken by the main streams of theological thought during the last twenty years.

Secondly, it is important to remember that, great as has been the reaction from many of the conclusions reached and positions held by the liberals, and deeply as some of us may sympathise with that reaction, the liberal attitude witnesses to duties and values which can be wholly repudiated only at the cost of severe loss to the Christian Church. We cannot lightly surrender the call to examine anew the contemporary expression of the faith that we have received, and we most certainly cannot exonerate ourselves from the responsibility of relating it to the particular conditions and issues that confront us to-day.

So long as liberalism keeps us alive to these demands it does us service, even though we may dispute and reject its specific forms and findings. Dr Henry Sloane Coffin has recently asked the pertinent question: "Is it liberalism from which contemporary theologians need to escape, or is it particular views widely held by liberals not so long ago, and still held by some who call themselves liberals?" And if the only alternative to liberalism is the revival of, and return to, a static inherited theological system, couched in a terminology unintelligible to the ordinary Christian of our time, we may well ask whether we are not being invited to exchange one evil for another. It is not improper to ask whether some exponents of neo-orthodoxy and neo-Calvinism are sufficiently alive to this dilemma.

Thirdly, and most important of all, we must notice that not by reference only to the disappointments and frustrations of our time can the marked return to a more dogmatic mood be explained. We are living in a day when the fellowship of believers in God through our Lord Jesus Christ is, as never before, both spread over the face of the earth and conscious of its essential unity of fellowship in the Gospel. Ecumenicity is everywhere in the air, recently culminating in the constitution of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam. Such a movement cannot go forward merely in terms of the attitudes and tempers dear to the liberals. Something more specific and concrete is necessary. We must have a clear understanding of the Gospel entrusted to us, of the nature of the Church, of the mission which God intends her to fulfil in the world. These are basic issues and unless we are able to reach substantial agreement about them the will for fellowship will evaporate in nothing more profitable than a vague disposition toward woolly-minded benevolence and an excess of that false toleration which results from all-round lack of clear convictions. It is not too much to say that had there been no other cause the sheer pressure of the ecumenical movement would have necessitated a return to clearer and more definite conceptions of the Christian tradition and programme.

If what has thus far been written represents a reasonably fair and just appraisal of the general background of the contemporary situation, it will be obvious that influences both outside and inside the Christian Church have been exerting an irresistible

pressure in the direction of a return to a more basic statement of the Christian message and a more explicit conception of the Church's mission. And if a single book is to be selected as providing both a symptom and an anticipation of the mood which has developed during the last ten years it is questionable whether a better choice could be made than Dr H. Kraemer's *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World.* It was no mere coincidence that this massive work was produced by one who came from the stern background of European frustration and that it was prepared with the explicit purpose of providing material for the Tambaram (1938) Conference of the International Missionary Council. Underlying the whole concern and thesis of the book was the deep conviction that "the primary need of the Christian Church in all its aspects, and also in missions, is for a radically religious re-orientation. Without that the Christian Church and the Christian mission in the present confusion get lost in nervous absorption into many important, but peripheral, activities."[1] It was a weighty argument for the renewed examination of the Christian message and, therefore also, of the Church's way of undertaking and discharging her commission. In dogmatic terms—"dogmatic" in both senses of the word—it adopted a position radically different from that set forth in the American *Laymen's Report*, which, also, had summoned Christian leaders to the task of "Rethinking Missions". For our present purpose it will be sufficient to quote only one other passage from Dr Kraemer's book. "The Christian revelation testifies to the self-disclosure of God in Jesus Christ, the Crucified and Risen Lord, which is a 'stumbling-block' to the Jew, 'sheer folly' to the Gentiles, and only adorable and saving mystery to the eye of faith. Revelation in Christ is a free divine act of redemptive irruption into the life of man and of the world. This is an offence to man, because all philosophy, all idealistic religion, all consistent mystical religion, all moralism meet in one point. They constitute various endeavours for self-redemption, and instinctively reject the truth that God and God alone can work redemption."[2] It is not hard to understand why such a position invited criticism, and it was forthcoming in good measure! Objection was especially levelled

[1] H. Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World* (Edinburgh House Press, 1938 edn.), p. 443. [2] op. cit., p. 70.

against the idea that the action of God in Jesus Christ had the nature of "irruption into the life of man and of the world". Such a concept seemed to imply the absence of God, previously and otherwise, from His created order. But though Kraemer's position may be regarded as marked by the over-sharpness of the Continental theological definition it did clarify the issue and it was one, possibly the most significant, evidence of a growing determination to rediscover the specific Christian message, explain its "differentia", and proclaim it with an appropriate assurance.

There have been other and less controversial evidences of the same concern. While Kraemer was preparing his Tambaram Study, an English theologian, Professor C. H. Dodd, produced *The Apostolic Preaching and its Development*, in some ways the most outstanding work of a decade so far as new emphasis, direction, and influence are concerned. As the outcome of a candid and competent examination of the New Testament records, but also with reference to the general religious outlook and literature of the time, Dr Dodd reached the conclusion that the apostolic heralds were men who believed themselves entrusted with a clear and definite "kerygma"—an authorised and authoritative proclamation. Two quotations will sufficiently illustrate Dodd's main contention. "In this survey of the apostolic Preaching and its developments two facts have come into view: first, that within the New Testament there is an immense range of variety in the interpretation that is given to the 'kerygma'; and, secondly, that in all such interpretation the essential elements of the original 'kerygma' are steadily kept in view. Indeed, the farther we move from the primitive modes of expression, the more decisively is the central purport of it affirmed. With all the diversity of the New Testament writings, they form a unity in their proclamation of the one Gospel."[1] "It [the 'kerygma'] begins by proclaiming that 'This is that which was spoken by the prophets'; the age of fulfilment has dawned and Christ is its Lord; it then proceeds to recall the historical facts, leading up to the resurrection and exaltation of Christ and the promise of His coming in glory; and it ends with the call to repentance and the offer of forgiveness."[2] Here is the essential Christian Gospel, as it was first preached, as it

[1] op. cit., p. 177.

[2] op. cit., pp. 104-5.

has been transmitted and received, as it is entrusted to us for proclamation in our own "day of the Lord". And it is worthy of note that Professor Dodd's conception of the "realised eschatology" shows him no less aware of the significance of the Gospel for the whole movement of history, whatever our verdict on the problems which that conception raises.

It would be a gross and inexcusable blunder to suggest, or even to imply, that Kraemer and Dodd represent an identical position. They do not, though we cannot here attempt to examine in detail the differences between them. What, however, is of real importance is their point of contact in focussing attention on the Gospel as a given message and on the idea of Revelation. It is a fair commentary on the central position of each of them, and of many other contemporary theological leaders of the period under review (such as, for example, Archbishop Temple, Dr J. S. Whale and Professor Reinhold Niebuhr), that they insist on reminding us that "the initiative is with the Eternal" and that the Christian Gospel represents what God has declared and done, declared and done uniquely in the historic Christ, before it represents what man has apprehended and accepted. Acceptance of the Gospel implies both grace and faith: but grace comes first, and faith is no synonym for a mere intellectual probing of the universe. That there is required of us the most thorough intellectual response of which we are capable is not to be called in question. But it will always be "response", and never the action that creates and constitutes—or even, in any thorough-going sense of the word, discovers—the Gospel. But whereas Barthianism, at least in its extremer forms and phases, has so emphasised as virtually to isolate from the rest of the historical process the redemptive "irruption" in Christ, it has been characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon position that it has *both* understood the uniqueness of Revelation *and* set it in the wider stream of God's continuous purpose for, and action in, the world. This is well expressed by Professor Niebuhr in Volume II of *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. "The self-disclosure of God in Christ is significantly regarded by Christian faith as the final 'word' which God has spoken to man. The revelation of the Atonement is precisely a 'final' word because it discloses a transcendent divine mercy which represents the 'freedom' of God in quintessential terms:

namely God's freedom over His own law. Yet this freedom is not capricious. It is paradoxically related to God's law, to the structure of the world. This is the paradox of the Atonement, of the revelation of the mercy of God in its relation to the justice of God."[1] Further, it should be noticed that such a view of, and attitude to, Revelation both requires fidelity to the content of Revelation and allows a proper liberty for new interpretation of that content. It is not surprising, therefore, but it is decidedly encouraging, to see how many books, marked by real scholarship and insight, have been, during recent years, devoted to this kind of interpretative task. Among them may be mentioned the following, chosen almost at random and mentioned purely for illustrative purpose: *Nature, Man and God* (Archbishop Temple, 1935); *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (Professor Reinhold Niebuhr, 2 vols., 1941 and 1943); *The Doctrine of the Trinity* (Professor Leonard Hodgson, 1943); *The Significance of the Cross* (Professor F. W. Dillistone, 1944); *Our Knowledge of God* (John Baillie, 1939); *God was in Christ* (Donald Baillie, 1948).

Every attempt to explicate the essence of the Gospel and the nature of Revelation must pay due attention to the relationship between them and Holy Scripture. The Bible refuses to be left out of the question. During the last decade it has, indeed, been receiving a new kind and degree of attention. Frequently we have heard the plea for a return to "Biblical Theology" and, as we have already noticed, the plea has not gone unheard. But how does the Bible provide us with the "Word" that we need? What is its relation to the Gospel? How does it become the medium of Revelation? And—not least important—how are we to co-ordinate the Gospel, the Bible, and the Church? And here again we meet evidence, in separate but related fields of modern scholarship, that problems such as these have been in the forefront of theological concern. To begin with, New Testament scholarship has, during the last twenty years, been grappling with the question of Form-Criticism. Here there is raised for us the question whether the Gospels may be regarded as providing any kind of direct biography of Jesus, or whether they must not rather be understood as "community documents" presenting us with the formulated and crystallised essence of the approved Apostolic testimony and teaching. To this prob-

[1] op. cit., p. 69.

lem competent scholars (Professor R. H. Lightfoot, the Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, and the Archbishop of Quebec are notable examples) have been directing their attention. And, as so often in such matters, the first impression created was little less than terrifying. In an often-quoted word, Professor Lightfoot remarked: "For all the inestimable value of the Gospels, they yield us little more than a whisper of His voice; we trace in them but the outskirts of His ways." A calmer frame of mind returned when men reflected that the Gospels never have provided us with objective biography in an ultimate sense, for the obvious reason that all biography is at least as much interpretation as it is record: that (as Canon F. W. Green says in an interesting appendix to his Clarendon Bible commentary on St. Matthew's Gospel): "So far from detracting from the historicity of the Gospels, the close connexion which Form-Criticism has shown to exist between their sources and the parent community is a valuable guarantee of their substantial accuracy":[1] and that behind the portrait provided in the Gospels ("portrait", let it be said, not "photograph") is the fellowship that was inspired to produce it and cannot conceivably have been adequate to imagine it. And it is well that we should remember our real and ultimate dependence upon the basic historical authenticity of the Gospel records. The inadequacy of any tendency to dismiss or disparage their historicity, as, for example, in the case of Bultmann, has been exposed by other contemporary scholars such as W. Manson.

Along quite different lines Professor Leonard Hodgson has been giving fresh and illuminating attention to the nature of Revelation in connexion with the Biblical records as a whole. His point of view can best be stated in his own words quoted from *The Doctrine of the Trinity*. "The divine revelation is given in acts rather than in words, and is received by those whose eyes God opens to see the significance of what He does. The eyes of the Biblical writers were opened to see the significance of certain events as the key-feature for the understanding of the universe. They proclaim that these events manifest God's redemptive activity, and by surveying the universe from this standpoint they are enabled to recognise elsewhere His creative and preservative activity. The Bible comes to us in the form of

[1] op. cit., p. 270.

propositions because only by statements in the form of propositions could those whose eyes were opened bear record to future generations of what they saw. It is not these propositions as such which are the 'revelatum'. They bear record to the 'revelatum', but as the ages go by they can only continue to mediate the revelation in so far as in each generation men's eyes are opened to see for themselves the significance of the revelatory acts of God to which they bear witness."[1] In other words, and as Professor Hodgson elsewhere shows, the Bible is not to be regarded primarily as offering us a history of Revelation, though that is a point of view—perhaps we had better say "a concept"—more and more widely held during the past fifty years. It is, more correctly, the library which calls us to see history itself as Revelation. From the Biblical standpoint history gains its real significance because it records the actions of God, actions which have the value of judgment and grace, which are the sufficient evidence of purpose in history, and which make it possible for man to live as though life were not the protracted futility which it so often seems to be.

This seems the appropriate point at which briefly to mention some other consequences of a return to dogmatic statement of the Gospel in an age which has tested the bitterness of universal upheaval, distress and frustration. There has been a revived interest in the ethical quality of the life in Christ. A distinctive quality of faith and love is required of men who live in a day when the foundations are being shaken and all things seem threatened with dissolution. And whatever may be the grounds and the extent of our legitimate criticism of Barth and Brunner we owe them at least this debt of gratitude that they, and others who understand what they try to say to us, have recalled us to the stern implications and obligations that attend on the profession of faith in God through our Lord Jesus Christ. A volume of essays by American theologians, and published last year with the title *The Christian Answer*, is an indication of serious contemporary concern that the Gospel shall not be proclaimed in a vacuum, that every aspect of Christian dogma has its practical challenge and significance for the way we behave in such a world as this. Secondly, the pressure of world issues and of the cataclysmic forces now at work, the prospect of all that,

[1] op. cit., p. 35.

literally and metaphorically, may be "coming on the world", has compelled fresh attention to Eschatology. This interest may be said to date from Schweitzer's great work, though the character of the interest has changed somewhat. In placid times (when man found it convenient to believe in the idea of perpetual and almost inevitable progress) the relation of time to eternity, the urgency of inquiring what was the specific function of the Church in history and in relation to the eternal Kingdom —all this seemed rather remote and academic. To-day no such complacency is possible. The last few years have witnessed a deep anxiety for constructive and convincing answers to problems posited by the desperate crisis upon us at this moment in history, if not also by the simple possibility that human sin and stupidity may usher in "the end of the human experiment". We are reminded again and again that the life of man—not only of individual man but also of the race as a whole—must have an end. The real question is whether that "end" is to be thought of only as "terminus", or also as "telos"; and if we accept a Christian idea of "telos", what is the relation of the individual Christian, and of the Church's mission, thereto? What, for example, is the nature of the Christian missionary enterprise? Are Christian missionaries purveyors of a diffused Christian culture, sometimes rather more easily recognised as culture than as Christian, or are they agents of a divinely appointed purpose which, begun and continued in "time", will not be fulfilled in "time" and must always be prosecuted against the background of the Eternal and with a steady eye on the fact that only beyond "time" will it be consummated? What does Evangelism really mean and how shall we carry it on? These are the questions that Alexander McLeish set before us when, in 1934, he published his realist examination of missionary principles under the title, *Jesus Christ and World Evangelisation.* The more we think about it the more obvious does it become that here, as everywhere, the Christian message confronts us with a seeming paradox. In Christ there is a real sense in which the "eschaton" is already realised. But there is also a hope set before us. As Dr Dillistone has finely put it in the closing sentences of his chapter in *The Triumph of God*, a volume of essays recently published under the editorship of Canon Max Warren: "That the nature of the final eschaton has already

been manifested in the Gospel we cannot seriously doubt. It will be in the light of their response to the Gospel that men will be finally judged: it will be into the enjoyment of the blessings proclaimed in the Gospel that the redeemed of the Lord will enter and will for ever dwell."[1] Thirdly, a returning conviction about the uniqueness and content of the Gospel has been reflected in a deepened anxiety that it shall be effectively proclaimed in a world where scientific secularism and the despair and cynicism born of repeated disappointments have led to increasing ignorance of it, even in lands hitherto too easily called "Christian". Some of the ablest minds of our time have been addressed to a new type of evangelism. We used to mention only the influence of such widely read authors as C. S. Lewis and Dorothy Sayers. That our generation is not entirely unwilling or unable to hear the Gospel preached in terms that it can understand seems evident from the mere fact that *The Screwtape Letters* and *The Man Born to be King* have attained the rank of best-sellers.

Our attention has, thus far, been directed mainly to the contemporary and deepened concern for a clarified understanding of the Christian message. We must not, however, fail to notice that there has also been, if chiefly in quarters other than those of which we have been thinking, an equal concern that corporate Christianity shall be in no doubt of its structure, its mandate, and its mission. In the Roman Church the neo-Thomists have been making a new study of the doctrine and policy formulated in the Middle Ages, chiefly under the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas, and of its relevance and applicability to our time. Jacques Maritain may be mentioned as evidence that there is freshness and courage in contemporary Roman thinking. The Russian Church has put us all in deep debt through the philosophic and historical insights of Nicholas Berdyaev, whose influence goes back to the beginning of our period. The influence of his works, such as *The Meaning of History* and *Freedom and the Spirit* will be with us for years to come. Much of his general outlook is shared by other thinkers with a different background—a fact which opens the door for passing allusion to Paul Tillich, a German who, by the misguided and unintended benefaction of Hitler, has in recent years made a re-

[1] op. cit., p. 90.

markable contribution to the development of American thought. Reference has already been made, in passing, to modern thought about the Church, but here we must remember that we have to do with a concern of all branches of Christendom. Further, the same unrest and disturbance which have driven scholars in the Protestant tradition to examine afresh the issue which, for them, seemed most directly challenged—namely, the Christian message—have driven scholars of more "Catholic" tradition to new investigation about that which represents, for them, the citadel of authority and continuity—namely, the Church. And it has frequently been said in recent years by competent spokesmen of both broad streams of tradition that "the rediscovery of the Church" has been the most signal and impressive proof that contemporary theology is alive. An equally hopeful sign is the concern of Catholic scholars like Ramsey and Hebert with the Bible, which matches the Protestant concern with the Church.

Few people who look back with knowledge and discernment, will doubt that the Church was given inadequate attention in the general scheme of Protestant theology twenty years ago. Since that time there has been a remarkable change in attitude and emphasis. Much of the credit goes to Barth for forcing us to face again this fundamental fact as, indeed, many another. Recent years have seen a gradual but unmistakable change of emphasis, a growing understanding that the Church is not, either merely or primarily, the incidental aggregate of individual believers in God through our Lord Jesus Christ. It is, in the first place, the divinely created and commissioned hearer of the living Word, the appointed instrument of God's age-long purpose of redeeming love. Thus understood, the Church is seen to be part of her Gospel, for her very existence in the time-process is an evidence and a sacrament of the supernatural. For clearer insights into the relationship between the Church and the Gospel we are indebted to contemporary scholars such as Professor Michael Ramsey and Father Hebert, however much we may feel ourselves free to disallow the validity of certain of the conclusions reached in the former's *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* and the latter's *The Form of the Church.*

The nature of the Church and the pressure of the ecumenical movement, alike, require us to give careful thought to prob-

lems of Catholicity, Church order, and the Ministry. Here again, there has been a considerable volume of stimulating literature during the period under review. One such book, the slightness of which is out of all proportion to its importance and influence, was published in 1942, *The Nature of Catholicity* written by Daniel T. Jenkins, a young English Congregational minister. The burden of his argument is that "the surest test of a Church's claim to Catholicity is whether its preaching, like the apostolic preaching, proclaims as its central message the resurrection from the dead of Jesus Christ", and he wisely warns us that "it is the presence of Jesus Christ Himself in the Spirit which alone ensures that the Church is a true Church, and whenever, as she is always in danger of doing, the Church allows herself to rest content with her possession of the tokens of revelation and does not allow them to perform their proper function of leading her beyond them to Christ Himself, then she is led astray."[1] We must, indeed, never forget that, while a balanced concern for the Church's form and order is wise and healthy, disproportionate preoccupation is both unhealthy and dangerous. Too often, such preoccupation is both an evidence of fear and apt to weaken our sense of the urgency of the Church's mission. Signs are not lacking at the present moment that some of us may overlook the fact that the Church is less an institution than an instrument, and that though she has, and must have, an accredited organisation her life is the free and developing life of a spiritual organism. This, to some of us, seems a characteristic tendency of the general position adopted in *The Apostolic Ministry* (edited by Bishop Kenneth Kirk) and we are well advised to weigh carefully the counterbalancing emphases provided by such an able and dispassionate study as is to be found in Professor T. W. Manson's *The Church's Ministry*. A good deal of the current criticism of the ecumenical movement in general, and of the recently inaugurated South India Church in particular, would seem to be in need of this reminder. In this connexion, earlier theologians (as, for examples, Bishop Lightfoot and P. T. Forsyth) have still much to say to us.

We do well to recognise at this point that a growing ecumenical movement makes, and will continue to make, exacting demands upon theological scholarship and training. Other-

[1] op. cit., pp. 67, 79.

wise, we shall discover, to our embarrassment and even to our peril, that a movement of the Spirit is outgrowing the scope of our theological response to it. The period under review does not present us with such evidence as warrants complacency. The situation at home still leaves much to be desired. It is even less satisfactory in the case of what are sometimes called "the receiving Churches". That phrase is itself witness to a dangerous tendency. We owe it to them to share whatever riches and truth have come to us through our older tradition but it is not less important that they develop such theological insights as will ensure their making distinctive contributions to our common life, problems, and tasks. It is not difficult to understand why the process has been retarded. Partly the weakness is in the sternly practical pressures upon under-staffed Colleges for the preparation of ordinands able to meet the urgent requirements which evangelism and pastoral ministrations will make upon them. Partly it is in the quality of the man who, with notable and shining exceptions, are being trained for the ministry. "One of the most disturbing features of the situation in India", says a competent authority, "is the extreme rarity of candidates of first-class intellectual capacity and the very general impression, both among theological teachers and those who observe their work from outside, that the ability of theological students is rather below that of Christian students in training for other vocations."[1] Let it be frankly allowed that this problem is no monopoly of overseas Colleges! But unless, and until, it is faced effectively we cannot hope to avoid the weaknesses which it involves. First, the indigenous Churches will be liable to undue influence from those contemporary theological tendencies which, having the force and the value of challenging correctives, are not necessarily to be accepted as offering balanced systems of thought. An instructive, if also somewhat amusing, example of this tendency is provided by a recent incident in which an able representative of one of the younger Churches expounded "pure Barthianism" in such a fashion as seemed both irrelevant and unintelligible to an equally able and sympathetic English member of the same Church! Secondly, we shall be deprived of wisdom and insights, which the younger Churches would give to us through their own competent

[1] C. W. Ranson, *The Christian Minister in India* (U.S.C.L.), p. 143.

theologians. It is encouraging to note that the last few years have not been without indications that we are moving toward a happier state of affairs. National Christians overseas are increasingly anxious that the staffing and the amenities of their theological institutions shall be more adequate, the spiritual resources of the whole ecumenical movement more available for their students, the training of mature theologians more ensured. As compensation for our earlier quotation we may take heart from what the Rev. Leslie Brown tells us of an experiment begun some three years ago in South India. Four ecclesiastical traditions were represented in the launching of a new venture in theological training. "Each co-operating Church supported its own students and one member of staff. Common worship was conducted in the ordinary manner of each Church in turn. . . . The staff was partly national and partly foreign missionary. In such a college the different traditions of the Christian Church all make their contribution to the understanding of theology. . . . The fact of the universal Church (is) a reality continually before the eyes of the students."[1] Similar developments are on foot in other lands. They hold good promise for the future.

Every age is an age of transition. How true this is in the realm of Church History and of dogmatic ideas Professor K. S. Latourette, with vast scholarship at his command, has recently been showing us. There are, however, periods in which the ordinary rate of transition is accelerated, by force of tendencies both within and outside the life of the Church. Through such a period we have been passing, and we are in it still. We cannot go back, and we should not wish to go back, to the old liberalism, or the old conservatism, in theology. Even this very inadequate survey of the years immediately behind us should encourage the conviction that God is leading us into new understanding of the Church's message and mission, and that His Holy Spirit can match us for the exacting demands and duties of the days ahead. It may be that we shall be required to give more attention than has been yet paid to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. There is inadequacy here which we should take seriously to heart.

[1] *The Triumph of God*, edited by Canon Max Warren (Longmans, Green & Co.), pp. 160-1.

ANGLICANISM AND THE INCARNATION

by The Rev. T. H. CROXALL

What difference can there be between Anglicanism and the rest of Christendom on the doctrine of the Incarnation? None fundamentally. But each body within Christendom has its own approach and emphasis, arising out of its own ethos and attitude. My purpose is to discuss, not so much the Incarnation in itself (though inevitably I must do that also to some extent) but the presentation given to that doctrine by the Anglican Church. And this I think I can best do by assembling and presenting my subject against the background of the Bible, the Creeds, and Anglican worship. Bible and Creeds (together with the teaching of the undivided Catholic Church of the first four centuries) form the backbone of the Anglican position; though of course that position has tried to be alive to more modern trends of thought also. And worship is the living expression of belief. I think therefore that these three lines of approach will help me to cover the ground as thoroughly as possible

1. The Bible

Anglicans, following the New Testament, believe the Incarnation as a physical historic fact, accepting 1 John 1.3 "That which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life, that declare we unto you." The *explanation* of that fact is the love of God, "For God so loved the world that he gave. . . ." How exactly redemption is wrought is, as St. Paul says, a "mystery of godliness". My reader will remember the lovely lyric in 1 Tim. 3.16:

> He was manifested in the flesh,
> justified in the spirit,
> seen of angels,
> preached among the nations.
> Believed on through the world,
> taken up into glory.

This is the general fact. The most comprehensive Biblical statement of its implications comes perhaps in the prologue to St.

John's Gospel. There, a plurality of persons in the Godhead is implied. The function of the Word (λόγος) is the objective self-expression of the Deity in His relation to (*a*) the universe of which He is the author and sustainer, (*b*) to man, who owes all illumination of conscience and reason to His presence and operation. The Fall is presupposed by St. John and the existence of a power of darkness or moral evil is emphasised. It was to recover man from a state of alienation and to raise him to a life of divine sonship that the Word was manifested in human form.

But no Anglican imagines that when the earthly body of Jesus left the earth, the Incarnation and its purposes were over. There is Christ's mystical body, the Church; the *Corpus Christi* through which the Incarnation is to be, as it were, for ever extended down the ages. No doubt the actual Church is imperfect, because it is tainted with the sins of its members. But ideally it is, as St. Paul says, the body of Christ; and wherever Christ is, there—as Ignatius says—is the Catholic Church.[1] Christ is the Head of the Church, says St. Paul (Eph. 5.23). From Him its life flows, as the life of the vine flows into its branches; and this is a conception which finds its culmination in the Eucharist, where, as our Anglican post-communion prayer puts it, "We are very members incorporate in the mystical body of thy Son, which is the blessed company of all faithful people." The Church, authorised by the Incarnate Christ, possesses the "power of the keys", and at every Anglican ordination to the priesthood, the words are said, "Receive the holy Ghost for the Office and Work of a Priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the Imposition of our hands. Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained." The priest, in Christ's name, pronounces both in public and private "the absolution and remission of sins" to the penitent. The redeeming and reconciling work of the Incarnation still goes on, through the Church of Christ; and this the Bible seems to Anglicans to envisage.

Historically, the Incarnation is linked up with the Virgin Birth. This is described by both St. Matthew and St. Luke. They both tell us that Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost. St. Matthew says that Mary "was found with child of the Holy

[1] Ignatius, *Epistle to the Smyrnaens*, VIII: *ὅπου ἂν ᾖ Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, ἐκεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία.*

Ghost" (1.18), and Joseph is bidden not to fear "for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost" (1.20). The Angel of the Annunciation, says St. Luke, told Mary, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God" (1.35). This miraculous birth is not contradicted, but rather corroborated in the rest of the New Testament. St. John speaks of Christ as "he that cometh from above" (3.31). St. Paul calls Christ "the second man from heaven" (1 Cor. 15.47), the "beginning (ἀρχη) of a new race" (Col. 1.18), the "first-born among many brethren" (Rom. 8.29), "the second Adam" (Rom. 5.14, 1 Cor. 15.45), the "new man" (Eph. 2.15). Clearly, therefore, Christ is regarded by the New Testament writers as at one with human nature, yet heterogeneous from it.[1] Bishop Gore rightly asks, "Must not the physical generation of the second Adam have been such as to involve at once His community with our nature and His exemption from it?" (*Dissertations*, p. 66). The New Testament writers often speak of Christ as a pre-existent being. This gives an antecedent probability to the Virgin Birth. But in the last resort, it is only by the leap of faith that we can believe it. "We ought not to marvel that a miracle is performed by God," says St. Augustine. "We should much rather rejoice and wonder that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ was made man, than that he performs divine acts among men."[2] Miracles are not performed to incite belief; they presuppose belief.

Cognate to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is the doctrine of Christ's sinlessness. St. John says, "the Father sanctified Jesus Christ" (10.36). St. Paul speaks of Christ as not knowing sin (τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν—2 Cor. 5.21). Hebrews 7.26 speaks of Christ as holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners (ὅσιος, ἄκακος, ἀμίαντος, κεχωρισμένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν). True, Christ appeared "in the likeness of sinful flesh" as St. Paul says (Rom. 8.3, cf. Phil. 2.7). "The flesh of Christ is 'like' ours",

[1] Søren Kierkegaard, the well known Danish philosopher, draws special attention to the heterogeneity of Christ. See, e.g., *Training in Christianity*, p. 216, *et passim*.

[2] Augustine, *Tractate on St. John*, XVIII: "Mirum non esse debet a Deo factum miraculum. Magis gaudere et admirari debemus quia Dominus noster et salvator Jesus Christus Homo factus est, quam quod divina inter homines facit."

say our excellent Anglican commentators Sandy and Headlam, "inasmuch as it is flesh. 'Like' and only 'like', because it is not sinful." This, as Origin says, indicates that while men have sinful flesh, the Son of God has only the similitude of sinful flesh, not sinful flesh itself.[1] It is true that the New Testament describes Christ as liable to temptation (cf. Matt. 4 and Luke 4). Hebrews 4.15 expressly says, "Christ was tempted at all points like as we are, yet without sin." And St. Luke makes Christ Himself speak of "my temptations" (22.28). I venture to suggest that Christ possessed fully all those human capacities for dread (*Angst*) and despair (*Fortvivelse*) which Søren Kierkegaard so ably describes as parts—indeed glorious parts—of human nature. Christ possessed the possibility (*mulighed*) of sin, but not its actuality (*virkelighed*) as Søren Kierkegaard would say. As St. Augustine says, "Christ entertained no evil desires; for of course He was not burdened by that discord between flesh and spirit which pertains to human nature (corrupted as it is by the prevarication of the first man) since He was born not of fleshly desire, but of the Spirit and the Virgin."[2]

But of course there are people who sincerely desire to be Christians who feel difficulty over the Virgin Birth. Their arguments run on two lines. God, they assert, works through uniform laws of nature which He would not allow to be suspended. But this, as Søren Kierkegaard says, is to do what the Greeks did, viz., to bind the gods in the fetters of necessity (ἀνάγκη); which is another way of saying that necessity is more potent than the gods. No doubt, judged by the ordinary workings of Nature, the Virgin Birth is highly improbable. But a gulf as big as eternity is fixed between Impossible and Improbable.

A second argument concerns the flimsy nature (so it is argued) of the evidence. St. Luke's account is later than the other Synoptists, St. Matthew's later than St. Mark's. Matthew and Luke, they say, differ considerably about the Virgin Birth. Luke tells of the shepherds, Matthew of the Wise Men.

[1] "Ostendit nos quidem habere carnem peccati, filium vero Dei similitudinem habuisse carnis peccati, non carnem peccati."

[2] Augustine, *Op. Imperf. contra Jul.*, IV. C.57: "Christus nulla illicita concupivit, quia discordiam carnis et spiritus quae in hominum naturam ex praevaricationi primi hominis vertit, prorsus ille non habuit, qui de Spiritu et Virgine non per carnis concupiscentiam est natus."

Where did Luke get his information, they ask? It must be admitted that since the earliest Gospel—St. Mark—begins with the Baptism of Jesus, it looks as though he either did not know what happened earlier, or thought it too insignificant to record. The general impression left by the Gospels is, I think, that our Lord's birth was known only to a few. "Is not this the carpenter's son?" "Is not this Joseph's son?" men ask. Philip says to Nathaniel (John 1.45), "We have found Jesus of Nazareth, son of Joseph." The genealogies in Matthew and Luke are traced through Joseph, not Mary. No direct allusion is made to the Virgin Birth in the rest of the New Testament, though the doctrine of the Incarnation is emphatically taught. All this and more we must face. Does then the Incarnation depend on the Virgin Birth, or can we believe the Incarnation without the Virgin Birth?

I think the answer is Yes, we can believe it. Most of the early disciples apparently believed the Incarnation without being aware of the Virgin Birth. Nevertheless, there seem to me to be no solid grounds for rejecting the Virgin Birth. Improbability, as I have said, differs from impossibility *toto caelo*. And as for the evidence, would 20, 50, 100 chapters in the Bible make it surer than two?

Of course the Incarnation gives offence to those who will not believe. Ebionites and their kind, as Søren Kierkegaard puts it, eliminate the quality God from Jesus Christ. Gnosticism seeks to eliminate the quality man. Speculative philosophy in Kierkegaard's day "transformed the God-Man into a mere speculative unity of God and man *sub specie aeterni*, or thought of it as appearing in the nullipresent medium of Pure Being; instead of regarding the God-Man as a unity of one who is both God and an individual man, in an actual historical situation."[1] Offence at the Incarnation is, says the same writer, twofold: (1) in the direction of superiority, (2) in the direction of inferiority.[2] The former is offence that any man should claim to be so high as God. The latter is offence that God should deign to

[1] *Training in Christianity*, p. 123. The Danish (*Samlede Voerker*, XII, 144) runs: "gjort Gud/Menneske til kun speculative eenhed af Gud og Menneske *sub specie aeterni*, eller apparent in den rene væsens intetsigende værende medium, istedfor at Gud/Mennesket er eenheden af at være Gud og et enkelt Menneske i historisk virkelig situation."

[2] *Training in Christianity*, p. 108. (Danish, Vol. XII, 127).

become so low as man. Gregory of Nyssa had already answered the latter in his "Catechetical Oration", by pointing out that only moral evil brings degradation; whereas the lowliness of the Incarnation is a display of moral perfection. And I suppose there is no lovelier picture of the moral perfection of the Incarnation than Søren Kierkegaard's parable of the King and the lowly maiden in the *Philosophical Fragments*.

2. The Creeds

So much then for the Biblical position. It is of course gathered up in the Christian Creeds, which are handy weapons against disbelief and heresy.

The Anglican Church uses all three Catholic Creeds in its public worship. Article 8 of its formularies says, "The three Creeds, Nicene, Athanasian, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scripture."

The Apostles' Creed is used in four contexts. *First*, it is used in the time-honoured way, at Baptism. Its Trinitarian statement fits in with our Lord's injunction, "Go ye and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." And within that Trinitarian formula, there necessarily comes mention of the Incarnation. "I believe in Jesus Christ, God's only Son, our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary . . . " *Secondly*, when the priest goes to visit the sick, he is ordered to recite the Apostles' Creed, and the sick or dying man is invited to respond, "All this I stedfastly believe" (see Office for the Visitation of the Sick). *Thirdly*, the Apostles' Creed is placed in the Catechism for the child to learn: and there it is explained in the following words: "What dost thou chiefly learn in these Articles of thy Belief?" "First, I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me, and all the world. Secondly, in God the Son, who hath redeemed me, and all mankind. Thirdly, in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me, and all the elect people of God." *Fourthly*, and perhaps the most prominent of all, the Apostles' Creed comes in the Services of Mattins and Evensong. The Creed is always said in the first person singular, "I believe", not "*we* believe"; and nearly always (I shall not

digress to mention the few exceptions)[1] the people join with the priest audibly whenever a Creed is said. This practice no doubt presents difficulties. Suppose a man just drops into Church, or is sceptical, or an inquirer, what must he do? He is not obliged to join in, and the general Credal statement said by the rest upholds what the Church stands for.

As for the Nicene Creed, Anglicans, in common with other parts of Christendom, use this at Holy Communion after the reading of the Epistle and Gospel. This position corresponds to the position of the Creed at Mattins and Evensong, where it also follows the reading of Scripture. This placing of the Creed after Scripture, means that after having heard the Scripture, we assert our belief in its fundamentals. The *Incarnatus* in the Nicene Creed is a very solemn moment, and many Anglicans bow their heads or kneel at the words "who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven, And was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made man." Emphatic statements of the implications of the Incarnation are also made in this Creed. "I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, Begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, Begotten, not made, Being of one substance with the Father, By whom all things were made." Every time the Holy Communion is celebrated, therefore, the Incarnation is thus mentioned and emphasised.

The Athanasian Creed, or *Quicunque Vult*, is appointed to be read at Mattins in place of the Apostles' Creed, on no less than thirteen great days in the Anglican calendar. Up to, I suppose, a hundred years ago, this injunction was, I think, fairly faithfully observed. But the past century has felt this a little too much, especially as perhaps none of us are quite so eager as that Creed is, to say "This is the Catholic faith, which except a man do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly." Or, "This is the Catholic faith, which, except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved." Whatever Athanasius thought about it, most people to-day are

[1] They are: (i) At the Visitation of the Sick, the priest says the Creed alone for obvious reasons. (ii) In the Prayer Book of 1662 the priest, in Baptism, puts the Creed interrogatively, "Dost thou believe?", and the godparents reply, "All this I stedfastly believe". The revised book of 1928 makes priest and godparents say the Creed together. (iii) Anent the Athanasian Creed, see later.

prepared to leave that matter to God, and not take upon themselves to state publicly what will or will not happen hereafter about damnation. A new rubric, therefore, has been framed, and a new translation of the Creed has been made. The rubric reads: "At Morning or Evening Prayer, on Trinity Sunday, the First Sunday after Christmas, and the feast of the Annunciation, *may* be said or sung *Quicunque Vult*. . . . Also the Minister may read the same to the people." The rubric goes on to order that the damnatory clauses may be omitted. The revised translation, instead of saying, as the older translation does, that a man *must* thus think of the Trinity if he would be saved, says: "He therefore that would be saved, *let him* thus think of the Trinity". This seems to me a better (as it is certainly a less harsh) translation of the words "*Qui vult ergo salvus esse, ita de Trinitate sentiat*". I have found it most impressive to read this translation to the people (without the damnatory clauses) on Trinity Sunday and the first Sunday after Christmas. What more impressive statement of the Incarnation could we have than those familiar phrases which follow the words: "Furthermore, it is necessary to everlasting salvation: that he also believe favourably the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ."

To sum up this part of my subject, let me read what Article Two of the Anglican formularies says on the subject of the Incarnation: "The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took Man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance: so that two whole and perfect Natures, that is to say, the Godhead and Manhood, were joined together in one Person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God, and very Man; who truly suffered, was crucified, dead and buried, to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for all actual sins of men."

3. Worship

But, of course, it is in Worship, not in Creeds and Articles, that the deepest expression of our faith appears. After all, Christianity does not exist for the amusement of Doctors of Divinity. It is to lead George and Sally, alike with the learned,

to the throne of God in humility and faith. And this is done *inter alia* by worship.

Christian worship would obviously be impossible without the Incarnation. Bishop Westcott, commenting on our Saviour's words, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (John 14.9) makes this sublime remark: "In these momentous words the idea of God receives an abiding embodiment, and the Father is brought for ever within the reach of intelligent devotion." When Anglicans and other Christians go outside strictly Incarnational sources for their worship, they do it cautiously. Take the Psalms for example. As a book of devotion the Psalms cannot be surpassed. But they are pre-Christian. Hence Christians add the words, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost."

Or take the Old Testament, which is integral to the Services of Mattins and Evensong. Why read it, seeing that the Old Testament is pre-Christian? The Old Testament is difficult no doubt, but it is far too valuable to lose. The Church therefore keeps it and explains it, and orientates it to the Incarnation. The doctrine, e.g. of Genesis 1, that man is born in the image of God and capable of intercourse with Him, comes to its consummation in the Incarnation. The theophanies of the Old Testament point in the same direction. The striking personification of Divine Wisdom in Proverbs and Wisdom (for the Apocryphal books are sometimes read in Church too) are fulfilled in Jesus Christ. The Messianic hope and the great concept "Son of Man" both originate in the Old Testament.

All this and more is conserved by public reading. It is grand to hear, e.g. on Christmas morning, the appointed Old Testament words, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" (Isa. 7.14); or at the Purification to hear Malachi's words, "The Lord whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple" (3.1); or on Ascension Day to hear the Ascension of Elijah read from 2 Kings 22, with its impassioned cry, "My father, my father, the chariot of Israel, and the horsemen thereof." And there is, of course, very much more besides. And if Christians thus value the Old Testament, how much more do they value the New.

As for the collects and prayers in the Anglican Prayer-Book, they have, of course, like all Christian prayers, the Incarnational

ending, "through Jesus Christ our Lord". All unprejudiced people, I think, will agree that the Anglican Collects are very beautiful, but none are more so than those for Christmas Day, Epiphany, the Annunciation and Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary, all of which specially concern the Incarnation. There are, too, the lesser feasts (with Incarnational emphasis) of the Name of Jesus (August 7th) the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary (September 8th), the Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary (July 2nd), the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary (December 8th)—all of which in the book of 1928 have Collects.

A word next about Hymnody. The Chorale, a congregational piece of singing, was the creation of Protestantism; for medieval hymnody was not congregational in the strictest sense, and was not vernacular. John Huss produced the first hymn book in any vernacular, and the Moravians followed. Luther translated some Latin hymns, wrote others, and set them or had them set to music. By Bach's day a great wealth of Lutheran hymnody had appeared. Calvinism restricted its hymnody to metrical psalms, and England, up to the middle of the eighteenth century, did the same. But for the last 100 years or so, all Christians, including Calvinists and Roman Catholics, have introduced the vernacular congregational hymn as a rich and valuable aid to devotion. British hymnody has never been narrow or exclusive. Among hymns special to the Incarnation, we have for example in translation the Latin hymns *Adeste Fideles*, *Veni redemptor gentium*, *A solis ortus cardine* (to mention but a few); also the Greek hymn *μέγα καὶ παράδοξον θαῦμα*, by S. Germanus; also "While shepherds watched" by the English poet laureate, Tate, of the seventeenth century; Christmas hymns by Wesley and others in the eighteenth; by Christina Rossetti, Housman and others of the twentieth; as well as hymns by ancient and modern poets of many nationalities. A tremendous improvement, both musically and poetically, has taken place in the last forty years in British hymnody, and it still continues. Many of our most famous musicians, poets and theologians are working at it.

But, besides hymns and Psalms, there are also the Christian Canticles. Take the *Te Deum*, for example, which is sung or said at Mattins after the first (or Old Testament) Lesson. The

Incarnational emphasis here is strong: "Thou are the King of Glory O Christ. Thou art the everlasting Son of the Father. When thou tookest upon thee to deliver man, thou didst not abhor the Virgin's womb." After the second (or New Testament) Lesson, comes the *Benedictus*, or Hymn of Zacharias, and once again the Incarnational emphasis is strong: "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel for he hath visited us; To give light to them that sit in darkness, and in the shadow of death, and to guide our feet into the way of peace."

At Evensong, the *Magnificat* follows the first Lesson; a Canticle which was first sung on an occasion inseparable from the Incarnation. After the second Lesson, when the people have heard from the New Testament of our Incarnate Lord, they say or sing *Nunc Dimittis*, joining with Simeon in asserting: "For mine eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast prepared before the face of all people; To be a light to lighten the Gentiles and to be the glory of thy people Israel."

But, of course, Christian worship reaches its culmination in the Sacraments. The whole world is sacramental if we have but eyes to see. Just as the visible world reveals the invisible God, so, as Dr Inge succinctly puts it, "the world is the poem of the Word (λόγος) to the glory of the Father". The Sacramental principle as a whole is, of course, beyond my present scope. I limit myself therefore now to the Eucharist.

In Anglicanism, as in Christendom generally, there are various shades of opinion about the Eucharist and consequently different outward types of worship. But no Christian, I think, denies the Real Presence (as it is somewhat confusedly called) of Christ in the Sacrament. Some may deny particular explanations about the Presence, but hardly, I think, the Presence itself. Nobody, in other words, believes in the Real Absence! And if Christ is present, then, no matter how we conceive Him present, He is present as our Incarnate Saviour, i.e. as both God and Man.

The word Incarnation naturally tends to send the mind to Bethlehem. The Sacrament of the Altar seems to send us to Calvary. But it is a mistake, I think, to separate the two. "Wherever the sepulchre is," says the Spanish thinker Unamuno, "there is the cradle." It is so here. The Christ crucified is the Christ incarnate; and when Christ said, "This is my body,

this is my blood", He reminds us of the fact that He is an incarnate God, who, in His cradle at Bethlehem, took human flesh and blood in order that by dying in the flesh, He might enable men to live in the Spirit. Harnack is right when he says, "Christianity is not merely a question of doctrine being handed down by uniform repetition; it is a question of life again and again kindled afresh." When we ask what life is, Christians can only point to Christ who said, "I am the way, the truth and the life." He is the real life, filling our souls; and those who are filled with the most real are most really filled, as Dr Inge says. The Church, Christ's body, is filled with His living Spirit, and that Spirit is given to us in the Eucharist. Humanity, though it is not the same as corporality, is yet impossible without it. And we cannot be too grateful that Christ, by possessing a body, also possesses the invisible quality, humanity. Because He knows humanity through and through (except for sin), therefore He can redeem it. Every Christian can echo the words of Robert Browning in his poem "Saul":

> 'Tis the weakness in strength that I cry for, my flesh that I seek
> In the Godhead! I seek and I find it. O Saul it shall be
> A Face like my face that receives thee: a man like to me.
> Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever! a Hand like this hand
> Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee! See the Christ stand!

Anglicans retain, in the Eucharist, the ancient Canticle *Gloria in excelsis Deo*—"Glory be to God on high, and in earth peace, goodwill towards men. We praise thee, we bless thee, we worship thee, we glorify thee, we give thanks to thee for thy great glory, O Lord God, heavenly King, God the Father Almighty." The Canticle is of Greek origin; but its Eucharistic use is Western, and seems at least as old as Hilary of Poictiers (350 A.D.). From at least the sixth century it regularly formed the opening of western liturgies. So too it did in the first Anglican Prayer Book of 1549. The book of 1552 moved it to the end of the Service as part of the post-Communion thanksgiving; and there it remains in our Prayer Book to this day. Many, however, want to put it back to the beginning. The sacrament is to them a dramatisation of the whole incarnate life of Christ. They argue that as the Saviour's earthly presence was introduced to this world by a *Gloria in excelsis*, so the Sacrament of His spiritual presence should be introduced by a *Gloria in ex-*

celsis too. But this argument seems historically precarious. The *gloria* of the angels was sung after Christ's birth, not before!

However that may be, all that Christians believe about the Incarnation is as it were summed up in the Eucharist. All the features I have mentioned are present in the Anglican Eucharist: Christ in His Divinity and Humanity, Bible-reading, Creed, Worship, plus, strictly speaking, the Sermon or exposition of the Gospel. For although many celebrations of Holy Communion in Anglicanism are without a sermon, yet the only place where a sermon is explicitly ordered in the Prayer Book is in Holy Communion. Word and sacrament should go together in perfect balance.

The Holy Communion office stands in the middle of the Anglican Prayer Book. It stands too in the middle of the faithful Anglican Churchman's life and worship. Not, however, to the exclusion of other forms of worship. Anglicans value very highly indeed the other services of their Church. They find in them rich and satisfying spiritual food, and they are glad to have such other worship besides the Holy Communion. But the Sacrament is still the central point.

Anglicans have never claimed that they alone are right and all others more or less wrong. Reasonable Christians believe that they can learn from each other. Anglicans know that, like all other Christians, they have made mistakes. But they also know that Our Lord has been with them; that they belong to the *Corpus Christi*, the Catholic Church of Christ. And together with the whole of Christendom they humbly hail and proclaim Him, in Bible-reading, Creeds and Worship, as God and Man—God Incarnate, second Person in the Blessed Trinity.

WHAT IS THE HISTORIC EPISCOPATE?[1]

An Inquiry based upon the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch

by The Rev. DAVID C. LUSK

I fear I may have little new light to throw on this difficult subject; but I love Ignatius, and should like to think that others may be drawn into the same affection. I propose, (1) to consider the meaning of the question; (2) (my main purpose) to say something of the Episcopate in Ignatius; (3) to venture a few remarks on later history.

(1)

Bishop Stubbs of Oxford, in 1888, explained the phrase, "the historic episcopate", as "a distinct, substantive and historic transmission of the commission of the Apostles in and by which our Lord formed His disciples into a distinctly organised body or Church"; and Dr Bell, the present Bishop of Chichester, in his excellent little book *Christian Unity: The Anglican Position*, appears to consider that to be a fair statement of the sense in which the phrase is still used. Bishop Stubbs was the great historian of the English Constitution, and he seems to have stated the matter as a constitutional lawyer might. Present day Anglicans, like Dr Kenneth Kirk, Bishop of Oxford, in the recent collection of essays, *The Apostolic Ministry*, see that it is historically difficult to establish an actual transmission in the early episcopate. They incline to assert transmission in an "essential ministry", whatever its form in early days. They believe that the essential ministry is to be found to-day in their own episcopate; and they are also eager that that episcopate should commend itself to all Christendom by its own spiritual value.

Bishop Lightfoot, who wrote his famous *Dissertation* on the early ministry in 1867, was not so much interested in the historically difficult idea of *transmission* of office. His interest was rather in the *form* of the ministry, in the development of the three-fold ministry of Bishop, Presbyters and Deacons, out of what the Apostles left behind them; and his famous thesis is,

[1] A paper read before the Edinburgh Clerical Club, May 1949.

that the episcopate was formed "not out of the apostolic order by localisation but out of the presbyteral by elevation". Recent work has made it very clear that the episcopate has varied greatly in form; for example, from the small town in Asia Minor to the huge medieval diocese of Northern Europe. The question at issue to-day, between "episcopalians" and others, has therefore tended to move away from the form of the ministry and to emphasise more the Oxford Movement idea (so to call it) of succession, or, more precisely, of "transmission of commission". A valuable essay by the late Cuthbert Turner, in Swete's *Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry* (1918), showed that for Irenaeus, who in the later second century first put forward the importance of succession from the Apostles, it meant not succession by ordination, but simply succession in office (as one minister succeeds his predecessor in a charge, often without any contact), and was valued—in days before the canon of the N.T. was formed—as reasonable presumptive evidence for doctrine. The claim of succession by ordination, or consecration, was made more explicit later, notably by Cyprian in the third century. The Lambeth Conference of 1930 thus distinguishes "Succession in two forms, the succession in office and the succession of consecration". But this means that the idea of a historical "succession of consecration", or "transmission", has become (I think) the more distinct today, with its claim to be the channel of transmitted grace, or at least of transmitted authority.

The Apostolic Ministry describes the original commission of the Apostles as a "shaliach" of Christ, meaning the power to be personal representatives, even "plenipotentiaries" (not easily distinguishable from the papal idea of "vicar"). Dr T. F. Torrance has already dealt with this in the *Scottish Journal of Theology* of September 1948; and in the same number Professor Burleigh has brought out the importance of the fact, that Dr Kirk's volume should stress the idea of transmission so strongly, that the "episcopate" is valued, not because of its administrative usefulness, nor even because of its venerable historic form, but just because it is asserted to be the sole channel through which the "Apostolate", or "Essential Ministry", is preserved to the Church.

The Letters of Ignatius may have little to tell us about

"transmission". They give, however, the first outline of the *form* of church life in sub-apostolic days, the first clear picture of the Episcopate in history. That outline, as it becomes distinct, will be seen to be of quite peculiar interest to the Church of Scotland to-day.

(2)

In an early year of the second century, in Trajan's reign, some time between A.D. 100 and 118—Lightfoot, after copious argument, cannot fix the date more precisely—a Christian bishop, Ignatius by name, passed through the Roman province of Asia, as a prisoner, on his way to Rome, to suffer death by wild beasts. He was Bishop of the church in Antioch in Syria, and had been, apparently in some local persecution, condemned to death as a Christian. Like St. Paul he was the prisoner of soldiers. Unlike St. Paul, there was no officer like Julius who "courteously entreated" him. Instead he writes, "I am bound amidst ten lepoards, even a company of soldiers, who only wax worse when they are kindly treated"! His route lay through Smyrna to Troas, thence to Neapolis and Philippi (like a Pauline journey); and so westwards to Rome. Before reaching Smyrna he had passed through Philadelphia, about eighty miles inland. In both of these towns there were Christian churches. There were also many churches off his route, the greatest of them being Ephesus; and the Christians of Ephesus and of some other places, which he had by-passed, sent delegates to visit him at Smyrna. The typical delegation seems to have been the local bishop, with one or two presbyters and one or two deacons. To three of these friendly churches which he could not visit, he wrote letters: Ephesus, Magnesia on the Mæander, and Tralles. Also from Smyrna, where he is apparently delayed (possibly waiting for a ship to Troas) he writes a letter of a different kind; he writes to the church in Rome; and the burden of his letter is that the Christians there should not, by any mistaken kindness, try to save him from his martyrdom. We remember a letter which Cardinal Mindszenty wrote before his arrest, to discount what he might say later. So Ignatius: "Even if, when I am with you, I should beseech you, do not obey me; rather believe what I am writing"[1] "Be not an unseasonable kindness to me. Let me be given to the wild beasts, for through them

[1] *Romans* 7.

I can attain unto God. I am God's wheat, ground by the teeth of wild beasts, that I may be found pure bread (of Christ)".[1] Extravagant language? Unbalanced? So Canon Streeter thought, and disliked him. I do not think so. Some of our Covenanters said things not very different. A martyr must make up his mind.

In the Roman letter too he tells happily how "those churches which did not lie on my route went before me from city to city".[2] We can picture how word of his coming went on ahead, and in one stopping place after another friendly Christians from churches up the glens and at the back of the hills were waiting to greet him.

From Smyrna he is moved on to Troas, and there he writes three more letters. One is to Philadelphia, which he had passed through earlier; one to the kindly folk of Smyrna itself; and the third is to the bishop of the church in Smyrna, Polycarp. That makes seven Letters; four written in Smyrna, to people he had not seen, three at Troas, to his recent hosts. Bishop Lightfoot devoted many years of immense and masterly research to this subject, and established the genuineness of these letters, writing full commentaries on the texts.[3] All writers on early Church history have something to say about them, and they have been studied from various aspects. Thus Dr T. F. Torrance has recently published a study of the *Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers*, in which he makes a careful examination of the word χάρις in these Letters. And of course they always come into discussions of the early ministry. Protagonists of Presbyterianism have not failed to point out a likeness between the three-fold system we know in Scotland, Minister, Elders, Deacons, and the Bishop, Presbyters and Deacons of Ignatius. It has frequently been noticed that the Bishop was minister of a single congregation. Yet I have never found what seems to me a full and worthy treatment of this subject.

The best way for us to come to know Ignatius is from the last of his letters, the one to Polycarp. It is an old minister writing to a younger one. And we shall understand it very simply if we think of any venerable parish minister, in days of difficulty, encouraging a young minister and his people to stand firm: "like an anvil".

[1] *Romans* 4. [2] *Romans* 9. [3] Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*.

Listen to what he says to Polycarp.[1] (Polycarp would be round about forty years old.)

"Carry them all, as the Lord also carrieth thee."

"Speak to them man by man, as is the habit of God" (*κατὰ ὁμοήθειαν Θεοῦ*).

"Carry the troubles of them all, like a finished athlete." Which I take to mean, not grousing about your difficult ones; but like a fine runner who runs so well that it all looks easy; it is like our Lord's "When you fast, anoint your head and wash your face."

"Cultivate 'prayers without ceasing'."

"Ask for wisdom, a larger wisdom than thou hast."

"Watch: don't let your spirit go to sleep."

"The hard thing is the thing worth doing"; ("the more pains, the more gains").

Short sentences, hitting the nail on the head; as friend to friend.

"Vindicate your office, with all diligence, of body and of spirit." His office was that of *ἐπίσκοπος*. Now it may be that it was somewhat new, in the one-man form. In so far as it may have been new, it would need to be wisely commended to the presbyters, deacons and everyone else. But the words say exactly what every minister, old as well as young, has to set himself to do, to justify his job every day, to make it respected by his diligence in doing it.

"If you love the good scholars, that is not to your credit! Rather, the more pestilent ones, subdue them by gentleness." I don't think that was meant for reading to the congregation! Some later paragraphs of the letter were; but I hardly think Polycarp would read out that. The word is what Tertullus the orator uses of Paul, "We have found this man a pestilent fellow": *λοιμόν*. But a minister may allow himself a home-truth like that, if he knows how to "subdue them by gentleness".

"Be wise as the serpent, in everything, and harmless for ever (*εἰσαεί*) as the dove." He seems to have been fond of that saying of Christ. "Mark the times. Him who is above the times, wait for; the Eternal: the Unseen, who for our sakes was seen: the Impalpable: the Impassible, who for our sakes could suffer: who in every way, for our sakes, endured."

[1] *Polycarp*, 1 ff.

Now some of these things are good advice for any bishop, whether of a small parish or of a great diocese. But what was this bishop's actual work? There is, of course, no formal description of a bishop's duties; these are assumed to be understood. But the very first matter Ignatius sets before Polycarp is this, "to exhort all men that they may be saved";[1] which I take to include both preaching and teaching; both preaching the Gospel in gatherings presumably open to the general public, and teaching it systematically to the Christian congregation.

Ignatius is very anxious about heresies. In every letter he refers to this. The two dangers seem to be Judaism and docetic Gnosticism. "If we live after the manner of Judaism", he writes to the Magnesians, "we have not received grace."[2] Philadelphia was evidently a town with a strong Jewish element. It was at a junction of important trade routes. In the Book of Revelation, in the letters to the Seven Churches, the Jewish element in Philadelphia is clearly marked, "the synagogue of Satan, who say they are Jews and are not" (Rev. 3.9). And in Ignatius's letter to the town, he recalls his own visit to them as he passed through. Evidently he had had time to visit the church. The "ten leopards" of his guard cannot have been always ill-tempered. He recalls how "I heard some people saying, 'If I find it not in the old writings (ἐν τοῖς ἀρχείοις, the charters), I believe it not in the Gospel'. And when I said to them 'It is written', they answered me 'That is just the question'."[3] These appear to have been Christians well versed in the Old Testament, doubtless Jewish Christians, who found difficulties in some of the Christian teaching, if they could not find the roots of it in the Old Testament. Now Ignatius was not a Hebrew of the Hebrews like St. Paul; and he may have found it difficult to satisfy such disputants, in the way St. Paul loved to do. But he met them as any sound evangelical might; he says, "My charter is Jesus Christ. The inviolable charter is His cross, and His death, and His resurrection, and faith through Him." He pleads with them for unity with their minister and kirk session and deacons, as their safeguard against false teachings. "I cried out when I was among you, with a loud voice, with God's own voice, 'Give heed to the bishop and the

[1] *Pol.* 1. [2] *Magnesians* 8. [3] *Philadelphians*, 8.

presbytery and deacons'. And there were some who suspected me of saying that, as if I knew beforehand of the division of certain persons. But He in whom I am bound is my witness, that I learned it not from human flesh. The Spirit was preaching, saying these things."[1] The N.T. canon was not yet formed. The young churches were struggling to establish sound doctrine, to "filter it clear" from all "discolouring matter", to use a figure Ignatius is fond of. And nothing stands out more prominently in all the Letters, than the confidence Ignatius has in the bishops as ministers of the Gospel. "The bishops that are settled in the farthest parts, share in the mind of Christ."[2] The "bishop" is mentioned fifty times in the Letters.

Against docetic Gnosticism there are frequent references to the reality of Christ's human nature. In the Letter to Tralles, "Be you deaf when any man speaketh to you apart from Jesus Christ, who was of the race of David, who was the Son of Mary, who was truly born and ate and drank, was truly persecuted under Pontius Pilate, was truly crucified and died, . . . who was truly raised from the dead."[3] We can see how the Apostles' Creed fastened upon these things (rather than on the ethical teaching of Jesus or His wonderful works). And then comes a revealing sentence: "If, as some say, He only suffered in semblance . . . why am I in bonds? Why do I pray that I may stand up to the wild beasts? It means I die in vain; (δωρεάν, "without sufficient reason", precisely as St. Paul uses the word in Gal. 2.21, "If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died without sufficient reason"). Then indeed I am acting a lie against the Lord".[4] What an intense temptation in days of persecution to wriggle out of Christian action, by persuading oneself that it is the unseen and spiritual alone that matters; not bodily action! We begin to understand Ignatius's repeated insistence on "bodily and spiritual". The phrase occurs again and again. It is his grasp of the reality of the Incarnation, with its consequence, that we must glorify God in our bodies and our spirits, which are His.

Heresy hunters have claimed that Ignatius verges upon Gnosticism. He does use words that Gnostics made much of, like ἕνωσις, πλήρωμα, μέγεθος, with perhaps post-New Testament

[1] *Phild.* 7. [2] *Ephesians* 3.
[3] *Trallians*, 9. [4] *Trall.* 10.

meaning. But he seldom uses γνῶσις: "The gnosis of God is Jesus Christ."[1] For him "faith and love are everything".[2]

We may ask at this point, How much persecution of Christians was there at that time?

There was no universal persecution until the middle of the third century, under the Emperor Decius in 250 A.D. The picture we get from Ignatius's Letters is that, while he himself had been condemned, as a Christian, in Antioch of Syria, the churches of the Province of Asia to whom he writes, are safe. Persecution, such as there was, was local. We have seen the same thing in China to-day. Indeed, before he writes his last three letters, from Troas, news has reached him from Antioch, that "the Church in Antioch of Syria hath peace"—"through your prayers" he adds in a Pauline spirit, writing to all his friends.[3] We must realise that there was no organisation to bind together these many churches; no "archbishop", no "synod of bishops" even. They were a unity in Christ; and kept it alive by their prayers; and on occasions, by sending delegates from one church to another. Among the last things Ignatius writes about, is his eager desire that all these Asian churches should send delegates —a deacon or some other messenger—to his beloved Antioch, to join in thanksgivings there for the return of "peace". Polycarp is to call together a meeting and to elect a good man to go. "A Christian hath no authority over himself, but giveth his time to God."[4] And Polycarp is to write to the churches to which Ignatius has not had time to write (perhaps Sardis, which he must have passed through, and Laodicea), and exhort them to do the same.

Pliny went to be governor of Bithynia in the year 110, and asked for instructions from the Emperor Trajan how to deal with Christians. The decision is, that they are not to be sought out, but, if openly and lawfully accused, they must be punished. That policy (which held for long) meant that, while governors usually turned a blind eye, Christians were always in danger of being accused by pagan neighbours, and were specially in danger in times of any public calamity (like pestilence, or earthquake) which might popularly be blamed on them. It meant too, that, as accusation had to be against an individual, the

[1] *Ephes.* 17.
[2] *Smyrneans*, 6.
[3] *Philad.* 10; *Smyr.* 11; *Pol.* 7.
[4] *Pol.* 7.

bishops, as preachers, were pre-eminently in danger. You may remember the later story of the martyrdom of Polycarp himself; quite unforgettable if you read the original letter from his church at Smyrna to "all the parishes of the holy and universal (καθολικῆς) Church".[1] The point I wish to make is that magistrates could be friendly, and yet be powerless before the crowd, just as Pontius Pilate was! It was in the year 155 (forty years and more after Ignatius). Polycarp, now the aged bishop, was sent by his friends out into the country, to one farm house after another, for safety. He was arrested by the police in a cottage. He stood up and prayed for two hours, for all men; like an old Covenanter. And the police apparently waited while he prayed. The police captain took him in his carriage and said: "What harm is there in saying 'Caesar is Lord', and offering incense?" And when they came to the great stadium the magistrate said in a friendly way, "Swear the oath and I will release thee; revile the Christ." Polycarp replied, "Eighty and six years have I been His servant, and He hath done me no wrong. How can I then blaspheme my King, who saved me?" The Proconsul said, "Prevail upon the people!" But when the crowd heard that Polycarp had "confessed himself a Christian", they cried out "with ungovernable wrath" that he should be burned. "This is the teacher of Asia, the puller down of our gods, the man who is teaching many not to sacrifice nor to worship". So, with eleven more, from Philadelphia, he suffered for Christ that day.

These early bishops were Gospel ministers, if ever men were. Sometimes I wonder if Scotland is the only country with no memories of a martyr bishop.

I have spoken of the bishop as preacher and teacher. Look at him now as the pastor of his little flock, with his office-bearers round him. We noticed a word to young Polycarp: "Speak to them man by man, as is the habit of God". It is difficult for us, more or less familiar with the later huge expansion of a bishopric, to have a clear view of the early church.

Picture where these churches were. Three of the five in Asia are mentioned in the Book of Revelation, in the Letters

[1] "Martyrdom of S. Polycarp", in Lightfoot's *Apostolic Fathers*: παροικίαις, "resident communities" rather than "areas".

to the Seven Churches: Ephesus, Smyrna, Philadelphia. Now Ephesus was a considerable city; and Smyrna has stood for twenty-five centuries, an important sea port. They are about 36 miles apart, both by the coast; and Philadelphia, on inland trade roads, is about 85 miles away. But Magnesia and Tralles, the other churches to which Ignatius writes? Magnesia on the Mæander is just 16 miles over the hill from Ephesus, by a road running through a glen; and Tralles is 15 miles farther on, up the river Mæander. Both were flourishing but not large "cities"; while not many miles farther on still were Laodicea and Colosse and Hierapolis, a little triangle of cities each 15 miles from the others. All these and many other country towns, in the second century, had "bishops".

Think of the size of the flock in Ignatius' picture. To the Ephesians (presumably the largest of the churches) he writes, "Come together, all of you man by man, in common, by name"[1] (ἐξ ὀνόματος, as if they called a roll). To Polycarp in Smyrna, "Seek out all men by name. Despise not slaves, whether men or women."[2] Plainly there is for each bishop a single congregation. "If the prayer of one and another hath so great a force, how much more that of the bishop and the whole church. Whosoever cometh not to the meeting (ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό) doth thereby show his pride and hath separated himself."[3] "If any one be not within the place of the altar, he lacketh the bread of God."[4] "Let meetings (συναγωγαί) be held more frequently."[4] "When ye meet together frequently the powers of Satan are cast down."[5] To Polycarp, "Have a care for union, than which there is nothing better."[6] The word "union" is ἕνωσις, and for Ignatius it means a great deal. Fundamentally it is that deep spiritual gift of God, which Christ has given to His people. "The glory which Thou hast given me I have given them, that they may be a unity (ἕν), even as we are a unity, I in them and Thou in me, that they may be perfected into a unity" (St. John 17.22). We remember John's connexion with the province of Asia. So Ignatius, "In these bonds which I carry about, I sing the praise of the churches; and I pray that there may be in them union, both of body and of spirit, which are Jesus Christ's, our never failing life—a union of faith and love, than which there

[1] *Ephes.* 20. [2] *Pol.* 4. [3] *Ephes.* 5.
[4] *Pol.* 4. [5] *Ephes.* 13. [6] *Pol.* 1.

is nothing to be preferred, and—more than all, union with Jesus and with the Father."[1] This deep unity is to express itself continually in the corporate life of the congregation. "Do all things in godly concord," he writes to the Magnesians, "the bishop presiding after the likeness of God, and the presbyters, after the likeness of the council of the Apostles, with the deacons also, who are most dear to me, having been entrusted with the diaconate (service) of Jesus Christ."[2] To the Trallians, "Do nothing without the bishop; but be ye obedient also to the presbytery" (for "presbytery" we should read "kirk session") "as to the Apostles of Jesus Christ. . . . In like manner let all men respect the deacons as Jesus Christ, even as they should respect the bishop as being a type of the Father, and the presbyters as the council of God and as the college (*σύνδεσμον*) of the Apostles. Apart from these there is not what is called a church" (*χωρὶς τούτων ἐκκλησία οὐ καλεῖται*).[3] Bishop, elders in a body, deacons. The picture is almost incredibly familiar to ourselves.

A careful reading of the Letters shows some delicate differences in these offices, corresponding presumably to their previous histories. Thus the presbyters, the council of elders, are assumed as well established, "the fitly wreathed spiritual circlet of your presbytery".[4] They go back, doubtless, to the Book of Acts, "elders in every church"; following a Jewish model. Ignatius speaks of elders "cheering the soul" of their bishop.[5] But the elders themselves never need to be commended to their churches. With the others it is different; he makes a point of mentioning the "deacons" with delicate politeness; and the "bishops" he commends again and again. After all "*διάκονος*" was still an everyday word for a servant. That there should be "deacons" at all, came from our Lord's own "Whosoever would become great among you shall be your servant, and whosoever would be first, shall be bondservant of all"; and the office still needed to be ennobled. Both *ἐπίσκοπος* and *διάκονος* were not only new offices compared with that of presbyter; they were comparatively speaking new ideas. The office of "server" had to be established in honour. That of "overseer", the one-man episcopate, had to "vindicate" itself,[6] and to make its own high

[1] *Magn.* 1. [2] *Magn.* 8. [3] *Trall.* 2, 3.
[4] *Magn.* 13. [5] *Trall.* 12. [6] *Pol.* 1.

standards. Both of these were for service, rather than for authority—such as had traditionally been attached to "eldership", or "seniority". That ἐπίσκοπος retained its natural connotation of "guardian", one who seeks the good of those guarded, can be seen in more than one phrase in Ignatius, like "abide in the unity and guardianship of God."[1]

A deacon from the church at Ephesus had come to see Ignatius at Smyrna, one named Burrhus, and he stayed on to help him with his letters and in other ways. Ignatius calls him "my fellow bond-servant Burrhus, who by the will of God is your deacon".[2] To Smyrnaeans and Philadelphians he writes of "the deacons my fellow bond-servants (συνδούλοι)".[3] He follows the politeness of St. Paul, who puts himself alongside of Epaphras and of Tychicus, as their "fellow bond-servant"—both of them he calls διάκονοι (Col. 1.7; 4.7). Ignatius writes of Burrhus as "a model of God's deaconship"; "I wish all were like him"[3]—in his helpfulness, readiness to do the things that need to be done. It was Christ's idea of honour in His Church; a basic element in all Christian office. Deaconship in the beginning was presumably for doing the multifarious things that have to be done (of which the care of widows and the poor was one), like all that enters into "Church work" to-day. In later history the deacon is the closely attached helper of the bishop —a natural development from the congregation, in which the pastor directs the varied activities of its willing workers.

The elders are always a "council" or "session"; and obedience is always to bishop and presbytery, minister and kirk session. Ignatius has repeatedly been misunderstood as depicting a "monarchical" episcopate. It is true that the bishop is the only ἐπίσκοπος, "mon-episcopos" if you like, but not monarchical. Ignatius frequently speaks of the Christian duty of obedience, obedience to the bishop; but he is invariably careful to add "and to the presbytery". To the Ephesians: "submitting yourselves to your bishop and presbytery may ye be sanctified in all things."[4] To Trallians almost the same.[5] To Smyrnaeans, "Follow your bishop, as Jesus Christ followed the Father, and the presbytery as the apostles; and to the deacons pay respect, as God's commandment."[6] (After all, deaconship, as service,

[1] *Pol.* 8. [2] *Ephes.* 2. [3] *Smyr.* 12; *Phild.* 4.
[4] *Ephes.* 2. [5] *Trall.* 13. [6] *Smyr.* 8.

is Christ's commandment.) But notice the difference; follow the bishop and the presbytery (kirk session) i.e. obey; and "respect" the deacons. "Now the Lord forgiveth all men, when they repent, if, repenting, they return to the unity of God and to the council of the bishop";[1]—note, not just to the bishop but to his "council", the kirk session. There is our old familiar "discipline", which kirk session records were so full of long ago.

Let me quote the whole of *Smyrnaeans*, paragraph 8, a paragraph which has been more quoted than any other in controversies.

> Shun divisions, as a beginning of evils. All of you, follow the bishop, as Jesus Christ (followed) the Father, and the presbytery as the Apostles. Respect the deacons as God's commandment. Let no one apart from the bishop do anything of the things belonging to the church. Let that be considered a valid[2] eucharist, which is under the bishop, or (under) one to whom he shall have committed it. Wheresoever the bishop shall appear, there let the people be; even as wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the catholic[3] church. It is not allowable apart from the bishop either to baptise or to hold a love-feast;[4] but whatever he approves, that will be well-pleasing to God also; that everything ye do may be sure and valid.

With very slight alterations, we ministers of the Church of Scotland should find ourselves at home in that paragraph. Lightfoot in his *Dissertation on the Christian Ministry*,[5] in spite of his deep interest in Ignatius, looks askance at his language about the bishop. He speaks of "the crushing despotism with which this language, if taken literally, would invest the episcopal office". Poor Ignatius, prisoner of Christ, in chains, snatching time to write hurried letters—to think that after eighteen centuries he would be held to literal interpretations of his burning words! No doubt it is dangerous language, if the bishop is to become the great prelate of a medieval diocese; but for those who can see the true picture, on the small scale, in the humble setting of an early church, the language is easily intelligible, natural and fitting. *But that means that one needs to know a Scottish church to appreciate it.* (I am certain this is so.) "Wherever the bishop shall appear, there let the people be." Think of a scattered parish, and the minister holding services in outlying

[1] *Phild.* 8.
[2] The adjective is *βεβαία*, and "valid" is Lightfoot's translation.
[3] This is the earliest occurrence of the words "catholic church".
[4] *ἀγάπη*.
[5] In his commentary on St. Paul's *Philippians*, p. 237.

places. Or think of the folk in Smyrna, with no church building of their own, and having to meet, as best they could find room, in one part of the city after another. "Even as where Christ Jesus is, there is the catholic church." Lightfoot says "the word 'catholic' was extremely common in the age of Ignatius"; it simply meant "universal". In Aristotle *καθολικὸς λόγος* is a "universal statement". Ignatius brings it in, not because he wants to say something new about the church, but just as a known truth; Christ's presence "constitutes", as we say, the Church; and because he loves to lift people to a sublime parallel like this, when he has a practical matter that he wants to teach —as here, that they should rally round their bishop. "Let no one, apart from the bishop, do anything of the things that belong to the church." Let nothing be done in the church behind the minister's back. No baptisms without him. No agape, lovefeast; Lightfoot thinks that still included the Lord's Supper. I find that difficult to accept, for he has spoken of the Eucharist separately. I rather think of their many friendly "social gatherings", more or less religious (like our own); but none of them to be behind the minister's back.

"Let that be considered a valid eucharist, which is under the bishop, or one to whom he shall have committed it." What could be more familiar, than the first part of that at least? What does he mean by *βεβαία*? "Valid", if a lawyer gets hold of it, is a dangerous word. Surely he explains his mind at the end of the paragraph; "that everything you do may be sure and valid", his words are *ἀσφαλὲς καὶ βέβαιον*, a pair of words used in Ep. Heb. 6.19, of the "hope which we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and stedfast", *ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν*. Lightfoot unfortunately misses this parallel. The words are used in the Hebrews in no legalist sense. Why, they are appropriately carried by every member of the Boys' Brigade! "Sure and stedfast" (an anchor "neither to break nor to drag", Weymouth; "safe and sure", Moffatt). Ignatius wants *all they do* to be like that; "not open to question", secure. "Let that be considered a trustworthy Eucharist, which is under the bishop or one he may appoint." (I am glad to notice that Dr Kirk, in *Apostolic Ministry*, p. 34, does not consider that Ignatius uses the word in the sense of "valid".)

"Whatever the bishop approves will be well-pleasing to

God." Of course he does not mean that the bishop can do no wrong. He is giving practical advice; not legislating. Make sure of your minister's approval; let all you do be above question. Particularly the Holy Eucharist. That will be secure if it is under him. To say, as even Lightfoot does, "The Eucharist is not valid without the Bishop's consent. A ceremony so held is displeasing to God and has no validity", is to be more legal than the original. What Ignatius would have made of modern ideas of "validity", I do not know. We must remember too, that Ignatius knew and trusted the Bishop (Polycarp), whom he so unreservedly commends to the loyalty of his people. We cannot say that what he says of this bishop he would say without qualification, of all. Indeed he gives a warning to all office-bearers, in this same letter, "Let not office puff up any man".[1] Perhaps the unhappy thought of a really unchristian bishop had never yet been entertained. It was too dangerous a job.

To complete the picture, or rather, to finish off my very rough sketch. As we have seen, the bishop leads the prayers of the whole congregation.[2] And there is a word about the widows; "the virgins who are called widows";[3] he writes to his friend in Smyrna, "after the Lord, be thou their guardian".[4] And there are references to the care of "the orphan, the afflicted, the prisoner, the hungry and the thirsty".[5]

Ignatius is "devoted" (as he says) to those who will back up their bishop and presbyters and deacons. "Work hard together, be in the contest together, run the race together, suffer together, lie down together, rise up together; as God's stewards and lieutenants and responsible servants."[6]

And if you ask—What about converting the pagans around? Some readers have been disappointed not to find more in the Letters about preaching to the heathen. Public evangelism was not easy. Domitian, towards the close of the previous century, had forbidden missionary activity among Roman citizens. We do not know how Trajan's policy may have begun to affect the province of Asia. Conversions, however, are seldom secured without personal contacts; and Ignatius speaks of that. "Pray without ceasing for the rest of mankind," he writes to the

[1] *Smyr.* 6. [2] *Ephes.* 5. [3] *Smyr.* 13.
[4] *Pol.* 4. [5] *Smyr.* 6. [6] *Pol.* 6.

Ephesians, "that they may find God. Allow them to take lessons from you, at least from your actions. Against their anger, be you meek; against their proud words, be you humble; against their slanderings, set you your prayers; against their errors, be you 'stedfast in the faith'. Don't be hasty to imitate them by retaliation. Let us be found their brothers by our forbearance. Let us be eager to be imitators of the Lord, vying with each other who shall suffer the greater wrong . . . " and so on.[1]

There are many striking things in these Letters, outside the scope of this paper. I have already strayed too far, perhaps, from the strict limits of the subject, "the Episcopate". But I feel that that subject has suffered badly from passages being torn out of their living context, whereas these can only be rightly understood in the living setting.

(3) Later History

Three questions present themselves. None of them, I fear, am I competent to answer, except very tentatively and briefly. (i) What happened to the early system? (ii) What happened at the Reformation? (iii) What about Succession?

(i) If the early "episcopal" system was so startlingly similar in pattern to our own, "what went wrong with it?"—or rather how did it change? This is a big subject. But I suppose the most important thing that happened to it was simply that it expanded. Right down to the fourth century, till the conversion of Constantine, most bishoprics were small, centred in country towns. In Asia Minor alone there came to be some 400 bishoprics. It has been claimed that, when Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, in the middle of the third century, made his bold and apparently extravagant claims for the almost autocratic independence of bishops, "he was in reality maintaining the equality in office, of the bishop or pastor of the meanest hamlet, with the Bishop of Rome".[2] After Constantine's conversion many small bishoprics were suppressed, and others expanded. Indeed Dr Kirk confesses that the pattern which Lambeth would ask us to accept to-day, is not that of the early Episcopate, but that of the fourth century![3] Well, that may be God's plan for South India to-day, as it may have been for Europe

[1] *Ephes.* 10.

[2] A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions* (1898), p. 123.

[3] *Apostolic Ministry*, p. ix.

in the fourth century. But it cannot be of the essentials of a Church. Dr Kirk sees this: "we are in fact", he writes, "making the fourth century development compulsory. This may be convenient, but it is quite unjustifiable."[1]

Expansion of a bishopric meant, sooner or later, the delegating of duties by the Bishop to his Elders; then the planting of them out in what might appear to be "churches of their own", but which were always properly looked upon as outlying parts of the mother church. We Scots are liable to look on an "episcopalian" system as being like our own, but with bishops super-added. England and Scotland will understand each other much better, I think, if we look upon "episcopalian" and our own, as macrocosm and microcosm of the same pattern. "Presbyterianism" is the Episcopalian system in miniature.

In the great cities the "planting out" of the presbyters must have come much earlier than in the rest. There is a tradition of the Church of Rome, that the Bishop there, of about Ignatius's time, named Evaristus, first settled presbyters in separate parishes.[2] Rome, of course, in the early centuries was larger than later, and larger than any other city in Europe till nineteenth century London.

We can see similar expansion to-day in our own Missions. Livingstonia has "Elders' Schools", chiefly for elders in charge of outlying villages. They are taught to do what is needed. Yet they are supervised by the trained and ordained minister, who is responsible for the Sacraments, and with whom they form a unity in one Kirk Session. A Scottish minister in Manchuria might have a parish the size of a county or more. "Superintendency by the Scottish ministers", said a Kikuyu report of 1942, "is a fact, working not by law but by personality and experience."

Thus the greatest "distending" of the size of bishoprics, in early days, came with the large-scale conversions of the tribes of northern Europe. Boniface was consecrated by the Pope as a "regionary bishop for Germany", The old dioceses of England were the "kingdoms" of the Heptarchy. In Scotland the Roman model was superimposed later, on what had been a different system in origin.

[1] *Apostolic Ministry*, p. 52.
[2] *Breviarium Romanum*: 26th October.

One highly important principle in the early pattern remained. The Episcopus remained the minister of the Word and Sacraments. He was responsible for doctrine, the defender of the faith; and his outlying presbyters were responsible to him. Calvin upbraids the bishops of his own day for not preaching. We may be a little surprised that he should have expected them to preach. But he was right. In the medieval Roman ordinal, a presbyter, after being authorised to celebrate the Mass, "took but one vow—that of obedience to his bishop. . . . In the case of a bishop, as the defender of the faith, there was required a more interior knowledge. . . . In his consecration, the vow to defend the faith is prominent and emphatic."[1] It is curiously like a huge distension of our own pattern; the teaching still the responsibility of the central minister, while the medieval presbyter was not really a "teaching presbyter", but rather a local administrator ministering the Sacraments, a "ruling presbyter", a "rector".

One of the most acute problems in any expanding church is how to provide well trained ministers in adequate numbers. It may be inevitable that outlying stations should have to be served by men with very limited theological training, supervised by a central minister. That is the picture in many a Mission to-day; and it is, broadly speaking, the picture, which the medieval church, in European history, presents. If, however, the central minister becomes absorbed in the endless administrative detail of his huge "parish"; if, for that or any other reason, he fails as a teacher, while his parish priests are not trained to teach, then we have the picture of much of the church as the Reformers saw it—"Mass priests" in the parishes, many of whom barely understood the Latin of their service books; and in the great cathedrals Lord Bishops, who, so far as preaching went, were sadly often "dumb dogs". Some of the best life of the medieval Church was fostered in the Monasteries and among the preaching Friars, organised almost apart from the diocesan and parochial system.

Monasticism seems to have arisen, when the pastoral quality of the Episcopate was being strained, by the expansion of the bishoprics; and its immense growth accompanied spiritual poverty in much of the territorial work of the Church. Great

[1] Allen, op. cit., p. 250.

bishoprics with powerful prelates did good service, when they maintained higher standards of justice and mercy than lawless barons; and they helped to civilise the laws of nations. But the Middle Ages are a long commentary on how hard it is to satisfy, in one system, territorial duties and the claims of personal piety. *Only a pastoral system of high quality can meet both needs.* Such a pastorate the medieval Church failed to supply. Monastic life drew off devotion that might have fertilised the attenuated territorial system.

It is claimed by many Anglicans to-day that the episcopate, as they see it, is the only ministry which can be expected to unify Christendom. The claim would be difficult to establish from history. The unity of the Western Church in the Middle Ages was the achievement rather of the Papacy than of the diocesan system: and since the Reformation, it can hardly be said that the diocesan system, even with its very great improvement (with parish priests ordained "to minister doctrine"), has satisfied the many-gifted religious life of England. Church life, in medieval and in modern days, has deeper continuity than is apparent. There have always been eager Christians liable to be dissatisfied with the religious provision of the everyday territorial system, and especially so when that system is attenuated.[1] In the Middle Ages, the contemplative "regulars" of the monastic orders and the activist "seculars" of diocese and parish were held together by the wisdom of the Papacy. Large measures of self-government were granted to the "regulars", making them virtually independent of the bishops, so long as they were loyal to the "Head of the Church". It was the genius of the Papacy to attract to itself, as Christ's "Vicar", something of that loyalty which every Christian willingly renders to Christ Himself. The unity of the Church consists in the relation of all its parts to the Head. "I in them and Thou in me; that they may be perfected

[1] Dr A. V. G. Allen, in *Christian Institutions* (1898), p. 275 f., has shown in some detail how "the larger divisions of Protestantism still perpetuate the various attitudes of monasticism, in so far as they were expressions of permanent tendencies in religion, . . . each standing for some single truth which the world seemed in danger of neglecting"; and now modern English "non-conformity" has striking parallels with earlier movements; Independency with self-contained Benedictines; Puritan simplicity and austerity with Cistercians or Carmelites; Genevan zeal for preaching with that of the Dominican Friar Preachers. Francis Thompson, the poet, himself a Franciscan Tertiary, in an essay on General Booth's *In Darkest England*, calls the Salvation Army a Religious Order, and pleads with the followers of Assisi to emulate William Booth.

into a unity." The Papacy at its best was a realisation of this (something far more spiritual than Hobbes's famous gibe, "the Ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof"). Only centuries of misrule shattered the ideal; and the horror with which Reformed Churches turned away from the Papacy is a measure of the nobility of the ideal, which they believed it had prostituted.

In the outcome, the rejection of the Papacy was due to even deeper causes than the long reaction against misrule. A fresh apprehension of the immediacy of the Christian life, in its relation to God, made it clear that the unity of the Church must be found at a higher level than in any unity of the ministry. A present Christ needs no "vicar". "Wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the Catholic Church." "What then is Apollos? and what is Paul? Ministers through whom ye believed"; ("Per quos, non in quos", remarks Bengel); "and each as the Lord gave to him." Re-examination of the nature of the ministry was inevitable.

(ii) *What happened at the Reformation?*

In spite of the likeness of our Scottish system to the Ignatian model, we can be certain that it is *not* a deliberate copy. Calvin rejected the Letters of Ignatius as worthless; but in his day they were mixed up with spurious matter. The best manuscript only came to light in the following century (1644). The Reformers aimed at reproducing the pattern of New Testament polity. Their actual achievement seems to have been, not so much the finding of a complete pattern in the N.T., but rather the working out of certain principles of Church life; and *it was these living, fundamental principles, which reproduced, in time, the same pattern that church life had (somehow) produced in the sub-apostolic days.* The Reformers considered the essential ministry to be the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments of Christ. Calvin says, "I have used the names, bishops, presbyters, pastors, ministers, without distinction, following the usage of Scripture; for whoever discharge the ministry of the Word, to them it gives the title of bishops."[1] The word Minister was preferred. It expresses most clearly relation to God. The word Presbyter was also used for this minister, and in relating it to the word Bishop, the Refor-

[1] Calvin, *Institutes*, IV. 3. viii.

mers revived Jerome's ancient interpretation of the N.T., that "Bishop and Presbyter are the same"—bringing out that strain of "medieval presbyterianism" (as Dr Kirk's book calls it) which had never died in the Church. (Dr Kirk is disappointed that even the sixteenth century Council of Trent did not take the opportunity to suppress it.)[1] To the Minister of the Word and Sacraments was added the "ruling Elder", to assist the Minister in the pastoral care of the flock; and (at least in theory) the Deacon, for care of the poor. In consequence we to-day find ourselves with virtually the Ignatian pattern.

Now we do not know how the Ignatian pattern developed from the N.T. picture. It is tempting to speculate, that it grew out of the natural needs of Church life; just as our own full system grew, out of the slender structure, which the earliest Reformers could discern in the N.T. If it was the same principles at work, that produced the similar results, in the two widely separated periods, we may perhaps say, that they were: the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments; the pastoral care of the flock; and the many kinds of service (deaconship) which Church life calls out.

We can readily believe that God guided the early Church to the organisation, which we have seen in the Letters. We can readily agree with Dr Kirk, when he writes, "What we do find in the N.T. is certain formative ideas and certain functions: it is these functions which create the officers to exercise them."[2] May we commend to our friends of the Church of England the thought that the same formative ideas, in the New Testament, produced both the Ignatian ministry and its virtual double which we have in Scotland; a parallel the more remarkable, in that the latter was not copied from the former? If God guided the early growth, may we not believe He guided also the later?

The Scottish Minister derives from the presbyter-bishop of the N.T. In practice he finds himself the bishop of the Letters of Ignatius. The Scottish Elder may derive more directly from the "helps and governments" of 1 Cor. 12.28. In practice he bears a strong likeness to the presbyter of the second century. Both the second century and the sixteenth were rooted in the N.T.; and both developed the same full-grown form. The later

[1] *Apostolic Ministry*, p. x. [2] *Apostolic Ministry*, p. 14.

development, we may say, confirms the rightness of the earlier; the earlier, seen clearly, justifies the later.

There were, of course, many differences between the two periods; yet these should not obscure the likeness. In Ignatius' day we see no conciliar organisation above the parish; whereas our Reformers from the first used a widespread conciliar system, covering a whole country. These councils, district Presbyteries, provincial Synods, and national or General Assemblies, as they came to be called, are prominent and important; whereas in the early Church little such co-operation was possible. Yet the daily life and spiritual health of the Christian society must be its worshipping and working people, under their pastors, and it is there that the likeness has become clear.

The earliest, the most nearly apostolic, form of "the Historic Episcopate" is found in the Letters of Ignatius. It was the form in which the Church set out to win the world for Christ. And it can be seen at work to-day in Scottish parishes.

(iii) *What about Succession?*

Of any "transmission of the commission of the Apostles" through the episcopate, Ignatius has nothing to tell us. It is hardly conceivable that he should have held such an idea, at least as a prerogative peculiar to the episcopate. For he is at pains to commend the bishop's office to all the churches—Magnesia has an "outwardly youthful" bishop; both Ephesus and Philadelphia rather silent men! If he could have said, like writers in *The Apostolic Ministry*, that in that office alone "the commission given by Christ to His Apostles" was preserved, he would have had his most powerful argument. Instead he has wider thoughts. The Bishop is indeed the "steward", whom the "Master of household sendeth to be over His house"; and he should be received "as the Lord Himself".[1] Yes, but even the Deacons are to be respected "as Jesus Christ".[2] We are reminded of "He that heareth you heareth Me", said by our Lord to all the Seventy.[3]

Again, Ignatius pictures the Church, with its "Bishop as a type of the Father, and the Presbyters as the council of God, and as the band of the Apostles".[4] Apostles, to him, suggest

[1] *Ephes.* 6. [2] *Trall.* 3. [3] St. Luke, 10.16.
[4] *Trall.* 3; cf. *Ephes.* 4, *Magn.* 6, *Philad.* 4, *Smyr.* 8, *Pol.* 6.

Presbyters, Elders. He speaks of the Apostles as "the Presbytery of the Church".[1] But *never* does he connect "apostles" and "bishops". The early Church did not forget the living presence of Christ. The Apostles were not "in place of Christ". They had been "His council"; and the model for the Church is—Christ's minister, with his "council"; a close-knit pattern on earth of the elders seated round the throne in heaven.

I fear I have not answered the question, What is the Historic Episcopate? not even in its newer form, What is the Essential Ministry? I hope I may have helped to introduce someone to the friendship of Ignatius of Antioch, and of Polycarp, and all their folk. Ignatius was a great Christian; "faith and love toward Jesus Christ, these are the beginning and end of life—faith is the beginning and love is the end."[2] A Bishop in whose Church we find ourselves at home. A brave man, who praised God in his chains, and though vividly conscious of his coming cruel death, could write, "In your harmonious love Jesus Christ is sung. Form yourselves all of you into a chorus, your presbytery attuned to your bishop as strings to a lyre, and sing with one voice, through Jesus Christ, unto the Father."[3]

[1] *Phild.* 5. [2] *Ephes.* 14. [3] *Ephes.*

THE TEMPLE

by The Right Rev. THOMAS HANNAY
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For some time past there has been a great need that theology should become more biblical, and that biblical studies should become more theological. To-day there are welcome signs that this is coming about, which is in effect a reviving sense of the authority of the Bible. There is a feeling that if criticism has not finished its task—which can hardly be the case—it is time that it was supplemented by something else; that it has too long dominated biblical studies as though it were the very building, whereas it is in fact a means of securing the foundations on which the main structure can be raised; that its necessary method of analysis, increasingly elaborated, has tended to destroy the recognition of the majestic structure of the biblical revelation and its unity. Thus Dr Vincent Taylor in the introduction to his *Jesus and His Sacrifice* confessed that after twenty-five years devoted to the minutiae of synoptic criticism, he had a great desire to consider what the Gospels really have to say for themselves. In the realm of Old Testament studies there has emerged a sense that, Israel's history being so remarkable, it is useless to brush aside all the later developments of, let us say, the Priestly Code as regrettable and retrograde; it is wiser and more helpful to ask what their significance really is, and whether they do not rather witness to the rich fulness of religion under the old covenant. The point to be driven home is just this: when the sources have been analysed and dated as far as may be, then begins the real task of considering what is the significance of the contents. That can and will only be found in our Lord Jesus Christ. But that in effect means allowing the Bible to be its own interpreter, explaining one part by another. Especially when seeking for the significance of the Old Testament must the search be carried over into the New Testament. It seems worth while to try and work this method out on the theme of the temple.

Behind all that follows there lie two presuppositions: (1) the

idea of a temple is very prominent in the Old Testament, and must *ipso facto* be accepted as significant; (2) in some way it must point to and find its meaning in the fulness of Christ. It has been too readily assumed that the temple stands for an element in Hebrew religion static, external, unspiritual, which for the purposes of true religion can conveniently be ignored.

(1)

It is necessary first to realise that in ancient times all such places were erected to provide a house for the deity, not to accommodate the worshippers (Ex. 25.8): the god dwells in his house, and there men meet him and consult with him; they meet for worship in a high-place or somewhere in the open (cf. Ezr. 10.9, 13). Thus the symbolic value of the holy house, whatever its character, is that the god dwells among his people. In the older strata of the Pentateuch this symbolic dwelling is a tent called "the tent" or the "tent of meeting" ("the tent of tryst" as Robertson Smith translated it), the place where God was wont to meet those who came to Him for whatever reason. It was pitched outside the camp, which as the Hebrew tenses show was done regularly, and its attendant was Joshua the son of Nun. According to the late narrative of Joshua 18.1, the tent was erected at Shiloh after the conquest of the land. We next hear of a sanctuary at Shiloh at the end of the period of the Judges, but the tent has become a temple, a permanent building. It is fairly clear that in all these stages the tent was the home of the ark, which in some sense was regarded as almost Jehovah Himself; certainly it was something more than a symbol of His presence, unless we give to "symbol" its old meaning of that which is in some sense what it represents. So that the old idea of the house of God as the place where God dwells is maintained. After the battle of Eben-ezer in which the ark was captured by the Philistines, Shiloh disappears from the scene; no doubt it was at this time that the disaster referred to in Jer. 7.12, 26.6; Ps. 77.60, fell upon the sanctuary. The ark had no fixed abode till the time of David, who brought it up to his new capital and installed it in a tent prepared for it (Sam. 2 6.17). Then David conceived the desire to house the ark more worthily, but was discouraged by the prophet Nathan. It seems that the historian rightly interprets Nathan's mind when he

puts into his mouth as part of the word from Jehovah: "I have not dwelt in an house since the day that I brought up the children of Israel out of Egypt, even to this day, but have walked from tent to tent and from tabernacle to tabernacle "(2 Sam. 7.6); i.e. Nathan, following the prophetic tradition, looks back to the desert and desert conditions as the model for Israel's social and religious polity, and dislikes the introduction of temples modelled on those of Egypt and Phoenicia. But a twofold promise is given to David (vv. 12, 13) that his seed shall be established in the kingdom, and his son shall build a house for the name of Jehovah. The connexion in one oracle of the permanence of the Davidic dynasty and the building of the temple is significant. It is interesting to note that in David's dying words to Solomon in 1 Kings 2 there is no word of building the temple, though the continuance of the dynasty finds a place.

Solomon having seated himself firmly on his throne builds the house, and the ark is duly moved into it. For the rest of its existence it exercised a beneficial influence on the religion of the southern kingdom, though its fortunes varied with the character of the reigning king. Almost at the end of the monarchy comes the Deuteronomic reform under Josiah which establishes the temple at Jerusalem as the one place of sacrifice. Whatever the date of Deuteronomy—whether earlier than Josiah with Welch, or later with Kennett and Hölscher—the history is clear on that point: the law of the single sanctuary is applied, and Jerusalem is the place which Jehovah chooses to put His name there. But reforms fail to avert the final disaster, and the temple is destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C.

In this same period what of the prophetic attitude? There is very little mention of the temple at all. Amos cries: "The songs of the *hekal* shall be the howlings in that day" (8.3). If the R.V. text is right in translating *hekal* as *temple*, then a cross reference to 5.23 is permissible, and the verse is a condemnation of the cultus. But it can equally well be translated *palace*, and then a reference to 6.5 gives the sense of a denunciation of selfish and luxurious living. The only other passages to be noted in this connexion are the strong rebukes in Jer. 7 and 26 of confidence in the inviolability of the temple despite the corruptness of society.

Thus in the period from Moses to the Exile a dwelling of

Jehovah persists in some form, and three points are to be noted: (1) the later temple is connected with the house of David; (2) signs of prophetic doubt as to its value; (3) twice the national sanctuary disappears at Shiloh and Jerusalem.

(2)

But the religious leaders of Judaism could not conceive of their religion without a temple, and Ezekiel draws up a scheme for its rebuilding: a scheme which depends on three principles —separation, gradation and symmetry. These stand for three essential elements in religion and man's relation to God. His conception embodies a fine ideal: Jehovah, the all-holy God, dwelling in a sanctified land among His own holy people; "and the name of the city shall be, Jehovah-shammah". Ezekiel's temple was never built, but that does not do away with its significance, for it kept alive a recognition of the practical necessity of a temple if Judaism was not to disappear, and it transformed the very meaning of the temple as we shall see.

The Exile comes to an end, and a number of Jews return to their country. The records of this return are confused, and it is hard to extract a clear narrative out of them. It would appear that when the first party of exiles arrived at Jerusalem in 537 they set to work and the foundation stone was laid; but the work was interrupted by the intrigues of the Samaritans who resented the refusal of their request to join in the rebuilding, and so no more was done till the second year of Darius, 520 B.C. At this point the prophets Haggai and Zechariah stirred up the people to build the house of God, which they did under the leadership of Joshua the high-priest and Zerubbabel, the governor. It is interesting to note the attitude of the two prophets. Haggai lays immense stress on the necessity of building the temple, and is emphatic that all the ills they have suffered of late are due to their neglect and to no other cause. With these prophecies he utters one which points to Zerubbabel as Messiah, and Zerubbabel was of the house of David. Once again the temple and the house of David are brought close together. Zechariah is concerned less to urge on the building—important as that must have been in his eyes—but rather with its ordering and its officers. It is clear that Joshua's position as high-priest was gravely questioned, and it was immensely important that it

should be put beyond all question; hence the trial of Joshua in the fourth vision. One small point suggests a link between the standpoint of Zerubbabel and that of the Chronicler. Jehovah's word to Zerubbabel is: "Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the LORD of Hosts"; which is to be compared with the Chronicler's statement: "and the pattern of all that he had by the Spirit" (1 Chron. 28.12). That is to say the temple is to be built according to a divine plan; which is very much the same thing as we find in Ezekiel, where the details of the structure come to him in a state of trance, and are explained to the prophet by a celestial guide. So the temple is built, and serves the religious life of Israel till it is replaced by the more magnificant structure of Herod the Great.

There are still two other representations concerning the temple in the post-exilic period which must be considered. For though the history of the Chronicler is to be regarded as adapted to his theory, to be described as *midrash* rather than strict history, and though the tabernacle of P may be an imaginary erection, the temple pushed back into the wilderness, yet these two representations are of importance if we are to consider the significance of the temple, and cannot be ignored as so much fiction, even if they are fiction. *Midrash* is the better word for it.

1 and 2 Chronicles are concerned with two main themes: the fortunes of David, and the temple, its ordering and its officers. The use that the compiler makes of the earlier regal narratives is significant throughout. David is made king by the word of Jehovah, and his first act is to take Jerusalem, in which he establishes himself as his capital, and the ark of God is brought and placed in a tent. The account of his wish to build a more adequate sanctuary is much the same as that in 2 Samuel, but it is followed by a new version of the numbering of the people, which thus no longer stands in an appendix apart from the main narrative of David's reign, but is brought into prominent and most significant connexion with his desire to build a temple. The point of the story as recast by the Chronicler is expressed in Chapter 22.1: "This is the house of the LORD God, and this is the altar of burnt offering for Israel"; i.e. the site of the future sanctuary has been indicated by God. There follows an account of the preparations for building, a solemn charge to Solomon, and a long section on the ordering of the temple's

servants. The old king assembles the leading men and presents Solomon to them as their future king, chosen by God for the express purpose of building Him a house (28.5, 6). Solomon too is reminded that he is chosen for this end (v. 10), and his father gives him "the pattern of all that he had by the spirit", and he adds (v. 19): "All this have I been made to understand in writing from the hand of the LORD, even all the works of this pattern." Thus the kingdom and the temple are God's gift to His people, channels through which their national life is to function and express itself, and by which His blessings are conveyed to them. But when he wrote the kingdom had gone, for the divine choice was contingent on the loyalty of the kings to the Law and the words of the prophets (28.7-9). All the more important then is the temple in which and in its cultus lies the hope of Israel's religion. Hence the immense stress laid on the need for rebuilding in these times; and thus the Chronicler ends his work with the rescript of Cyrus authorising the re-erection of the temple, he having been charged to do so by God Himself.

The tabernacle of P is to be regarded as unhistorical, like Ezekiel's temple, and is the temple of the monarchy pushed back into the wilderness. That is a commonplace of Old Testament criticism, but the matter does not end there. It is one more witness to this sense of the sheer necessity of the temple and what it represented. In general the idealised tabernacle stands for much the same conception as Ezekiel's vision: Jehovah dwelling among His people (in P *mishkan* makes its appearance, though not to the exclusion of the older term "tent") and the three marks of religion, separation, gradation and symmetry. Connected with both are the significant elaborations of the sin offering. But where Ezekiel looks forward P looks back. One wonders whether this is priestly support for the prophetic notion of the wilderness as the ideal period of Israel's existence; as such from the priestly point of view it could not lack some means of mediating God's presence as later ages understood it, and so a tabernacle with the fully developed hierarchy, and the full complement of sacrifices is postulated as established by Moses. Be that as it may, the temple was the centre of Judaism both of the homeland and the diaspora till Herod's temple in its turn was destroyed in 70 A.D. when Titus captured Jerusalem.

We note three points as we survey the period from the exile to the fall of the capital: (1) The connexion with the Davidic house has disappeared, and the temple is left as the messianic symbol; (2) despite the work of Ezekiel, Haggai and Zechariah, there are signs in Isaiah 66 of the former prophetic hesitation as to the value in the long run of the Temple; (3) again we end with a temple destroyed.

(3)

What then is the outcome of all this when we turn to the New Testament? Here we expect to find the end of the story which gives meaning to the whole process. We may select three bridges between the two Testaments.

(1) The first bridge is the messianic significance of the temple, which leads to the Fourth Gospel: "The Word . . . tabernacled among us, and we beheld his glory" (John 1.14). There is a clear reference here to the Divine Presence manifested in the earlier tent or the later house; what the evangelist wishes to say is that the dwelling of God among His people, symbolised of old by the house of God has now become a manifested fact in the Word made Flesh. So too "His glory" suggests the glory which appeared in the house when Jehovah manifested His presence; the glory which Ezekiel saw leaving the doomed city, and returning again when all was rebuilt and ready. Israel Abrahams pointed out that "the glory" tends to become a messianic idea in rabbinic circles, and though in the long run it is superseded by the *Shekinah* the two ideas come close together in that they are both associated with light. The importance of this substitution is that the messianic idea is no longer a future ideal. but a present, active force in human affairs. Thus one is constrained to believe that the evangelist definitely wishes to connect the coming of our Lord with the range of ideas which centred in the temple. This is reinforced by the conversation in the next chapter: "Destroy this temple . . . he spoke of the temple of his body". To treat the words as mere metaphor weakens them to the point of commonplace. But when the Jews challenge His right to cleanse the temple, He replies in effect, as John interprets Him: I have rights over the temple. For all the ages of its existence it has borne witness to the reality of

God's dwelling with His people, and has foreshadowed a time when that dwelling should be closer, more intimate, more real than any of old time dreamt. I am the fulfilment of all that the temple signifies; I am God dwelling as man among men, for in me dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

(2) This naturally leads on to another connexion symbolised by the repeated destructions of the national sanctuary: (*a*) the disappearance of the symbol before the reality, so in the Apocalypse—"I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple of it"; (*b*) the judgment on those who are so obsessed by the symbol that they cannot appreciate the reality when it comes, which is the argument of Stephen's defence in Acts 7; (*c*) the necessity of holding on to the reality so as to be undisturbed when the symbol is taken away. To deal briefly with these: (*a*) From the standpoint of the seer of the Apocalypse the need is past for the messianic witness of the temple, for Messiah has come to take over the functions it foreshadowed. It is surely significant that since the disaster of A.D. 70 the temple has never been rebuilt. (*b*) Stephen's apology picks up the gist of Jeremiah's temple speeches, and denounces the incurable tendency of the Jews to put their trust in the shadow instead of God the reality behind it. He summarises the history of tabernacle and temple, and quotes Isa. 66, presumably intending to develop the argument that the temple is now superseded. But the teaching is too strong meat for his hearers; an outbreak is at hand, and he ends with a strongly-worded denunciation of current Judaism in its hopeless failure to fulfil its vocation. They have rejected, betrayed and murdered the Righteous One, and so have filled up the measure of the iniquity of their fathers. The unspoken corollary is that Israel has sealed its doom, and returns once more to be Lo-ammi, Forsaken, Desolate. (*c*) It is true that the author of Hebrews speaks only of the tabernacle, but it is clearly the temple with the developed cultus which he has in view—the tabernacle of P in fact, and not the earlier "tent of meeting"—and the point of his argument is summed up in the words: "Consider . . . even Jesus." Then they will see that all that was significant, vital in the old ordinances of Leviticus has found its fulfilment in Jesus Christ, who has done in fact what the ancient cultus did in symbol; He is the heavenly and un-

shakable reality of the earthly counterpart which is shaken and nigh unto vanishing away.

(3) The last bridge is found in the connexion between the Deuteronomic conception of the temple as the only place where sacrifice could be offered, and its holiness, and such passages as John 4.20-24, where our Lord tells of an end to the controversy between Jew and Samaritan in a spiritual worship which will not be tied to the sanctuaries of either people; or 1 Pet. 2.4-10 where the Apostle shows that Christians are the heirs of the promises to Israel. The requirement of a single sanctuary was of course intended to ensure a stricter control over the worship of Judah and the abolition of abuses at the high places. But it means more than that. The day of universal monotheism is coming nearer, and here is a way to picture that outwardly; and with this there goes a desire for the unity of Israel. At any rate it is significant that from the seventh century onwards, along with the growth of monotheism in the general body of the people, there is found in the literature a sense of the oneness of Israel, despite the disruption some four hundred years before and the practically complete disappearance of the northern kingdom (cf. Ezek. 38.16; Zech. 9. 10,13; Jer. 31.6, 9; 18.20). The work of Jeroboam must be undone, and all the sons of Jacob come together into one as the people of God. In the same period the need of holiness is greatly stressed: holiness in the sense of separateness which never leaves the word, and that moral content, which Isaiah attached to it. God is one and God is holy, and as a consequence Israel is to be one and a holy people. This necessarily implies his differentiation and separation from all the nations upon earth, chosen as he is by Jehovah that He may dwell there, and through Israel bless all the nations.

All these ideas and representations pass over into the New Testament teaching of the Church as inheritor of the promises, the new Israel. The new Israel is one because God is one; there are not, there cannot be many temples, but one building of which the Christ is at once the foundation and the corner stone, wherein God dwells through the Spirit, and which is therefore holy, and being in the world is yet not of the world. The parallels could be worked out in greater detail, but let it suffice to note one point. The Old Testament being incomplete always

leaves an unresolved tension, which applies in this particular connexion. Grand as are the ideals of the writers there are two difficulties: the ideals are attached to a localised temple and to a unique people. We have noted prophetic hesitations on the subject of the temple, and clearly in the first century A.D. it was a stumbling-block as it had been in the days of Jeremiah. How was its witness to a fundamental truth, its function as a centre of unity for dispersed Judaism to be reconciled with a conception of God so great that the heaven of heavens cannot contain Him? In St. Paul the tension is resolved by the recognition that the reality symbolised by the temple is Jesus Christ the Son of God who dwelt among us, whose work is continued by the Church, a temple built of living men—a metaphor which passes easily into that of the body of Christ—in which He dwells by the Spirit. There is nothing here to tie it to a particular place, a particular people, but the value of those conceptions is preserved.

The one all-holy God dwelling with His own holy people, a nation elect, precious; and inspiring them in His service to bring all nations to Him: this is the vision of Israel's prophets, priests, and sages, seen in fashion fragmentary and imperfect, fulfilled in a fashion which transcends all their dreams in the Lord Christ and His Church. The end is not yet, but as one tries through its varying fortunes to trace out the witness of the temple to fundamental truths one can only say of its history in the words of the psalmist that "he hath done it".

RE-THINKING THE PASTORAL MINISTRY

by The Rev. J. W. STEVENSON

"When I see you setting off down the road on Monday morning," the village schoolmaster once said to me, "I sometimes wonder if you are regarding human life as radically as you did when you were preaching in the kirk the day before. You seem, somehow, easier-minded about it. You come into the school. What, honestly, do you see there? A fine bunch of children, going on their pleasant way to become decent men and women—or are they really heading for a life which is rooted in the world's evil, a life out of which you'll tell them in a few years they must be saved by the grace of God?

"And then on the Tuesday morning," he went on, "you're off to the Presbytery. Now, tell me honestly, don't you meet together pretty much as any other body of people would do—to transact your business, to express your opinions, and to come to the judgment which your own experience has led you to hold? And yet your distinctive characteristic is supposed to be that you believe that human experience and human judgment are shot through with a deadly evil. You say that you *distrust* yourselves, that 'of yourselves you can do nothing aright'—but I can't say that you look or sound particularly like people who are distrusting themselves. You say in your opening prayer that you want to be over-ruled and corrected—but you'll forgive me for saying that you don't seem very often to go through the process during the meeting that follows.

"I'm not being cynical or trying to be clever. I'm only wondering if this may be a reason why we don't always take you as seriously as the ministers of Christ as we should—because your pastoral ministry seems to be set in a different key from your preaching ministry and you're too much just 'one of ourselves' by the Monday morning, taking us as we are, and apparently quite content to do so, reacting in much the same way as we do to the events of the day and to the people around us, speaking in the same sort of way about life and death, looking at the problems of career and income very much as we do,

coming to the same sort of opinions and decisions. It seems to me that, taking a line from your preaching of the Word, I should expect you to take us both *less* seriously and *more* seriously—*less* seriously than you do in our opinions and judgments (I don't see why you don't laugh at us more than you do) and *more* seriously than you do in being bold enough to challenge the presuppositions and the standards of ordinary human nature."

I think there was some truth in that. Is it not true that sometimes our practical theology does get divorced from our dogmatics? Is it not true that the work of our pastoral ministry is sometimes based, by implication, on a doctrine of man and a conception of human evil to some extent different from that which we preach?

For what is the nature of sin, as we declare it to be in our preaching? It is not just what men ordinarily call evil. It is nothing more disreputable in the eyes of the world than the independence and self-confidence and reliance upon ourselves and our self-made experience which the world is accustomed to admire. Its subtlety is that it transfers these qualities from one sphere of relationship into another and confuses the ultimate issues of life. It takes our consciousness of doing the things of our daily work well and transmutes it into a belief that we are capable of ordering life itself well. It takes our confidence before men and transmutes it into confidence before God. It encourages us to build up an experience which can become a movement away from a daily learning at God's hands even while it is an honest seeking for "Christian principles". The subtlety of sin, as we understand it, lies in its extraordinary power of tempting us to take God's primary gifts and turn them into a self-satisfaction which prevents us being ready to receive the deeper gifts He is waiting to bestow. The dilemma of man is how to develop a capacity for proper independence in the duties of life without developing a total reliance upon his own wisdom and a sinful independence of God.

And even within the life of Christian belief there is the higher form of the same temptation—to turn the faith of the Church, and our own experience of the working of God's Spirit, into a "rule" sufficient in itself to walk by, and to make it a substitute for immediate, child-like trust and obedience—to

escape, in fact, from the apparent uncertainty in which we learn to walk, precisely because *we do not know* when the Father's hands are going to uphold us and when they are going to allow us to stagger a little way alone, the uncertainty in which we learn, in a new dimension of living, the paradox of freedom and dependence under the divine grace. The fact that temptation comes to us in that form, luring us away from that life in which "we know, and do not know", towards a life which we can make entirely orderly and satisfactory to our minds, is an indication to us of the real nature of sin, its subtlety and its respectability.

This temptation is not something we discover for ourselves. It is revealed to us by the operation of the divine grace.

We can watch the process in the men who were nearest to our Lord. When they found the evil spirits subject to them they had to be told not to rejoice and not to say "us" about it at all, lest it be turned from a power of good to sin. In the moment of beholding their Lord's transfigured glory they were concerned how they could turn it into a human experience, into a human possession—"Let *us* build three tabernacles here . . . " When they discovered a fellow-worker casting out devils they wanted him to be forbidden because he wasn't conforming to their experience of how devils were to be cast out. At the very moment when they were being permitted to see some little way into the sufferings of Christ, the just for the unjust, some of them were concerned chiefly about how in the coming glory there was to be a proper distribution of *human* justice. They feared even a heaven without earthly authority and lordship. No sooner had Peter made his confession of faith, "Thou art the Christ", than he was thrusting forward his own ideas, from his own experience, of what this Christ should do and not do. That desire to turn even the glory of God into a possession, to lay it under their judgment, to make themselves and their experience the final authority, to revolt against the living, hourly teaching because they considered that they already had enough wisdom and experience laid up like riches to live by—that was eventually revealed to them as the essence of sin, although it bore none of the ugly marks by which men would ordinarily have described sin. (One meaning of the parable of the rich man is surely the temptation to be rich in the commerce of human

relationship and in the store of human experience and poor in relationship to God, from whom alike comes the immediate word which day by day is the true enrichment and treasure of our life and the immediate word for the ending of our life when our soul shall be required of us.)

This was an evil which men could never have detected in themselves, a sin which would have been the final despair had it not been that its darkness was being thrown into relief by a divine light which would not be overmastered by the darkness.

And that is the discovery which Christian men and women have always been making—of a sin in themselves more subtle than they had thought possible, a sin which is essentially the refusal of the living, immediate, obedient fellowship with God in favour of what can be laid up in principles and applied by ourselves without God's help.

Now, if that is the nature of sin, Christ's minister is plainly not sheltered from it. He may be sheltered from some of the cruder manifestations of it because he is not called to share so deeply some of the labours of men where it is entrenched. But he is not sheltered from the temptation to live by the security of what his mind has grasped, rather than by the apparent insecurity of daily faith and daily correction.

It is true, of course, that we have to live and speak at different levels, as other men have. There are some levels at which we express a simple personal opinion on some private or public issue, as it appears to us from our experience. There are other levels at which we are called upon to express a more carefully considered judgment on Christian principles, adding the Pauline rider, "I *think* I have the Spirit of God". And even at these levels, though we disclaim any false appearance of authority, what we are in ourselves by the grace of God will have its fruit in the form our opinions take. Our experience of His saving power will be daily informing our humblest judgments and decisions, even when we are unaware of it. But can anyone, looking back on his own history and the history of the Church, doubt the strength of the temptation to elevate these views and opinions, curiously blended of remembered mercies and our own assertiveness, into spiritual dogmatism and to make them a substitute for "live" and immediate direction at the hand of God?

As we go out amongst men in our week-day ministry, on

the Monday morning and after, we ought to be speaking and acting in realistic recognition of that kind of temptation in ourselves and others. If we are unaware of it we will be going amongst them in a false relationship. We may convey a sense that we are not so perturbed as we were on the Sunday about human life, as it is in the world and in ourselves. Or we may convey a sense of superiority, even when we are not conscious of it—a sense that we are not quite one of themselves in this fundamental conflict, that we "know all the answers" where they scarcely know how to ask the questions; that, even if we acknowledge our "proneness to err", it is a more refined sort of erring than the ordinary man thinks of, a genteel kind of "falling short" of what one knows one ought to be. It is impossible for us to convey by any simulated attitude or form of words that we know ourselves to be under assault from the deadliest evil if we do not honestly believe we are. If we are not crying out in daily need against the new and ever-changing subtleties of sin within us we certainly shall not convey to other people that we are standing in a Jordan of common penitence with them, whatever we say along with them in the prayers of public worship about our need of deliverance and saving and help.

If evil is as we declare it to be we are not in a sheltered occupation. We are more exposed than most. We are committed daily to be giving help out of our experience. We are constantly judging human evil and good, and having to interpret other men's experience. More than most we are under the temptation to make an ideal of our own rightness, our reliability as advisers, our soundness of judgment, our experience; and to escape from the apparent insecurity and tension of having even our past experience of God's mercy laid open to daily renewal in forms which may seem contradictory to what has gone before. The greater God's gifts to us the subtler the temptation to turn them, first, into "our experience" and then into something of our own which we have to give to others.

The temptation is with us every time somebody comes to us in trouble. Unless we are laying ourselves under that discipline where we allow our security to be made seemingly insecure we are tempted to say to ourselves, "This is something I have known before", and to give advice from our experience instead of wrestling in prayer for the immediate "live" word for this

person in front of us—to rely upon law, the rule we have codified from our experience, rather than upon the living truth which God is waiting to give us in the fellowship of two who are agreed "touching something they should ask".

The temptation may be with us even at the bedside of a dying man. We know the words in which we can give comfort; and they are the Church's words, God's words, and not merely our own. But even these great comfortable words must not prevent us seeking to find what God is wishing us to say to this individual man which we may not have said to any other, and may never say again—the words that are for his immediate need. For some of us this is where there has first been discerned the temptation to rely rather upon the general word of Christian experience than upon the living, particular word for that moment; where we have become aware, perhaps, that we have not been considering it necessary to evoke or express the penitence of a dying man—that we have been using words that seemed too high and holy to him because they had not been related to his own condition by the other word that was for himself alone—that we have been saying "Peace, peace", even under the shadow of death, when there was still a great hurt unhealed. Some of us have had to confess that, in spite of the solemn words of our preaching on sin, we had not been taking the fact of sin as seriously as we ought in the presence of the dying—so that even the formal, and as we might say magical, rites of the Roman priest have risen up to judge us, reminding us, even in what we may consider its misuse, of the high seriousness of the Catholic Faith.

The temptation is with us whenever we beseech men "in Christ's stead". Unlike Him we have to consider our words when they have been spoken, asking ourselves if they have been fit for their purpose, and at once we are under temptation from the voice of our human nature which turns a holy concern into an unholy consciousness of self and puts words like "You did well—you were right" or "You let yourself down" into our hearts—words which we are all too ready to hear.

If we are indeed going out as pastors to speak, to warn, to encourage "in Christ's stead" we are more exposed to temptation, not less, than the people to whom we go. We go for nothing less than the saving of men's souls, which means that

we believe men's souls are in urgent and deadly peril. But it is the paradox of our ministry that they who save go in greater danger themselves and stand in greater need. The words of the hymn are scarcely a true description of our position:

> . . . while I stand
> Firm on the rock and strong in Thee,
> I may stretch out a loving hand
> To wrestlers with the troubled sea.

Bernanos puts it more truly: "Sweet miracle of our empty hands! Thus to be able to give what we do not ourselves possess"—to be able to help in the saving because we know that we ourselves go in hourly danger.

. . . . .

Can we set down, then, any suggestions for the better undertaking of this pastoral ministry?

First, perhaps, there should be the reminder that, in the wrong as well as in the right translation, "our conversation should be in heaven". In the intellectual climate of to-day there are strong temptations to speak the current language with the honest motive of making ourselves all things to all men, but with a resultant thinking of the *thoughts* of current fashion which we certainly do not intend.

Is it not true that for the younger ministers especially there is a temptation to fall away from forthright Christian utterance in private conversation, and even in the conversation of their pastoral ministry, because they are more sharply aware than the older generations of the extent of the drift-away from Christian conviction and knowledge of the basic Christian truths? (Experience of a cross-section of the community in the Services in war-time was a shock to many of us who thought we knew how the young people of to-day were thinking—although it also provided plenty of experience of their real hunger to find standards for human life.) We are perhaps over-sensitive, over-conscious that we are moving much of the time in an atmosphere of half-belief and scepticism; and in our over-anxiety to establish and maintain "contact" and friendship at all costs we are tempted away from the proper boldness of Christian witness which declares a radical re-direction of human life—away from the speech which implies, as the Sacraments do, that the old human nature has passed away and a new creation has

been begun in Christ, in which *all* is of God—into the merely tentative and the defensive.

When I used to hear the stories of my predecessors in my parish—what the great James Proudfoot had said to a defaulting laird; how John Anderson had met a moral crisis in one of the homes of his people—I always felt an inward rebuke to my own ministry. There may have been a tendency to sententiousness in some of the utterances of these ministers of last century. Sometimes, perhaps, they may have been too pontifical. But they were *definite*. They walked the roads of the parish with the purpose of speaking what they believed to be Christ's word for the particular condition of each person in their flock. We cannot imitate them in the *ore rotundo* of their public utterances, nor in all the confident judgments of their pastoral ministry; but we might learn much from their conviction that they were called to a prophetic interpretation of the lives of their people, and from their fearlessness in laying bare the hidden issues beneath the surface respectabilities.

. . . .

A second point is the recovery of regular pastoral prayer in the homes of the people. That raises many questions, the first of which may well be the size of our congregations, and the impossibility of anything more frequent than an annual or biennial visit. A prayer in a home in such circumstances is something different from the prayer of one who knows the individual needs of the family.

Dr Bonar used to go to his church for an hour on certain forenoons, and, kneeling in each pew in turn, he considered the lives of the people who sat there on Sundays and offered up his intercessions for them one by one. A high ideal which the busy-ness of the ministry to-day makes more remote. Yet it is a picture of the interceding pastoral ministry which we should not allow ourselves to forget. It also points us to the kind of prayer in the homes of our people in which we become a second intercessor touching anything that one of our people may ask, or a "second with Christ" for those who do not pray for themselves—the kind of prayer which may be the means of raising the eternal issues in complacent hearts, the point of new honesty between man and man, and man and God, and the point of decision.

There seems to be a need for some new thinking here. Couldn't there be a link between a family's own beginnings of worship in the home and the minister's periodic sharing in it? Do we have the printed helps of the right kind for people who have drifted away from the desire to share prayer together—the kind of help which really understands where they are, and how they may be led to begin a corporate action which even as an action involves a radically new relationship with one another? Have we anything simple enough, yet pregnant enough, to encourage people to the act of asking even while they are confused in mind and not quite sure that the asking will mean anything or result in anything? Have we the kind of thing which has at once the high seriousness of a saving Gospel and a Christ-like understanding of the mind of the man who does not think he is a sinner and does not believe that he stands in any sort of spiritual danger whatsoever? Do we have it, as what would be called to-day a "directive" to the ministry?

Somewhere here there seems to be a point for the breaking-through of a salient into the entrenched self-confidence of modern man, even modern man in the Church.

. . . .

A third point might be the consideration of the opportunities given for consultation between minister and people. The evening in the vestry is not enough, particularly if it is intimated, as it frequently is, in the form: "I shall be in the vestry on Friday evening from 7 to 9 to see anyone on Church business." There is no invitation in that to a man or woman who might wish to see a minister on the thing that he preaches about on Sundays—the deadly and daily threat of sin to a man's soul. How does one explain one's presence in the vestry for such a purpose in terms of Church business?

I have watched people fumbling for an excuse to come to the manse for what was, after all, the primary purpose for which manse and minister were there—and been ashamed. A farmer coming with a form for the oats subsidy to be signed—though it had never needed a minister's signature before—making it an excuse to stumble into a confidence about something that was threatening home and faith. A girl coming to borrow a book and having to be reminded on the doorstep as she is leaving that she hasn't got the book she came for, because she

has made the visit an opportunity to talk about something which should have been confessed and cleansed from her mind years before. Such recollections seem to me to point to a great lack in some of our denominations—and in saying this I am not forgetting the varying practice and the better opportunities provided for this kind of ministry in some places than in others.

Speaking for those who are conscious of something lacking here, may I suggest that some new thinking and new decisions are needed if people of this generation, with all the temptations of the prevalent attitudes to life, are to be encouraged to lay bare their hearts to God and to seek honesty and new life in Him? We have a lot to break down. We have to create opportunities, as our Lord Himself created them, so that people may feel it less difficult to come, because they know they can count on us understanding why they are coming. We must somehow convey to them that we are, in medical language, "consultants" —that we have time for this, because it is at the very heart of our ministry, that these are the issues of life and death and that we are the ministers of the saving power of Christ. We must make it easy for them to come, as He did—easy for them to fumble with something else, if need be, while they try to get at what they want to say. For these words "come" and "easy" are not a pandering to human weakness; they are at the heart of the great Gospel invitation.

There are unusually strong influences to-day tempting men to a false confidence in their experience and a blindness to the sinfulness of sin. That means that the minister of Christ must be armed with greater boldness in attacking the defences, greater penetrative power, greater understanding of the deceitful and respectable forms that sin takes and of the unlikely signs that tell of the beginnings of the soul's hunger and seeking—and a deeper sense of his own temptations.

A STUDY IN NEW TESTAMENT COMMUNICATION

by The Rev. Professor T. F. Torrance

It is often claimed that the problem of communicating the Gospel is the major practical problem facing the Church to-day, as it may also be the major theological problem. This concern is a very healthy sign, but it is becoming increasingly apparent that we are apt to be so concerned with devising new methods of evangelism as to forget the one factor of supreme importance: the burden of the Gospel itself, that is, to forget that the Gospel is not simply the message of divine love, but the actual way in which God communicates Himself to us in history. No technique that forgets that the Gospel has already been made supremely relevant to sinful humanity in the Incarnation and death of Jesus Christ will ever avail for the communication of the Gospel. This is therefore an attempt to probe into what the New Testament has to say to us about this, and into the way in which, as a matter of fact, the New Testament actually communicates the Gospel to us.

We may take as our starting point the Parables in the Synoptic Gospels with the parallels in the Fourth Gospel. According to Professor C. H. Dodd, "a parable is normally the dramatic presentation of a situation intended to suggest vividly some single idea" (*The Parables of the Kingdom*, p. 165). Jesus used parables to "illustrate what Mark calls the mystery of the Kingdom of God" (p. 33, Mark 4.11)—i.e. He presented His teaching in a concrete fashion and not in abstractions. However, because "there is no mere analogy but an inward affinity between the natural order and the spiritual order" (p. 24) the Parables are so self-luminous that "the interpretation will show through" (p. 20). Professor Dodd goes on to say: "The Kingdom of God is intrinsically like the process of nature and of the daily life of man . . . the sense of the divineness of the natural order is major premiss of all the Parables" (p. 22).

In this view Dr Dodd follows Jülicher in rejecting the idea that Parables are allegories where the elements are treated as

mysterious cyphers or allegorical equivalents for eternal ideas, but he refuses to follow Jülicher in making "the process of interpretation end with the generalisation". No doubt the Parable has the character of an argument but "the way to an interpretation lies through a judgment of the imagined situation, not through a decoding of various elements in the story" (p. 23). "The Parables bear upon the actual and critical situation in which Jesus and His hearers stood: when we ask after the application we must look first not to the field of general principles but to the particular setting in which they are delivered. The task of the interpreter of the Parables is to find out, if he can, the setting of a Parable in the situation contemplated by the Gospel and hence the application which would suggest itself to one who stood in that situation" (p. 26).

Unquestionably Professor Dodd has put us greatly in his debt for his exposition of the Parables, and for the astonishing light that his method of interpretation casts on them again and again. It is difficult to avoid the feeling, however, that his restricted definition of the parable and the resulting method of interpretation are unduly narrow. A more balanced and, certainly to the preacher, a more satisfying account has been given by the Rev. R. S. Wallace in a previous number of this Journal (2.1, pp. 13 ff.). In that article Mr Wallace raised the question whether the relation upon which the Parable reposes is a natural or a sacramental relation. That is the point of crucial importance for a doctrine of communication. Is it really true, as Dr Dodd maintains, that when we scrutinise the Parables and relate them to the original situation so far as we can reconstruct it, the conclusion regarding the original meaning and application follows or shines through (C. H. Dodd, op. cit. p. 31)? That would mean that so far as we can reconstruct the original Jesus in His setting in history (*Sitz im Leben*), we can read off the divine Revelation because there is an inward affinity between the natural order and the spiritual order, and because of the divineness of the natural order. Surely that is not the message of the Synoptic Gospels, nor the teaching of the Parables. Undoubtedly the divine communication must involve analogy if it is to get across to men who can only think in terms of human and worldly analogies, but the whole significance of the Parable is that it is *analogy with a difference*, analogy

which has at its heart an eschatological event which, until it actually overtakes us, nothing in the natural or historical order can begin to reveal. Even when it happens, absolutely necessary as the analogical elements are to convey the Revelation, they are unable of themselves to point to the truth. "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven" (Matt. 16.17). The extraordinary fact is that while Professor C. H. Dodd recognises this teaching quite unambiguously (op. cit. p. 197), he fails to carry it into the heart of his epistemology. In other words the eschatological relation upon which he has thrown such a flood of illumination is not truly realised in the depth of faith. That is the significance of the *mystery* of the Kingdom (cf. Wallace, loc. cit. p. 14).

The Synoptic passage which we must discuss here is Mark 4.1 ff., especially 4.11 ff. Professor Dodd's thesis is that the Evangelist has misunderstood the Parables and the significance of the Parable itself, and the result is a series of interpretations attached to the Parables which he pronounces a confusion. This leads him to reject every New Testament interpretation of the Parables. In this instance Dr Dodd's own method of interpretation does not allow him to make sense of the passage as it stands, and he is forced to mutilate and reconstruct it. In particular he lays the axe to the word *mysterion* as not being a genuine word of Jesus, in spite of the fact that an *agraphon* survives through Clement of Alexandria and the Clementine Homilies in which *mysterion* in a similar connexion is found on the lips of Jesus, apparently from a different source altogether, which makes the genuineness of *mysterion* in this passage all the more certain. However, it does not matter ultimately whether the word itself is scored out, for the thought is inextricably woven into all three Synoptic accounts as well as the Johannine, going back to Old Testament passages such as Deut. 29.29; Ps. 72.12; Isa. 6.9 ff.; 42.18 ff.

What did Jesus mean when He said, "How shall we liken the Kingdom of God?" or "the Kingdom of God is like" this or that? Surely that Kingdom or the Word of the Kingdom or the Mystery is difficult to express directly. It is like this and it is like that, and yet it is like this and like that. We cannot say, "Lo, here is the Kingdom of God" or "Lo, there is the Kingdom of God", for the Kingdom of God does not come

like that. It does not come with observation. As the *Fourth Gospel* puts it, "Except a man be born again (from above) he cannot see the Kingdom of God".[1] "How shall I liken the Kingdom?" says Jesus. "I shall express it by a parable" (*παραβολή*)[2]. The Word of the Kingdom can be expressed only indirectly by a series of parallels on a different analogical level side by side with it. The Word of the Kingdom can be expressed to men of flesh and blood and concrete existence only by throwing a parallel in flesh and blood and in the language of humanity to the Word of the Kingdom. That means, as Jülicher and Dodd agree, that the parable is not an allegory, although to say that the parable yields *one idea* is to make it as much an allegory as if it yielded a series of ideas. Behind the parable, or rather beside it, there is the Kingdom which has broken into the midst, the *eschaton* which is here and now. Dr Dodd agrees that it is this which gives the parables their peculiar significance. The *basileia* or *eschaton* is identified with the Word of the Kingdom. That comes out very clearly, as K. L. Schmidt points out, when we compare the Synoptic parallels. The parable therefore is the picturesque, dramatic and analogical speech thrown alongside the invisible Kingdom already in the midst, already "among you" (*ἐντὸς ὑμῶν*). "The Kingdom of God is come upon you" (Matt. 12.28; Luke 11.20: *ἔφθασε ἡ βασιλεία ἐφ' ὑμᾶς*). The parable is thus essentially two-sided. It has a visible side, the analogical; but that is thrown alongside the invisible Kingdom and is, so to speak, contrapuntal to it. The parable is essentially sacramental in form and that is always its intention on the lips of Jesus. Jesus Christ, in teaching and Person, is Himself the great Parable of the Kingdom of God.

If the Word of the Kingdom is identical with Christ Himself then it is clear why the Word cannot be expressed directly in speech. Christ Jesus cannot be put into words. In Him we have the Word and the Act of the Kingdom, *logos* and *dynamis*, in one: a Person in the midst. As Professor Dodd says, the parable describes an aspect of Christ's own ministry and the developing situation and the crisis which His coming has brought upon history. But the design of the parable does not lie in itself or in any symbolic meaning to be read off the face of it or even

[1] cf. 1 Cor. 2.1 ff.

[2] The Greek word used by the Evangelists is particularly significant. *παραβολή* indicates the act of throwing alongside (*παρὰ βάλλω*).

in any single idea. It is designed to put a man into a situation in which he is confronted with God and can hear for himself the Word of the Kingdom which flesh and blood cannot reveal. Consequently the relation between the Word of the Kingdom and the parables is conceived in terms of *mysterion* or *krypton*. It will help us to understand this if we remember that *mysterion* is not used in any sense relating to the Greek mysteries. A passage such as 1 Tim. 3.16 is helpful, "Great is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh". That is the fundamental sense in which it is nearly always used in the New Testament, in the Synoptics, in St. Paul's Epistles, and in the Apocalypse as well.[1]

There is a very illuminating sentence from the Fourth Gospel (8.43) which throws a flood of light upon the situation here. "Why do you not understand my speech (λαλιάν), because you cannot hear my word (λόγον)?" The Jews were unable to make anything of the speech (λαλιά) of Jesus, i.e. the parables (παραβολαί) because they could not hear or could not bear to hear His Word (λόγος). If we ask the Fourth Gospel what the relation is between the speech and the Word the answer is given in the expression "abiding" (μένειν). It is when a man abides in the Word or when the Word abides in a man that the man understands the speech and knows the Truth which will make him free. Thus the preaching of Jesus is broadcast to all who hear it as speech but only he who has ears to hear or who makes room for it (χωρεῖν), as the Synoptics say, can hear the Word. In this way the Word is broadcast to all and sundry through speech and parable, but only those who are prepared to receive it in faith actually hear it as the Word of the Kingdom. That comes out again and again in the Fourth Gospel. The voice of God speaks; the unbelieving crowds say that it thunders, but the believers say that it is the voice of an angel. "Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us and *not unto the world*? Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me he will keep my word (λόγον) and my Father will love him and we *will come unto him and make our abode with him*." (John 14.22, 23). That is the Johannine way of putting the Mystery of the Kingdom.

This helps us to understand the teaching in Mark and the

[1] There is, of course, a counterfeit *mysterion* in evil.

Synoptic parallels. "To you is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom of God but to them who are without all things are spoken in Parables." Then Jesus declares that the clue to all the Parables is the same—the Word (λόγος). "Do ye not know this parable? How then shall ye know all parables? He who sows, sows the word (λόγον)."[1] And so Mark goes on to say (v. 37): "And with many such parables He spake (ἐλάλει) the word (τὸν λόγον), as they were able to hear." (καθὼς ἠδύναντο ἀκούειν: recall the οὐ δύνασθε of John 8.43). "Without a parable He did not speak unto them (χωρὶς παραβολῆς οὐκ ἐλάλει αὐτοῖς)." There is little doubt therefore that the thought of the Synoptics is close to that of the Fourth Gospel.

We come now to what is usually reckoned exegetically most difficult, the scandal of a ἵνα (Mark 4.11), "Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom of God but to those who are without all things are done in parables that seeing, they may see (ἵνα βλέποντες βλέπωσι) and not understand (καὶ μὴ ἴδωσι): and hearing, they may hear; lest at any time they should be converted and their sins should be forgiven them." Several things must be said here.

(1) Its very harshness is the strongest argument for the authority of ἵνα.

(2) No doubt the Greek is harsher in sound than the Aramaic. It may be that the Aramaic was capable of ambiguous interpretation as Professor T. W. Manson avers.

(3) This ἵνα must be put side by side with ἐὰν μὴ ἵνα in v.22, which indicates that the Parables, while they concealed the mystery, only concealed it with the intention of revealing it (4.21-23), while the expression in v. 33 καθὼς ἠδύναντο ἀκούειν also throws a flood of light upon the passage.

Why, then, does Jesus speak in parables?

(1) He speaks in parables in order to reveal that the Kingdom of God has come into the midst in His own Person and to direct men to believe in Him in such a way that there is evoked from them full decision. The parable is chosen by Christ as the means of confronting men with Himself, the Word, in such a way that men can choose Him in love and yet not be over-

[1] K. L. Schmidt points out that in each Synoptic set of parallels Kingdom and Word of the Kingdom are equated with the key of knowledge (Luke 11.52). The hearing of the Word is the key to knowledge, the key to the Parables of Jesus. cf. G. Kittel, *Theologisches Woerterbuch zum NT*, Bd. 1, pp. 581 ff.

whelmed by His divine majesty. The Word comes through the parable in such a way that men have to choose God in order to know Him, to surrender to His will in order to understand. The Word is so nigh that it creates room for faith and decision. Jesus consistently avoids giving a compelling manifestation of Himself for that would leave no room for faith and decision and men would be fixed in their sin by the unveiled divine majesty instead of being wooed to belief and trust so that Christ can heal them. In the parable, so to speak, the Kingdom of God comes into the midst and throws a man into the crisis of decision, and yet by its veiled form the Word of the Kingdom holds man at arm's length away in order to give him room and time for personal decision.[1]

(2) We can say with Calvin that Jesus spoke in Parables not simply for the purpose of instruction but to keep the attention of the hearers awake until a more convenient time. He kept the un-understanding and the unbelieving in a state of suspense till a fitter opportunity arrived. And so in the parable Jesus accommodated the Word to men's capacity who were yet rendered inexcusable by the amount of light they got from the surface of the parable but whose final verdict is suspended because as yet they were not sufficiently prepared to receive instruction. That is the force of the words "as they were able to hear" (*καθὼς ἠδύναντο ἀκούειν*, Mark 4.33). Above all forms of speech the parable is calculated to have the greatest propensities for suggestion in which with the light and skilled thrust of a rapier Jesus gently touches men to the quick of their soul by the two-edged Word, summoning them to decision without crushing them to the ground by an open display of majesty and might. It is by means of the parable that Jesus pierces to the heart in such a way as not to crush the bruised reed or quench the smoking flax—*καθὼς ἠδύναντο ἀκούειν*. In Johannine thought, this means that Jesus did not want to judge the hearers on the spot in any final fashion. The *eschaton* had broken into the present but if men were confronted openly with the *eschaton* in the Word and presence of Jesus in their unbelief, they would be finally damned on the spot. But Jesus veiled the *eschaton* so that it encountered men obliquely. "I

[1] This necessary time-element is really eliminated by a realised eschatology which holds that "the time-scale is irrelevant to the ultimate significance of history" (C. H. Dodd, op. cit. p. 71).

judge you not but the word that I speak that shall judge you at the last day" (John 12.48). The Word of God is always creative. It always acts upon a man whether he will or no; but in the event of a man's 'no', in the event of his unbelief, Jesus intends that the judgment shall fall with a delayed action still leaving room and time for decision and faith. The Word of the Kingdom creates ferment among men and sooner or later there must be an explosion. There may be conversion now, which is an eschatological event: "Repent for the Kingdom of God is come upon you." It may be damnation in the *eschaton*: "Depart from me for I never knew you."

(3) Jesus deliberately concealed the Word in the parable lest men against their will should be forced to acknowledge the Kingdom, and yet He allowed them enough light to convict them and to convince them. Jesus refused to reveal Himself to men in such a way as to command their assent and still leave them unbowed in the haughtiness of their pride. He revealed Himself in a way that often involved offence (*σκάνδαλον*) so as to cut across the grain of human pride and demand humility and rebirth.

We make a real mistake if we imagine that the Jews simply did not recognise Jesus as the Son of God. They did indeed and yet they did not recognise Him. They were blind, but they were wilfully blind. They had such an obstinate disposition of soul that in the very act of perceiving the truth they insisted that it should not apply to them for they could not bear the Gospel; they could not endure the Word of Christ because it cut clean across all their proud national aspirations, their rigid ideas and desires. Thus they rendered themselves morally and spiritually incapable even of understanding the speech (*λαλιά*) of Jesus. In the language of St. Paul they deliberately held down the truth in unrighteousness. When a man does that, God delivers him over to a reprobate mind. That is God's punishment for the perverter and evader of the truth; and so Jesus said quite plainly, "For judgment am I come into this world, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind" (John 9.39). That is the force, the terrible force, of the *ἵνα* in Mark 4.11. It is not, says Calvin,[1] that the teaching of Christ by itself or by its own nature causes

[1] Comm. ad loc.

blindness. "Where the Word of God blinds and hardens the reprobate, as this takes place through their own depravity it belongs truly and naturally to themselves, but is accidental as respects the Word." The Word of God in its own nature is always full of light, but its light is choked by the darkness of man and it becomes a savour of death to death and a savour of life to life (2 Cor. 2.15, 16).

That is surely the meaning of this difficult passage. As we have seen in the interpretation that follows, the Word of the Gospel is broadcast to all and sundry. Only where it is received in good soil does it bear fruit. That does not mean that the Word presupposes an esoteric aristocracy and acts selectively upon them. Professor C. H. Dodd points out that Jesus told another series of parables to show how this selective activity (if we may call it that) works. The appeal goes to all and sundry. The saved are separated from the others by their free reaction to the demands which the appeal of the Word involves (op. cit., p. 189). This selection is itself the divine judgment, though men pass it upon themselves by their ultimate attitude to the appeal. That is very apparent in the series of *pericopae* in Mark 10.17-22 and Luke 9.57-62. The fact that in Mark 4.11 we have a ἵνα and not just a οἵ means that this is a divine judgment. That inevitably happens when the Kingdom of God comes into the midst. It takes full charge of the situation and acts upon men whether they will or no. God is always Subject. He is the King. This is the breaking of His sovereignty (βασιλεία) into the midst of men's desires and decisions and choices, throwing them all into critical ferment and giving them an essential form vis-à-vis the Kingdom. Had Jesus spoken openly (ἐν παρρησίᾳ, John 16.29) men would have been damned on the spot, but as He spoke in the veiled encounter of the parables men were judged in unbelief and yet given freedom still to believe. However, because in the breaking in of the Kingdom the emphasis is laid upon the action of God, the δύναμις of the λόγος, this experience is viewed as divine act.

So far we have been dealing with the relation of Word to speech, of mystery to parable, but here is another relation which is also central to the question of communication, the relation of Word (λόγος) to power (δύναμις). It will be sufficient to say here that in the Synoptics there is the closest relation between

the Word and the Act in Jesus' preaching. Word and Act are inseparable and complementary. The Kingdom is essentially God's saving intervention among men, and that takes place in the preaching and the miracles of Jesus in inseparable unity. This identity of Word and divine Act is most obvious in Mark's Gospel (cf. 9.1; cf. 1 Cor. 4.20), but the notable passage is that of Matt. 12.28 (with the Lukan parallel 11.20). "If I by the Spirit (or finger) of God cast out devils then the Kingdom of God is come upon you"; and so Jesus went about *preaching* and *healing* (Matt. 4.23) and sent the disciples out to *preach* and to *heal* (cf. Matt. 13.15: *καὶ ἰάσομαι αὐτούς*). This "and to heal" (*καὶ ἰᾶσθαι*, Luke 9.2; cf. Matt. 10.7 ff.; Mark 3.13 ff.) is of special importance as it throws considerable light upon Mark 4.12 (and parallels), where Jesus says, "Lest they should be converted and I should heal them" or "Lest it should be forgiven them".[1] In the eyes of Jesus the Act of healing thus appears identical with the Word of forgiveness. The classic example of that identification is found in the case of the paralytic in Mark 2. There, however, for the purpose of faith there is a lapse of time inserted between forgiveness and healing—"That ye may know the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins". It is precisely that lapse of time or eschatological reserve between the Word of the Kingdom and the power (even the violence—*βιάζεται*) of the Kingdom that Jesus is concerned to preserve in the Parable where the *Word* is spoken in such a way that full Action is still suspended, even in the case of the believer who enters the Kingdom of God.

Jesus is not one whose Action falls short of His Word. Therefore, though the Word of forgiveness is spoken in such a parable as that of the Prodigal, that same Word is acted out in Himself on the Cross. There the Word of pardon is enacted in flesh and blood and inserted as a reality into our history and life. There the Word of forgiveness becomes an actual fact not just a mere idea, not just a word spoken into the air, but an accomplished fact. "It is finished."

We may now see further why the Word was indirectly communicated through the parable because the Act is also part of

[1] This is a quotation from Isa. 6.9 ff.; the LXX has instead of "and it should be forgiven them" the words "and I should heal them", both of which come in the Synoptics.

the Word. The Word of God is not mere speech (λαλιά) but power of God (δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ), Christ crucified, as St. Paul said. It is because the Word is also power that it cannot be conveyed in mere speech but has to be conveyed in saving acts, in miraculous signs (σημεῖα or δυνάμεις) until the final great Act is completed. In the death of Jesus the Word and the Action are completely one. God is just and the justifier of the ungodly.

The next conception which demands our examination is that of *witness* (μάρτυς). Fundamentally there are two kinds of witness in the New Testament. First there is witness in the sense of John the Baptist, the man sent from God to bear witness to the light of the world. He was not himself the light, but pointed away from himself to another. So much did he concentrate upon bearing witness to this other that he reduced himself, as it were, to a bony finger pointing and the voice of one crying "Behold, the Lamb of God". Here the light is not mediated through himself. He himself fades out of the picture. "I must decrease, He must increase." He is witness only in the sense that he is a voice. It is in that sense that the preacher of the Gospel is witness in the act of preaching. He does not call attention to himself, but points away to the Lamb of God, so that all the focus of attention is concentrated upon Him to whom witness is borne. It is such preaching that as a result there takes place an encounter, a conversation, and an abiding with Jesus Christ (cf. John 1.35 ff.).

Second, in the profoundest sense Christ is witness. He does not witness to a light that is other than Himself for He *is* the light of the world. Here, then, the witness and the light witnessed to are identical. Jesus Christ is in His own Person witness to Himself. That is why in the Fourth Gospel Jesus says "I am the Truth". He is Truth in the form of personal being. He Himself is the Truth of God embodied forth in history, personally encountering man. Some of the most significant passages in the Fourth Gospel are concerned with this majestic *I am*. The most illuminating passage in this respect is that which describes Jesus before Pilate: "To this end was I born and for this cause came I into the world that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. And Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?". Why did Jesus

not answer Pilate?[1] Just because to ask Jesus Christ, who is Himself the Truth, a question about the Truth is to assume that He is not the Truth and that He only thinks *about* it or knows *about* it. Suppose we are talking to a man and then suddenly we say, "Do you exist?"; what can a man say if he is asked that question? He can only say something like this. "If you who stand here and talk to me cannot feel sure that I exist, what good can I do if I *tell* you that I do exist. If you do not believe that I exist you cannot believe what I say." That was the situation before Pilate. We can almost hear Jesus saying, "Pilate, if you do not hear my word you cannot understand my speech". But here we go a step deeper. "Pilate, if my person or my life does not open your eyes to what truth is, then it is utterly useless for me to *tell* you what the truth is." The Word is identical with the Person of Jesus Christ. That thought comes out again in the trial with the majestic, kingly words of Jesus, *'ΕΓΩ 'EIMI*, when the cry went up, "What need have we of further witness?" This man is witness Himself. He is a witness in which Word and Person are identical.

That event made a profound impression upon the early Church—indeed to such an extent that the fact that Jesus *witnessed a good confession* before Pontius Pilate became part of one of the earliest creeds of the Church.[2] The point is this: It is in His death that the Word and the Act of Christ, the Teaching and the Person of Christ become absolutely identical. It is there that He is supremely "the faithful and true witness" (Rev. 1.5; 3.14). It is there that the Captain of our salvation is made perfect through suffering. He is God's Truth done into flesh and blood. God's Truth in the midst of sin and guilt being true to itself. It is God's own witness in the flesh and blood of Jesus Christ, a witness consummated in His death. The New Testament calls that witness God's testimony (μαρτύριον): Christ crucified who is both Word (λόγος) and Power (δύναμις), that is the Word made flesh, the witness who is Himself the Truth.

We must now ask in what sense we Christians are witnesses. How may we communicate the Truth by personal witness?

We are witnesses without doubt in the sense of John the Baptist when we preach, when we proclaim Jesus Christ in

[1] cf. S. Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity*, pp. 199 ff.

[2] cf. O. Cullman, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (Eng. trans. by J. K. S. Reid) p. 25 f.

such a way that the person of the preacher fades out of the picture altogether and the Person of the living Christ is in the foreground encountering men face to face. But we must say more than that of Christian witness, for he that is least in the Kingdom of God is greater than John the Baptist. This Truth, to which we bear witness, is no longer a bare word but Truth in the form of personal being. The Christian has an intimate relation to the Truth such as John the Baptist did not have. Because Truth and personal being, Word and Deed are now one, the Christian does not know the Truth without being true, without in a profound sense becoming one with the Truth. That is why the New Testament uses such expressions as "doing the truth", "being true" and in particular ἀληθεύοντες ἐν ἀγάπῃ (Eph. 4.15), and so St. Paul could say, "It pleased God to reveal His Son in me". In a profound sense the Word becomes flesh in the Christian by his incorporation into Christ, i.e. not through any extension of the incarnation but through an eschatological repetition of the incarnation in faith. And that is why real faith is always a virgin birth in the soul, for Christ, as St. Paul says, becomes formed within the believer. John the Baptist could never have said, "It pleased God to reveal His Son in me"; but now that the Word has been made flesh and the incarnation has been completed upon the Cross, the Truth is done into our flesh and blood. It is part of the *mysterion* that "he that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit". The word that St. Paul uses here is very enlightening. It is κολλάω, the word that is used for the marriage union when a man shall cleave unto his wife and they shall be one flesh. Behind that lies an idea that comes out more clearly in the Johannine literature, expressed in the Hebrew word *yada* which means both to *know* and to *love*. The knowledge of the Truth is an act of the most intimate union. And so the Christian is a witness to the Truth in a profound sense because he is in the Truth and the Truth is in him. He has a relation to the Truth which Paul calls "communion" (κοινωνία) and which John calls "abiding" (μένειν). Christ alone is absolutely identical with the Truth. No one can be a witness to the Truth in that unique sense except Jesus Christ. The Christian, however, can be a witness to the Truth in a parallel fashion in so far as he is in Christ and Christ is in him.

The early Church thought of this union with the Truth as

begun in baptism where the believer is sealed with the Truth and joined to Christ in death and resurrection. What he is in baptism he becomes through suffering inasmuch as through the fellowship (κοινωνία) of Christ's suffering he becomes conformable to Christ. Just as Jesus Christ began His ministry as a witness at baptism, identifying Himself with men, and completed that in His terrible baptism of blood in which He was so straitened till it was accomplished, when He became God's Testimony, God's Word-deed, God's Witness in flesh and blood, so the Christian in the thought of the early Church follows his Lord beginning with baptism when he starts to be a witness (μάρτυς) but becomes a witness in deed and in life through suffering for Christ. Thus, it is in the Christian's suffering witness (μαρτυρία) or martyrdom that he becomes conformable to Christ, and there, as far as is possible for men, he, the martyr-witness, becomes in his death and resurrection at one with Christ the Truth, who in Himself has already wrought out that atonement. He is a complete witness in word and life and seals it with his blood.[1] This is not the same as truth mediated through personality in the modern sense. It is something vastly different. How different we shall see now as we discuss the New Testament thought of proclamation.

According to St. Paul (1 Cor. 1.2) God's testimony, *martyrion*, takes place through proclamation (κήρυγμα). God's testimony, as we have seen, is defined concretely as Christ crucified, Power of God. *Kerygma* may be defined as the straight-forward proclamation of this *martyrion* in such a way that the original *martyrion* actually takes place in the experience of the hearer. That is to say, the original event becomes event all over again through the power of the Spirit so that in *kerygma* a man encounters the living Christ, Christ crucified but risen. No doubt the *kerygma* in itself is mere speech (λαλιά or simply λόγοι) but it is not in the enticing words of man's wisdom nor with the excellency of speech, nor indeed by human or logical demonstration that the *martyrion* takes place, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and of power (ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως). In other words, God bears witness to Himself as men proclaim the crucified and risen Christ. Through the power of

[1] There is a similar thought in the Epistle to the Hebrews in the idea of the death of the Testator where the promise is sealed with blood and where the Christian bearing witness to Christ must resist evil unto blood.

the Spirit God's Testimony is self-authenticating. Thus St. Paul goes on to say that *kerygma* is a revelation (ἀποκάλυψις, see also Rom. 16.25) or a mystery (μυστήριον). In itself *kerygma* is simply speech (λαλιά) but it becomes the power of God (δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ)—that is the great mystery (μυστήριον): God manifest in the flesh. This is the treasure that we may possess in earthen vessels. The Christian is put in trust with the Word of the Gospel, the *mysterion*, and it is in that sense that it pleases God to reveal His Son in the Christian's witness, while the Christian's sufferings in witness are the signs and the marks of Christ upon him. We may put this in our own words by saying that *kerygma* is objective, sacramental preaching with an eschatological result such that the original event (Christ crucified) becomes event all over again in the hearer.[1]

In the parable, as we saw, the full action of the Word was suspended until the Crucifixion. Now the Word and Act are one, as one they take the field in *kerygma*. Whenever Christ crucified is preached in the demonstration of the Spirit there is power (δύναμις). Whether a man believes or not, the creative Word continues activity. It cannot return void. It is the Word-Deed that always acts upon man, the unbeliever as well as the believer. Hence it becomes a savour of life unto life or of death unto death. Some eat and drink salvation; others out of the same cup and the same plate eat and drink damnation. The Word of God is never idle. It always accomplishes its action upon man in the *kerygma*.

No doubt that is a terrible thought for the preacher (κῆρυξ), to think that through his preaching some may be damned. That is what Paul called the "terror of the Lord". But the constraint of the love of God was so heavy upon him that he was unable to resist. He was impelled to go on preaching as an ambassador of the reconciling love of God in Jesus Christ.

It is at this point that we meet again with the difficult passage of Mark 4.11. If we score out the ἵνα, then we deny the *kerygma* its gracious and yet dread urgency, an urgency that

[1] That is why we cannot reject outright the thought of *repetition* in the Roman Mass. In the teaching of the New Testament, however, this is not temporal repetition, but eschatological event. Thus there is also an element of truth in the Roman doctrine of the *opus operatum*, for the Word-deed of God, that becomes event and becomes flesh in the sacrament, is the creative Word, the creating Word, the active Word, the original Word-deed of God (cf. John 1.1 ff). It is that Word that is the *dynamis* in *kerygma*.

modern preaching has largely lost. In Jesus Christ God's Word and God's Action are absolutely identical. He is the *Eschatos* who confronts men in His own Person, in His teaching and in His work, with the final Word and Act of God, and demands absolute love and obedience. The situation has the urgency of finality, of salvation and judgment. It is that eschatological urgency that lies at the heart of *kerygma*. *Kerygma* is not the proclamation of ideas or a bare message, but such a proclamation of Christ, the Word-Act of the living God, that by the Holy Spirit it becomes itself the actualisation of that Word-Act among men in salvation and judgment. *Kerygma* has thus a dual significance corresponding to the eschatological tension at its heart. It is used by God to intervene Himself in the human situation as He who once and for all has wrought out His final Act in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, so that through the *kerygma* the hearer is brought face to face in the present with the *eschaton* and may pass from death to life here and now. That takes place in the Church of Jesus Christ where the age to come has already overtaken this age and overlaps it. In the mercy of God, however, Jesus Christ, the *Eschatos* by whom God will judge the quick and the dead, has withdrawn Himself visibly from history, *without being absent*, and has appointed a day when He will *appear* again in glory and power. Meantime the Word of the Gospel and the final Deed of God are partially held apart in eschatological reserve until the *Parousia* or the *Epiphaneia*. This is therefore the age of grace, the age of *kerygma*, in which the Word of the Gospel is proclaimed to all, in which time and space are given for repentance and decision. But this is the age too when by the Spirit of God all who believe the *kerygma* of the Church may taste already the powers of the age to come and with her enter into the Kingdom of God. Because this Kingdom is neither an ideal nor a bare message but actuality in the midst, the *kerygma* of the Church is power of God, and through it the sovereignty of God (*βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ*) overtakes men and by the passion of Christ struggles with them (Matt. 11.12—*βιάζεται*). Those who lay violent hands upon it (*βιασταὶ ἁρπάξουσιν αὐτήν*)[1] may press into it (Luke 16.16—*βιάζεται*), but whether they will or no the grace of God will abound and reign over all.

[1] Cf. Luke 24.29: *καὶ παρεβιάσαντο αὐτὸν λέγοντες, Μεῖνον μεθ' ἡμῶν.*

BOOK REVIEWS

The Claims of the Free Churches. By Henry Townsend. Hodder and Stoughton Ltd. 320 pp. 15s.

Dr Townsend does not propose to add another to the already existing histories of the English Free Churches. His aim is to vindicate by appeal to history their combined claim upon the gratitude of all English-speaking peoples for their important contribution to religious and political freedom and other benefits. *Freikirchentum*, for which there is no satisfactory English word, was not native to England, and has achieved its fullest efflorescence in the United States. Nevertheless in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries England was its classical habitat and there it developed its characteristic features and produced its enduring effects. Dr Townsend's survey is therefore very properly confined in the main to the English scene. He traces the witness and experience of the Nonconformists from the Tudor Reformation, through the Puritan Revolution in all its phases, the Tory regime of Queen Anne, the Whig ascendancy under the Hanoverians, the reaction to the French Revolution, down to the final removal of legal disabilities imposed upon them and their emergence as a powerful political force in the nineteenth century and beyond. It is a remarkable story told in a lively, popular and vigorously polemical style. The echoes of old battles are aroused. The wounds inflicted by old persecutions may have healed but the scars remain and are here proudly exhibited. Credit for the form and spirit of British democracy with its absence of bitter anti-clericalism, as well as great part of the credit for social reform from 1832 to 1914 is very justly claimed for the nonconformist and his conscience. These claims have been widely acknowledged by liberal historians and also by Anglican scholars. But Dr Townsend fears that they are being obscured by recent trends in historiography and are in danger of being forgotten by the general public. Dr Leslie Weatherhead writes that every Free Churchman will want to read this book and that every Anglican ought to be made to do so. The Scottish Churchman may also find it profitable. He will learn with some self-congratulation how different his own ecclesiastical history has been. One cannot refrain from noticing that, like most Englishmen, Dr Townsend has difficulty with the appropriate use of "England" and "Britain". One may sympathise, but he might have

spared us the statement (p. 141) that: "Near Culloden a British force under Cumberland defeated and scattered the Scots."

The theme of the book is announced as "the rise and growth of Free Church principles as they have affected the religious political and social structures of the British people and the peoples of the United States and of the British Commonwealth". It may be felt that the religious or at least the theological aspect of the matter is unduly subordinate. Of course by religion Dr Townsend means "religious experience" and "ethics" as contrasted with "dogma" and "endless theological debate". His interpretation of Christianity in these somewhat vague terms is set forth in the introduction. Moreover he is writing as a loyal member of the Free Church Federal Council and hopes to serve its objectives. The Council is representative of ten denominations each with its own "principles" so tenaciously held that the project of a "United Free Church" has had to be abandoned. Federation and co-operation has so far proved to be the only practicable solution. Dr Townsend takes comfort in the thought that "there is deeper evangelical and spiritual unity between the federated Free Churches than between groups in the Church of England". This is to bridge somewhat airily the divisions, e.g. between Calvinist and Arminian or between Baptist and paedo-baptist. And are Presbyterians, Congregationalists and Baptists really agreed as to the nature of the Church and Ministry? Of the Westminster Assembly he writes: "The Presbyterians were afraid of 'the Sects'—a horrible word—and used by them in derision, a term which Troeltsch has unfortunately used to distinguish the Free Churches from Churches using the name Catholic." The term Sect has only become derisory and horrible in loose modern popular usage. Troeltsch rescued it from this degradation by recalling its scientific theological sense which certainly does not mean "Free Church", but is perfectly respectable. There are Free Churches which conform to the Troeltschian *Kirchentypus*, e.g. Anglican Churches outside England, and communities originally of the sect-type tend unconsciously to become institutional Free Churches. If we are to take as normative for the English Free Churches the section of the Constitution of the Federal Council given on pp. 28-29, together with the summary of Dr Newton Flew's *Jesus and His Church* which follows, there seems little reason why most Anglicans should not be embraced within its evangelical and spiritual unity. The Ecumenical Movement has resolutely declined to accept federation as its final goal becaues it expresses Christian unity on a merely pragmatic level and thus tends to obstruct the search for a still deeper unity. In the last sentence of his book Dr Townsend seems to see that too.

Up to the nineteenth century those of whom Dr Townsend writes were known as and recognised themselves as being Dissenters or Nonconformists. They dissented from this or that feature of the Church as established, and refused to conform to its worship. Only very gradually and finally with some debt to French Revolutionary ideas did they formulate explicitly the "principle" of the "Free" Church as one of universal application. In 1844 began the attack on the Establishment under the name of the Anti-State-Church Society which later assumed the more ambiguous title of Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Patronage and Control; and by 1884 it was confidently expected that disestablishment would soon be achieved. Dr Townsend's chapter on The Dilemma of the State Church reveals that the dilemma now confronts the leaders of the Free Churches no less than those of the Church of England. The problem is complicated for both by the existence within the Church of England of the strong and influential Anglo-Catholic party. Dr Townsend favours the American solution and points to the experience of Ireland and Wales in its support. Here again may be "the only practicable solution", which, however, might only preclude the search for a better in a Church, Free, National and Ecumenical. The English genius for "comprehension" may not yet be exhausted.

Dr Townsend is obviously most at home and at his best when he is describing the Free Church contribution to the liberalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the rise of political democracy in its British form, to national and undenominational education, to social amelioration and reform. Here most convincingly he presses his claim to the gratitude of us all, which will be accorded without stint. But withal there arises a question: can the Church without skaith identify itself with a political party? At any rate the gratitude of political parties to their ecclesiastical allies is apt to be evanescent.

Dr Townsend's book by its title challenges comparison with the Archbishop of York's recent *Claims of the Church of England*. The comparison must be left to Englishmen to make. But an outsider cannot but observe that Dr Garbett has a modest section on *The Recovery of the Church*. Dr Townsend seems to suggest that Free Church optimism reached its peak in 1884.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah: an Historical and Critical Study. By CHRISTOPHER R. NORTH. Oxford University Press. pp. viii + 247. 15s.

IN 1941 Professor North whetted the appetite of his fellow-scholars

by the publication of an article which appeared in February and March numbers of the *Expository Times* of that year. This article not only contained a most valuable survey of the multifarious theories which had been put forward regarding the identity of the Servant of the Lord in Isaiah 1.3 and the related poems but advocated a return to a form of the Messianic interpretation. It became known that Professor North had in preparation a large book in which he would expound in detail the views put forward in what we may call the "trailer". Difficulties of publication delayed the appearance of the book till some years after the end of the War, but, when it was at last published, it was at once recognised that it had been eminently worth waiting for. It is in fact one of the most comprehensive studies of the problem with which it deals ever written. The bibliography is probably the most complete in existence and the documentation throughout is perfect. The industry of the author and the skill he has shown in handling his refractory material are beyond praise. It can be confidently maintained that for the Old Testament scholar this is one of the books which really deserve the application of the adjective "indispensable". Professor North has placed all his colleagues and indeed all serious students of the Old Testament deeply in his debt, irrespectively of whether they do or do not accept the interpretation of the evidence which he advocates. The book does not make easy reading, because the question at issue is a most complicated one and there is nothing superficial about the way in which it is handled. The author has certainly earned his right to an opinion.

The book is divided into two main parts, the first containing an elaborate historical survey of the various views about the Servant from the earliest times right down to the present day, the second containing the author's own critical study of the text, a statistical enquiry designed to demonstrate that the songs may well be the work of the Second Isaiah himself, a criticism of other views and the author's own positive contribution.

In the historical survey it is made clear that the three most important dates to remember are 1789 when Döderlein broke away from the traditional Messianic interpretation, 1892 when Duhm put forward his "leprous rabbi" theory and greatly reinforced the individual interpretation, and 1921 when Mowinckel suggested the autobiographical theory, a theory he was to abandon himself ten years later. Since 1921 perhaps the most important contributions to the discussion have been those made independently by the late Principal Wheeler Robinson and by Professor Eissfeldt who advocated a form of the collective theory of the servant which made use of the concept of "corporate personality" borrowed from the writings

of the sociologists Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim. These scholars did much to strengthen the collective interpretation, which, maintained by a whole succession of scholars in Germany, had won a large measure of support from well-known scholars in this country (e.g. Driver, Davidson, Peake, Skinner), though there were differences in the way in which they presented it. The majority of Continental scholars who dealt with the subject, apart from those who adhered to the traditional orthodox view, exhausted their ingenuity by putting forward every conceivable variety of the individual interpretation.

Professor North marshals all the conflicting theories with admirable clarity and no one could ask for more fairness or objectivity than is shown in the presentation of the views of each several author. If, when one lays the book down, one is still left with a confused picture in one's mind, this is not Professor North's fault, but is due to the complexity of the question and the extraordinary variety of the solutions which have been proposed. One might well be excused for succumbing to an overpowering sense of the hopelessness of the problem. That, however, is not Professor North's reaction. He feels that the various individual interpretations by their very number tend to cancel each other out. The most attractive of them, the so-called autobiographical theory, contains a measure of truth, since, whatever view one takes, it must be recognised that the author is in part indebted to his own experience. In the form, however, in which it has been advocated by Elliger and, in his ultimate view, by Sellin, it is seen to rest on unsure foundations. The collective view, especially as maintained by Wheeler Robinson and Eissfeldt is undoubtedly attractive and it likewise has in it a measure of truth. Wheeler Robinson, however, conceives of the expansion and contraction involved in his theory of corporate personality—systole and diastole are the terms used by Eissfeldt—as having the empirical Israel and the prophet himself as its two poles. He does not seem to have considered the possibility that the two poles might be Israel and the Messiah.

In modern times the Messianic view enjoyed the powerful advocacy of Gressmann, who rejected Rudolph's opinion that the Servant was an unknown contemporary of the Prophet whom he expected to be the Messiah, and maintained that the Second Isaiah had created a new Messianic ideal, that of a supernatural being who was about to come in the not too distant future. During the Exile the older political conception of the Messiah almost faded out and was replaced by the thought of a Messiah who would suffer a martyr death. Professor North also gives high praise to the work of the Roman Catholic scholar Fischer whose treatment he characterises as "in some ways the most objective that the subject has ever received."

Professor North comes down quite decisively on the side of the Messianic interpretation, holding that the Servant was one who should come and that "the songs are myth—provisional or anticipated history—not allegory". The hope of the Messiah—a suffering Messiah—was awakened by the circumstances of the Prophet's time. "The Songs", he says, "are quite evidently born of an intense anguish of soul, anguish such as the Prophet must have experienced when Cyrus, whom he had expected to be a kind of first-fruits of Yahwism among the Gentiles, proclaimed instead his enthusiasm for Bel-Marduk." But, while voting for the Messianic interpretation, Professor North quotes with approval Bentzen's statement—"The Servant of Yahweh is at once the Messiah, and Israel, and Deutero-Isaiah, and his circle." It appears, therefore, that he concedes the relative truth both of the collective theory and of the autobiographic relative truth both of the collective theory and of the autobiographical theory.

It is interesting to note that a Messianic view of the Servant appears in the work of two Swedish scholars, Engnell and Nyberg, who link up the Tammuz-Adonis liturgy with the kingship in Israel and consider that "the sufferings of the king" played an important part in Israelite ritual. Further, in his book *Jesus the Messiah*, a New Testament scholar, Professor W. Manson, argues that the Servant is a Messianic figure in whom the element of suffering is prominent.

The reviewer's own sympathies are with a Messianic interpretation of the Servant songs, which seems to be the best hypothesis in view of all the evidence. But there is a further point of some theological importance which seems worth making. Professor North says: "The Prophet can hardly have been blind to the inadequacy of his own people to be the perfect Servant of Yahweh. Nor was he. This is quite clear from what he says about them, even if we regard as later insertions those passages in the book which depict them in the darkest colours. After all, no nation, or, for that matter, no religious community, ever has acted, or perhaps ever can act, as the Servant does in the last Song; and the Prophet was realist enough to know it. Cyrus failed. Israel failed." That is no doubt quite true, and yet must we not believe that the lineaments of the Servant were in part at least suggested by things which the Prophet had seen and experienced in the community to which he belonged? He made, indeed, a great leap of faith when he looked forward to the realisation of an ideal in the figure of One who should come, but the Israel to which the Prophet belonged was not just an Israel that had failed. It had produced men like Moses and Jeremiah and the Prophet himself and all the humble folk of whom we seldom

hear, but from whose lives were distilled the colours with which the ideal was painted.

NORMAN W. PORTEOUS

The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel. By Professor AUBREY R. JOHNSON, PH.D., Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1949. 6s.

PROFESSOR JOHNSON has already put Old Testament scholars in his debt by his *The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God* (1942), *The Cultic Prophet in Ancient Israel* (1944), as well as by his articles in various periodicals. He now offers to us another monograph of great interest, giving intimation that it is the first of a series which will serve by way of a prolegomena to a systematic Biblical Theology.

The present monograph is concerned to show "that in Israelite thought, man is conceived, not so much in dual fashion as 'body' and 'soul', but synthetically as a unit of vital power or (in current terminology) a psycho-physical organism" (p. 88). The method by which this view is supported is a detailed examination of the Hebrew words which connote the endowments and the principal organs of the human body, through which man functions as a human being, expresses his thoughts and emotions, and carries out his purposes. It is shown that many of these terms have not only a physical but also a psychical reference. Thus *nephesh* signifies the life-principle or life-force in a human being which can be weakened by hunger or oppression, and strengthened by sympathy or joy; in association with a possessive adjective, it can have the value of the corresponding personal pronoun (i.e. my *nephesh*—I). But it can also signify physical appetite and seems originally to have designated the throat as the organ of expansion. To maintain, however, that *nephesh* may have a volitional aspect also, using as evidence such a verse as Deut. 21.14: "If a man lose interest in a captive woman whom he has made his wife, he may not sell her as a slave but must let her go as she will (*lenaphshah*)" is doubtful. In *lenaphshah* we can readily see an example of *dativus commodi*, i.e. he must let her go for the sake of her *nephesh* or, in other words, lest she suffer from an unduly restricted and impoverished way of life. It is acknowledged that according to the Hebrew mode of expression, volition is indicated by *ruach* rather than by *nephesh*.

Ruach itself, which indicates human energy or life-spirit and has so wide a reference that, "it seems to have been possible to resort to it as a means of expressing the whole range of man's emotional, intellectual and volitional life" (p. 34), and was used also of the

Spirit of God, originally meant breath or wind in a plainly physical sense.

It is true that in the use of such terms, the Hebrew conception of man as a psycho-physical organic unit, is elucidated but the phrase within brackets in the following quotation does not express that truth in the most felicitous way: "it is in one's own essential *ruach* (with all that this involves in the grasping of a totality and the exercise of self-control) that the forceful and indeed purposeful individual is revealed" (p. 37).

But the Hebrews, like other peoples, were aware of the manifestations of psycho-physical parallelism. They knew that psychical functions have close physical associations. For that reason the state or condition of one organ of the body may be used by synecdoche to describe the state or condition of the whole. So the Hebrews could speak of a hard forehead, of lofty eyes or darkened face, of smooth tongue, of crooked lips or of discriminating ears. Professor Johnson, while he maintains that, "the various members and secretions of the body, such as the bones, the heart, the bowels and the kidneys, as well as the flesh and the blood, can all be thought of as revealing psychical properties" (p. 88), yet will not accept the category of "diffusion of consciousness" as advocated by the late Principal H. Wheeler Robinson. What he seeks to maintain is that these organs reveal or reflect, they do not possess, psychical properties; and they reveal or reflect such properties because of their functional relation to the *nephesh* or *ruach*. The ideal state of human well-being is commonly described in the Old Testament as "life"; that sometimes meant simply length of days. But as Israelite thought developed, so the connotation of that term changed until it came to signify the fulness of life which God gives to those who live in fellowship with Him.

The present monograph, therefore, is substantially a psychological study of man according to the relevant Hebrew terminology of the Old Testament, and it is for that reason a contribution to the Old Testament doctrine of man. It is a detailed study in Semantics, carefully and copiously annotated and documented; and it is a notable sign of contemporary biblical scholarship that, as scholars like S. R. Driver and D. Winton Thomas are engaged in the study of Semantics in Semitic languages in general, so Snaith, the present author and others are engaged in a similar study with a specialist theological interest. This fundamental theological investigation is work of very great value. The only fear one may have is that a scholar may so exhaust himself in the detailed research involved in it that he may not in the end have the time or the energy for the systematic theology for which this investigation is a preliminary.

One may hope, therefore, that Professor Johnson may have length of days that he may be able to fulfil his task.

JOHN MAUCHLINE

Pascal and Kierkegaard: a Study in the Strategy of Evangelism. By DENZIL G. M. PATRICK, M.A., PH.D. 2 vols. Lutterworth.

PASCAL and Kierkegaard stand out from the general run of the great thinkers of Europe in much the same way as "rogues" stand out from the other potato plants in a field. One cannot insert the name of either in a list made up of, say Bacon, Descartes, Locke and Hegel, without feeling as if one were preparing a "spot the non-homogeneous term" question of the type so dear to compilers of intelligence tests. What makes Pascal and Kierkegaard a minority of two among the outstanding figures of Western thought is, according to Dr Patrick, "that they are united in affirming the impotence of abstract thought to deal with the basic problems of life, and the need for man to enter into a living personal relationship with transcendent reality in order to know it at all" (Vol. II, p. 344). That being so, it is not surprising that those whose thoughts have been guided by other masters less diffident about the capacities of the abstract intellect, should find the two men strange and not wholly sympathetic figures. Even so eminent and appreciative a critic as Professor Clement Webb could deny to Pascal the status of a great philosopher because he did not have "that primary interest in speculation on the ultimate structure of reality, for the mere sake of knowing what it is, which we nowadays take to be the peculiar qualification of the philosopher in the strict and proper sense of the word" (*Pascal's Philsophy of Religion*, quoted Vol. I, p. 216 n.). As for Kierkegaard, it was until the last decade possible to complete an Honours course in Philosophy at a British University without even having heard of him.

Dr Patrick's estimate of these two thinkers is a very different one. It is his conviction that Pascal and Kierkegaard are to be regarded, "not as odd subjectivists, whose thought is an unimportant marginal note in the history of European thought, but as representatives of a perennial concern of the human spirit to which the dominant current of modern European thought has provided no satisfaction" (Vol. II, p. 351). Such a conviction must be taken seriously by all who share Dr Patrick's belief that the present age marks the end of the Renaissance, and indeed by all who see in man's ability to discover, and inability to be trusted with, the atomic bomb, a chastening commentary on the merely intellectual approach to reality.

Dr Patrick's general sympathy with the standpoint of Pascal and

Kierkegaard does not mean that he is blind to their failings. He does not acquit Pascal of morbidity and of a certain amount of intellectual arrogance (which can apparently come out even in those who see the limitations of the purely intellectual approach to reality!). And, as we would expect from one who did so much service for the Ecumenical Movement, he deplores Kierkegaard's excessively individualistic Christianity. But in the main, his verdict on these two great and often unhappy men is marked by the charity which springs from real understanding. That there is an abnormal side to Kierkegaard, Dr Patrick does not, of course, deny. But he refuses to interpret even the final outburst against the Church in merely pathological terms. His treatment is in refreshing contrast to that of those whose approach is purely psycho-analytic and whose grasp of Kierkegaard's neuroticism enables them to explain everything about him except the not unimportant fact that, unlike most neurotics—and indeed, unlike most psycho-analysts—he was able to write masterpieces.

Equally commendable are the studies of the intellectual climate of seventeenth-century France and nineteenth-century Denmark which precede and enrich the two biographical portraits. They are the more valuable in that each of the two thinkers was essentially a man of his time, speaking to its special needs, sins and follies, and therefore cannot be adequately understood apart from it. Dr Patrick draws a parallel between the two periods and the two countries. In Kierkegaard's life, Hegel, the Romantics and the Danish Church filled the roles that were respectively played in Pascal's by Descartes, Montaigne and the Jesuits.

Suggestive, too, are the comparisons which Dr Patrick makes of the two men, the one a Catholic, whose doctrine of grace could at least be accused of being Calvinist, the other a Protestant with a most un-Lutherlike regard for the Epistle of James. Each of the two was an intellectual giant—and knew it! Each identified discipleship and suffering. Each distinguished the winning of men from the bringing forward of intellectual proofs on the one hand and the psychological conditioning of minds on the other, and so each summoned men to decision. (Dr Patrick draws an interesting comparison between the Wager Argument of Pascal—not, he considers without Biblical support in Luke 9.25!—and Kierkegaard's call for existential decision.) It follows that each is an exponent of that true Apologetics which brings men to Christ, strips them of their pretences, and then leaves them to decide. Again both men were profoundly and inwardly conscious of the Fall and what it entailed. Finally and not least there is the point that each possessed that hall mark of real greatness which lies in the ability to warn men

of evils yet to come. Of Pascal Dr Patrick says: "In the midst of the seventeenth century, he foresaw, and did his utmost to prepare men's hearts and minds, for the great crisis through which Christianity was to pass in the age of the so-called Enlightenment" (Vol. I, p. 221). Surely it is equally true to say of Kierkegaard that in the midst of the nineteenth century, he foresaw, and did his utmost to prepare men's hearts and minds for the crisis of the Third Reich, when, if ever, the crowd was untruth.

With all their resemblances the two men differed in two main respects. The first is illustrated most dramatically by their behaviour on their deathbeds. Just before he died, Pascal received the Sacrament for which he had begged for several days. But the dying Kierkegaard, refusing to accept Communion when ministered by one of those whom he called royal officials, and, unable to receive it at the hands of a layman, chose deliberately to depart without it. Ultimately, as Dr Patrick points out, for Pascal the history of the Church was the history of the truth and for Kierkegaard it was not. In addition the two men differed in their attitude toward reason and its place in apologetics. With Pascal there is nothing of the crucifixion of reason. His Wager Argument may involve the existential decision of faith but it also involves the mathematician's rational consideration of probabilities that plays its part in the not-so-existential decisions of the filler-in of football coupons.

As the sub-title of the book indicates, Dr Patrick insists that both Pascal and Kierkegaard must be considered primarily as evangelists, and he has no sympathy with the attempt to interpret either in terms of an atheistic existentialism. His justification for such a standpoint follows not only from the fact that religion was the dominant interest in the life of both men, but also from what he claims to be the essentially Biblical basis of their thinking. Thus Dr Patrick points out that when Pascal talks about truths being known by the heart, and not by the reason, such phraseology does not mean that feeling has the primacy over the intellect but that man's personality as a whole is involved in his apprehension of truth in any ultimate form. That, however, does not mean that he is a modern existentialist born out of due season, but simply that his conception of the heart is taken from the Biblical usage of the term. Dr Patrick claims that Kierkegaard's thought has a like Biblical basis. One wonders here if he has recognised sufficiently that Kierkegaard's exegesis of Scripture, while often brilliant and always exciting, is sometimes unreliable—Dr Bultmann, for instance, in his commentary on St. John's Gospel, criticises Kierkegaard's portrait of Nicodemus. But with Dr Patrick's contention that Kierkegaard is essentially a Christian thinker, there can, of course, be no disagreement.

To conclude, the work is an able and well balanced study of two outstanding and unusual thinkers. Its merits lie in its careful portrayal of the periods in which Pascal and Kierkegaard lived, in its balanced and sympathetic study of their lives, and in its treatment of their thought as a whole. As a detailed commentary on the individual books of Kierkegaard, it is less successful, Dr Patrick having perhaps carried to excess the advice that the best way to interpret an author is to let him speak for himself. The result is that in this part of the book one often has the feeling that Dr Patrick has substituted quotation for the penetrating and illuminating comment he was so well fitted to give. But one's last words must be of thankfulness that in the midst of so busy a life he found time to write so much of value on this theme, and of profound regret that he will write no more. IAN HENDERSON

The Theology of F. D. Maurice. By ALEC R. VIDLER, D.D. S.C.M. Press, 1948. 8s. 6d.

AMONG the rediscoveries of our time none is of greater importance than that of Frederick Denison Maurice. To his contemporaries he was a baffling figure. Some found his thought confused and obscure, and his writings verbose and tedious. To others, his championship of Christian Socialism seemed a dangerous quixotry, and the theological integrity which cost him his Chair at King's College, London, nothing more than perverse obstinacy. None, if they knew him, denied his greatness of character, his humility, and his intense love for the poor, the suffering and the downtrodden, but few appreciated his true intellectual and spiritual stature. Posterity, however, has accorded him an ample vindication, and the reputation which even one so discerning as Dr J. B. Mozley had likened to a house of cards, destined to collapse at the least touch, has been steadily increasing.

Dr Vidler has provided us with a most lucid, faithful and authoritative exposition of his theology. Considering the number and character of Maurice's works, this study is no mean achievement. No one acquainted with them can help sympathising with those of his contemporaries who found them difficult and uncongenial. For this, two factors in particular were responsible: he wrote, as Dr Vidler points out, "*ad hoc* and *ad hominem*", yet all the time under circumstances hardly conducive to a fluent style and an attractive presentation of his material—there was no sympathetic public to which he could address himself, and his critics and opponents were always waiting to attack. It is all the more valuable, therefore, to have in these lectures so clear and compact a survey of his thought and teaching, skilfully illustrated by copious extracts from over forty of his published works.

From first to last, Maurice was in the strictest sense a theologian, His vocation, he said, was "not to build, but to dig"—to discover, that is, the basic principles of social law and order which were rooted in the divine purpose for mankind—but it was also, at the same time, to look upward to the living God, and to bear witness to Him and to interpret Him as He speaks and acts. The theologian's task was simply "to reflect earnestly upon what was happening in the world, and to ask what God was doing and saying in the events of his own time"; it was not to erect systems—a tendency which Maurice deplored and warned against, though he greatly valued method, logic and order in theology. Indeed, he regarded Bible, Church, Creeds and Prayer Book, not as "propounding a system or furnishing materials for system-building", but rather as "man's great protection against systems". Hence he never allowed himself to be diverted from what he considered to be the principal business of the theologian, and this gives his teaching a remarkable consistency. Though in this respect Maurice was truly original, taking nothing at second-hand, testing everything and making it his own, he disclaimed any pretension to novelty in the vulgar sense; his thought was thoroughly Biblical, and he readily acknowledged his indebtedness to Plato, and to Coleridge and Erskine of Linlathen among his contemporaries.

Maurice's name is still associated principally with the beginnings of the Christian Socialist movement, and with the controversy concerning eternal life; but Dr Vidler shows that his real significance is not to be sought in either connexion. It lies rather in a new theological emphasis. In the thought and preaching of his day Maurice felt that there was a wholly disproportionate stress upon sin and human depravity. "The Fall of Man", he wrote, "is commonly regarded . . . as the foundation of Theology—the Incarnation and Death of our Lord as provisions against the effect of it", whereas "St. Paul speaks of the Mystery of Christ as the *ground* of all things in Heaven and Earth, the History as the gradual discovery or revelation of this ground". He set himself, therefore, to redress the balance by basing his theology, not upon fallen and sinful man, but upon the God of all grace; not upon the Fall, but upon Redemption. The central truth of the Christian religion, he asserted, was that Christ is the Head and King of the whole human race, and that in him all mankind had been both created and redeemed. That men continued in sin was simply because they rejected or ignored their essential relation to God in Christ, and attempted to live apart from and independently of Him, whereas the truth is "that every man is in Christ; the condemnation of every man is, that he will not own the truth; he will not *act* as if this were *true*, he will not believe that

which is the truth, that, except he were joined to Christ, he could not think, breathe, live a single hour".

This cardinal principle of the universal sovereignty and headship of Christ "in", "through", and "unto" whom (Col. 1.16) all things have been created, and in whom all things cohere, governed and conditioned all Maurice's thinking. His desire was "to ground all theology upon the Name of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; not to begin from ourselves and our sins; not to measure the straight line by the crooked one"—a method he learnt from the Bible, wherein "everything proceeds from God". Thus, election and predestination were to be understood, not in a negative, exclusive, individualistic way, but as signifying the good pleasure of the Father "to restore the race itself to its foreordained state by incorporating its members in the body of which Christ is the Head", and Justification meant that "we are justified by the fact that Christ is the Head of our race, not by our belief in the fact".

Having expounded this dominant idea of the sovereignty and headship of Christ, Dr Vidler devotes the rest of his lectures to an examination of the way Maurice worked it out with reference to the Church, the Sacraments, the Bible, and politics, and shows how important a bearing it had upon his interpretation of Christian doctrine and his conception of Christian institutions and the Christian life. But no one who reads these lectures carefully and sympathetically will fail to see that they are more than a study of the thought of an original Victorian theologian. We are forced inescapably to the conviction that in Maurice's great idea of Christ the King and Head of the race we have a seminal principle which, if taken seriously, must radically affect our attitude to many of the ecclesiastical, social and political questions of our time—indeed, Dr Vidler repeatedly draws attention to the contemporary relevance of Maurice's teaching. Into the full range of its interpretation and application it is impossible to go here, but it may be illustrated with reference to one or two selected topics.

In his theory of politics Maurice began by insisting that it was wrong to think of the nation as a secular thing; it was one of the forms in which human society was constituted by the will of God, who had in fact manifested Himself first through a family, and then through a particular nation, and finally through the divine Society which transcends national confines, though it does not dissolve national bonds. Every nation, in his view, had a holy calling, and national unity, integrity, and distinctness was necessary for the preservation of a living faith in God. In particular, he saw nothing anomalous in a National Church. Both Church and State were established by God to accomplish the ends of His providence, and

there was between them a true reciprocal relation. An established Church (in the proper sense) was not comparable with the Christian Church under Constantine and his successors—the arrangement in that case was simply an alliance between Church and Empire. Its rationale was to be sought, rather, in the "eternal connexion between the law, which is embodied in the State, and the religious, life-giving principle which is embodied in the Church"; the office of the State corresponded to that of the Law, and the office of the Church to that of the Gospel, and both were complementary. A National Church bore witness to "the idea of a spiritual polity for each nation", and served as a bulwark against both sectarianism and Romanist super-nationalism, Maurice's conception of the nature of the State and of the character of its relation with the Church was based upon the conviction that the State was appointed by God "as His minister for dealing with the outward formal, visible conduct of men", and for maintaining the law, order, and justice which are rooted in the divine will for society. At a time when the old ideas of the State are tending to disappear, and Christians are being compelled to make up their minds about new ones, it is likely that Maurice will have much to teach us about the nature and function of the State in the purpose of God, and about the relation in which it should stand to the Church.

About another topic under discussion at present, Maurice had something to say. He rebelled against all sectarian conceptions of the Church. A sect was simply a voluntary society, grounded on the will and belief of men, existing to propagate as the full truth its own partial insights; the Church, on the other hand, was called into being by God, grounded on His will, and represented the unity of the race in Christ its Head. The ordained ministry in the Church was therefore a sign that there is an order and constitution for mankind: that certain men are taken into a special, settled relation with Christ through His choice of them signified to the whole body of the Church that upon such relations its life depends. It signified also the principle upon which human society itself is constituted—the paradox that the chief of all must be the servant of all; that the relation of the ruler to the governed must be one of sacrificial service. Further, the calling and commission of the ordained ministry signified to all men that each person's work ought to be regarded as a vocation, the nature of which it was the office of the minister to interpret in terms of his understanding of the meaning of vocation by God. As to the constitution of the ministry, Maurice held that the apostolate was the original and characteristic office in the Church, and the root of all orders therein. Out of the apostolate the different orders evolved, but he considered that much of the controversy concerning the min-

istry was irrelevent. The essential question was, "whether there was or was not to be continued in the Church any office corresponding in its essential characteristics to that one which we judge from the New Testament to be the distinguishing one of the Church at its foundation". He found in the Episcopate the "main constituent" of the Church's polity, since "the Succession and Consecration of Bishops are the witnesses of [Christ's] permanent and present Government", and the Bishops themselves the "representatives of Christ's universal kingdom". Episcopal succession itself, about which so much misunderstanding exists, he regarded as an important witness to the permanence of the Church's constitution, and to the perpetuation of the gifts and authority with which the apostolate was endowed. It will be appreciated that we have here a view of the most controverted question concerning the ministry which differs from some of the theories which are being advanced to-day, and deserves serious attention.

Finally, Maurice has something to teach both Anglicans and non-Anglicans about Anglicanism. His dislike of sectarianism has already been mentioned, and he maintained that the great deliverance from it, the God-given way in which fragmentary apprehensions of the truth were to be unified and apparent contradictions reconciled, was through "the idea of a Church Universal, founded upon men's relationship to God in Christ, and not on the particular truths that they had succeeded in grasping". To this it was the vocation of Anglicanism to witness. In relation to other denominations, the Anglican Church was not, and ought not to be seen as, "a competitor in the provision of religious systems", but rather as "a witness to man's deliverance from them". Anglicanism was not the product of a single divine, nor of a party or movement, nor of a confession or system of divinity. Nor did it stand on "an invisible equatorial line between Romanism and Protestantism", half Catholic, half Protestant. It is all too easy to see Anglicanism, and to acquiesce in it, as a compromise, even a Laodicean compromise, whereas in fact it is the expression of the tension which must result from any search for the whole truth. Maurice insisted that for this very reason it was the calling of the Anglican Church to point men away from systems to the discovery of those positive principles which underlay all divergent ecclesiastical institutions, and to the divine society in which those principles were embodied. For this reason worship and the sacraments were put before doctrinal definitions; while other denominations aimed at dogmatic uniformity, combined with freedom of liturgical expression, the Anglican Church preferred to secure uniformity in those acts which directly connect man with God, through the Book of Common Prayer, allowing a diversity of

opinions while preserving the fellowship of worship. Within Anglicanism, Maurice welcomed movements of thought and even the emergence of different groups, but he strongly opposed their organisation into parties, all of which simply presented one side or fragment of the truth. It may be thought that Maurice's abhorrence of parties was something of an obsession, and his own "non-party" role idealistic rather than practical, but none can contemplate the history of the Anglican Church during the last hundred years without realising that in principle he was absolutely right. Moreover, while maintaining his own position and prepared to defend any minority or individual against attack, he was no advocate of a "non-party party". If he felt that Anglicanism had vital principles to which to bear witness among the Christian Churches, he showed at the same time to individual Anglicans (and perhaps not to them only) a more excellent way amid the bickerings and obscurities of party strife and claims.

Within the compass of a review, justice cannot be done to Maurice's importance, nor to the admirable way in which his teaching has been arranged and presented by Dr Vidler. But it is hoped that enough has been said to show that Maurice is a thinker to be reckoned with, and that this is a book to be read by all who are concerned with the ecclesiastical, political and social questions of our day. If they read Dr Vidler's lectures, it is certain that they will not stop there, but, like the reviewer, find themselves again and again being guided by the footnotes to Maurice's own works, to examine and reflect upon his arguments.

SHERWIN BAILEY

The Sayings of Jesus. By T. W. MANSON, D.D., D.LITT. S.C.M. Press 21s.

THERE is something both timely and relevant in Professor Donald Baillie's shrewd conclusion in what is probably the most impressive contribution to Christological study for a generation, his *God was in Christ*; his conclusion that, "I cannot believe that there is any good reason for the defeatism of those who give up all hope of penetrating the tradition and reaching an assured knowledge of the historical personality of Jesus. Surely such defeatism is a transient nightmare of Gospel criticism, from which we are now awakening to a more sober confidence in our quest of the Jesus of history." The violent reaction against any interest in, far less any idea of finding, a Jesus of history has moderated, and most balanced theological thinking is interested again in the great Historical Teacher of First Century Palestine. This change of mood alone, apart from the intrinsic excellence of the volume, assures a warm welcome to the reprinting of

The Sayings of Jesus, by Dr T. W. Manson, originally published twelve years ago as Part II of *The Mission and Message of Jesus*, the combined work of Dr H. D. A. Major, Dr C. J. Wright, and Dr T. W. Manson. Now with a very few alterations *The Sayings of Jesus* has been re-issued by the S.C.M. Press in a most pleasing and useful lay-out. The student should note the Addenda to the Bibliography, indicating how Gospel scholarship has advanced in the past twelve years.

Apart from being a very helpful commentary on much of the material in the Gospels, this book is a very useful synopsis of the teaching of Jesus, printed in a readable and accessible form in the text of the English Revised Version. Reference numbers to the Eighth Revised Edition of Huck's *Synopse* are included which makes this setting of the English text of particular use to the careful student of the Greek text.

A short Introduction provides a clear summary of the present generally accepted critical position in regard to the teaching matter in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. In contrast to the "pronouncement-stories" which have attracted the particular notice of the *Formgeschichte* critics, stands the teaching material presented by Q, M and L, which consists mainly of "deliberate religious and moral instruction which can be understood by itself without any narrative context" (p. 29). Dr Manson deals very helpfully with "our Lord's use of poetic form and His practice of teaching in parables" (p.30 ff.).

The Sayings of Jesus, then, is a very fine commentary on a large part of the Gospel text. But there are disappointments. The commentary on such a key passage as St. Matthew 11.25-27, is inadequate. The writer seems too preoccupied with literary and textual concerns; and his attempt to establish the original Aramaic verse-form of this saying is unconvincing. Does one trace regret in his "there is no good reason for doubting its authenticity", when the author fails to attempt any adequate theological or doctrinal treatment of this vital saying of our Lord?

Yet, the writer shows himself a real disciple of the Master, as, for example, when he comments on Matt. 10.34-36: "In these lines we see the desperate tension in the kindest of all hearts between His own tenderness and the hardness of His task" (p. 120).

As a critic, Dr Manson is at times startling, but his care and thoroughness are most impressive. With great exactitude and penetration he critically examines the passage dealing with the place of Peter in the Church, Matt. 16.17-19, and he comes to the conclusion that, "we should not regard the saying as a genuine utterance of Jesus" (p. 203). He regards this saying as of Palestinian origin, and current when a church was already established at Corinth with Paul

contending for the apostolicity of his ministry in face of the absurd claims of the Petrine party (cf. 1 Cor. 4.15, etc.). The scholarly examination of this saying is a reminder of the inadequate scriptural foundation upon which Romanist and Papal claims rest.

This is a book which one would like to see being put into the hands of every divinity student. Let the student of the Gospels carefully examine *The Sayings of Jesus* with the help and guidance of such as Dr Manson, before being tempted to adopt any extreme and over-assertive theological or ecclesiastical position. This commentary brings us into the presence of Jesus, the Teacher, and as Principal Curtis reminded us in his admirable study of *Jesus Christ the Teacher*, "the time is opportune and urgent for a fresh and far-reaching exploration of the mind of Jesus. The Church and the world are both with good reason in a chastened frame of mind."

In an impressive Epilogue to his reprinted volume, Dr Manson concludes: "It is probable that the key to the teaching and the ministry of Jesus, and indeed to the whole New Testament, lies in a single phrase, which expresses, as perfectly as words can, the supreme interest of our Lord, that for which He lived and died, for which He endured hardship, loneliness, and obloquy, that to which He gave His whole undivided devotion—not 'the Law and the Prophets', not 'the Kingdom of our father David', but 'the Kingdom of my Father' " (p. 345).

R. Stuart Louden

Die Begründung der Mission in der katholischen und evangelischen Missionswissenschaft. By Hans Schärer. Evangelischer Verlag, Zürich. 3s.

This little book (43 pages) by the late missionary in Borneo has an importance which cannot easily be overestimated. In some ways it forms a doctrinal counterpart to the more narrative and practical *Missionarische Verkündigung auf dem Missionsfeld* (reviewed in this Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1).

The author's purpose is briefly but comprehensively to set out and to compare the doctrine of the basis of Christian missions, as held, firstly, by Roman Catholicism (represented chiefly by Schmidlin and Ohm) and, secondly, by modern Protestantism (in the basic work of Gustav Warneck). Immediately it becomes apparent that a very large degree of similarity exists between the two. The Romanist Schmidlin finds no difficulty in admitting his indebtedness to the Protestant Warneck even to the extent of large borrowings in matter and form. There is, in fact, no fundamental theological difference between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in their doctrine of missions; as Schmidlin himself says, they go hand in hand.

Wherein lies this agreement? Schärer finds it in the insistence of both parties that the basis of missions must be a double one; God's self-revelation, and so missionary theory and preaching, must all rest upon a foundation not only in God but also in men, not only in the Creator but also in the creature, not only in Christianity but also in heathenism. On the Roman Catholic side this takes the characteristic form of a double basis for missions, namely supernatural and natural. For the Protestant likewise missions must be based upon the grace of God on the one hand, and upon a faculty for God, a capacity for salvation, on the other. Both parties hold that but for this *habilitas ad gratiam* missions would be unthinkable. Christianity itself as the religion of the one true God bears the supremely distinctive qualities of absoluteness (an absoluteness which is not so absolute as to reject the degenerate heathen religions with their premonitions of God and their longings and strivings after Him) and of universality (i.e. a capacity for accommodating itself to all human situations). Missions are possible only because man has "a healthy remnant of his religious faculty", or the "last traces of the image of God in him", out of which he can bring a response to the new Christian message; God must have a bridgehead previously established in the nature of man.

Schärer in the final section of the book criticises this whole viewpoint which Roman Catholicism and Protestantism could so significantly share, and insists that for a truly Reformed faith a double basis for missions is impossible. For it a basis for missions can be found only in the revelation of Jesus Christ, which by its absoluteness excludes all other "knowledge about God". This revelation is not the climax or fulfilment of what heathen religions may possess in premonitions of God or in intact orders of creation. Heathenism is not something with two sides, one turned towards God and the other away from Him, but is totally contrary to Him. The religious longings of heathenism, of which so much has been made, are to be understood as a *part within* the complete and closed system of a religious *Weltanschauung*, and they find their fulfilment *within* that system, not outside of it in the Christian faith. (This is confirmed from experience in Borneo, where the Dyak can make room even for Jesus Christ as a *part* of the totality of his own religious system.)

It is fatal to hold that the absoluteness of the Christian faith consists in its monotheistic nature. This idea has resulted in great helplessness in the face of Islam and Judaism. And above all, Schärer holds, Reformed theology must abandon all thoughts of "bridgeheads in the nature of man", of the capacity to receive salvation, of the point of connexion for God's grace in the human soul.

This insistence on the non-existence of "points of connexion"

has often been castigated in this country as academic and scholastic; but it is, very likely, in the sphere of missionary theology that the practical importance of it will be shown. If any should fear that Schärer's opinion must lead to a loveless inhumanity towards man, let him notice in Schärer's other work (mentioned above) how deep in fact is his true sympathy and love for the Dyak, how profound his insight into the Dyak's religion. This book, while in no sense claiming finality as a dogmatic treatise, clearly indicates how necessary it will be for a truly Reformed doctrine of missions to depart from the viewpoint of modern Protestantism with its plain inherent relatedness to the Thomistic and Romanist doctrine.

JAMES BARR

Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. By REIDAR THOMTE. Princeton University Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege. 228 pp. 18s.

THE whole of Kierkegaard's Works (with the exception of *The Concept of Irony*, his University thesis) is now available in English; likewise a selection of his Journals in one volume—though it should be remembered that the Journals fill eighteen volumes in the uncompleted Danish edition and include a great deal of highly interesting material which forms as it were the quarry out of which the works themselves were hewn.

It is much too early for the effect of this impressive corpus to be assessed: it will take a generation of theological and philosophical activity for this to be properly seen. One of the difficulties under which British philosophers and theologians at present labour is the rather casual and hotch-potch manner in which Continental thought is made available. We *ought* to have known Kierkegaard before we read Brunner who is so startlingly dependent on him (cf. especially *Training into Christianity* and *The Mediator*); and no one can possibly understand Barth who does not realise how intensely aware he is of Kierkegaard. (Barth once told me he had "gone through" Kierkegaard and then shaken him off and realised that this process had to happen to young theologians also.) Kierkegaard, of course, was available in German at least thirty years ago.

On the other hand we insular people, coming later to the waters of life, can avoid some of the perils of the early-comers. My English tutor once said that in Shakespearean studies the Germans spent an enormous amount of energy in confuting extremes of (German) Shakespearean scholarship; then the urbane English scholar steps in with a brilliant study in which he says the last word—for a time—having profited by the gigantic labours of his German colleagues.

What perils can we avoid in Kierkegaard studies? It is too much

to hope that monographs on this and that in S.K.'s life will remain on the unpublished Ph.D. shelves of the universities. And we must expect that S.K.'s *psyche* is fair game for the "objective" investigators. It is also a vain hope that people will prefer S.K.'s own books to books about him. But at least we may hope that the limit of such studies of S.K. will be traced as they are in this latest book: in other words, a sober, steady, dispassionate examination, with copious quotations, of what S.K. was really saying.

But when you consider that the substance of Kierkegaard's whole thought, what makes it "existential", to use his word, is the problem: How to become a Christian, and that all his work and living revolve round the perilous and exciting possibility of being changed, then perhaps you will be justified in asking: "Then why is Mr Thomte so sober?"

And I have no answer, except in another question: "Why is theology commonly so dull and unrelated to the passions and storm of (say) the weekly pastoral round—or any other round?" S.K. himself is not dull and unrelated to living. If Mr Thomte, with his carefully documented and conscientious exposition, can help some readers to the source in S.K.'s own work he will no doubt feel that his introduction is justified. It is at any rate the best general introduction in English that I have come across.

R. Gregor Smith

Winnington-Ingram. By S. C. Carpenter. Hodder & Stoughton. 20s.

This biography of Arthur Foley Winnington-Ingram, Bishop of London from 1901 until 1939, written by the Dean of Exeter, will do much to keep alive the memory of one who might otherwise be forgotten in a comparatively short time. The chapter entitled "Orthodoxy" shows clearly that he had little academic interest in the intellectual problems of his day, and a chapter called "The Christian Leader" makes it obvious that he had not the originality to lead the Church of England into new channels of action. Indeed without the aid of this character-study his greatness would soon have been forgotten, and his chances of remembrance much more remote than many of his ecclesiastical contemporaries.

He had an amazing capacity for extending true Christian sympathy to all sorts of people, and the gift of making friends quickly and easily. More important still, he had the power to preach the Gospel in terms easily understood by ordinary people, and above all he felt the divine call to evangelise. His neat explanation of the Love of God (printed in *Addresses to Working Lads*), and his direct challenge at the Northampton Church Congress in 1902, both

quoted in this biography, are excellent examples of good popular preaching.

This winning evangelism and his numerous friendships secured his popularity, but these are qualities which are apt to be remembered only so long as friends who were moved by his voice and character live. Fortunately the Bishop has been given a biographer who has successfully performed the difficult task of persuading those who come after that he (the Bishop) undoubtedly possessed these great gifts.

Inevitably there is a sameness about the description of Winnington-Ingram's activities. His good pastoral qualities appear at all points of his ministry, in a curacy, in the East End of London slums, in schools, at the Universities, with the Armed Forces, or on a World Tour. While this consistent portraiture often makes dull reading, yet it ensures that the reader grasps the essentials which made his episcopate in the world's largest city so fruitful for good.

Those who only knew the Bishop by hearsay in the latter years of his episcopate were familiar with two things connected with him —his tremendous physical capacity for playing games in his old age, and the widespread liturgical chaos which reigned in his diocese. These two factors are confirmed by the Dean's biography. Throughout the book we find him full of zeal for exercise of every kind, and this is particularly stressed in the chapter "Recreation". The liturgical chaos of his diocese is also portrayed in the most interesting chapter of the book, "The Anglo-Catholics and Prayer Book Revision", although the author thinks that those who skip it "will lose very little".

This biography, then, will be best appreciated by friends of the late Bishop or by those connected with Anglican affairs in the Diocese of London, yet all who are vitally concerned with the salvation of mankind through Christianity will find an example worthy of imitation. A more succinct account of the Bishop's life would probably have served the author's purpose better. It is asking a good deal to expect the majority of readers to be interested in some of the petty details of the book, such as the subjects which the Bishop took in very minor school examinations, or the scores of his tennis matches with Miss Wills.

Every reader will be grateful that the Dean has included in the first chapter an analysis of "The Spiritual Eye" taken from an unpublished fragment written towards the end of the Bishop's life, because more than any other citation in the book it shows the depth of his spiritual perception and conviction.

W. Eason Robinson

THE REAL CHURCH[1]

by Professor KARL BARTH

The word "Church" has in our day again become more significant and more powerful. In 1926 Otto Dibelius, then General Superintendent and now Bishop of Berlin, published a book under the title *The Church's Century*. By that was meant our twentieth century. The author was surely right in maintaining that the Church has been more talked about during the three decades since the First World War, which we have behind us, than in the whole of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries put together. Who would have dreamt about 1910, when the writings of Hermann Kutter were at their height, that this could happen? Perhaps this has something to do with the almost complete collapse of the political, economic and cultural shape of the old Europe, which began with the First World War and with which the question is closely related: whether it may not once again be given to the Church to save this old Europe, perhaps in a new form, as she helped to found it? In this respect the Roman Catholic Church seems to be in very good spirits and to raise many open and secret expectations. Her greatly improved position and her vigorous pushing forward in certain places is also a sign that the word "Church", even outside of her particular folds, has again come to the forefront of Christian consciousness and theological discussion. For it is undoubtedly part of her strength that she knows much better than anyone else how to give the impression that one is dealing with the Real Church when dealing with her. During the great crisis 1933-45, however, it was nevertheless true that there was in the Evangelical Churches, first in Germany, then in Holland and Norway, as well as in other countries, "demonstration of the Spirit and of power". This was neither to be overestimated nor underestimated, but was really rather unexpected everywhere. From it more than one inside and outside of this Church could see that the dissolution of the

[1] Lecture delivered in Miskolc, Debreccen, Budapest, Papa and Sopron, March and April, 1948. Translated by J. W. Edwards, Braunschweig, Kohlmarkt.

Evangelical Church was not as far advanced as one might on occasion have previously supposed. From a totally different side the idea is thus once again forced upon us that for nearly a quarter of a century we have had an ecumenical movement in which the weak Churches are encouraged to have more confidence in their own affairs through contact with really, or allegedly stronger, and in any case more self-conscious Churches. And finally it may well be that the abandonment by evangelical theology, at least in certain quarters, of the traditional liberalism and individualism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century fathers has helped to bring about a new understanding for the *communio sanctorum* and to turn the thoughts of many in this direction, in spite of the diverse way in which it brought about this change.

Now the more the Church is talked about to-day, the more necessary it is, if we are not to waste our time, for us to give an explanation of what the word and the concept really mean and denote. What really is the Church? What is the Real Church? That is the question which we should try to answer as simply and as centrally as possible.

I

The Real Church becomes visible because the power of the Holy Spirit enables her to step out of and shine through her hiddenness in ecclesiastical establishment, tradition and custom.

We begin with the question: How and where is the Real Church to be seen? According to the third article of the ancient creed, she belongs to those realities in which we Christians must believe. There it is laid down that we Christians actually see the Real Church, but only because we are able to do so through faith, not as one sees a state, in its citizens and authorities, laws and institutions. What one sees in faith one sees in the event of its revelation, as the object of faith steps out and shines forth. The believer has no power over it, and the only part he can have is that which is given to him. The Real Church is truly not invisible, but visible. She is, however, visible at that point, and only there, where she is made visible by an act of God and the witness of the Holy Ghost. In this visibleness she will be seen in faith. That which is seen in the same place without

faith and therefore without the actual revelation and witness is not the Real Church. One can, of course, see her as a religious community in the same way as one can see a state; but then one only sees Church members and Church authorities, Church orders and Church constitutions, Church buildings and also Church history, Bible, dogma and ritual, Church-goers and clergy in their various activities, etc. One sees an image, an appearance of the Church. One sees something which everywhere and under all sorts of titles claims to be the Church. Obviously one need not have faith to see this. One sees the Real Church, however, because she, as the original of the image, the reality of the appearance, steps out into the arena and speaks for herself. She does this unambiguously. Then she is to be seen. Just there where one had previously seen that image, that appearance, one now sees the Real Church. As the dark letters of illumination advertisements are made visible, readable and audible by turning on the electric current. One believes in something which one considers to be the Church, in a holy universal Church, as one believes in the Holy Ghost and therefore in God. For it is in fact not the Church who adds this visibility to her reality, but God, whose pleasure it has become to grant her such visibility. Who does not think at first and indeed often of that image, that appearance, whenever one says "Church"? Unfortunately one seldom believes what he says, especially when he says this word. It is good to convince oneself that he is not then thinking of the Real Church. We can think of the Real Church then, and only then, when God pities us, when He acknowledges that image and appearance, and there with us also, and, through faith in Him, allows us to believe in and to see the Real Church just there, where we only saw the image and the appearance.

II

The Real Church therefore will always and everywhere be visible only to very few, the very terrified and very joyful among "Christians", and to these only through God's free grace.

What has been said up to now should be a warning. The situation is such to-day that the Church is once again spoken of too lightly, too quickly, too confidently and too directly, as

if—perhaps because of better exegesis and doctrinal theology we have realised that there is such a thing—she were there and to be seen and as if all her authority and spiritual treasures were at the disposal of us Christians. I think of many among our younger theologians, who, because they were not present, no longer remember the departure out of Egypt and the crossing of the Jordan, and who now find it hard to understand that the way from seeing to believing is a way to seeing anew, and that to tread it, or rather to be led along it, does not follow as a matter of course. The image of the Church is still only an image and her appearance still only an appearance if the mercy of God does not intervene and allow us to see the Real Church. One can speak very weightily, very solemnly, very ecclesiastically, and certainly very impressively and grippingly about the Church, and yet quite inanely, if, in doing so, one only in fact thinks of that image and that appearance, if faith and its vision do not intervene, if the subject "Church", which is of supreme worth, in fact only refers to something which all the world can see, if the worth of the Church does not spring from faith. It cannot then be worthy of faith and cannot inspire any. Here we must be warned against results which are easy to obtain, but which have no duration.

The warning must be underlined. As surely as they depend on the Revelation of God and the witness of the Holy Ghost, the faith and therefore the vision of the Real Church are not for everybody. Here also many are called but few are chosen. One can put this to the test of fact: the Real Church is the lowest, the poorest, the most insignificant, the most helpless thing under God's heaven, as surely as it is centred on a manger and a cross. Who is now startled at this fact when he says "Church"? Who now thinks of the deep shame he takes upon himself when he becomes a member of the Church? If he were to see the Real Church, how terrified he would be! And the Real Church is the highest, the richest, the brightest and the most powerful thing under God's heaven, just as surely as He, who was born in a manger and crucified on Golgotha, rose from the dead and sits as ruler at the right hand of God. Who now rejoices, who now really rejoices over this fact when he says "Church"? Who now really thinks of the unique honour that is done him in that he may become a member of the

Church? If he were to see the Real Church, with what joy he would rejoice! There are certainly enough timid Church members and certainly enough who are over confident. But where are those who are very terrified and, at the same time, very joyful, who, even as such, could prove that they knew the Real Church? "When the Son of man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" (Luke 18.8). Is it not true that those who know the Real Church will never be in the majority, but always in the minority? Let us understand it rightly: the offer and the call are for all. Who cannot and may not see the Real Church? But the mystery of free grace and the mystery of free faith stand in the midst to judge and examine, even in the midst of those who seriously want to be Christians. When one knows this, one will avoid rash conclusions and cocksure talk about this matter because one can only speak of the Real Church in fear and trembling—only in very great fear and very great joy.

III

The Real Church lives as the community of her Lord, that is, as the congregation of lost sinners called together by Him through the comfort and exhortation of the Biblical witness to the reconciliation of the world with God which has taken place in Him.

We seek now a first answer to the decisive question: How and from what and for what does the Real Church live? In doing so we look at her establishment by her Lord Jesus Christ and answer as follows.

1. She exists as a community, bound to Him and not to be separated from Him. She exists in such a way with Him and from Him that He always goes before, she always follows after —He always above, she always below—He always speaks, she always only answers. She belongs not to herself but Him. She lives not from and for herself, but because He lives, He, the Head, she the body in His members. She knows no wisdom, no holiness, no power and glory apart from those which are in Him. She does not want to exist apart from Him, and if she did she could not. The Real Church is so lowly, that all she has she has only in Him.

2. The Real Church lives as the assembly which is called together by Him. No one belongs to her as a result of birth or

descent, no one by virtue of the fact that he is a member of a Christian family or Christian people, no one by virtue of something that others have done for him, but also no one because of his own decision and attachment, no one because of his religious experiences or any other inward change. The Real Church is the assembly which is called, united, held together and governed by the Word of her Lord, or she is not the Real Church. A commander calls his officers and non-commissioned officers together at the front in order to give them definite information and instructions. So, in this receiving of information and orders, the Real Church lives. In this way and in no other.

3. But the members of the Real Church are not just "officers". Those who are assembled in her are lost sinners and therefore neither religious virtuosos nor moral paragons. Where the Church is portrayed as the "good society", there she is certainly not the Real Church. What distinguishes her members from others can only be that, among themselves, they know, admit and recognise that we human beings as a whole are not "good society", but are "by nature inclined to hate God and our neighbours". Righteous? Yes, in that they know that they have no other alternative but to admit that God is right and that they are wrong. "Better?" Yes, in so far as they know better than others how much we human beings continually become guilty before God and before one another.

4. The Real Church lives therefore as if she were continually being supported and carried over an abyss. Where she knows how to comfort and encourage herself, there she is certainly not the Real Church. The Real Church lives on the comfort and exhortation which she may receive in spite of the human foolishness and perversity in which she also takes part. She lives, that is to say, in the strange, transcendent power of her Lord. She lives because she allows herself to be shamed by His goodness. She lives because her religiosity and wonted piety, her ordinary and extraordinary solemnity must be repeatedly reduced to dust and ashes in the fire of His Word and Spirit. She lives because of the mercy that is shown her. If only for this reason she will not grow weary. The unreal Church on the other hand is always weary, because she will not allow herself to be shamed, to be burned, and to have mercy shown

her. How much better even now she could be as the Real Church!

5. The new, the strange comfort and the transcendent exhortation which the Real Church receives and from which she may then live are, however, entirely the comfort and exhortation of the Biblical witness. She lives not from two or three or many sources, but from this and this alone. Why only from this? Because, of all the places which can be considered, only in this will an answer be found to the question which can move the Real Church. The question is: What will become of us who are all such evil doers against God and our neighbours? From the answer to this question come Moses and the Prophets, John the Baptist, the Evangelists and the Apostles. Other questions have many answers. But this is the question of the Real Church. It is not obstinacy or narrow-mindedness, but pure objectivity when she adheres to the Scripture, which is holy, because it is written for unholy people. It bears witness of Life, which has appeared and which is promised to all the unholy.

6. This is, however, the Life from which the Real Church may continually live: the reconciliation of the world with God that has taken place in Jesus Christ, the covenant of grace established in Him between Himself and lost sinners. It is the law of the Gospel, the law of the Spirit of Life to which the Real Church is subjected and which she cannot throw off, and which she cannot praise enough; she may believe, she is under orders to believe that God, in great wrath against all our human unfaithfulness, was faithful, is faithful and remains faithful, and, in that He has given Himself in His Son and thereby restored again His offended right and our lost human right, and so established an eternal peace. No man has ever lived at any time or in any situation, for whom this did not happen and for whom it is not valid. What is the solidarity of human guilt compared with the solidarity into which all men are transplanted through God's grace? The latter must be known if we are willingly to admit the first also. The Real Church is the Assembly of men who through God's grace may know of God's grace for all, who as first-fruits of the whole creation may know the Lord of the world, who is also Lord of that covenant, as their Lord. The Real Church lives in this knowledge.

IV

The Real Church lives in the mutual relationship of the comforted and the exhorted on the ground of their common relationship to the Son of God, who, for all men, was born as man, was crucified and rose again.

As we essay a second answer, we take, as it were, a horizontal view and say: the Real Church lives in an absolute solidarity, an unconditional association of her members among one another.

There are also other human associations. That there are families, peoples and classes, that there are all sorts of communities of interests, action and conviction is true, right and necessary. They are, however, not to be compared with the association which is in the Real Church. They are quite conditional associations, that is to say they embrace human beings only in part, only at certain points of their existence, not in their existence as such. That is why they overlap one another. That is why family can be against family, people against people, class against class, this community of interests, action and conviction against its corresponding community; that is why the community of class can be against that of the people and vice versa, the community of conviction against the community of interests and vice versa. As people are gathered into the Real Church they will be called out of, fetched out of, all these conditional associations or solidarity—first of all, we know, from the family. Not that the Real Church is against these other associations. She does not, however, coincide with any of them. She stands above them all. Nor does she take any part in their overlapping and opposition. She stands for unconditional human solidarity. She is solidarity in human existence before God and neighbour. That her members are called out of, fetched out of, the other solidarity means that they are called into, fetched into the true and the real solidarity.

In the Real Church men know each other. Each knows the other for what he really is, a lost sinner, who cannot help himself, one of the comforted and exhorted of Jesus Christ, who is helped as such. Just this, according to the Gospel, is the existence of men, in which, in spite of all other differences, they are relatives, brothers and sisters. In the Real Church they know one another in their human existence, and therefore as brother

and sister. In the Real Church they may and therefore must have ultimate, natural and radical confidence in one another —otherwise they are not in the Real Church. Why? Because a man sees his own nature there in that of the other, and the other immediately recognises his own nature in him, because the least estrangement, the least fear of one another is thereby necessarily excluded.

In the Real Church men love each other. In the Real Church love means neither esteem nor admiration nor veneration. Here love means simply this: that one wants and approves the other in his station and nature exactly as he is, and without this wanting approval on the part of the other, and without the other's existence in his station and nature, he himself does not want to be. One cannot see how men may come really to love one another where they know nothing of God's judgment and grace and of that solidarity of all men. On the other hand again one cannot see how men can help but love one another when they see before them this foundation of human existence, and that means in the Real Church. Since Christian love has this root, one need definitely have no worries about the necessary reservations which one owes to the truth, to the other and also to oneself. On the contrary, since Christian love has this root, it is impossible for men to oppose one another with final reservations in the Real Church.

In the Real Church men help each other. Not in the way that God helps His creatures, but in the way that men can help one another. They help one another not with the intention of doing good, not to prove that they are unselfish people (which we certainly are not), not to please God and to make an impression on the public with the offering we bring (a superfluous undertaking as the offering that counts, has been made for us long ago), but because in the Real Church they have something in common in which everyone can share. In the Real Church men help each other in the most realistic way, for together they engage in a common task and come under a common command, so that without any qualms they are invited to stand in for one another and bear one another's burdens.

We are not talking about striving towards an ideal. We are not talking of any other law than the law of Jesus Christ. That they know, love and help one another in the Real Church is

life from the Gospel, life in the universal and in the Real Church of all who universally acknowledge solidarity in the Word of God, who has become flesh for us. Christians do nothing special; they are under no fixed rule when they associate with each other a little differently than is usual among other people. They may, however, allow their "moderation" to be made known to all men (Phil. 4.5). Even in this they only represent and speak for all others in anticipation for they do not yet know, have not yet heard, cannot grasp and understand that the reconciliation of the world with God also takes place for them, the ordinance of life which has its root in this event is also in force for them. They cannot live it yet. Or can they, do they nevertheless do it occasionally, and perhaps occasionally to the shame of Christians? One can say bad things about certain children of this world, but one cannot possibly deny that, among themselves at any rate, they are better comrades than the majority of the members of most of the clerical associations in the world. Perhaps that happens as a token of fact that that ordinance of life in which the reconciliation took place for all whether known or unknown, actually is in force for all. Perhaps also to reveal the fact that for Christians the Real Church is often apt to get lost.

V

The Real Church lives in the Communion of the Holy Ghost, that is, from the knowledge that the Kingdom of God has come, in prayer for the revelation of His glory and therefore lives for the commission to tell all men that God was, is and always will be for them.

We essay a third answer to the question as to the life of the Real Church in that we look to the event, the act and the history which are consummated in what the New Testament calls the "Communion of the Holy Ghost". Its relationship to the fellowship of Christians with one another is that of the vertical to the horizontal.

The Real Church lives because God, who was in Christ, because Christ at the right hand of God, does not cease to live for us. She lives because it is not enough that God is in heaven and man on earth, and also because it is not enough that He has, once and for all, done what had to be done for the good

of man on earth. The Church lives because something new happens every day from God's eternal throne. She lives because, day by day, she may see, hear and receive this new thing.

She lives in ever new knowledge of what God, in Jesus Christ, has done for us men. How can she ever be finished with the contemplation and comprehension of the depth, height and breadth of God's perfect work? What generation can here do more than begin in its own way at the beginning? Immanuel, "God with us": the little child can grasp it and the old man need not hesitate to admit that he is far from grasping it, because from there ever new dimensions and aspects appear on all sides, ever new light shines there, ever new growth in knowledge is possible and is offered. The Real Church lives in this growing knowledge.

And she lives in ever new prayer for all this, even for the revealing of Jesus Christ as Lord that surpasses all Christian knowledge, and for the ultimate vision of His glory. And yet the Real Church still stands with the whole world in the midst of so much temptation and weakness, so much affliction and distress, so much frustration and error. Furthermore the people who see a great light are still the people who also walk in darkness. Therefore as yet we can only pray that what God has perfected in men, in the whole creation and in the Real Church, will take shape. The Real Church distinguishes herself from the mere image and appearance of a Church in that she continually breaks through to this prayer, in that she leaves behind all self-sufficiency and self-satisfaction, and also all brooding and despair over the special problems of the actual present, and breathes: "Hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come, thy will be done!" or to sum up: "Amen, yes, come, Lord Jesus!" and this groaning, as Luther once described it, because it is the groaning of the Holy Ghost Himself, will become a shout that goes through the whole heaven: so loud that all angels hearken for a louder note than this they never thought to hear.

And so in ever new knowledge and prayer the Real Church now lives in ever new movement. Even the Real Church is not an end in herself, but she ministers: namely, God to all men. Even when she withdraws within herself that can and will only be as a preparation for a speedy and more powerful return to

the external world. When those officers and non-commissioned officers have received their instructions, then they return to the troops—that was the only reason why they were summoned—then the orders will be passed on. "For God so loved", not Christians but "the world". "I am the light of the world", said the Lord and, in that He gave Himself, He passed it on to His disciples: "Ye are the light of the world". What it does not know it will be told and shown through the Real Church. Now that does not mean that it is her task to reprimand the whole or indeed half the world. If she were to behave like the accuser of her brothers and sisters then she would certainly be in the service of a quite different master. Her task is not to say *No*, but *Yes*: the mighty *Yes* to God, who, because there are godless men, has, for His part, never thought and never thinks of being a "manless" God—and the powerful *Yes* to man for whom, behave himself as he will, Jesus Christ died and rose again. Of what use would be the Church's preaching, her instruction, her diaconate, her theology, her political watch, her mission—how would she overcome unbelief in her own message, if she did not deliver this ruthlessly in its wholeness to all people: that God is not against, but for mankind? She need not worry if that necessary *No* to human arrogance and human slothfulness does not thereby come to its own. This necessary *No* will become audible enough if she, as Real Church, occupies herself with—washing of feet and with nothing else. This is the obedience which she owes to her Lord in the world, this is the thing which is worth all her burning zeal, this the movement which she will consummate again and again. Because this movement, together with that of knowledge and prayer, is ever newly consummated, the Real Church lives, really from above downwards, really involved in the Communion of the Holy Ghost. If she did not live in this renewal how could she be more than an image and appearance of a Church, how could she be the Real Church?

VI

The Real Church lives under the ordinance and government which her Lord Himself carries out in that He bestows on the community gathered in His name the gifts which are necessary for the performance of her ministry.

We essay now yet a fourth and last answer to our question and say: the Real Church lives in such a way that she is governed by her Lord Himself and by Him alone.

She does not, therefore, live according to her own discretion; nor at her own responsibility and risk. If at any time she has, in obedience tried to think, to speak, to act, then she will not regard herself as being eternally, infallibly and unshakably bound to any of her measures and decisions, to any of her own traditions and customs, not even to any of her recent resolutions; rather will she hold herself in immediate readiness to receive new instructions. That applies to her preaching and divine services, her theology and her theoretical and practical canonical law. What we men regard, conceive and devise as true and right in the life of the Church, over which we have agreed according to our highest wisdom and conscience, and perhaps have already agreed for centuries, may, as a result of our efforts and the efforts of our fathers, possibly have its serious import by way of anticipation and in pointing the way; but it cannot and dare not become the governing power in the Church. That would mean that we or our fathers had made ourselves lords of the Church, and had at the same time become the slaves of an ecclesiastical democracy which, because it is ecclesiastical, has not in the slightest a higher claim on our souls than any other democracy. Here we find ourselves at the point where the image and appearance of a Church on the one hand, and the Real Church on the other, part company in a particularly significant way.

It is granted to the Lord of the Church to govern her Himself and alone. In that He has testified of Himself to the Prophets and Apostles, in that the Real Church listens to her testimony, her Holy Scripture, provision has been made for Him to speak to her time and again and for her to distinguish time and again between His voice and the voice of other lords. All that is necessary for Him really to carry out His government is nothing else than this, that His Church really be and remain the Church which hears and proclaims Him in preaching, baptism and the Lord's Supper. He is then in the midst of her, He is then among us indeed with His Spirit and gifts.

It is thus through His spiritual gifts that He governs the Real Church, makes her capable, willing and ready for the

ordinary fulfilment of her duties, the many duties, which, having regard to the various people, circumstances and times, are necessary for the fulfilment of her one duty. We read in Rom. 12 and 1 Cor. 12 of the diversity of these gifts, and suppose that this diversity can indeed be endless. The Real Church is not afraid of these riches. One may well ask whether the reason why the gifts of the Spirit among us are so few, and why there is so much mutual distrust among the bearers of the gifts, which we perhaps have—as between the teachers and the pastors, between the prophets and those gifted to be deacons and those called to leadership—is not because we all want to build the Church according to our own wisdom, because we quench the Spirit and are, to this extent, not the Real Church at all. What comes from ourselves, even in the Church, will be incomplete, paltry and therefore unacceptable. That is, it will mean the dividing and breaking up of the Church. As surely as they come from one Lord, the gifts of the Spirit will not break up the Church, but will govern and set her in order. One must not, however, fear them, nor want to protect oneself against them by a barricade of man's work. One may not say gift and mean one's own ability, say duty and mean office, say creed and mean confession, say prayer and mean rite, say ordinance and mean regulation, say Christ and mean the fathers or still simpler, oneself, and whatever all this *quid pro quo* may be called. The doors must always and everywhere be kept open for the Lord. The Real Church is free in that she trusts in the Spirit, i.e. in the Spirit of the Word of her Lord, confident that He will certainly lead her into all truth. And so she is also bound in that she cannot rely on any other leadership than this, not on her tradition, or any kind of inspiration, not on hierarchy, and so also not on the more or less overwhelming experiences that one may boast of in her midst. The best that can be said in this respect, however, is this: that time and again it has pleased the Lord, and was possible, to come to His own even through closed doors, and out of a mere image and appearance of a Church to create the Real Church, i.e. the Church governed by Him and the gifts of His Spirit.

VII

This Real Church is the one, the holy, the universal, the apostolic

Church which we are invited to acknowledge and so become her living members because Jesus Christ calls us to follow Him.

We close with the question: How does one come to the Real Church, to participate in her life? That happens once one is given really to see her under this or that aspect or to hear from her, and does not close one's eyes and ears, does not stand on ceremony, does not say Yes—but. Few see her. Many could and are allowed to see her. Why is it that only so few see her? Because between her and us stands a whole wall of pious and impious human obstinacy, of new and old human cleverness and dullness. Why do we not break through this wall? Why do we not leap over it with God? And why do we ask: how then can the Real Church become real for us? Because somewhere in the depth of our being we are agreed that we will not break through or leap over—even if an angel from heaven were to invite us to do so.

But our last word should not be an accusation. All are doubtless called to the Real Church, which lives from her source in Jesus Christ, from whom the call ever goes out into the image and appearance of the Church, the call which is powerful enough to create even the Real Church. He calls very graciously and very sternly. He calls the sleeping and the very busy, the weary and the sad. He also calls the secret and the open hypocrites in the Church. He calls to repentance, to conversion, to confession of faith. He calls for meek and for courageous people. Time will have to show whether too much or too little has been ventured by the great undertaking at Amsterdam. Whether it stands or falls will depend on whether He calls there and whether it pleases Him to make Himself heard there. But the smallest village church can be more important than the whole Amsterdam Assembly, should it happen that they return to and acknowledge the Real Church with heart and mind and lips—in the sense of the 54th question of the *Heidelberg Catechism*, where the answer to the question of what we think of the Church is that the Real Church can be touched by hands:

> That out of the whole human race, from the beginning of the world to the end, the Son of God, by His Spirit and Word, gathers, defends and preserves for Himself unto everlasting life a chosen communion, in the unity of the true faith, and that I am and shall remain for ever a living member of the same.

CONVERSION[1]

by The Rt. Rev. Bishop STEPHEN C. NEILL

The duty of the Church to evangelise is now a commonplace of all ecumenical discussion. The moment, however, that we go beyond vague generalisation, it becomes apparent that there are within the Church widely divergent ideas as to what evangelism is, and as to how it ought to be carried out. This has proved in many places an insuperable obstacle to common planning and action.

At no point is this disagreement more apparent than on the question of conversion. Even the meeting of minds in rational discussion of the problem is not easy to achieve. To those who can look back on some recognisable experience of conversion in their own lives, this is so much more important than anything else that they find it very difficult to take seriously any type of Christian living from which this experience is eliminated. Those who have had no such experience tend to be unable to get beyond the idea that conversion is some kind of emotional experience, and are thus unable to enter into any serious discussion of the real questions involved.

One of our most urgent needs is a thorough, scientific and theological study of the whole subject in the light of modern psychological knowledge, and of the rediscovery of biblical theology. It is unfortunate that the classic work, from which almost all modern consideration of the topic starts, William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, has proved in some respects misleading. James really deals rather with one type of religious experience than with the possible varieties of experience, and within that one type rather with instances that are in some way abnormal than with those that can be classed as "normal", if that word can ever be used of any human being or any human experience.

It may help to clarify the issue, if we state in the extremest

[1] This "Introductory Statement" was prepared for the Conference on "The Evangelisation of Man in Modern Mass Society", held at Oxford last year, under the auspices of the Study Department of the World Council of Churches.

form two antithetic approaches to the problem, recognising that there is an element of exaggeration in the statements, and that each is open to criticism on various grounds:

(*a*) Conversion is the beginning of real Christian life. Christian nurture, education and worship may be valuable preparations. But no one is, or should be called, a Christian until he has personally encountered God in Jesus Christ, until he has personally repented, until he has personally accepted God's gift of salvation through faith in Christ, until by this faith he has individually been born again. The reality of the Church in every generation consists in those who have thus been born again. The continuance of the Church in the world depends on there being enough people who have passed through this experience, and through whom it can be passed on to others.

(*b*) Christian life begins at baptism, when by the grace of God operating through the Church, original sin is taken away, and the divine life is sown as a seed in the heart of man. Through Christian teaching, through life in the Church and through the grace of the sacraments, this seed can grow. Though growth may be hindered by resistance on the part of the individual, nevertheless it is a continuous process. To demand any other decisive new beginning is to deny the reality of the grace of God. What the individual is called to do is to recognise the reality of what God has already done in him and to take that seriously.

In general, this second position, with considerable variations, is that maintained by the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and by the state Churches of Europe, where it is taken for granted that the normal sequence of Christian nurture, worship, special religious instruction and Confirmation will lead on to full membership and responsibility in the Church. The first position, again with many variations, is that maintained by the evangelical Free Churches, and by evangelical movements within the more traditional Churches. In one case membership in the Church is expected to lead on to personal Christian experience. In the other, personal Christian experience is regarded as the pre-condition for effective membership in the Church.

If conversion is not an emotional experience, what is it? The following statement might win fairly wide acceptance

among those who "preach for conversion", and regard it as essential for all men, as a part of their Christian experience:

"Conversion is primarily an act or determination of the will. All men are in a state of alienation from God; each man is the centre of his own world, and claims the right to determine his own existence. This is rebellion and the way of death. Even those who have been baptised do in practice go on living in this way; particular sins are the fruit of the central sin of rebellion. Real life begins only when a man consciously finds his true centre in God. God's offer of grace in Christ is continuous and unconditional. But it constrains no man and leaves the freedom of decision to men. To return to God is response to the love of God manifest in Christ. Nevertheless it is impossible without a decision on the part of the individual, the exercise of that freedom which has been impaired by sin, but which God Himself has kept in being in every man. Without this personal and individual response, there can be no reality of Christian life."

Obviously, there will be immense varieties in the way in which individuals are brought to the point at which this response is possible. For some, the clearing away of a mass of prejudices and intellectual difficulties may be a necessary preliminary. Others may be so sunk in psychological entanglements that no real personal decision becomes possible until a measure of mental health has been restored. In some cases, conversion appears sudden, though in almost all such cases, examination will show that there has been a long period of inner preparation. In many cases, the occasion, by which the decision is determined and in relation to which it is made, may appear quite trivial. The immediate effect on moral character may be very marked, or almost imperceptible. The interpretation given of the experience may be determined much more by outside influences than by the experience itself. (Accounts of their conversion by converts from non-Christian religions are nearly always jejune, trite, and phrased in the current vernacular of the Christian body to which they have given their adherence.)

But, under all these varieties, there will always be found certain common traits in every genuine record of conversion:

There is at least a minimum intellectual content. No one

can be converted to Jesus Christ, unless he has a mental picture of Jesus, which, however imperfectly, is related to the truth and the reality of Jesus.

But the central factor is always in the will. Conversion always involves acceptance of the will of God as that which determines the life of men, and this involves the repudiation of the old self-centred and self-determining will.

Emotion is largely irrelevant to the significance of conversion. It may be markedly present or it may not. The conversions which are most permanent are usually those in which the emotional element is least present. Strong emotion is dangerous, as it can easily disguise the ethical element which must be present in all genuine conversion, and may even be used as an evasion of the new orientation of the will. Misuse of the emotional appeal by unskilled evangelists has done more than anything else to confuse the issue, and to discredit the idea of conversion.

The results of any genuine conversion will always be found to include at least the following elements:

(*a*) The establishment of an I-Thou relationship between the soul of man and God. What had been external now has become genuinely inward and personal.

(*b*) A sense of God's favour revealed in Christ to the individual. This is based not on emotional feeling, but on the Word and promises of God.

(*c*) Submission to the will of God continually renewed, and with it the realisation of the living Christ as the inward power of the new life.

(*d*) Repentance and a new sense of ethical obligation.

(*e*) Acceptance of responsibility in and for the Christian fellowship. (Individualism is a characteristic of mysticism, and not of evangelical religion.)

(*f*) A serious acceptance of responsibility to bear witness and to win others for Christ. On this depends the naturally self-propagating character of the Christian fellowship.

Obviously in most cases the individual cannot be aware of all these things at the moment or in the experience of conversion. Much instruction may be needed to make plain to him all that is involved in what he has done. But all these things are implicit in the act of accepting Jesus Christ as Saviour and

Lord, and no conversion can be accepted as genuine, unless all these consequences follow from what has been done.

Many problems remain still to be considered in this field. Space permits the mention of only two:

(*a*) What is to be thought of similar conversion experiences in non-Christian religions? (cf. A. D. Nock: *Conversion* and Underwood: *Conversion, Christian and non-Christian*). Is there any clear and valid distinction? The same problem arises in relation to mysticism, as represented in Hinduism, Sufism, etc., etc. The answer depends on the view taken of human experience and its relation to external reality; it cannot be determined by a study of psychological process. If experience is really experience of an external reality, then the nature of the experience is determined by that which it is an experience *of*. If Christian faith brings men into an I-Thou relationship with Jesus Christ, in that rests the distinctiveness of the experience and its incommensurability with every other.

(*b*) What is to be said of the fact that most experiences of conversion appear to take place during the troubled years of adolescence? Does not this indicate a serious danger of illusion, self-deception and instability in such experiences? Here much fuller study is needed than has yet been made. It may be pointed out however that the occurrence of such experiences mainly in the adolescent age-group is not in itself any ground for criticism or objection, since there is strong evidence that, in spite of the emotional instability of that period, it is in fact that part of life in which character is most rapidly being formed, and in which most of the decisions are taken which determine the future of the individual. It is interesting to note that the Roman Catholic Church, which more than any other tends to frown on the idea of conversion in the evangelical sense, ordinarily begins its training of boys for the priesthood at the age of seventeen, thus assuming that it is usual for "vocation" to be recognised precisely in the unstable years of adolescence.

The primary aim of this study is to bring out into clear light the differences between Christians who alike are sincerely seeking the glory of God and the good of the Church.

Here attention has been drawn to the differences as they present themselves in the context of practical action. But it will be found that differences of approach and method attach

themselves to much deeper grounds of division—in the theology and ethos of the various confessions, and even in their basic apprehension of Christian faith. Such differences cannot be reconciled on the practical level. But if the study of evangelism is to wait upon their reconciliation, it will wait for a very long time. And, if it is recognised that Christian faith and action can only artificially be separated from one another, no harm is done by considering at what points in the field of evangelism and conversion closer understanding and co-operation can be reached

When the differences are stated in an extreme form, it may seem difficult to find any points of agreement from which progress towards understanding may be made. This would be too pessimistic a conclusion. It does seem that, even when the differences are most categorically stated, there are two points in which all would be in agreement:

(*a*) Christian life, in whatever form, is always response to the gracious activity of God in Christ. The initiative always rests with God, who approaches man as Redeemer, and not with the individual, whatever his seeking and striving after God.

(*b*) Christian life cannot be other than an affair of decisions. God chooses to be the Saviour of man. But man also chooses to live as a son of God—or chooses to live otherwise. The nature of this choice may be variously interpreted. The point at which the choice is first made may be impossible to detect. Nevertheless, among the many choices and decisions made by one who lives as a Christian, there must be one choice and decision, which in fact was the first. And the first is always the most important, though its importance may not be recognised at the time.

In a full study, it would be necessary to pay attention to the problems of loss or temporary obscuration of faith, relapse, the persistence of sin, recidivism, and so forth. But as these are common to all parts of the Christian Church, and are not eliminated by any type of approach or understanding, they need be no more than indicated at this point.

Most of what has been written so far has dealt with the problem of conversion from the standpoint of countries in which the Christian tradition has been long established, and in which children are born into an existing Christian community. But

it is widely recognised that a great deal of light is shed on the problems by the experiences of the Church in the non-Christian world, where the approach is to the individual entirely untouched by any Christian influences at all. These experiences become all the more important and relevant, since, in the West, the Church finds itself increasingly face to face with similar conditions. In some countries of Europe, only a small minority of the children are baptised; only a small minority receive any Christian instruction. The thinking of modern man is determined much more by pagan than by Christian categories. Even in those countries where the Christian tradition has been more strongly maintained, it is no longer possible to count, as it was until recently, on even an elementary acquaintance with the Bible or with the facts of the life of Christ. What do the problems of evangelism and of conversion look like in this new setting?

In all recent testimony from the "mission field", immense stress is laid on the part played in evangelism by the Christian community. It is the life and witness of the Christian community *as a community* that is the effective power in evangelism. The non-Christian, who in any way becomes interested in the Gospel, comes to understand something of the meaning of it not so much by an intellectual process of absorption, as by entering into the life of the Christian community, coming to feel as it feels, and gradually apprehending the vital forces which are at work in it as the body of Christ.

This is wholly true, but it cannot be taken as a complete statement of the case. Inquiry on a very wide scale among converts from non-Christian religions indicates that in a very large number of cases, what first attracted their attention was some action on the part of a Christian which presented itself as radically different from the kind of action which would have been taken by a non-Christian in similar circumstances (e.g. in the matter of true and false testimony in the law-courts, a perennial problem in non-Christian countries). The next step has in many cases been personal friendship with an individual Christian, who may or may not have borne direct testimony to Christ in words. Introduction to the fellowship of the Christian community has usually been the third, and not the first, stage of the process.

Integration into the Christian community is essential for the convert, since it is only in living within that community that he can learn what it really means to be a Christian. But once this is stated, two grave problems immediately arise:

(*a*) It is necessary for the convert to be fully integrated into the Christian community; otherwise his own Christian life does not develop as it should. But he should not be separated more than is absolutely necessary from the social milieu in which he has grown up; otherwise he becomes almost completely ineffective as a witness, and is in danger of becoming a stranger, living in two worlds in neither of which he is perfectly at home. This is, in an acute form, a tension which is always present in every form of Christian living. The Christian community must be separated from the world, otherwise it loses its divine character. The Church must not be separated from the world, otherwise it ceases to perform its function as light and salt. This tension will be with us till the end of time; there can never be more than approximate and partial solutions, and on this subject there can be legitimate differences between groups of Christians equally devoted and equally sincere.

(*b*) What is to be done, where there is no Christian community, into which the convert can be introduced, other than that of the professional Christian workers? This situation arises at the beginning of all successful missionary work. It is beginning to be recognised as a problem in the renewed penetration of the secularised world by the Gospel. To deny the convert the only fellowship available to him is impossible. To admit him to that fellowship may very quickly turn him into the typical pseudo-layman, the half-lay, half-clerical type which is specially offensive to the genuine layman. Again there is no immediate solution; the problem largely solves itself with the growth of a Christian community, deeply rooted in the local situation, and strong enough to have an independent life of its own.

This emphasis on the community and its part in evangelism is further borne out by the experience of the so-called Mass Movements, which have been taking place in many parts of the world, and particularly in India. In some forms of society, decisions are taken by the group rather than by the individual. In so important a matter as a change of religion, it seems natural

in such a society that the unit of action should be the group. In various periods of Church history, we find a similar process at work. The conversion of the greater part of Europe was the result of mass movements of tribes rather than of the conversion of individuals.

Most missionaries now accept this argument as valid, and believe that such Mass Movements are a real movement of the Spirit of God. It is important, however, not to overlook the passionate opposition to the whole idea manifested by many of the most distinguished Indian leaders of the Church; their contention is that such movements can never lead to anything but a base mixture of Christianity and paganism, and that the low level of Christian life seen in Mass Movement communities will in the end prove one of the greatest possible hindrances to the final conversion of India to the Christian faith.

This is not the place for a discussion of this interesting divergence of view. A few special points, however, may be noted in passing.

We are faced here, in one of its sharpest forms, with the question as to the objective of the evangelist: should he try to detach individuals from the mass of non-Christian society by means of personal conversion? Or should he try to penetrate the whole of that non-Christian society with the Gospel, in the hope of producing a landslide later on?

This has for a very long time been a matter of debate in missionary circles in India. The time has now come when a verdict has been pronounced by the course of Christian history. It seems to be clear that those who have gone on the first line, of aiming at producing converts, have won (in most cases) a small number of converts, but have penetrated society far beyond the limits of the range of their immediate and effective action; whereas those who have followed the method of peaceful penetration have made no converts, and have penetrated society far less deeply than those whose evangelistic purpose has been more direct and aggressive. From this judgment of history, it may be possible to draw certain lessons for the Church in its present situation in the west.

Study of the history of Mass Movements shows that in no case do they take shape primarily as a sub-conscious movement in the common mind of a group. Every Mass Movement on

record has taken its start from intense personal conviction on the part of an individual. This individual has frequently to undergo persecution as a disturber of the social order in which he has been born. Usually his progress in attaching adherents to his point of view is for a time extremely slow. (The history of Muhammad in Mecca is a most interesting non-Christian parallel.) The group movement follows only if the first converts remain firm in the face of all the opposition that befalls them. Even in primitive societies, where the influence of the group mind is at its strongest, the faculty of individual decision and action is never completely inhibited. Any progress made by the group, in the religious or in any other sphere, always can be traced back to the courage and initiative of an individual.

This fact does not provide us with any answer to the question of the detachment of the converted individual from his group. In non-Christian countries, baptism is usually taken much more seriously than in countries with a long Christian tradition. It is taken as seriously by the non-Christians as by the would-be Christians, and is taken as marking the definite detachment of the individual from his tribe or caste. Wise strategy in mission fields has usually suggested the delaying of baptism as long as possible, in the hope that the converts may remain within their social group, until they have won the whole of it to the faith, and so avoid the schism which often does take place when one part of the group becomes Christian and another remains pagan. But sooner or later, and often sooner, the point comes at which a break must be made. Unless the Christians are in a position in which they can show their own distinctiveness in relation to such matters as participation in social customs of a pagan kind, they tend to lose their own fervour of conviction, and their power to influence. By delaying too long the decision of the individual for the sake of the group, it is possible to lose both the individual and the group. At no point can the individual factor in conversion be eliminated.

The great danger in all group movements is that adhesion to the new, or to the transformed, group, may be taken as a substitute for personal confrontation with Christ. Every missionary is well aware of the addiction of the inquirer to finding substitutes, by the acceptance of which he can evade the pain-

fulness of real Christian decision. It is well known that Mass Movements, unless very carefully developed, tend to lose their force and die away within a generation. What is the reason for this? If hundreds and thousands of people are admitted in a comparatively short time to the Christian Church, intense spiritual effort must be applied to the care of them for a very long time. Otherwise the result is a large nominally Christian population, with no apparent desire for further spiritual progress, and living on so low a level of Christian achievement as to be a hindrance to any further progress of the Gospel among the non-Christians living round about it. Again we are forced back to the individual. If in a mass movement area a sufficient number of people are led to personal surrender to Christ and to the transformation of personality which follows from it, the movement will remain in motion. These living individuals are the centres of radiation throughout the Christian community and beyond it. If such individuals are too few or non-existent, the movement becomes stagnant and may develop from an opportunity to a menace.

In this brief study, it has not been possible to argue any point at length. For the sake of brevity, the form of statement has had to be dogmatic. The aim throughout has been to throw problems into relief, and to indicate some of the sources from which further light may be sought, and some of the answers which may provisionally be given. At every point, the need has been felt for a far more extensive and deeper study than, as far as the writer is aware, has been made in recent times. This study is not academic. The answers given to the questions raised will affect the whole approach of the Church to its evangelistic task. There must always be room for wide diversity of interpretation and approach. But unless there is agreement on a common aim, mutual understanding and, still more, common action, become impossible. We are always lamenting that the disunity of the Church is one of the chief causes of its weakness in the modern world. United evangelism is often proclaimed as one of the points at which the Church can recover its lost unity. Is this true? Or is a difference about the nature and purpose of evangelism just one of those points at which the helpless dividedness of the Church is most clearly brought into view?

THE SUFFERING SERVANT: CURRENT SCANDINAVIAN DISCUSSIONS[1]

by The Rev. Professor CHRISTOPHER R. NORTH

In my book *The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah*[2] I gave some account of current Scandinavian discussions on the problem. My treatment of them had to be sketchy, otherwise the work as a whole would have been out of focus. Besides, I had not then access to all the literature. It now seems opportune to deal with these latest discussions in more detail.

The debate resolves itself into a triangular contest between Oslo, Uppsala, and Copenhagen, with, as we should expect, some differences of view within the Uppsala group itself.

We may begin with Oslo. As is well known, Sigmund Mowinckel[3] in 1921 advanced the theory that the Servant was the Prophet, Deutero-Isaiah himself. The Prophet-Servant composed all the "Songs", even the last (Isa. 52.13-53.12), in which he anticipated his approaching death. By 1931[4] Mowinckel felt constrained to abandon this view of the provenance of the Songs. Instead, we are to look for their origin in "Trito-Isaianic" circles. Mowinckel, however, though with somewhat less confidence, still adhered to his original thesis that the Servant was the Prophet. The Servant was *possibly*, indeed even probably Deutero-Isaiah, who, it is to be presumed, had been martyred and was now "in faith extolled as cult-hero and delineated with mythological colouring". On this last point he has since[5] called attention to a possible parallel between the Servant and *Krt*, who in a Ras Shamra text is called "the servant of El" (*'bd 'el*).

Mowinckel's present position is expounded in the third volume of the new Norwegian Translation-Commentary on the

[1] This essay was completed in October 1949.
[2] O.U.P., 1948, referred to in what follows as *SS*.
[3] *Der Knecht Jahwäs*; cf. *SS*, pp. 72 ff.
[4] "Die Komposition des deuterojesajanischen Buches", *Z.A.W.*, 49, pp. 87-112, 242-60; cf. *SS*, p. 80 f.
[5] "Til uttrykket 'Jahvaes tjener': Streiflys fra Ugarit II", in *Norsk teologisk tidsskrift*, 1942, pp. 24-6; cf. *SS*, p. 81.

Old Testament.[1] It does not differ materially from the modified "autobiographical" theory which he adopted in 1931. On one or two points of exegesis he appears to have changed his mind. He no longer speaks of the Servant as having been martyred,[2] but as dying of leprosy.[3] The speakers ("we") in Chapter 53 are no longer the Gentiles,[4] but "the poet himself and the circle of Jews who share his view of the Servant."[5] Mowinckel insists that the Servant is depicted as a prophet, not as a king.[6] He still thinks that the most likely answer to the question, "Who was the Servant?" is that he was "an actual historical person, a prophet and missionary who lived among the Jews not long before the poet's own time, and who, the poet and others expected, would soon be raised again from the dead"[7]; and since two of the Songs are in the first person, the most natural assumption is that he was the Second Isaiah, who was the founder and inspiration of the "Trito-Isaianic" circle. But—and this is the significant difference between Mowinckel's position in 1944 as compared with 1921-31—"What is decisive, however, is not *who* the historical Servant was, but *what* he *is*."[8] This leads him to say that "the historical person who in the present instance stands behind the Servant-figure may, for that matter, have been more an occasion for the prophetic description of the future, perfect Servant of God and saviour, than an exact model".[9] This, of course, raises anew "the question whether the Servant belongs to the present (or immediate past) of the poet, or whether he belongs entirely to the future, perhaps as an eschatological great-figure (*størrelse*)?"[10] On this, says Mowinckel, no absolutely decisive answer is possible. But the tenses in the Songs "do not exclude the possibility that the Servant is a purely future figure whom the Prophet had seen and heard in his inspired imagination. The thought is then: (not a political and military Messiah, but) such a one as he has described in this prophetic picture of 'the Servant' must and

[1] *Det Gamle Testamente, III: De Senere Profeter*, oversatt av Sigmund Mowinckel og N. Messel, Oslo, 1944, pp. 192-201 and notes on the several Songs.
[2] cf. *SS*, p. 81. [3] *GT III*, pp. 194, 248 f.
[4] As in *Der Knecht Jahwäs*, pp. 37 n, 45.
[5] *GT III*, p. 246.
[6] ibid., pp. 192 *et passim*. [7] ibid., p. 196.
[8] ibid. It may be remarked that Mowinckel seems to go out of his way to write a *Christian* commentary on the texts—a welcome precedent for future expositors.
[9] ibid. [10] ibid., p. 195.

shall one day come. . . ."[1] Finally, Mowinckel stresses that in any case the Servant is a "soteriological" rather than a "Messianic" or "eschatological" figure—"The Servant is a 'saviour-figure', behind whom there stands an historical person".[2]

Mowinckel's emphasis upon the immediate historical background of the Servant-figure does not mean that he overlooks traces in it of more ancient conceptions. It is relevant to notice these here because they are in a measure parallel with those adduced almost contemporaneously by H. S. Nyberg.[3] For one thing, since the Servant conception is the high-water mark of the prophetic revelation, it may be taken as certain that features from earlier prophets and men of God have been taken up into it. A second antecedent is the concept of what in English we are accustomed to call corporate personality. Mowinckel does not intend this as a concession to the collective interpretation, or as any admission that there are collective features in the portrait. What he has in mind is only that "the one can atone for all in such measure as they by their own will and consciousness identify themselves with the one, with his person and his work".[4] For the same reason it is natural for the poet to express his thoughts about the death and saving work of the Servant in figures taken from the sacrificial ritual. A further not unimportant precursor of the poet's faith in the Servant's resurrection is to be seen in thoughts and style-forms derived from psalms of lamentation and thanksgiving. In these a sick man was wont to describe himself as if he were gone down to the grave and were already dead, or to give thanks because he had been raised from the dead. In the Psalms this is little more than a style-form, though the suppliant no doubt did believe that God could perform such a miracle as raising the dead. But what in the Psalms is only a figure, is, in the last Servant-Song, to become a reality. Finally, Mowinckel refers to the widespread myth of the dying and rising god as having contributed something both to the psalms of lamentation and to the last

[1] ibid. [2] ibid., p. 197.

[3] Nyberg's article (see below p. 366, n. 2) was published two years before the Norwegian *GT III*. Once only, so far as I can discover, in a textual note on Isa. 53.10 (op. cit., p. 793), does Mowinckel refer to it. What he writes about the origins of the Servant conception makes no reference to Nyberg, and it may be assumed that it was written before Nyberg's work was published.

[4] op. cit., p. 197.

Servant Song, and he calls attention once more to the title *'bd 'el* in a text from Ugarit.[1]

I turn now to Uppsala. There is little doubt that Nyberg's article "Man of Sorrows" in the *Swedish Exegetical Yearbook*[2] will take its place as one of the great contributions to the subject. He begins by observing that modern exegetes are accustomed to assume from the obscurities of Isaiah 52.13-53.12 that its text must be seriously corrupt, and that they then proceed to emend it on the basis of the versions, particularly the LXX, cheerfully resorting to conjecture where the versions fail. But, insists Nyberg, an obscure text is not necessarily a corrupted text, witness the Indian Sutras and the Persian Gathas. To resort to conjectural emendation is waste of time, because if a text really is corrupted no amount of guesswork can cure it, and we must be as content as we can with what we have. Nor are we free, without further ado, to emend on the basis of a version, even a version as old as the LXX. We must first carefully examine the version—in this case particularly the LXX—to see what are the ideas which dominate it. It may be that the differences between it and the MT are due not to its being translated from a different Hebrew recension, but to the translator's contriving to force the original into a thought-pattern of his own.

Nyberg then proceeds to analyse the LXX. He finds that the text as printed in Swete (Codex B) is not in all points the original LXX, that the oldest witness to the present LXX is Clement of Rome (A.D. 96), and that the New Testament citations point in places to something closer to the original. He maintains that the Hebrew text from which the LXX was first made differed very little from our MT, and that the differences between the LXX and Hebrew texts of Isaiah 53 are due to the translator's having handled his original so roughly as to come very near to doing violence to it. What he, an Egyptian Jew, had in mind, and proceeded to accommodate his translation to, was a triangular drama between God, the sinful world of men, and a righteous man, "my παῖς". This Hellenistic interpretation of the Servant was carried farther by the Wisdom of Solomon (4.20-5.23).

[1] See supra, p. 363.

[2] "Smärtornas man. En studie till Jes. 52.13-53.12", *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, 7, 1942, pp. 5-82.

Nyberg prefaces his examination of the MT with some observations on the question of metre. He denies that Hebrew metre was as regular as is commonly assumed, and he will allow no emendation *metri causa*. So far as I can see he defends the MT to the last consonant, and manages to extract a coherent translation from it, just as it stands. If this should seem impossible, we do well to remember that it is only what the Authorised and Revised Versions did without any serious reservations, though sometimes, of course, Nyberg has to treat as deliberate archaisms, expressions which most moderns assume to be textual corruptions. In a word, Nyberg would have us believe that the LXX and the MT go back to a common original which, almost to the last detail, was identical with the present MT.

What Nyberg has accomplished in his handling of the Greek and Hebrew texts may turn out to be a *tour de force*. Time will show. But it is, to say the least, remarkable that he wrote what he did five years before the recent discovery of Hebrew scrolls. These scrolls are widely asserted to date from the second century B.C., and the Isaiah text as now published reveals a text of Isaiah 53 more like the MT than the emended texts on which, since Duhm, expositions of the passage have frequently been based. If the scrolls are second century B.C., and if Nyberg's explanation of the differences between the LXX and MT is the right one—and a second century B.C. date for the scrolls would go far to say that he is—then most commentaries on the passage would have to be rewritten.

The most striking detail in Nyberg's translation of the passage is his treatment of the word *šᵉmû'ātēnû* (RV "our report", mg. "that which we have heard") in 53.1. This he understands as "the myth preserved in the tradition", a rendering which has since occasioned lively discussion. Like Mowinckel, too, he thinks the Servant is depicted as a leper, and he takes the expression "kings shall shut their mouths at him" as meaning that they take every precaution to avoid contamination from him.

Viewing the description as a whole, Nyberg says it is clear from the beginning that the Servant is a more-than-individual (*överindividuell*) figure, notwithstanding that the description moves throughout on the individual plane. He has been at work in the past and will continue to be active in the future.

"This oscillation in time is equally typical of the text with the oscillation between individual and that which is more than individual."[1]

The roots of the Servant-idea, or *myth*, as it is proper to call it, are to be found in three motifs: (1) the shoot (E.VV. "tender plant", 53.2) which springs up in the desert leads us to the Tammuz-mystery; (2) the man who, though guiltless, bears the wrong-doings of many, and endures woe and punishment for them so that it may be well with them, leads us to the kingship-ideology of the Ancient East and to the rôle of the king in the great cult-drama at the beginning of every new year; (3) the man who secures a long and happy existence for his descendants leads us to the ancestor-ideology which was so powerful a factor in the tribal organisation of the desert.

I have not space to reproduce in any detail Nyberg's exposition of these three motifs. Nor, indeed, is there any need. All of them are sufficiently familiar to English-speaking readers. Thus, it has long been suggested that there is some relation between the Servant-figure and Tammuz, whether it be that the Servant is Tammuz, or, as is more usual, that there are more or less conscious literary reminiscences of the Tammuz-mystery in the descriptions of him.[2] As to kingship-ideology, this country is generally regarded abroad as the home of the "Myth and Ritual" school,[3] rather to the embarrassment of British scholars, who find their suggestions carried farther by Uppsala than they ever anticipated or intended. As to ancestor-ideology, this is substantially Wheeler Robinson's "corporate personality", though Nyberg's handling of it is more akin to that of Pedersen and Eissfeldt than to that of Wheeler Robinson.[4]

We are familiar, then, with each of Nyberg's motifs, taken singly. What is original about his presentation is that he appeals to all of them together, and since he does so, the expectation lies near to hand that he will attempt some sort of a synthesis of them. As, indeed, he does. Take the first two, the Tammuz-mystery and the kingship-ideology. The Hebrews learned their kingship from the Canaanites. They could hardly

[1] op. cit., p. 64.
[2] cf. *SS*, pp. 69 ff., 101 f., 201 f.
[3] cf. *Myth and Ritual*, 1933, and *The Labyrinth*, 1935, both edited by S. H. Hooke.
[4] cf. *SS*, pp. 105-9.

do otherwise. Now the divinised founders of Canaanite dynasties were supposed to be incarnations of the dying and rising god. "We have therefore every reason to assume", says Nyberg, that among the Hebrews "the usual Canaanitish Adonis-conceptions about death and rebirth were associated with the king's person and with the dynasty-founder David, and that the king's penance was an integral part of the New-year-festival ritual".[1] In other words, the king was Tammuz.

Further, in accordance with the conception of corporate personality—to use again our familiar English term for it—the king represents the ancestor Jacob-Israel; indeed, he *is* Jacob-Israel.[2] This in its turn means that Jacob-Israel, the founder of the nation, is a kind of prototype of the king. From this there results a certain transformation of the ancestor-ideology which Israel had inherited from the desert. The ancestor comes to assume some of the features of Tammuz and to be involved in a Tammuz-drama.[3] Here the sufferings of Jacob at Bethel and the Jabbok acquire significance. Thus: "In and with the New-year-festival conception of the king's vicarious suffering, the conditions are given for ideas about the vicarious suffering of an ancestor Jacob or Israel for the people who are his seed, because with him the king was actually identified."[4]

According to Nyberg, then, what we have in the Hebrew original of Isaiah 53 is a figure of super-individual, superhuman proportions, very different from the somewhat conventional lay-figure of the LXX. He embraces the people as a whole, and the ancestor Jacob who still lives and suffers in his descendants. He is at once individual and collective. The disjunctive collective *or* individual is therefore false. The Servant is both or neither, whichever we please. He is Israel in the sense both of ancestor and people. The ancestor in him bears clear traces of the kingship-ideology, which in its turn has taken up into itself the Tammuz-Adonis drama. At the same time the text goes far beyond the kingship-ideology and the Tammuz-Adonis drama. It has completely broken through the thought-boundaries in which it was originally conceived. Indeed, we can almost speak of an allegorical use of the myth-material.

[1] op. cit., p. 68.
[2] ibid., p. 71.
[3] ibid., p. 72; cf. H. Riesenfeld, *Jésus transfiguré*, pp. 86 ff.
[4] ibid., p. 74.

The old myth has become little more than an outer vestment, a style-form.[1] The inner reality behind the drama of the Servant is of a completely different kind. This means that the Tammuz = king elements in the description should not be taken too literally. The individual features in the Servant must be derived from actual models, and they cannot be derived from the kingship-ideology, still less from any individual king. For the kingdom was fallen, dead and doomed. During the exile it stood condemned as the most shocking example of apostasy from Yahweh. Instead, the prophets themselves assumed the position of religious founders and leaders. They had long claimed the title "servants of Yahweh". They could, therefore, as well as the king, be said to represent the ancestor Israel and therewith also his descendants; they were the ideal, the true Israel. In this connexion we cannot forbear to think of Jeremiah and Isaiah, especially if, as is not impossible, there is truth in the tradition that the latter had suffered martyrdom under Manasseh.

So Nyberg comes to his final paragraph: "The spiritual development among the Greeks describes a curve which can be expressed in the formula 'from *mythos* to *logos*': the world of myth is succeeded by the world of reason, the thought-forms of myth by abstract thought-forms, and the mythical associations of ideas by systematised knowledge. The Semitic development presents a completely different curve, for which we may suitably employ the formula, 'The Word became flesh': what was once conceived in the words and thought-forms of myth is taken up into a living man, in whom it takes manhood and becomes a reality in and through him."[2]

This brings us to another Uppsala scholar, the brilliant and resourceful Ivan Engnell,[3] whose interpretation is avowedly Messianic. To understand his theory, one must know the views of the Uppsala "School" about the place of the king in the

[1] ibid., p. 78. [2] op. cit., p. 81 f.

[3] "Till frågan om Ebed Jahve-sångerna och den lidande Messias hos 'Deutero-jesaja' ", *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, 10, 1945, pp. 31-65, published in a revised English translation as "The Ebed Yahweh Songs and the Suffering Messiah in Deutero-Isaiah", in *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, Vol. 31, No. 1, Jan. 1948, pp. 1-42. See also article "Herrens Tjänare" in *Svenskt Bibliskt Uppslagsverk*, Första Bandet, utgivet av Ivan Engnell och Anton Fridrichsen, 1948, cols. 844 ff. Engnell's position is shared by Geo Widengren, *Religionens Värld*, 1945, p. 6, n. 3; similarly H. Riesenfeld, *Jésus transfiguré*, Copenhagen, 1947, pp. 81-96, and F. F. Hvidberg, *Den Israelitiske Religions Historie*, Copenhagen, 1944, p. 169.

thought and cultus of Israel.[1] On this Engnell may speak for himself. Briefly, all kings in the Ancient East were

> . . . *sacral* kings, priest-kings, with all that that implies from the cultic and ideological standpoint. Their kingdoms were thus supposed to be of divine origin, instituted by the gods, and at the same time representations of conditions in the heavenly world. . . . The king himself was of divine origin, begotten in the womb of the mother-goddess by the god himself, born as his son, indeed, before birth pre-existent as a divine being. He is "identical" with the god himself, both with the creator "high-god" and especially with "the young god", the dying and rising god of vegetation. For this reason all divine attributes are ascribed to him: he is eternal, almighty, all-wise, absolute judge, creator, and sustainer, embodying completely in himself, and therewith also responsible for, the cosmic order, "righteousness", and the seasonal changes of nature, particularly the rain, upon which all fruitfulness depends.[2]

With this "myth" there is associated an elaborate ritual. The ritual is primary to the myth, and the myth is an integral part of the ritual. The features of this "pattern" are familiar enough to readers of *Myth and Ritual.*

The particular aspect of the kingship which Engnell emphasises in connexion with the Servant is that in which the king "suffers" in the New-year ritual, when he is publicly humiliated before the god and smitten on the cheek by the high-priest.[3] This parallel was noted as long ago as 1925 by Lorenz Dürr,[4] though only in relation to the New-year festival in Babylonia, which the Prophet in exile, he thought, may actually have witnessed. Nyberg took it as "certain" that something of the kind was an element in the corresponding pre-exilic Israelite ritual,[5] though he did not adduce any direct evidence for it in the Old Testament. Engnell, however, following a suggestion by A. R. Johnson[6] that in certain Psalms the Davidic king is represented as humiliated and suffering, proposes to treat Johnson's and a great many other Psalms as "psalms of the Ebed-Yahweh type", and then to see in the Servant the future Messiah depicted in the categories of the pre-exilic kings.[7] Indeed, he goes so far as

[1] See Engnell's article "Konung" in the *Uppslagsverk*, cols. 1221-6; also *Gamla Testamentet: en traditionshistorisk inledning*, I, pp. 142 ff., and, in English, *Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East*, 1943, *passim.*

[2] *Uppslagsverk*, col. 1221.

[3] cf. *SS*, p. 102.

[4] *Ursprung und Ausbau der israel.-jüd. Heilandserwartung*, pp. 134-50.

[5] op. cit., p. 67.

[6] "The Rôle of the King in the Jerusalem Cultus", in *The Labyrinth*, pp. 71-111.

[7] *Rylands Bull.*, p. 6.

to assert that a large proportion of pre-exilic Psalms—and this for him means a large proportion of the Psalms as a whole—are Royal Psalms. The ground for this assumption is that the Temple was originally a royal chapel, with the king's person central in the cultus. The king was the incarnation of Yahweh and at the same time representative of the people over whom he ruled and in whose name he prayed. All Psalms entitled "Of David" are Royal Psalms, the term *lᵉḏāwîḏ* being a technical term meaning "for the king".[1] The "I" of such Psalms is the king, and wherever in them the psalmist is depicted as suffering, we have psalms of the Ebed-Yahweh type. Later on, so the theory goes, the "pattern" became "disintegrated" and "democratised", so that what originally referred specifically to the king came to be appropriate on the lips of private individual worshippers.

With regard to the composition of Deutero-Isaiah, Engnell dissents from the now widely current view that it was a loose concatenation of independent short oracles. Instead, he maintains that Deutero-Isaiah, including the Servant-Songs, was "*a prophetic remodelling* (or imitation) of a liturgical composition belonging to the Annual Festival".[2] This enables him to bring the last Song into fairly close proximity to Isaiah 55.3 f., the passage about "the sure mercies of David", thus strengthening his argument that the Servant is a Davidic Messianic figure.

Naturally, Engnell has to interpret the language of the "Songs" of the Servant in consistently royal categories. For example, in the first Song (42.1 ff.) the endowment of the Servant with the spirit and his imparting of *mišpāṭ* and *tôrâh*, stamp him as king, not as prophet. In the second and third Songs the epithets "my God" (49.4) and "my Lord" (50.4) are proper only upon the lips of a king, since "aboriginally it is the king alone who calls the god 'my God', with the first personal suffix".[3] The third Song "may best be rubricated as *a royal psalm of confidence* (of course still in imitation of the original cultic pattern) in parallelism with the Accadian so-called innocence psalms".[4] In the fourth Song the Tammuz-motif is as obvious as it can be, and the equation Tammuz = king is as

[1] *Studies in Divine Kingship*, p. 176 f.
[2] *Rylands Bull.*, pp. 5 f., 13: this suggestion was first made by Gyllenberg in *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*, 5, 1940, p. 87 f.
[3] *Rylands Bull.*, p. 20, n. 2. [4] ibid., p. 19 f.

clear to Engnell as it is to Nyberg. Where Engnell parts company from Nyberg—in addition to repudiating his theory that the Servant was a leper—is at the point where Nyberg goes far towards abandoning all he has had to say about the Tammuz-king motifs in the description, as though these were little more that literary reminiscences employed to embellish a portrait which was really conceived after the likeness of the prophets. Instead, Engnell adheres throughout to his interpretation of the Servant in Messianic categories, saying that he is "the [Davidic] Messiah *victorious and triumphant* through his vicarious suffering".[1]

To sum up the differences between Engnell and Nyberg: Nyberg's theory is complicated, Engnell's is simplicity itself, granted its presuppositions; Nyberg makes a synthesis of the myth-motifs, Engnell fuses them into one, the oscillation between individual and collective being sufficiently accounted for by the fact that the king embodies in himself the whole people, whose guilt he takes upon himself and atones for.

It seems to me that we need to be a good deal clearer than as yet we have any right to be about the Tammuz-kingship ideology before we can venture to apply it rigorously to such texts as the Servant-Songs. For example, only recently Cyrus H. Gordon has renounced what he now calls "the erroneous view" that "Tammuz is said to die and revive *annually*: a generally accepted idea for which I can find no support in the Mesopotamian mythological texts; annual celebrations prove nothing, for holidays tend to be annual affairs; no one would maintain that Columbus discovers America every year because Columbus day is celebrated every 12th October".[2] The Ugaritic texts, too, he says, "tell us nothing of any annual death and revival of Baal".[3] Even Engnell volunteers to say that the complete "cultic pattern" is a *Konstruktion*, that it naturally took different forms in a petty city kingdom in Canaan from what it did in the great centres of culture, and that "the utmost caution must be exercised when we attempt to frame a reconstruction of it out of its varied forms".[4] Yet when he reads in the first Servant-Song that the Servant is endowed with the spirit, he immediately takes that as one of "the royal qualifications of the

[1] ibid., p. 23.
[2] *Ugaritic Literature*, Rome, 1949, p. 3, n. 2.
[3] ibid., p. 4.
[4] *Uppslagsverk*, I, col. 1222.

Servant", this, presumably, because "the spirit plays a special rôle in the kingship-ideology".[1] The idea appears to be that the king unites in himself the offices of both priest and prophet, so that when he delegates his priestly and prophetic functions to cultic specialists, they, the priest and the prophet, really derive the spirit from him.[2] This, of course, is pure *Konstruktion.* But so far as I have been able to discover, the idea of the spirit of Yahweh is peculiarly Israelite, and no real parallels to it are forthcoming from outside Israel.[3] Moreover, in Israel the conception of the spirit is earlier than the monarchy, and Saul, the first king, first received the spirit when he came into contact with prophets who already had it. Considerations like these should make us hesitate to force the Servant into the pattern of kingship.

We come now to the third corner of the triangle, Copenhagen. Aage Bentzen is a prolific writer and his contributions to the debate are extensive.[4] It should be said that he shares to a large extent the Uppsala theories on the sacral kingship. On general critical questions his affinities are usually with Mowinckel, though on the particular problem of the relation of the Servant-Songs to their contexts he stands nearer to Uppsala than to Oslo.

Bentzen prefaces his discussion[5] by referring to the new points of view which Nyberg and Engnell have brought into the debate—"with the accustomed energy and temperamental one-sidedness of these uncommonly stimulating researchers in the carrying through of their pet theories."[6] His most polemical passages are directed against Engnell's attempt to force the Songs into the strait-jacket of the Tammuz-kingship ideology. For example, when Engnell takes the first Song in close connexion with its preceding context—and Bentzen agrees with him that it is right to do this—the word *mᵉḇaśśēr* in 41.27

[1] Article "Ande", in *Uppslagsverk,* I, col. 66.

[2] ibid., col. 67.

[3] cf. J. Hehn, "Zum Problem des Geistes im alten Orient und im AT", *Z.A.W.,* 43, 1924, pp. 210-25.

[4] *Jesaja fortolket,* Bind II, 1943; ibid., Bind I, 1944, pp. viii-xi; *Messias—Moses redivivus—Menschensohn* (in German), Zürich, 1948; *Introduction to the Old Testament,* Eng. Trans. revised, from the Danish edn., 1941, Copenhagen, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 110-113; "On the ideas of 'the old' and 'the new' in Deutero-Isaiah", in *Studia Theologica,* I, Lund, 1947, pp. 183-7; see also *Det sakrale Kongedømme,* Copenhagen, 1945.

[5] In *Messias—Moses redivivus—Menschensohn.* [6] op. cit., p. 43.

(E.VV. "one that bringeth good tidings") should make it clear that the subject of the Song is a *prophet*, not a king. When Engnell says that "the king was in principle the only receiver of oracles", to say "in principle" really begs the question, because even if that were true of the king "in the grey antiquity of the hypothetical paradise", it is no longer true in the Old Testament as we know it.[1] To say that the expression "my Lord" is only proper on the lips of a king is "simply bad method".[2] If we are to say, whenever we meet with language reminiscent of the kingship-ideology, that we are dealing with a king, we shall have to say that Jeremiah was a king, because his "colloquies" and the account of his call could quite easily be made to bear that interpretation.[3] Linguistic parallels with the Tammuz-ideology have an antiquarian interest, but for the understanding of the text as the Prophet intended it they are quite irrelevant. There is much that is "typically royal" in the descriptions, but "the democratisation of the ritual must have gone so far by the time of Deutero-Isaiah that we cannot answer this question simply by an unqualified assertion (*Dekret*). The context must decide whether the Prophet thought of the Servant as king or as prophet."[4]

In his Isaiah Commentary Bentzen took exception to Nyberg's "tradition" (53.1)—"How can an old myth be something which no one has ever heard or seen before?"[5] To this Engnell retorts[6] that "the mysterious message of the ancient cult-myth is, contemporaneously, always new, i.e. experienced over and over again." But Bentzen sticks to his point:

> The rehabilitation of the Servant is something "new", not merely in the meaning that we find in the "new song" of the Accession-Psalms, that the circle of the year is begun anew, that the world through the ritual is once more secured, "new" created again; but something *absolutely* new. *Deutero-Isaiah makes use of the old forms of the New-year-festival and of the conception of the "new-creation" of the world, but in a quite different, "literal" way. It is not only the cultic repetition of the "old" reality of creation,* (which, in Bentzen's view, meant for Israel) *the Exodus from Egypt. The "new" is something greater than that which was experienced in the old festival.*[7]

Bentzen further objects to Engnell that his interpretation denies *a priori* the "historical reality" (*Historizität*) of the Ser-

[1] ibid., p. 52. [2] ibid., p. 51. [3] ibid., pp. 53, 62, n. 37.
[4] ibid., p. 54. [5] *Jesaja fortolket*, II, p. 103.
[6] *Rylands Bull.*, p. 30, n. 6. [7] *Messias u.s.w.*, p. 55.

vant. If everything is dissolved into Messianic-mythology we may just as well deny the historicity of Cyrus in Isaiah 40-55. Besides, if the Prophet was composing an imitation of a New-year liturgy he must have had in mind some actualisation of the myth. He must have thought of a particular Davidic prince, much as Haggai and Zechariah later saw in Zerubbabel the Messiah.[1]

In Bentzen's view, then, the kingship-ideology is not the only possibility for the interpretation of the texts. Many features in the portrait of the Servant are common to both king and prophet. And when Engnell says that the king is in principle "the primeval prophet" (*Urprofet*), he should go farther back. For the all comprehensive "original phenomenon" (*Urphänomenon*) is not the king but the "primeval man" (*Urmensch*), from whom chieftain, king, priest, prophet, and the rest, all derive their several functions. We can therefore equally well, and in the present case better, think with Nyberg in terms of prophet, ancestor, and cult-founder.[2]

The only thing with which Bentzen finds fault in Nyberg's final interpretation of the Servant-figure in prophetic categories is his failure to find any place for Moses as model for the Servant. This, for Bentzen, is a feature of cardinal importance. Deutero-Isaiah pictured the return from Babylon as a new and more wonderful Exodus, from which it is clear that the figure of Moses must have played for him an important rôle, a rôle which both Nyberg and Engnell quite ignore. The Deutero-Isaianic Messiah is the Moses *redivivus* of the "new world-order" with a "new" cult-myth. This raises the question of his relation to "David" in 55.3 ff. The "I" of two of the Servant-Songs (49.1 ff., 50.4-9) shows that the Prophet must have taken upon himself the task of the new Moses. The coming David must thus by the side of him be thought of as an independent leader of the return. When we consider how the Exodus traditions

[1] ibid., p. 60 f. In a concluding note to the last paragraph of the English edition of his 'Ebed-Yahweh article Engnell says he has been criticised by Nyberg (he gives no reference and I have been unable to find one) on the ground that he has denied the foundations of the Servant-conception in real life. This charge he repudiates, and retorts with a *tu quoque* that "on the contrary it would seem very questionable how Nyberg's own, newly-repeated interpretation of 'Ebed Yahweh as a 'prophetic collective' or 'Isaiah as a collective figure' could imply a stronger and firmer 'foundation in real life' than the interpretation of the Ebed as the Davidic Messiah."

[2] ibid., p. 61 f.

served as a model for Deutero-Isaiah, it is very probable that he thought of *two* leaders of the coming time, corresponding to Moses and Aaron, or better to Moses and Joshua. In this partnership the Servant = Moses *redivivus* is the Prophet himself. We thus reach the conclusion: "The 'Ebed Yahweh' is Deutero-Isaiah and Israel, the new Moses ('Messiah') and the community for which he is ready to die, in one person."[1]

What this means may not be immediately clear, so it may be well to set beside it Bentzen's conclusion as he expresses it in his *Introduction*.[2] After saying, "I think it most probable that we have to uphold the autobiographical theory of the Servant Songs, as it was propounded by Mowinckel in 1921", he ends:

> When all this is taken together, we come to the assumption that the Servant of Yahweh is not only an ideal figure of Messianic character, but also a concrete historical person, identical with the prophet. The prophet perceived in the Servant a model for his own life. Like Moses he has to identify himself with his people "for better and for worse". It may be expressed in the following way: The Servant Songs belong to the same circle as the rest of the Deutero-Isaianic poems, representing the profoundest thoughts uttered concerning the problem of suffering and concerning the task of Israel as the prophet of Yahweh to the world, expressed in one individual figure, in whom the prophet and his disciples have seen both a Messianic promise and a programme for their personal life. 'Ebed Yahweh is both the Messiah and Israel and Deutero-Isaiah and his band of disciples.

This seems to mean that the Servant was an ideal figure, Messianic after the pattern of Moses, who was to deliver Israel in the near-approaching new Exodus, and that the Prophet sought to actualise the figure in his own person and in the lives of his disciples. The Davidic Messiah—if we may call him so—of Isaiah 55.3 ff. is another person, a kind of Joshua to the Servant Moses.

What is difficult to grasp in this presentation is the identification of someone now living with an ideal figure still to come. As I see it, Bentzen has complicated the situation by assuming (1) that the autobiographical form of two of the Songs obliges us to conclude that the Servant was the Prophet, and (2) that the last Song must have some relation to the expected deliverance from Babylon. With regard to (1): the Songs, from first to last, are set in a framework of divine pronouncements, in "tenses" which are timeless, if not actually future. Surely then,

[1] ibid., p. 66 f.

[2] Engl. ed., Vol. II, p. 112 f.

within the framework, the Servant may speak in the first person without our being obliged to conclude that he and the author of the poems are the same person.[1] In any case, the Servant's task of raising up the tribes of Jacob and restoring the survivors of Israel is ancillary to the conversion of the Gentiles (49.5 f.), and it looks as if Yahweh directs the Servant to abandon it for the more far-reaching task.[2] In regard to (2): I can see no definite political background to the last Song,[3] nor any reason why Bentzen should, as it would seem, regard the *šᵉmû'âh* of 53.1 as the same thing as the *ḥᵉḏāšâh/ôṯ* ("new things") of 42.9, 43.18 f.[4] The *ḥᵃdāšâh* refers to the new Exodus, the *šᵉmû'âh* to the atoning death and rehabilitation of the Servant. It looks to me as if the consequences of regarding Deutero-Isaiah as a co-ordinated literary whole involve us in such complications, that it is much more likely that the chapters are a collection of more or less separate oracles, even though, as I have tried to prove elsewhere, the Songs are by the author of the main prophecy.[5]

I have put these difficulties to Bentzen himself and he has replied[6] in these terms:

> You say, you cannot combine someone who is to come with someone who is already there. But I would answer that you have to do that in the case of the fulfilment of the prophecy. Jesus is both the present Suffering Servant and the coming Christ in the Glory of the World to Come. He is so, whether you think of the Gospel narratives or in sacramental-ecclesiastical categories. I think it is theologically very interesting, methodically, that in this case we can use the fulfilment as a means of explaining the O.T. text. The Servant in Isaiah II is, in my conception, the personal centre of a religious *corpus Christi*, in his life and after his death living in his circle of disciples like Jacob in the *sod* (E.VV. "council") of his sons (Gen. 49.6), and he has believed in his own being the future saviour of Israel. In my opinion the answer to your remarks lies in the idea of "corporate personality" applied to the prophet-founder and his disciples.

This, at last, I think, is reasonably clear. Bentzen's position, even to details, is very similar to that of Wheeler Robinson.[7]

[1] cf. *SS*, p. 210. [2] ibid., pp. 143 f., 147. [3] ibid., p. 210.

[4] *Studia Theologica* I, p. 185; cf. my article "The 'Former Things' and the 'New Things' in Deutero-Isaiah", in *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy*, ed. H. H. Rowley, p. 125 f.

[5] cf. *SS*, p. 186. [6] In a personal letter dated 18th October 1949.

[7] *The Cross of the Servant*, esp. III, The Messiah-Servant, pp. 64-87. This is the more striking because, although Bentzen is of course familiar with Wheeler Robinson's exposition of "Corporate personality" in *Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments*, ed. J. Hempel, 1936, I do not imagine that he has ever read *The Cross of the Servant*.

Concerning the composition of Deutero-Isaiah, Bentzen says that Mowinckel wrote a long criticism of his views some years ago,[1] much on the same lines as I have done, but that he has lately examined the question afresh and finds his own views better grounded than before. As I see it, the solution of the isagogic problem is likely to be decisive for the problem of the identity of the Servant. If we take Isaiah 40-55 as a whole, exactly as it stands, it would seem as if we must attempt some kind of synthesis of the seemingly disparate elements in it—as that the Servant *is* Israel (41.8 f., etc.), the Servant has a mission *to* Israel (49.5 f.), the Servant is an individual still to come (52.13-53.12). The result will be what is really a theological interpretation, much on Bentzen's and Wheeler Robinson's lines, though I still do not find it necessary to conclude from the "I" in two of the Songs that the Servant must be the Prophet himself. It seems to me that the last Song is *sui generis*, in a real sense distinct from the main body of Deutero-Isaiah, and that in it the Servant is an individual still to come. Bentzen's synthesis is devotionally, theologically, and religiously valuable, and ultimately we all come to it when we think of the Servant as Christ, the Head of the redeemed and redemptive society of the Church which is His body. That *is* the ultimate interpretation and fulfilment of the prophecy. The question is whether the sixth-century Prophet, in the moment of supreme inspiration when he composed the last Song, was thinking of the Servant in so many different (even if related) categories as Israel, Moses, the Messiah, and himself. Bentzen thinks he did, and we must leave it at that.

[1] In *Dansk Teologisik Tidsskrift.*

THE RELATION OF GOD AND MAN IN THE WRITINGS OF NICOLAS BERDYAEV[1]

by The Rev. DONALD G. M. MACKAY

Nicholas Berdyaev was born in 1874 in Kiev, the cradle of Russian Christian culture. He was a scion of an aristocratic family, but while studying in Kiev, came under the influence of the writings of Kant and Hegel. While Hegel himself drew conservative conclusions from his own system, Karl Marx drew revolutionary conclusions, and the young Berdyaev followed Marx and the early Communists. Expelled from the University for these Marxist leanings, he found himself in exile in the north in company with some of the founders of Russian Communism. Yet all through his life he remained an independent and a rebel. Although he accepted the economic and political conclusions of Marxism, he rejected the dialectical materialism on which they were supposedly based, and as a result he was again exiled in 1922, this time by the Communists, after he had served as professor of philosophy in Moscow University. Most of the rest of his life was spent in exile in Paris, with the little group of Russian emigrés, but as he remained true to the Marxian analysis and critique of capitalism to the end of his days, and loathed the bourgeois order of society as cordially as any disciple of Lenin, he was naturally in little favour with them. He died there on 24th March 1948 at his writing table.[2]

It is significant and not surprising that the dominant theme of one who suffered first at the hands of a tyranny of the Right, and then at the hands of a tyranny of the Left should be the "freedom of the spirit". This creative freedom is the essential

[1] Since this essay was written, two books on Nicolas Berdyaev have appeared. In the first (*Introduction to Berdyaev* by O. Fielding Clarke (Geoffrey Bles)), a close friend of Berdyaev's gives a sympathetic and informative study both of the man himself, and of the Russian background from which he drew his inspiration. In the second (*Nicolas Berdyaev* by George Seaver (James Clarke & Co. Ltd.)) a notable attempt is made to bring out in concise form the implications of Berdyaev's personalist philosophy.

[2] The information about Berdyaev's life is taken from an article by Rev. O. Fielding Clarke, one of his translators, published in *The Listener*, 24th June 1948.

mark of man's personality in his view. "Freedom", he says, "has brought me to Christ, and I know of no other path leading to him."[1] In an age where mankind is increasingly regimented and depersonalised, this conviction gives his writings a prophetic value.

It is a dictum of his that both philosophy and theology should take their start, neither with God, nor with man (there being no bridge between these two principles), but with the God-Man.[2] This is so because the basic and original phenomenon of the religious life—the raw material of theology, so to speak—is the meeting and mutual interaction of God and man, the movement of God towards man, and of man towards God. Of God as He is in Himself we can know nothing, and man apart from God ceases to be a person, and becomes only an individual, almost a mere animal.

That man is made in the image of God is for Berdyaev a concept of profound meaning and mystery. "Man lives in an agony, and he wants to know who he is, where he comes from, and whither he is going."[3] The cause of his agony and his perplexity, as George Seaver points out in a penetrating essay on Berdyaev in *Transformation Three*,[4] is to be found in the fact that he is at one and the same time both an *individual* and a *person*. As individual, he is a part of nature, a member of society, a number on a National Registration Card, a name on a voter's list, a unit in a factory organisation, a *means* to an end. He is an object, the product of his environment, a slave to tradition and custom, capable of communication with other individuals but incapable of communion with them as persons.[5]

As person he is *subject*, free, not part of anything, unique, a creative being, indestructible: not an aggregate, or a unit in a mass, but a primary whole, a microcosm, reflecting, potentially at least, in himself the whole universe.

"When a person enters the world, a unique and unrepeatable personality, then the world-process is broken into, and compelled to change its course."[6] Personality thus belongs to the realm of the spiritual: it is subject neither to time nor space: it makes its appearance from another world: "It bears witness

[1] *Freedom and the Spirit*, Introd. p. x.
[2] ibid., p. 189.
[3] *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 20.
[4] *Transformation Three* (Lindsay Drummond Ltd.).
[5] *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 35.
[6] ibid., p. 21.

to the fact that man is the point of intersection of two worlds, that in him takes place the conflict between spirit and nature, freedom and necessity, independence and dependence."[1]

This then is the dual nature of man, and Berdyaev is fully aware of the contrast between his doctrine of man—"theandric anthropomorphism" as he calls it—and the views of Western theologians, who belittle man and insist that he is sinful, insignificant and impotent, and that there is nothing divine in him, except what is conveyed to him by a special act of grace.

"Theologians will reply in alarm that Jesus Christ alone was God-Man and that man is a created being, and cannot be God-Man. But this way of arguing remains within the confines of theological rationalism. Granted that man is not God-Man in the sense in which Christ is God-Man, the unique One, yet there is a divine element in man. There are so to speak, two natures in him. There is within him the intersection of two worlds. He bears within himself the image which is both the image of man and the image of God and is the image of man in so far as the image of God is actualised. . . . That man bears within himself the image of God and in virtue of that becomes man, is a symbol. One cannot work out an intellectual concept about it."[2] And from that point he goes on to attack monist and dualist philosophies which, he maintains, can never understand this mystery of the divine-humanity of man. Berdyaev is particularly averse to "Western rationalism". In his judgment its method of objectivisation and analysis, as applied to ultimate reality, presents a barrier to all true knowledge, i.e. to knowledge of the Divine Being who exists beyond our human history, but reveals Himself within it.

The task which confronts the theologian may therefore from one angle be accurately described as the attempt to discover "The Meaning of History". In this undertaking empirical observation and objective analysis take us only a short way. The knowledge aimed at is not a philosophical statement but a mystical insight, and only as the subject identifies himself with the object of his knowledge is the gulf between phenomenon and noumenon overcome and true knowledge attained. In this sense, history, of course, includes scriptural history, the story of the coming of the God-Man, Jesus Christ.

[1] ibid., p. 36; cf. also *Solitude of Society*, p. 159 ff. [2] *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 45.

Berdyaev makes some use of Plato's theory of knowledge as reminiscence. According to the Socratic theory of education, teaching consists, not in imparting knowledge but in eliciting from the pupil what he already knows unconsciously. In similar fashion, Berdyaev maintains that any penetration into such a crucial historical epoch as that of the first century A.D. yields truth only if there occurs such an act of remembrance. In some mysterious way, all the past experience of mankind is the heritage of a newborn child. "Each man represents by virtue of his inner nature a sort of microcosm in which the whole world of reality and all the historical epochs combine and co-exist."[1] Thus the task of a philosophy of history is a clarification of man's inner consciousness, for only deep down in *himself* can man really discover the secrets of time.

In practice, this "historical memory" takes the form of *myths*, and it should be observed that in the scheme of Berdyaev's thinking, the concept of "myth" is of great importance. He starts from St. Paul's saying: "But *now* we see in a mirror darkly . . . " and insists that all real knowledge of God is symbolic. True knowledge of God comes from *real* symbols, i.e. symbols which are not chosen capriciously by the human mind, but which already exist in the world, and by their presence bear witness to the fact of the continuity of the divine and the human. Myths belong to the class of real symbols. They are the expression of the spiritual consciousness of different epochs. A myth is not a fiction, but a reality: though of a different order from that of the so-called objective world of empirical fact. It is the story of a past event of spiritual significance as that event is preserved in the popular memory. "Myth is the concrete recital of events and original phenomena, symbolised in the natural world, which has engraved itself on the language, memory and creative energy of the people. The original reality pre-exists in the spiritual world in the deepest mystery. But the symbols, signs and reflections of this primitive reality are not given us in the natural world. Myth presents to us the supernatural in the natural, the super-sensible in the sensible, the spiritual life in the life of the flesh. It brings two worlds together symbolically."[2]

As an example of myth in this sense Berdyaev quotes the

[1] *Meaning of History*, p. 22. [2] *Freedom of the Spirit*, p. 70.

story of the Fall of Adam and Eve. To judge this on empirical scientific standards, or to take it absolutely literally would destroy its inner value, but symbolically interpreted it contains a primary truth of the religious experience, the separation of man and the world from God.

Knowledge of the true relation between God and man is therefore not to be found either by objective analysis of the Being of God or of the state of man, but rather by an act of historical remembrance whereby through the myths and in virtue of our community of nature with the Divine, we penetrate through the symbols apparent in terrestrial history and grasp in some measure the ultimate meaning and purpose of the celestial history which lies beyond. In this connexion he quotes with approval a saying of Vladimir Solovyev: "All that we see is simply the reflection and shadow of that which is invisible to our eyes." All terrestrial history then is symbolic of some deeper reality beyond, not a static reality, but a dynamic one whose inner life is manifested symbolically here below. Philosophy of history thus becomes what Berdyaev calls "a sort of reversed prophecy", for "only a prophetic vision can re-animate the dead body of history, and inform the lifeless static with the inner fire of spiritual movement."[1]

This means that we must take history seriously. It has both meaning and purpose. It is throughout the record of God's dealings with man. Any Christian philosophy of history must therefore part company with Greek philosophy since a dynamic interpretation of history was foreign to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, who interpreted the world aesthetically as a finite and harmonious cosmos. Christianity, on the other hand, following the Hebrew prophets, conceives history as a drama, a tragic drama, in which there is constant conflict between the forces of light and darkness. "The character of the religious and historical process presupposes a profound clash and interaction between Divinity and man, between Providence, divine fatality and necessity on the one hand, and the unfathomable mystery of human freedom on the other."[2]

We are now ready to pass to Berdyaev's discussion of the nature of God and his relation to man, but as we do so, we must note at least in passing that in addition to his belief in

[1] *Meaning of History*, p. 41. [2] ibid., p. 37.

historical remembrance, Berdyaev places great value upon the discoveries of the mystics, notably St. Simon, the new Theologian, Jacob Boehme, and Eckhardt. "Authentic mysticism", he says, "is a *reality*: it is a preoccupation with primal realities, with the existential mystery, whereas orthodox theology treats only of socially consecrated symbols. . . . It is a revelation of revelations, a revelation of the realities behind symbols . . . a spiritual path leading to the highest achievements."[1] He is conscious, however, of the inherent dangers of the mystical path, and protests vigorously against any attempt to base mystical experience on a monistic metaphysic, insisting that a metaphysical explanation of such statements as that of Eckhardt's: "If I were not, God would not be" deforms the profound truth contained therein.

The proper place to start, according to Berdyaev, in any attempt to understand the nature of God is neither with the Absolute nor with man but with the God-Man.[2] For the starting-point of all religious experience and the primary phenomenon of the religious life is the meeting of God with man.

In Christianity this fact is given clear expression by the myth of the Incarnation. "The fundamental myth of Christianity is the drama of love and freedom between God and man, the birth of God in man, and the birth of man in God."[3] In the coming of Christ, there is a perfect union of these two natures, of God and man, in one person, and only thus can the mystery of religious experience be explained.

"We can only think of God symbolically and mythologically," states Berdyaev[4] and this, he contends, is just what western rationalist theology has failed to do. Instead it has tried to construct a purely objective concept of God, regarding Him as the "objective Creator" among His objective creatures. It has described God, not as a living and dynamic reality, but as an abstract intellectual concept.

But, as George Seaver points out clearly, for Berdyaev, as for every mystic, God cannot be envisaged thus. "God is not an object to any man, any more than man is an object to God. He cannot be known, as other objects external to consciousness

[1] *Spirit and Reality*, p. 131; cf. also *Freedom of the Spirit*, Chap. 7.
[2] *Freedom of the Spirit*, p. 189. [3] ibid., p. 189.
[4] *Destiny of Man*, p. 38.

are known: He can only be experienced. He is the Subjective Ground of all Being."[1] "Thou in Me, and I in Thee"—that is the only possible description of the relation between God and man.

The poverty of rationalistic theology is seen in the fact that it destroys the mystery inherent in the divine revelation—*Das Heilige*—and the two natures, God and man, fall irrevocably apart. In monism, God becomes an abstract Absolute, without any active inner life, devoid of all emotional states, without the movement and tragedy which Berdyaev discerns within the life of the Trinity. Similarly the traditional theological concept of God as an absolute Monarch, autocratic and self-sufficient is out of keeping with the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity. Creation becomes an act of divine caprice, and the Atonement inexplicable.

Berdyaev prefers therefore to think of God in company with Nicolas of Cusa and the mystics as the *coincidentia oppositorum*, the meeting-place of opposing forces. Such an idea defies rational analysis. "In God absolute rest is connected with absolute motion." "Our idea of God *must* be contradictory for opposites are naturally identified in Him." "The fact that God longs for His Other Self, for the free response of his love, shews not that there is any insufficiency or absence of fullness in the Divine Being, but precisely the superabundance of His plenitude and perfection."[2]

It is at this point that Berdyaev turns to the mystics for help, quoting the saying of St. Simon: "Come Thou, who remainest unmoved, yet who ever moveth and dost direct Thyself towards us." God is Mystery towards which man ascends and with which he enters into communion. The highest form of this communion, penetrating beyond the symbols, is mystical communion, and in this man is both one with God, and yet completely himself. It is communion, not abstract unity.

Berdyaev is strongly attracted by the curious doctrine of Jacob Boehme that there is a primal reality beyond God, a dark irrational sphere, the "*Ungrund*", the source of freedom. To describe this in metaphysical terms would, he admits, be heresy, yet following Eckhardt and Boehme he holds that God and His creation are inseparably linked. "Before the creation

[1] George Seaver; loc. cit. [2] *Freedom of the Spirit*, p. 191.

existed, God was not God" (Eckhardt). God "became" God in relation to the creation. "In the primal void of Divine nothingness, God and creation, God and man disappear . . ." Negative mystical theology penetrates beyond the Creator in His relationship to Creation and beyond God in His intercourse with man. The Creator is manifested at the same time as creation, God and man appear simultaneously."[1]

Creation of the world implies movement in the Divine Being. It is a dramatic event in the Divine Life. We should not, he thinks, be afraid to ascribe movement to God, as though it were a sign of imperfection. It might equally well be said that immobility is an imperfection for it implies a lack of the divine quality of life. In the Christian revelation of God, there is sacrifice and tragedy but this denotes the fullness, not the poverty, of the Divine Life. To deny this tragedy in the Divine Life is possible only at the cost of denying Christ, His Cross, the sacrifice of the Son of God.

By the path of mysticism and the use of myth, Berdyaev even attempts to penetrate into the mystery of the inner life of God, and in this regard he gives a remarkable exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. He notes that rationalistic theologians have always been utterly at a loss to portray the inner life of the Deity, because they have conceived Him in terms of an abstract Absolute. Men have been afraid to ascribe to God the inner conflict and tragedy characteristic of all life: yet they have had no hesitation in ascribing to Him anger, jealousy, vengeance and other emotions which are regarded in man as reprehensible.

It is from the doctrine of the Trinity and the idea of the God-Man that we are able to perceive the inner movement within God, a movement which explains the mystery of creation. The Trinity is to be interpreted through the search of man for God, and God for man.

Man in himself is conscious of a hunger for God: that is the primary religious experience. But at the same time spiritual experience convinces us that God seeks for man, that "He yearns for the birth of man who shall reflect his own image."[2] Infinite love cannot exist without a loving subject and a loved object. It is the Son who responds to this desire of God for His

[1] ibid., p. 194. [2] ibid., p. 197.

Other Self. The Son, "born from all eternity", is the God-Man who raises human nature from the depths of sin and links us to the heart of the Trinity. In Him "is comprised the whole human race, mankind in all its multiplicity and form."[1] He is the Spiritual Adam through whom humanity, and indeed the whole cosmos responds to the appeal of Divine Love. "Through the Son we return to the bosom of the Father." With Him, there begins a new race of human beings, the "race of Christs", born and regenerated by the Spirit.

The Divine mystery is not fulfilled, however, in the relation between Father and Son, but presupposes the existence of Three Persons. "The loving subject and the loved object find the fullness of their life in the Kingdom of Love which is the Third Person. The Kingdom of God (i.e. the Kingdom of an enlightened humanity and enlightened cosmos) is realised only through the Holy Spirit in whom the drama is completed, and the circle closed."[2] It is only within the Trinity that "the divine love is given up in perfection, that the loving subject and the loved object create their Kingdom and find the content and fullness of their life".

History therefore is a symbol. It is neither a meaningless jumble nor automatic progress, but a reflection on the terrestrial plane of the eternal drama of the inner life of the Three-Personed God, whose second face is divine humanity.

The Second Person of the Trinity is to be understood in relation to redemption, which Berdyaev, in common with the Eastern Church, links closely to the Incarnation. Christ is the Second Adam, assuming in Himself the whole of humanity. It is through His sharing in our nature, that we are delivered from the corruption of the Fall, and linked again with the Divine Father. In Christ, man in response to God's love overcomes both sin and death by a heroic effort of suffering and sacrifice. Human nature therefore, through the free creative act of Christ, co-operates in the work of redemption, which is a dual process in which both God and man have a share.

In this way the absolute kinship between God and man is revealed, and both God's essential freedom and man's essential freedom are safeguarded. This position Berdyaev calls "theandric anthropomorphism"—a creative and Christian stand-

[1] ibid., p. 198. [2] ibid., p. 199.

point, he maintains, which recognises the independent existence of the two natures, and the reciprocal action of divine grace and human freedom.[1] Man, the "other divine", makes a free response to the call of God and thus reveals his creative nature. But this is possible only because Christ the God-Man has identified Himself with man, and restored the image of God in him which was obliterated at the Fall.

We are now at the crux of the problem as it presents itself in this essay. Does this "theandric anthropomorphism" contain the germ of a new theological approach which will cut across the old liberal-orthodox controversy and cast new light on the problems that face the theologian?

As stated, it contains already the antinomy which is present in all Christian thought. On the one hand, we may conceive that God, by an act of grace, enables man, who has lost his freedom in the Fall, to overcome sin and thus re-enter the divine fellowship. On the other, we may believe that only by a free response can man satisfy God, a response which *he* must make. The former doctrine involves an act of irresistible grace, and thus overrules man's essential freedom. The latter fails to do justice to the far-reaching power of sin.

It is the merit of Berdyaev's doctrine that it takes man's freedom very seriously. "Freedom", he says, "is a fatal gift which dooms man to perdition." It is not even to be thought of as the gift of the Creator, but is part of man's essential nature, which he derives from the *Ungrund*, the "primal pre-existential freedom", τὸ μὴ ὄν or Non-Being, out of which God and creature alike take their origin.[2] It is inalienable, and possesses a fatal dialectic by which it tends to pass into its opposite. In his desire to exercise his freedom to the full, man becomes a slave. "God the Creator cannot be held responsible for freedom which gave rise to evil. Man is the child of God and the child of freedom—of nothing, of non-being, μὴ ὄν."[3] Only by virtue of this uncreated freedom, this essential part of his being, can man make a real response to God's act of love in Christ. He cannot be coerced into the Kingdom of God.

Thus Man as personality cannot be in any sense a means to an end, even to God. "The theological doctrine that God

[1] *Freedom of the Spirit*, p. 209.
[2] *Destiny of Man*, p. 33.
[3] ibid., p. 34.

created man for His own glory and praise is degrading to man, and degrading to God also. It is a striking fact that any doctrine which is degrading to man also degrades God. The relation of personality to personality, even the most exalted personality of God, cannot be a relation of means and end: all personality is an end in itself."[1]

He points out on more than one occasion the erroneous theodicy in which traditional theology is involved by its failure to take man's freedom seriously. Here he finds a fruitful moral source of atheism, for not only do the wicked hate God because He prevents them doing evil, but the good are ready to hate Him for not preventing the wicked from doing evil and for allowing its existence in the world.[2] In terms of the traditional theology, he says, God the Creator can be in no way absolved for the responsibility for pain and evil. In His omniscience He foresees all the terrible consequences of His gift of freedom, and the perdition and eternal torments to which it condemns many of His creatures. Not only so, but in expecting an answer from man whom He has endowed with freedom, He is only expecting an answer from Himself. He knows the answer and is only playing with Himself. "The logical conclusion is that God has from all eternity predetermined some to eternal salvation and others to eternal damnation. Calvin's horrible doctrine has the great merit of being a *reductio ad absurdum*.[3]

Berdyaev finds escape from this antinomy in a negative theology, which he derives from Nicolas of Cusa, and which makes no attempt to rationalise the mystery behind life. Man's freedom is real and primary, and it is in virtue of it that he can fulfil his personality by entering into an I-Thou relationship with God, for "God as Personality does not desire a man over whom He can rule, or who ought to praise Him, but man as personality who answers His call and with whom communion of Love is possible."[4] Man thus bears within himself the image of God: this is the secret and meaning of the Divine Humanity: he is also the possessor of an uncreated freedom of spirit, and his tragic destiny depends on whether he uses it to realise his true personality by communion with God or to enslave himself to the natural world of which he is also in some sense a part.

[1] *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 39.
[2] *Destiny of Man*, p. 31.
[3] ibid., pp. 32-33.
[4] *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 40.

In this struggle between good and evil, he is bound to become involved in the suffering of the world, and indeed the most fundamental characteristic of personality is its capacity to suffer. Suffering is inherent in the nature of God, and without suffering and the catharsis it brings, there can be no full development of personality. Dostoievsky maintained, he reminds us, that suffering was the unique *raison d'être* of the consciousness. It is through suffering, and disinterestedness in his own fate, that man rises to the highest development of his nature, and shares in the creative works of God.

More than sufficient has been said now to indicate the general outline of Berdyaev's philosophy of religion. In conclusion, let us make some general observations upon its validity and value. To pin down his extraordinary discursive and meteoric thought to definite criticism is not easy: it is rather like picking up pieces of quick-silver.

There are, however, in all his thinking two sources which are not in my judgment wholly reconciled. On the one hand, he borrows deeply from the writings of the "Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite", who in the fifth century attempted to combine Alexandrian allegorism with Neo-Platonism. His influence upon mysticism and scholasticism was considerable, and it comes to Berdyaev through the writings of Solovyev. He made a distinction between Affirmative and Negative Theology. Negatively, God was beyond all human attributes, and earthly categories, but affirmatively He could be known, in part at least, through symbols. Man could attain to knowledge of this "supra-essential" Being through a symbolic understanding of dogma and ritual and history. He further held to the mystical monistic philosophy of Neo-Platonism, and combined it with a belief in the tri-unity of God and in the existence of a heavenly hierarchy of whom the earthly hierarchy is a reflection and a descent.

On the other hand, Berdyaev is profoundly influenced by German mysticism, and borrows deeply from Schelling, whose monistic philosophy was influenced by Jacob Boehme. "I regard myself", he says, "as being a Christian theosophist in the sense in which Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Jacob Boehme, St. Martin, Francis Baader and Vladimir Solovyev were Christian theo-

sophists."[1] He quotes continually with approval from Boehme and Eckhardt, and also from Eastern mystics, like St. Simon the New Theologian, whose outlook is similar.

He is thus drawn between the symbolic interpretation of the Divine Reality, derived from Dionysius with its accompanying dualism, and the mystical interpretation of God, with its attendant monism. Despite his efforts, and religious insight, that conflict is, I think, never wholly resolved.

In his writings we miss almost entirely the prophetic consciousness of God as both transcendent and immanent, standing over against history as Judge, yet working in and through it. The prophets believed that God had a plain word to speak to mankind, a word of rebuke, of pardon and of exhortation. But there is little sign of this "plain speaking" in Berdyaev's interpretation of the Divine revelation. The nature of God and of His Will are wrapped up in mysterious symbols and myths which yield their esoteric truth only to initiates who have trodden the mystic way. It could easily be shown, however, that the idea of a personal relationship between God and man comes, not from mysticism, but from prophetism. Berdyaev never acknowledges this debt. It may be that in his own mind this teaching of the Hebraic prophets can be reconciled with the insight of the mystics, but these make awkward bedfellows. Actually Berdyaev's whole insistence on the value of personality traces back directly to the prophets; by themselves his mystical sources would quickly degrade personality into a mere facet of the Absolute, devoid of freedom as we understand it.

If this be true, then Berdyaev may have erred in attempting to use "personality" as a category of explanation. It is, for him, the key to our understanding of the Divine Nature, but thus employed, it loses at once its essential mystery. After all, we do not really know what "personality" is, and the only explanation offered to us is the insight of the mystics. Mysticism at its most Christian is a dangerous ally for a personalist philosophy and so far from illuminating the mystery, only deepens the darkness.

Should personality not rather be thought out along the line of the prophets, as in Martin Buber? It is when God Transcendent has chosen to reveal Himself to men, that they have

[1] *Freedom of the Spirit*, Introd.

realised for the first time their true selfhood. In prophetism, however, the transcendence of God is never compromised.

On the contrary, in the moment of vision when for the first time they realised their own true selfhood, the prophets acknowledged with one voice the glorious transcendence of God.

In Berdyaev, on the other hand, as in the writings of the mystics, the distinction between the divine and the human becomes very slight. It would seem at times as if there were but one level of existence, containing both God the Creator, and Man the creature, both emanations of the uncreated *Ungrund*. But if this be Berdyaev's position, then very serious doctrinal difficulties at once arise. In what sense can the Incarnation of Christ be regarded as a new fact which entirely alters the relationship between God and Man? If divinity and humanity be different levels of the same reality, if God be essentially in some way "human" in Himself, what does St. John mean when he says, "The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us"? According to the New Testament, and the Creeds, this was an entirely new and unbelievable event—yet, according to "theandric anthropomorphism", it was already implied in the Divine Nature.

Criticism must also be directed at his adoption of Boehme's curious doctrine of the *Ungrund*, the dark night of Non-Being, whence God and Man and Creation alike take their origin. The real transcendence of God having been implicitly denied by his theandric anthropomorphism, this seems like a backstairs attempt to reintroduce the transcendent element into his religious philosophy. We do not, however, explain one mystery by positing another. One must choose here between the teaching of the mystics and the utterances of the prophets: but is it not much more satisfying to worship God "high and lifted up", as Isaiah saw Him, than to live at the mercy of this dark fearful unknown *Ungrund*, which lies beyond God and Man alike? Berdyaev perceives here the dangers of pantheism, and endeavours to avoid them, but no amount of mystic alchemy can conjure a real transcendent out of an immanent personalism.

In the end, much will depend on the judgment we pass on Berdyaev's use of "myth" and "symbol" as categories of interpretation of Biblical and terrestrial history. That there is here insight of great value, I doubt not; but it is a method fraught

also with much danger. What is to be the criterion of truth? Is it to be the revealed Word of God, or the religious insight of the Christian mystics? Berdyaev seems to incline towards the latter.

Very significant in this regard is the use which he makes of scripture—or rather the lack of use. Although he quotes constantly from the writings of the mystics in support of his argument, referring to them almost as "authorities", he seldom quotes at all from the Bible. A comparison of Calvin and Berdyaev on this point is most striking. Whereas Calvin never makes any statement about the nature of God without quoting the Bible in confirmation, Berdyaev scarcely ever refers directly to it at all. This leads him at times into sheer speculation, but he freely admits the inconsistencies in his own thought. A final unity in thought, he maintains, cannot be reached. "The end of the dynamic of the spirit and its ever newly arising contradictions can only be the end of the world."[1]

Nowhere are the dangers of this speculative method more clearly seen than in his attempt to delineate the inner life of the Trinity, the "Divine Psychology". That man should seek an esoteric knowledge of the Divine Nature is to be expected, but the Bible makes it plain that this desire cannot be fulfilled. On the contrary, God jealously guards His "Name", and reveals Himself only to chosen individuals in a limited way. Only on the Cross is the veil rent apart, and the everlasting mercy of God revealed.

Berdyaev has many hard words to say about western rationalism, but here in the end we find him employing a far more dangerous speculative rationalism which imagines that it can probe into the secret personality of the Most High! The perils of theandric anthropomorphism thus become apparent. Surely the Chalcedonian Formula with its insistence on the real humanity of Jesus and on the union of the two Natures, human and divine, in one Person, stands fairly and squarely in the way of any such doctrine of the divine humanity of God, and its attendant ideas of the divine-humanity of man. For Berdyaev, personality and divinity seem almost synonymous terms, and man thus becomes the child of God by nature, not by grace. But if that be so, if "personal" man can thus be divine, we are

[1] *Slavery and Freedom*, p. 9.

bound to ask in what sense Christ, the God-Man, is unique. Is the difference between us and Him only one of degree, and if so, can He really effect the reconciliation of God and Man? If the Incarnation is to have any meaning for us, surely we must hold on firmly to the words of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, that Christ "being the Eternal Son of God, became man, and so was and continueth to be God and man in two distinct natures, and one person for ever." This attempt by Berdyaev to get behind the hypostatic union by some kind of mystic fusion is derived from the writings of the later Greek Fathers, notably Gregory Nyssa, but its origin is philosophical, not Biblical.

Such are some of the lines that criticism might take. He is, however, a sincere and stimulating thinker, whose works repay study and provoke thought. If he does not reach a new solution, at least he sets up for us in a novel and suggestive way the eternal theological problem of the relationship between God's transcendence and man's freedom. The great merit of all his books is that he takes human freedom seriously, and, not only in theology but also in ethics and sociology, leads a crusade against all who seek to belittle or degrade human personality.

In an interesting biographical introduction to his latest book, published in 1943, he says: "As the result of a long spiritual and intellectual journey, I have arrived at a particularly keen awareness of the fact that every human personality, even of the least significant of men, bearing as it does within it the image of the highest existence, cannot be a means to any end whatever."[1] It was from Tolstoy, he tells us, that he first gained this insight, and to it he has held all his life, despite much suffering. It is a concept of profound significance for his remarkable writings on social ethics on which I have not attempted to touch at all. His "theandric anthropomorphism" seems to be the attempt to reconcile this conviction of man's essential freedom and greatness with a mystical insight into the glorious love of God revealed in Jesus Christ.

In essence perhaps it is only a theological statement of Dostoievsky's profound insight in the *Legend of the Grand Inquisitor*, a story which Berdyaev admits had enormous influence upon the spiritual conflict in his adolescent mind.[2] In the

[1] ibid., p. 10.

[2] ibid., p. 16.

Legend, the Grand Inquisitor turns to Christ, and reproaches Him with these words: "You have desired man's free gift of love and that he should follow you of his free will, tempted and made captive by you." It was in the acceptance of this picture of Christ that Berdyaev took his stand as a Christian, and it is in the spirit of this Christ that he has lived.

A STUDY OF SIN AND SALVATION IN TERMS OF C. G. JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGY

by The Rev. J. W. D. SMITH

1. Introduction

Psychology offers a particularly subtle and dangerous challenge to religious belief. The theologian and the psychologist are both interested in the facts of man's spiritual nature, but the difference in their approach to these facts inevitably arouses tension between them. The psychologist's approach is purely empirical and he uses descriptive terms which ignore the cosmic significance of the experiences which he describes. But the experiences of the Christian believer are vitally affected by his beliefs about them. Christian doctrine is not the result of later reflection on experiences which had no intrinsic meaning. Doctrine is an inseparable part of the total Christian experience.

The conflict between psychology and theology thus seems to threaten the central citadel of each. The psychologist is apt to regard the theologian as an obscurantist whose unproved and unprovable assumptions hinder progress in the understanding of man's spiritual nature and whose dogmatic position denies the right of others to approach the problems of the soul in the disinterested spirit of scientific inquiry. The theologian, on the other hand, sees the psychologist as a narrow-minded specialist whose insight is grievously limited by the blinkers of his own terminology and whose blundering hand is destroying precious realities whose true nature he does not understand.

Jung's position is therefore of special interest and importance. He, too, is empirical in his approach to the problems of the soul, but he finds himself compelled to use the language of religion in describing the experiences of some of his patients. There may be dangers in that practice but there are also fruitful possibilities. His description of the soul in sickness and in health throws light on the Christian doctrines of sin and salvation from an unusual angle, and it provides an area of com-

mon interest on which psychologist and theologian may profitably meet and debate with one another.

2. The Psychological Problems of Youth and Middle Age

The psychologist regards neurotic symptoms as evidence of inner conflict. The individual is unconsciously seeking a way of escape from the tasks and responsibilities of life. Jung makes a clear distinction, however, between the psychological tasks of youth and of maturity. This distinction is often described in his writings by the metaphor of the sun's daily journey. In adolescence and early adult life the sun is still rising towards its zenith. The horizon is widening and life beckons the young traveller forward with promise of rich and varied experiences. In middle life the situation changes. The sun of life moves slowly, but irrevocably towards its setting. However rich and full life may be in the middle years, the prospect is one of declining strength and narrowing horizons, with death as the inevitable end. The neurotic shrinks, in adolescence, from the responsibilities of life: in middle age he would fain escape the approach of death.

The tasks of the adolescent lie in the outer world. Physical nature and human society force these tasks upon him. He must find a livelihood. He must master the problems of sex. He must find his appropriate place among his fellows. The spiritual sickness of youth shows itself in a neurotic shrinking from these normal responsibilities of adult life. The neurotic adolescent is afraid to meet the challenge of the real world. He is unwilling to grow up. Lacking inner security he has no confidence in his own judgments. He is afraid to walk alone and he seeks escape from the real world and its tasks in day dreams and aspirations which can only end in frustration and distress, if not in complete mental breakdown.

Jung maintains that the tasks of adolescence are *never* accomplished without cost. In adjusting to the responsibilities of adult life we all develop a conscious personality which, like the mask of the old Roman players, hides the real self from the eyes of men. The conscious personality of adult life, Jung says, is always mutilated and incomplete. It is shaped by our vocational choice and by our conscious ideals and purposes. But other aspects of the personality remain unassimilated and un-

developed below the level of consciousness. Every personality has its shadow side which is hidden from the world and unrecognised by the individual himself. It need not be morally blameworthy but it is always irrational and it acts indirectly and surreptitiously on the motives and conduct of men. It is the source of moods and irrational judgments and it shows itself in eccentricities and faults of character which may often be obvious to others although we are blind to them ourselves.

Those who have serious difficulty in accomplishing the psychological tasks of adolescence bear the mark of their struggle in the limitations of the conscious personality. It is narrow in range, rigid in organisation and sharply separated from the unconscious levels of personality. The infantile craving for power, for recognition and appreciation, for untroubled security, remain potent beneath the level of consciousness. The analytic technique of Freud or Adler may help the young neurotic to achieve a temporary adjustment to the outer world, or the abundant energies of youth may enable him, unaided, to overcome his problems but the cost of that success may have to be paid in the typical neurosis of middle life. The unsatisfied infantile cravings may bring him again to the verge of psychological collapse.

Middle age brings a new and more difficult task of spiritual adjustment. The sun of life has reached its zenith and has begun to decline. The aims of youth have been attained or are now recognised as unattainable. The motives of youth begin to lose their meaning and power. The neurotic individual is unwilling to accept this situation and finds difficulty in adjusting himself to it. He clings to the objects and interests of youth but finds diminishing satisfaction in them so that life becomes empty and purposeless. The typical neurosis of middle life has its source, says Jung, in the absence of motive and meaning from life.

The neurotic adolescent shrinks from life but the middle-aged neurotic shrinks from death. Jung does not mean that neurosis in middle life is due to fear of bodily dissolution. He means that the middle-aged neurotic is evading the task which the second half of life presents. Youth must face the problems of the outer world but middle age must grapple with the unsolved problems of the inner world. The unassimilated ele-

ments of the unconscious clamour for recognition. The mutilated and one-sided personality craves completeness and fulfilment. It may still be possible to trace the roots of the neurotic condition in the experiences of early years but this reductive type of analysis no longer relieves the condition. The motives which help the young neurotic to overcome his difficulties have lost their power. The old problems emerge again at a deeper level and this time they must be faced as problems of the inner life.

3. The Attainment of Psychological Maturity

Jung maintains that each individual personality must, in a psychological sense, return to the mother's womb and be reborn before he can enter into the fullness of a mature and healthy personal life. Just as a physical bond must be severed before the human embryo enters on an independent physical existence so also the bonds of infantile dependence on the parents must be severed before psychological maturity can be attained. The struggle to escape from these bonds begins in adolescence but, as we have seen, it is never successfully completed at that stage. A proportion of the total psychic energy is held captive and remains unassimilated and undeveloped below the level of consciousness.

The psychic qualities which appear in the conscious personality are balanced by opposite qualities in the unconscious. When the conscious and unconscious levels of personality are sharply separated the conscious qualities are likely to be exaggerated and the unconscious qualities to be crude and undeveloped. The individual who has a one-sided intellectual or rationalistic attitude to life at the conscious level may have an undeveloped and childish emotional life. Aggressive self-confidence in the conscious personality is commonly accompanied by strong inferiority feelings in the unconscious. A strictly ascetic and puritanical attitude may be compensated by crude sensuality. Jung quotes Drummond (presumably Henry Drummond) to the effect that "bad temper is the vice of the virtuous" and he adds the comment, "obviously whoever builds up too good a persona has to pay for it in irritability".[1]

In middle life the problem must be faced afresh. A one-

[1] *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, p. 209.

sided conscious attitude is no longer adequate because the motives which sustained that temporary compromise are losing their power. The problem of infantile dependence emerges afresh and the neurotic individual faces a second period of adolescent storm and stress. This period of conflict sometimes issues in a surprising change of personality. The individual may swing over from one extreme to the other. But the only satisfactory solution, in Jung's view, lies in releasing psychic energy from the infantile bonds. Reconciliation of the opposing qualities then becomes possible and the personality is enriched and developed to its maximum capacity.

Jung uses the metaphor of birth to describe this process of development. The individual breaks the psychological bonds which hold him in the womb of infantile dependence. By doing so he achieves "an attitude which is invulnerable to emotional entanglements and violent upheavals . . . a consciousness freed from the world."[1] Jung describes this change by saying that the centre of gravity of the total personality has altered its position. He tells us that his patients frequently use religious terms to describe this experience. "They came to themselves, they could accept themselves, they were able to become reconciled to themselves and by this they were also reconciled to adverse circumstances and events. This is much like what was formerly expressed by saying: He has made his peace with God, he has sacrificed his own will, he has submitted himself to the will of God."[2]

Jung himself turns to the New Testament to find appropriate descriptive language. "I could even express the same thing", he says, "in the words of Paul: 'Not I who live but Christ liveth in me'!"[3] The interpretation which he puts on these words can be illustrated from a very interesting passage in which he says: "The illusion as to the superior powers of the conscious leads to the belief: I live. If, by the recognition of the unconscious, this illusion is shattered, the unconscious appears as something objective of which the ego is a part. . . . It is as if the leadership of the affairs of life had gone over to an invisible centre. . . . In this remarkable experience I see a phenomenon resulting from the detachment of consciousness, through

[1] *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, p. 124.
[2] *Psychology and Religion*, p. 99.
[3] *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, p. 246.

which the subjective 'I live' becomes the objective 'It lives me'."[1]

This second birth seems to Jung to be a natural preparation for physical death. As a psychologist he is unwilling to discuss what may lie beyond death but he recognises a quality of timelessness in the detached personality of this second birth and he regards belief in immortality as normal and psychologically helpful. "If viewed correctly in the psychological sense, death, indeed, is not an end but a goal, and therefore life for death begins as soon as the meridian is passed."[2]

4. Jung's Ambiguous Attitude to Religion

Jung's attitude to religion is ambiguous in two ways. In the first place, he is not quite consistent in his attitude to the metaphysical status of religious experience. In some passages he seems, like Freud, to regard religious belief as a projection of inner conflicts. In other passages, however, he expressly repudiates the suggestion that the facts of religion are illusory. They are at least *psychologically real*, he would say, whatever their cosmic status may be. As a rule, he is careful to recognise the limitations of psychology as an empirical science and to remain within its frontiers. His attitude might be described as one of benevolent neutrality. In one of his later books he says: "The fact that I restrict myself to what may be psychically experienced and repudiate the metaphysical, does not mean, as anyone with insight can understand, a gesture of scepticism or agnosticism pointed against faith or trust in higher powers. . . . Therefore when God . . . has been spoken of as . . . a condition of the soul, something has been said about the knowable only, but nothing about the unknowable."[3]

The other ambiguity in Jung's attitude requires fuller consideration. He seems inconsistent in his discussion of the healing function of religion in cases of psychological illness. Sometimes he seems to regard religion as wholly beneficent in its effects. "What are we doing, we psycho-therapists?" he asks. "We are trying to heal the suffering of the human mind, of the human psyche, or of the human soul, and religions are dealing with that same problem."[4] In other passages he seems to suggest that religion may be providing a substitute for the neurosis. It

[1] *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, p. 133.
[2] ibid., p. 124.
[3] ibid., p. 135.
[4] *Fundamental Psychological Conceptions*, p. 204.

may be removing the symptom but leaving the fundamental condition unchanged. Membership in Mother Church and worship of the Heavenly Father may lift the burdens of neurotic fear and satisfy regressive longing for the security of childhood without really helping the individual towards a fuller and richer personal life.

This apparent ambiguity is due to a clear recognition of the neurotic element in religion. Religion does, at times, provide relief from emotional tension arising from some conflict which the individual has not faced. The obvious sexual appeal of some of our more sentimental hymns and the childish craving for security which finds satisfaction in some types of religious life are sufficient illustration of that fact. Jung insists that the path of true progress can only be trodden by those who face the conflict, but he recognises that the task is often greater than the individual can compass. In such cases religion may be a valuable palliative but it is not a real cure. On the other hand, Jung recognises that the experience into which men enter when they have faced and overcome the conflict is essentially and genuinely a religious experience. It is the real thing while the other is only a substitute.

The contrast between the substitute and the reality is admirably illustrated in the account which Jung gives (in *The Integration of the Personality* and in *Psychology and Religion*) of the dreams of one of his patients. The patient was a highly intelligent youngish man who had been brought up in the Roman Catholic faith but had adopted a sceptical, rationalistic attitude to life. That attitude had now broken down in neurosis and the man was in a state of vacillation between the rationalistic, materialistic attitude of adult life and the sentimental immature religious outlook of childhood. Here was a man who had found difficulty in facing the task of adolescence. In making his adjustments to adult life he had developed a conscious attitude which was limited in range and sharply separated from the unconscious levels of the personality. His conscious personality was mutilated and incomplete. Jung tells us that "the patient always tried to avoid his emotional needs. As a matter of fact he was afraid that they might get him into trouble, into marriage, for instance, and into other responsibilities."[1]

[1] *Psychology and Religion*, p. 50.

In a case like this there was real danger that the patient might seek escape from the consequences of one-sided development by swinging over to the opposite extreme. But that would have left his real problem unsolved. Religion would have become a safety valve for unsatisfied emotion. His condition would still have been neurotic and the danger of a fresh breakdown would have remained. The only real cure for this man's condition lay in reconciliation of the two sides of his nature, in a richer synthesis. It was to this solution that his dreams pointed.

5. A Psychological View of Sin and Salvation

This brief account of Jung's teaching may have shown already how closely it bears on Christian teaching about sin and salvation. The neurotic fear which causes the adolescent to evade the challenge of life, and the middle-aged to shrink from the approach of death, is the neurotic fear of the self-centred soul. It is a symptom of sin.

The Bible teaches that man was made for a life of fellowship with God. God is the true centre of man's nature and the true law of his being is the law of trust and obedience towards his Maker. Sin entered human life through unbelief and rebellion. Man, in his anxiety, was unwilling to surrender his life in trust and obedience to God. Reluctant to accept his creaturely dependence he wanted to be "as God". He sought therefore to overcome his insecurity by his own efforts. He asserted his own will and immediately became the victim of self-centred fear. His instincts and emotions, his motives and purposes, his thoughts and plans were distorted and vitiated by self-regarding concern. His life had lost its true centre in God and, in consequence, there was conflict within his own nature and competitive strife in society.

This self-centred fear is transmitted to each new generation through the parents and through society as a whole. The egocentricity of the parents is visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. It intensifies the bonds of infantile dependence and the pressure of a tainted social tradition cooperates with it in the distortion of each new life. Original sin is thus a fact of man's social inheritance. The child is shaped in iniquity from birth even if it be not conceived in sin. An

exaggerated self-concern born of insecurity and unbelief, or lack of trust, causes the child to build neurotic walls of defence around himself which distort his social relationships and hamper his fulfilment of adult responsibilities.

Religious training in childhood and youth can make a vital contribution to this situation. The adolescent may be helped to transfer his neurotic sense of dependence, and the feelings of guilt arising from acts of rebellion and aggression, from the parents to God, and he may find assurance and relief through trust and forgiveness. The evangelical experience of conversion may be described, psychologically, in this way. In adolescence it may provide release and sublimation for repressed sex energy. In more mature personalities it will have a richer psychological significance but it is not likely to mark more, in either case, than a first tentative step on the way of salvation.

The more neurotic and ill-adjusted the personality is before conversion, the less likely it is to make much real progress, in that experience, towards integration and wholeness. The converted neurotic may experience great inner release. He may have a genuine sense of peace with God and a new feeling of brotherly concern for his fellowmen. His acute neurotic symptoms may disappear and a condition of comparative psychic equilibrium may be attained but his ill-adjusted condition is likely to show itself in dark moods of doubt and depression, in fear-ridden dogmatism and fanatical persecuting zeal or in other unbalanced behaviour. For all such souls, and for many whose neurotic tendencies are much less obvious, the Christian Church provides, from the psychological standpoint, a valuable healing influence. It may prevent total breakdown and it brings them into contact with that Word of Life which can make them wise unto salvation.

The limitations of their development, psychologically and spiritually, may be illustrated, however, in two examples. Consider first the condition of such neurotic souls in relation to that sex adjustment which is part of the task of adolescence. If sex impulses have been sharply repressed and release from tension has been found within the life of the Christian Church the presence of crude, unassimilated sex energy below the level of consciousness is likely to reveal itself in prudishness or in sexually tinged sentimentality. The psychological limitations of

this condition have already been discussed. Its spiritual weakness needs little emphasis. There is a law in such a man's members which is fighting against the law of his mind. He is still under Law. He is not yet under Grace. He obeys the moral law because he knows that he ought to do so and, therefore, as Brunner points out in *The Divine Imperative* (p. 74) he is still under the "bondage of sin".

Consider, again, the situation of the middle-aged neurotic as he faces death. As a Christian believer his hopes may reach out to a fuller life beyond the grave but as a neurotic he will find it hard to abandon the satisfactions of physical and temporal life on earth. The man or woman who has found difficulty in adjusting himself adequately to the world of things and persons in adolescence finds, paradoxically, that detachment from them is equally difficult in middle-age. His adolescent struggles have developed an over-intense attachment to these mundane interests and satisfactions and detachment from them may be excessively painful. "The sting of death is sin."

The Christian hope of immortality may comfort and help such souls. It may save them from psychological breakdown. But it will not cure their condition. It may indeed be spiritually harmful. As the late Dr Temple said in his Gifford lectures: "The centre of all true religious interest is in God, and self comes into it, not as a primary concern which God must serve, but as that one thing which each can offer for the glory of God. . . . If my desire is first for future life for myself, or even first for reunion with those whom I have loved and lost, then the doctrine of immortality may do me positive harm by fixing me in that self-concern or in concern for my own joy in my friends."[1] The urge to use God for self-centred ends is, indeed, a characteristic mark of the neurotic soul.

There is, doubtless, a measure of neurotic self-regard in the most saintly Christian character. Unsatisfied infantile cravings linger on in the most mature souls and find expression in religion also. The pilgrimage from self to God is a long and arduous one and none of us can hope to complete the journey within this mortal life. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God and it doth not yet appear what we shall be," says St. John (1 John 3.2). Even the saint is a child of God whose full

[1] *Nature, Man and God*, p. 458.

maturity is still a distant and dimly apprehended goal. But saint and justified sinner are both within the family of God, and the Church of Christ offers healing and nurture to the souls of men at all stages of their spiritual pilgrimage. For those who have their spiritual home within the Father's house there are many "resting places" where the weary pilgrim may find refreshment and strength for the next stage of his journey.

We may surely accept, then, the distinction which Jung makes between the healing function of religion which preserves the soul in outward health although it may still be far from integrated wholeness and that fuller redemptive experience of rebirth which brings the soul towards its full maturity. Jung recognises that only a few follow the path of "individuation" as he calls it, in which the problems of the soul find solution through the full personal rigour of immediate religious experience. "The saying 'For many are called but few chosen' applies here as nowhere else," he says.[1] Jung's goal of individuation is described by him, as we have seen, in terms which suggest that it corresponds closely to the Christian conception of the God-centred life. The narrow, one-sided, conscious ego is no longer the centre of the individual's existence. The centre of the personality is outside the conscious ego altogether. Inadequate though Jung's language may be, it suggests an attempt to express as far as may be possible in psychological language that salvation from the bondage of self-centredness which Christianity calls eternal life.

6. The Limitations of Psychology

We have noticed the ambiguity and inconsistency of Jung's position in some respects. May it not be said that they arise inevitably from the limitations of psychology as an empirical discipline. It is surely impossible, in the last resort, to describe the facts and experiences of the human soul in terms that are metaphysically neutral? Religious experience cannot be explained, *without remainder*, in psychological categories and, as Jung himself found, the deepest experiences of the human soul are essentially religious. If these experiences are indeed the human side of that encounter between God and man which the Christian regards as the essential characteristic of man's

[1] *The Integration of the Personality*, p. 288.

nature, a vital element in them is destroyed when they are described in terms of "the unconscious"—however reverently the psychologist may gaze into the unknowable depths of that entity!

It seems doubtful whether a position of agnosticism is logically tenable by one who admits the psychological truth of religion in the sense in which Jung does so. It would not be difficult to show that his theological understanding is by no means equal to his psychological insight and it may be suggested that his agnostic position arises in part, at least, from a lack of theological knowledge. He seems, at times, to attribute to the Christian theologian a somewhat crude and concrete literalism which does scant justice to Biblical teaching. For we, too, see through a glass darkly when we contemplate the ultimate realities and we stammer in the language of metaphor and symbol when we try to describe them.

A frank recognition of that fact might help many honest but perplexed souls who find it difficult to reconcile the faith of childhood with the scientific knowledge of maturity. It might prove to be an important contribution to the reconciliation of Christian doctrine and psychological teaching. In a phrase of the late Baron von Hügel, God is both *incomprehensible* and *indefinitely apprehensible*.[1] Christian doctrine is not a metaphysical account of the universe. It is an attempt by finite minds to express coherently the truth of divine revelation. Christian faith is not grounded in metaphysical argument. It is man's response to that Word which was spoken in history and was made flesh in Jesus Christ. "No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him" (Matt. 11.27).

[1] Von Hügel: *Selected Letters*, p. 71.

IS THE USE OF THE WORD *PREDESTINATION* REALLY NECESSARY IN THEOLOGY?

by The Rev. Principal H. CUNLIFFE-JONES

The Divines of the Westminster Assembly, conscious of the difficulty of the doctrine of Predestination and aware of its power to provoke interminable argument that may be a substitute for the obedience of faith, uttered a warning about its use: "The Doctrine of this high mystery of Predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in his Word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal Election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence and admiration of God, and of humility, diligence and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the Gospel."

But much water has flowed under the bridge since the seventeenth century. Professor Emil Brunner in *The Christian Doctrine of God* writes: "If there is any point at which it is urgent that the Church should re-examine the content of the Christian Message, it is certainly at the point of the doctrine of the Divine Decree, and of Election" (p. 306). Or again: "The evidence of the New Testament does not contain a trace of that whole complex of problems connected with the doctrine of Predestination, dealing especially with moral freedom and responsibility. Thus the tormenting and insoluble problems raised by an erroneous belief—Predestination—e.g. how can fore-ordination and freedom, predestination and responsibility co-exist?—not only do not constitute any problem for the New Testament but are regarded as truths which are naturally and inseparably connected" (p. 312). Or again, on the problem of "double predestination": "The verdict of history is that in Reformed theology the doctrine of a double predestination as the 'central dogma' ought to be modified, at least to this extent; we should recognise that in Calvin's theology the doctrine of Predestination has been wrongly equated with the

actual heart of his belief, namely the doctrine of Election in Christ. How did our Fathers in the Reformed Churches manage to teach this terrible theological theory in the name of the Biblical Gospel?"

We are given an opportunity to reconsider the doctrine of Predestination by the publication of an occasional paper on the subject by the Presbyterian Church of England.[1] The approach of this pamphlet to the issue at stake is useful and suggestive, whatever be the merits of the solution proposed. "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Thus the Westminster Confession, and on this there was no shadow of divergence between Congregationalists and Presbyterians in the seventeenth century.

But why did the Reformers hold this doctrine? To this question the pamphlet offers three answers: (*a*) the teaching of Scripture; (*b*) the influence of Augustine; (*c*) the basis of experience. It is worth while testing these answers to see what validity they have for us to-day.

The teaching of Scripture means ultimately the teaching of St. Paul in Romans 9-11. There are other passages of course, and Paul in Romans is not making an eccentric addition to Biblical terms, but focusing under the stress of his own experience the central theme of the Bible. But does the message of Paul in these chapters mean for us a doctrine of predestination? I think not. We have learnt to read them in an historical perspective which was not available to the Reformers, and we are thereby freed from some of their tormenting problems. I note that C. H. Dodd in his Commentary on Romans never himself mentions the word "predestination" in connexion with these chapters. This may, of course, be defective theology, but it should make us ask whether the word of God which we should heed in these chapters involves the concept of predestination. Professor James S. Stewart writes of Paul's doctrine of election:[2] "We shall never understand this doctrine as it appears in the

[1] *The Doctrine of Predestination: Its Meaning and Value for Religion To-day*, by F. W. Armstrong. 6d. (134 George Street, W.1).

[2] *A Man in Christ*, pp. 143-4.

epistles until we realise that it runs back to the personal experience of a man who, by the fact of his conversion, discovered himself to be elected of God, marked out by divine decree for service and ambassadorship": "He hath chosen us in Him [in Christ] before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1.4). "Predestination, in this aspect, is just another name for grace. It is safe to say that if Paul's interpreters had always kept this personal background adequately in view, many of the enormities of interpretation which have overshadowed the whole idea of election, making it productive of misgiving and even of misery for thousands of pious souls, could never have been perpetuated. What Paul is really trying to do is not to suggest misgivings but to remove them. He is bidding anxious souls reflect that their religion stands in the last resort not upon their choice of Christ, but on Christ's choice of them."

The mighty genius of Augustine, which spreads itself across so many centuries of Christian theology, is not by any means exhausted in our time. Indeed, it may be that a renewal of some aspects of the Augustinian tradition is the way ahead for theology to-day. But, if so, it will be a more discriminating adherence to Augustine, a greater awareness of the serious limitations that lurk in his greatness than ever before. The medieval tradition might be called a "muted" Augustinianism, and the Reformers in their re-discovery of the Biblical meaning of grace, gave an insufficiently discriminating adherence to the African father.

Emil Brunner says of Augustine that he "is not so much concerned about the gracious *action of God* in Jesus Christ, as he is in the *transformation of man*, who was in bondage to sin, into a free *man*, by the working of Grace. The *infusio caritatis*, not the *remissio peccatorum*, accepted in faith, is his main idea; he does not understand that the justification of the sinner does not follow the inpouring of love but precedes it."[1] And again: "If we are to estimate Luther's and Calvin's doctrine of Predestination aright, we must start from the fact that for them the problem was regarded entirely from the standpoint of the question of Augustinianism versus Pelagianism. Thus from the very outset they adopted the position of the 'Either—Or' set up by Augustine, and thus they accepted that fatal perversion

[1] op. cit., p. 340.

in the idea of Election, which we have seen to be present in the thought of Augustine" (p. 342).

Now Brunner notes that "before Augustine, there was no doctrine of Predestination. In a world like that of declining antiquity, dominated by the idea of Fate, it was far more important to stress the freedom and responsibility of man than the fact that he is determined. This concern led the Early Church Fathers to the other extreme from that of the doctrine of predestination: to the doctrine of Free Will, which they developed in connexion with the Stoic idea of *αὐτεξούσιον* as the presupposition of moral responsibility."

The inference which I myself want to draw is that the relation between Augustine and the Patristic period needs reexamination. We need not commit ourselves to all the libertarianism of the Fathers, if we think that it was a pity that the volcanic powers of Augustine were set behind a doctrine of predestination.

In so far as the doctrine of predestination is necessitated by the testimony of experience, we can hardly stand against it. But the question is precisely whether the experience of God's redeeming grace, of His mighty delivering hand, warrants our saying that only a doctrine of predestination can account for it. Is not this exactly one of the points on which the theologian must exercise critical discrimination for the sake of the well-being of the Church? Just as in the early centuries, the "Confessors" who had suffered for their faith were not always the best theologians, so those who have passed through a shattering upheaval of transformation may not always be the best exponents of the meaning of God's grace.

In experience we need *assurance* of God's grace. But such assurance is based on trust in what God is. It is a moral relationship. It is not a mathematical possibility, a physical certainty. In the end it does dishonour to God to leave out of account the human being whom He has called into communion with Himself. The witness of experience is to the necessity, centrality and wonder of the grace of God. It does not of itself imply a doctrine of predestination.

The Presbyterian pamphlet, after treating of the reasons which led the Reformers to hold a doctrine of predestination, asks "What about *reprobation*?" The answer given is that they

could not take the ground of personal experience, nor build on the uniform testimony of Scripture. "It was rather a conclusion forced upon them by their observation of life and their view of Omnipotence. They saw that great masses of men were indifferent to the Gospel, and, believing as they did that God was Omnipotent and could change men's hearts as He had changed theirs, they could only infer that it must be because He had not seen fit to do so for reasons which they did not see."

This view leaves one factor out of account—the main theological tradition of the medieval church. The Reformation is to be characterised as a drastic concentration and reduction of medieval teaching. It swept away cluttering externals in order to make the central facts stand out clearly. It is quite true that neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas Aquinas taught double predestination, but they came very near it.

The damned are damned for their own fault, but they could not be saved without God's electing grace which has not chosen them. The fact of God not choosing them in Augustine and Thomas is just as certain an instrument of their damnation, as the ascription of a positive decree to damn them in Calvin. The Reformers seeking to concentrate this medieval heritage, and seeing the hand of God in everything, were almost bound to approve a double predestination.

Not wishing to affirm predestination, I can hardly say that we need to take reprobation more seriously than we do. It is not God's reprobation of man that needs to be affirmed; but the fact of man's reprobation of God. Salvation, if it comes at all to many, will only come after the painful dislodgement from a way of life which is against God's will, and the difficult process of re-integration in God's truth and love. There is a serious barrier in man's reprobation of God to the fulfilment of God's purpose in man and it will not easily be removed. That is a truth which we need to heed to-day.

In the controversy between Dr J. A. T. Robinson and Dr T. F. Torrance on *Universalism*,[1] my sympathies are all with Dr Torrance. Indeed, it seems to me that Dr Robinson has refuted his own doctrine when he says: "From the *point of view of the doctrine of God*, the assertion comes that God's summing up of all men in Christ is, and must be, the ultimate fact and

[1] *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1949.

outcome of the universe. But if a man faced with the decision for Christ *rests* on that ultimate outcome, or lets it in any way influence him, so as to avoid the seriousness or the necessity of decision, then, in that state, he cannot be saved." The plain fact is that the teaching of universalism has influenced the choices men have made, and that we cannot have a theology which we keep from having any influence on our practical decisions. It is quite certain that to go away from the way of God is to bring judgment upon ourselves. We may hope, indeed we are encouraged by the Gospel to *hope*, that all men will come through judgment to salvation. But we can be certain that the way of the wicked leads to judgment.

What is the upshot for the doctrine of predestination? The Presbyterian pamphlet says: "The difficulty cannot be met by ignoring the doctrine as though it were a kind of skeleton in the ecclesiastical cupboard, for the ghost would still haunt us; nor by discarding it, for that would break up the continuity of our theological thought. A doctrine can be effectively transcended only when what is vital in it has been taken up into a new form. That is a genuine process." This is a lame conclusion. It looks suspiciously as if there is a Presbyterian vested interest in Predestination, and a reluctance to abandon it for sentimental reasons though it is no longer a living truth.

We ought to remember that continuity in theology is not continuity of theological terms, but continuity of loyalty to the fact of Christ. In the course of Christian history heavy armoury has been built up, not all of which is either necessary or useful to-day. Those who stand in the Reformed tradition should recognise the parochial and limited elements in the Reformation, as well as its greatness. With the achievements of historical criticism we are called to a new task of constructive theology which shall exhibit its continuity with the old in the function of the building, not in the use of the same building materials.

It is difficult in a paragraph to do justice to the work of Karl Barth on Predestination, and yet he must be mentioned. He has made an outstanding criticism from within the Reformed tradition of Calvin's doctrine of predestination, and he has insisted, rightly, that the predestination of God must mean predestination in Christ Jesus. That is true whatever the issue

of the debate between Barth and Brunner on predestination.[1] But he does not answer the question: Do we need the term "predestination" at all?

There is a tendency to use the terms "election" and "predestination" as if they were equivalent. If this is right, then we ought to keep the term "election" as the more fundamental. I doubt if it is quite right, however, and hold that the eternal counsel or purpose of God is a wider term than the more specific term "election". But we ought to use for the eternal counsel or purpose of God a less misleading term than that of *predestination*, which is coloured for us with associations which are needlessly distorting. There is a task for the theologian, then, to probe the relation between the eternal counsel of God and His election. Emil Brunner would, I think, dismiss this suggestion as speculative, as he holds that the fact of election is only known in the response to God's grace. But the charge of being speculative must not deter the theologian from his proper task. Both election and the eternal counsel of God are only known in faith, and any probing of the relation of God's election to His eternal will to gather all men into fellowship with Himself is altogether based on His revelation in Christ. But the use of the term "predestination" can only mislead.

[1] See the exposition of Barth in *Reformation Old and New*, ed. F. W. Camfield, pp. 71-85; and the criticism of Brunner in *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, pp. 346-352.

LOVE IN THE CHURCH

A Study of First Corinthians, Chapter 13

by The Rev. Professor ALLAN BARR

The thirteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians loses some of its force through our familiarity with it. It is one of the best-known passages of the Bible, and many a man who has little interest in the Church, and less patience with Pauline theology, will accept it as a literary classic and warmly express his admiration of it. No one who is responsive to elevated thought or sensitive to beauty of language will deny it its right to a place in an anthology of literary excellence, whether it be regarded as eloquent prose or as lyrical poetry, whether it be read in the original Greek or in the mellifluous music of our English version. But the custom of abstracting it from its setting and treating it as a poem or hymn, self-complete and self-illuminating, brings great disadvantages.

In the first place, it is arbitrary to cut the chapter out of the letter of which it is a part and deny ourselves the aid to its understanding which comes when we take the trouble to read it in its context, connect it with what is said before and what follows in the letter, and try to find out what it meant for its writer and his first readers. And further, it becomes clear, as soon as we approach it in this way, that a merely aesthetic appreciation of the passage is untrue to its own character, that the Apostle did not write it as a literary exercise for all and sundry to read and enjoy, but was setting down a particular piece of advice for the members of a Christian Church, with a difficult practical situation in his mind, aiming at a change in his readers' conduct and at anything but their aesthetic satisfaction. It is in fact primarily a message, not altogether soothing, for members of a Christian community; only the crumbs of it that fall from the Church's table are for the outsider. It is the object of the present study to throw some light on the passage by relating it to other parts of the Epistle, and to add some tentative suggestions as to its application to the Church life of to-day.

The passage is embedded in a context in which Paul discourses on the gifts of the Spirit (*χαρίσματα, πνευματικά*). These powers and activities, discovered by the early Christians in themselves, within the fellowship of the Church, and recognised as the working of the Holy Spirit, are not named or described anywhere in a complete or systematic way, to judge from the variations in designation and order which appear in this Epistle, in Chapters 12 and 14, and in similar lists elsewhere (Rom. 12.6-8, Eph. 4.11, 12). While some of the gifts mentioned, such as "teaching", "helps", "governments" may appear to be quite normal powers, enlarged by the Divine inspiration, it is precisely those farthest from normal experience which here come into greatest prominence. It may indeed seem surprising to us that the attribution of some of these activities to the Spirit is not doubted by the Apostle. For the exercise of some of the gifts in the Corinthian congregation was accompanied by excessive enthusiasm and emotion, working themselves out in noise and disorder which earned the Apostle's reproof. Yet Paul is ready to attribute the manifestations, even those that were liable to abuse and seemed to lead to nothing but disorder, to the operation of the Holy Spirit. Most of us, if we had witnessed one of those disorderly meetings in Corinth, would have condemned the proceedings outright and seen no prospect of good arising from them. Paul had a deeper experience of Christ's power. He saw that the Corinthians were over-ambitious for these gifts, that in the pursuit of them they left out more important things; he distinguished greater and less among the gifts; but he despised none of them. "Keep on coveting the gifts of the Spirit," he wrote.[1]

[1] It is remarkable how reluctant the early Christians seem to have been to adopt criteria leading, on what we might call psychological grounds, to the condemnation of eccentric behaviour as not "of the Spirit". They had been well warned by Jesus Himself of the enormity of "blaspheming against the Holy Spirit" and had been directed by Him to ethical standards of discrimination—"Ye shall know them by their fruits." In the *Didache* (XI.5.9) the itinerant prophet is detected as false if he imposes himself on the hospitality of the community for more than two days or if he orders a table (an *Agape*, or Love-feast) of which he is himself to partake. This may seem quaint; but it is in line with the ethical standard of Jesus and also with 1 Cor. 13. In this Epistle the power to discriminate between spirits (12.10, *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*) is itself a gift of the Spirit. But there are cases affecting the essentials of the faith on which the Apostle's pronouncement is enough: "No man speaking by the Spirit of God calleth Jesus accursed: and no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost" (12.3; cf. 1 John 4.1-3).

It is to be noted that love itself is not named among the gifts of the Spirit, and indeed in this passage stands out in a certain contrast with them. This of course is not due to any dissociation of love and the Spirit. On the contrary, love is the "abiding" manifestation of the Spirit, while the "gifts" are "in part" and pass away. In Galatians (5.22) love appears first among the fruits of the Spirit, over against the works of the flesh—a change of term not due to any sentimentalisation of love or withdrawal of it from the sphere of practice, but to the special associations of "works" in Paul's discussion there. Love (ἀγάπη) in the New Testament is not merely an attitude or virtue of the soul; it is an eminently practical activity moving out to meet the needs of others at every level. But it lies too close to the nature of the Spirit Himself to be regarded as a gift or a passing manifestation of the Spirit.

The minister or teacher who undertakes to expound this chapter to his people must be ready to make some precautionary explanation of the Christian understanding of the word "love". There is indeed something to be said for the retention of "charity"; for the intelligent reader is soon aware that this word is being used with a now unfamiliar meaning, and proceeds to gather its true force from the passage he is reading. The use of the word "love", however, may trap the unwary reader into making false connexions with romantic ideas of love, with in fact the modern version of the pagan *Eros* to which the Christian *Agape* stood in such contrast for the original readers. If the word "love" is preferred, as it usually now is, there is an obvious need for the distinctively Christian aspects of the word to be explained and emphasised.

Further explanations are called for as the teacher proceeds to the exposition of the chapter. When the uninstructed reader or listener meets at the outset the phrase "tongues of men and of angels" he is apt to think at once of the eloquence of the public orator. However true the verse may remain when so applied, this is far from an accurate interpretation of it. Speaking with tongues (γλώσσαις λαλεῖν) is one of the special gifts of the Spirit, prominent in the discourse of the previous chapter, and vividly described in the one which follows. The "tongues" with which Paul and his readers were familiar were unintelligible utterances, requiring another special gift of the Spirit for

their interpretation, and without such interpretation useless to the congregation which heard them though edifying to the Spirit-possessed man himself. Paul says of them that though he himself could speak with tongues yet in the Church he had rather speak five words with his understanding, that he might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue (14.18, 19). The Corinthians who had this gift were clearly very proud of it. Perhaps we would be inclined to go farther than Paul in depreciation of it. It might appear to us a kind of by-product of religious excitement, a psychic aberration akin to hysteria. Paul does not doubt that it is a gift of the Spirit. But without Christian love it is "as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal"—meaningless and jarring noise.

At several points the second verse also is likely to be misunderstood, and is illuminated by reference to the condition of the Corinthian Church as the rest of the Epistle reveals it. "Though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge, . . . and have not charity, I am nothing." It is hardly necessary for us to elaborate an explanation of prophecy, though there are still some of our listeners who will connect it exclusively with foretelling of the future. The prophecy of the early Church was not unlike our preaching in some respects, for it was delivered in intelligible speech (as our preaching is supposed to be!) and was directed to the edification of the hearers. The prophet, however, was understood to be under the direct control of the Spirit. He spoke not for himself but as the mouthpiece of God, as the vehicle of Divine revelation; and the revelations came, in many cases at least, in spiritual experiences of an abnormal and ecstatic kind. Paul makes it clear in Chapter 14 how high was the value he placed upon prophecy. But if I have the gift of prophecy and have not love, I am nothing.

The "understanding of all mysteries and all knowledge" is a phrase which it is easy to pass over with very imperfect comprehension. The word "knowledge" will suggest to many the subjects taught in schools and Universities, the information stored in our great libraries. The people to whom Paul was writing were in little danger of stifling their charity under a load of mathematics or of history. There were not many wise men after the flesh among them. It is important that we make

clear that it is to the sphere of religion not of secular learning that the mysteries and knowledge of which the Apostle speaks belong. Indeed, the characteristic pagan religions of the time, from which the Gentile converts at Corinth had been delivered, were "mysteries". Their secrets were known only to the few who by long preparation and discipline had earned and received initiation. Such had knowledge, "gnosis", a privileged inner understanding of the truth. This conception of religion seems to have infected the Christian community at Corinth, and Paul's references to it in this Epistle are numerous. The new light that had come to them in Christian teaching and experience was regarded as an acquisition. It was not love, service of one another, but ambitious striving after accomplishment in the spiritual life that had become their concern. They were becoming proud, were adopting superior airs, well pleased with the state of their spiritual bankbook. Their frame of mind is well illustrated in Chapters 8 and 10 of this Epistle, where Paul handles the question of the eating of food offered to idols.

There the Apostle shows himself to be not unduly perplexed by the concrete problems: he is ready to give detailed advice for the various situations in which the Corinthians are likely to find themselves (10.23 ff.). But he is perturbed by the attitude of some of the Corinthians who were already following a line of their own in the matter. They were those who prided themselves upon their enlightenment, whose "gnosis" enabled them to see that "an idol is nothing in the world", that presentation of flesh to idols did not affect the flesh itself, and that those who were free from superstition might partake of the flesh without harm to themselves. Some of those superior Corinthian Christians were apparently so revelling in their liberty that they boldly partook of the flesh in the idol's temple itself (8.10). Not only was the confidence in superior enlightenment unjustified ("If any man think that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know," 8.2); it left out of account the essential principle of Christian action, the exercise of love. "Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth." *Gnosis* inflates, but love builds. There were weaker brethren who could not eat this flesh without eating it as a thing offered to an idol, and without defilement of their conscience. Thus, all because of the superior Christian's enlightenment, a weak brother

might perish, for whom Christ died. Such a sin against brethren of weak conscience is a sin against Christ. "Wherefore," says Paul, "if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend." It is love, not knowledge, that answers such questions.

Other evidences of spiritual pride are hinted at in the remainder of verse 2 of our passage and in the following verse. The faith that can remove mountains[1] is no doubt to be connected with the gifts of miracles and healings, and the bestowal of all one's goods to feed the poor may correspond with the "helps", mentioned in the previous chapter (12.28). Paul can conceive of these worthy things being done without love, for selfish ends, and hence as quite unprofitable. Similarly, giving one's body to be burned, or (adopting a textual variant of some standing) to make a boast, points, however the phrase is interpreted, to some spectacular act of subjection of the body by the will to an ordeal which might offer the appearance of self-sacrifice and yet be lacking in genuine consideration for others.

In the verses which follow (4-7) the careful reader cannot but hear the echoes of other portions of the Epistle. The references to envy, pride and irritability recall numerous strictures of these Corinthian failings in the course of the Epistle and gather meaning as we think of the party strife and social divisions that were disrupting the Corinthian community (e.g. 1.11 ff., 3.1 ff., 11.17 ff.). And consider the words "Doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own". There is surely here a reference to the improprieties and disorders prevalent at Corinth. Christian was haling Christian before the heathen magistrates (6.1 ff.); the women were causing scandal through lack of self-restraint and disregard of generally accepted standards of propriety (11.1 ff.). And there were the disgraceful scenes when the Corinthians gathered together for the Lord's Supper (11.17 ff.) and the confusion when the whole Church came together and all spoke with tongues (14.23). Let all things, says Paul, be done decently and in order. The root of all these disorders is the lack of *Agape*, the loving consideration of Chris-

[1] The phrase of course accords with the usage in the Gospels. In Paul's own characteristic conception of faith, love is inseparable from it. The essence of Christianity is "faith which worketh by love", that is, faith expressing itself in action through love (Gal. 5.6).

tian for Christian. Love does not behave itself unseemly, seeks not her own.

"Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth." In the language of the Bible "truth" is a term that is strongly ethical. It belongs to the sphere of conduct rather than of abstract thought; so much so that in the Fourth Gospel we actually encounter the phrase "doing the truth" (John 3.21). Here in our passage there is a clear antithesis with "iniquity" (ἀδικία) and since we expect, where love is being described, that one's relation to others will be in view and not merely one's own moral standing, there is some probability in the bold rendering of the Moffatt translation, "Love is never glad when others go wrong, love is gladdened by goodness". If that is so we can see a reference to the case, treated in Chapter 5, of a Christian who had been guilty of gross immorality, such as even the heathen would disown. Instead of "mourning" about the lapse, the Corinthians had been puffed up, complacently proud about it. Perhaps antinomian impulses had been asserting themselves and the Corinthians had become insensitive to the gravity of sin. Or perhaps they were just congratulating themselves on their superiority to such temptations and thanking God that they were not as other men. In any case their attitude was not Paul's. His judgment was severe; he required the Corinthians "to deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh". But with it all his ultimate concern was for the eternal welfare of the erring brother—"that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus". The Corinthians appeared to be more tolerant but there was no love in their attitude. "Love rejoiceth not in iniquity."

As for verse 7—"Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things" (Moffatt: "Always slow to expose, always eager to believe the best, always hopeful, always patient")[1]—it is helpful to associate it with what Paul

[1] The Moffatt translation differs from the A.V. mainly at two points: (*a*) by taking πάντα in an adverbial sense, "in all respects", "always", rather than as the direct object of the four verbs, which is difficult grammatically with πιστεύει and intrinsically with ἐλπίζει and (*b*) by interpreting στέγει as "covers" rather than "bears". The function of a house-roof (στέγη) is, from one point of view, to keep out rain and wind; from another, to cover, shelter, and in a sense hide the inmates. The idea of "covering" is in line with Biblical conceptions of forgiveness, and is very appropriate in a description of Christian love. Other modern versions diverge here, to varying extents, from the A.V.

has had to say of his own life in Chapter 9, where he offers it in fatherly fashion as an example to his Corinthian family. Like Chapters 11 and 12 of 2 Corinthians this is one of the passages in which Paul finds himself forced to "boast", to "glory". In these passages there is revealed a side of Paul which is apt to be overlooked in discussions of his theology. He is an Apostle, he says, as truly as any. No one can deny that as such it is lawful for him to eat and drink at others' expense, to lead a wife about with him as other Apostles do, to cease working with his hands and claim the advantage of the rule, ordained by the Lord Himself, that they which preach the Gospel shall live of the Gospel. Yet these things he has not done. He has toiled for his living with his own hands. He has not used the powers permitted to him as an Apostle, but instead he suffers all things lest he should hinder the Gospel of Christ. He has made himself servant unto all, that he might gain the more (cf. Acts, 20.17 ff.). Reduced to plain terms such sayings mean that during much and probably all of his missionary life Paul toiled incessantly at his craft, and declined to call upon the support of his Christian brethren, not because his conscience disapproved of such dependence, but because he was willing to go to the last degree of sacrifice in order to avoid a course of action which might weaken the appeal of his testimony for Christ and be a burden upon his friends. Can we wonder that men loved Paul? His life reflected that greater love of his Lord, who endured all things.

And now, as Paul reaches the climax of his discourse, he returns to the gifts of the Spirit. Prophecy, tongues, knowledge, are "in part", passing and imperfect. We move from stage to stage in them, as children grow to manhood. Now we see only "baffling reflections", then it will be "face to face". In these verses the prominence that Paul gives to knowledge is highly significant. His words "then shall I know even as also I am known", which recall those of 8.3, reveal the inner logic of our chapter. In that earlier passage, rebuking the false Corinthian "gnosis" which puffs up instead of edifying as love does, he writes: "And if any man think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know. But if any man love God, the same is known of him." There, as in the later passage, there is a significant change of voice from active to passive

which is characteristic of Paul (cf. Phil. 3.12, "but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus". So Gal. 4.9). Paul's religion is God-centred. It is God who took and takes the initiative. What God knows of him, not what he or the Corinthians know of God, is decisive.

But there is something in both passages more significant still. It is the modification in the meaning of "know", the transition from "gnosis" to "agape", from men's partial knowledge to the love of God. Paul is here founding, as far as language is concerned, on Old Testament usage, where to "know" (יָדַע) is regularly used of the most intimate personal relationships, between man and man and between God and men. The truest, deepest "gnosis" is God's gracious recognition and love of us in Jesus Christ. That is why love abides while tongues and prophecies and knowledge come and pass away. It is another New Testament writer who tells us that God is love (1 John 4.8, 16), but this underlies all Paul's thinking and living too. With love, faith and hope abide. But it is a Divine love in which faith rests ("The life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me"—Gal. 2.20), and it is a Divine love on which all Christian hope is based ("Hope maketh not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us"—Rom. 5.5). Therefore, while all three abide—faith, hope, love—the greatest of these is love.

The Church of to-day is far removed from ancient Corinth, but we cannot but feel that the searching light of the Apostle's teaching penetrates to ourselves. We have many problems. There are endless discussions as to the faults and needs of the Church to-day. The need for revival is keenly felt, and there are many prayers for an exceptional outpouring of spiritual power. Some of us may long for, and some fear, an outburst of religious emotion and excitement, comparable to "speaking with tongues". Certainly a Christianity that is sleepy, inert and conventional is no Christianity at all. Some may long for a revival of the ministry of healing, and feel that the Church of to-day should have more to contribute to the physical health of mankind than it does; others may fear a false popularity and the danger of imposture if such a function of the Church is

emphasised. And there is prophecy. In spite of all the Reformers did and present theology is doing to bring home to us the primacy of the Word, ministers and laymen alike have need to pray that the authentic revelation, intelligible, challenging, winning, should have still more its rightful place in the Church's life and that the Spirit should raise up and inspire her prophets. Perhaps not many among us nowadays are gnostics like the Corinthians. Yet do not many think of religion as an accomplishment, of one kind or another, and—more serious still—may not vast numbers of men be alienated from the Church simply because they think that her doors are open only for those who have attainments they themselves can never hope to reach?

Spiritual gifts of one sort or another we should pray for and not be slow to recognise. But let us heed the Apostle's word. The chief fruit of the Spirit is love, love of the Christian stamp, pure, disinterested, self-sacrificing love, like the love of the Saviour Himself. Exceptional manifestations of the Spirit's working may appear and bless us; but without love they are fruitless, and where love is, there is no need of further proof that the Spirit is present in power. Who shall contend that the Church of to-day is true to her calling in this vital matter? Love is the sign of the abiding presence of God with His people. Here is a simple and at the same time an exacting test of the reality of our Christian life, in the individual and in the Church. Is there Christ-like love there? No spiritual gift can take its place. By the test of love Christians and Churches stand or fall.

BOOK REVIEWS

The City of God. By J. H. S. Burleigh. Nisbet. 12s. 6d.

The *De Civitate Dei*, Professor Burleigh tells us, has been called religious journalism, a description which rouses one's curiosity about the general quality of church papers in St. Augustine's day. More justly, perhaps, it has been called his commonplace book, for during the thirteen years of its composition the original construction received a great deal of miscellaneous furniture and decoration, and not a few of those miscellaneous treasures which get themselves hidden away in the cupboards of a large house. Though the plan remains clear in outline, the movement from point to point is sometimes so slow and the material one meets on the way so varied that a general introduction and guide is quite necessary; and this Professor Burleigh has admirably provided in a revision of his Croall Lectures of 1944. Some, no doubt, will use it as a substitute for the original, which is a pity, and not the author's intention. Its real value lies in the analysis of the outstanding themes of a mighty work and in the preparation which it affords for their further study by setting them in the context of Augustine's life and writings. Unfortunately we have too little information about the growth of the *De Civitate Dei* (begun in 413 and finished in 426, books I-V were written by 415 and book XI by 417) to make all the comparisons and synchronisations which might be desirable. Possibly a little more attention might have been given here to the development of Augustine's thought over so substantial a period.

As was appropriate to a course of lectures, six main themes are distinguished, and these are discussed with clarity and good sense, mainly in order "to expound the message of the work to its own time", but not without some discerning application to our own. There seems to be some difference of method from chapter to chapter, intentional, I suppose, but not made explicit and perhaps not completely beneficial. Such a theme as *In Search of a Christian Philosophy* (Chap. II) is necessarily built up from Augustine's other writings, and the same is largely true of the third chapter, on his use of Scripture. The fourth and fifth, *The Divine Plan of Salvation* and *The Heavenly and Earthly the Cities*, are primarily expositions of the *De Civitate* without much reference to other works. Evidently the scope of the lectures imposed some such limitations, but one misses, to give but two examples, fuller illustration of Augustine's thought

on the will, desire and love (pp. 125-130) from the anti-Pelagian writings, and on the Church and the problem of its membership (pp. 177-180) from his controversy with the Donatists.

To turn to the chapters *seriatim*, the first, "The End of an Era". sketches the historical background, relating it in particular to the anti-pagan polemic of books I-V. The point is well made that Augustine "has no consciousness of living at the end of an era or even in a period of transition" and that the age has no literature of crisis. Rome had survived the terrible crisis of the third century. Why should not the latest barbarian threats prove a passing incident? Accustomed to catastrophe and sufficiently biblical and eschatological to avoid the doctrine of progress which we so happily vituperate to-day, the early Church still found it hard to envisage the downfall of Rome. Yet, as Professor Burleigh rightly insists, Augustine differed in principle from the pagan concept of *Roma Aeterna*. Particular crises might be overcome, but Rome as such, an organisation of temporal power, could not last for ever nor fully realise the purpose of God.

Chapter II gives a straightforward account of Augustine's philosophical development. Without going deeply into the problems (e.g. what Neoplatonist books had Augustine read?), it is sufficient to guide the general reader. Chapter III shows the growing importance of Scripture to Augustine. At first subordinate to philosophy, it became for him the source of truth; faith precedes knowledge and God reveals by acting in history. "The *De Civitate Dei* is not a rational deduction from the idea of Two Cities, but is fundamentally an exposition of the Scriptural *Heilsgeschichte*."

With the next chapters we reach the chief substance of the *De Civitate*. "The Divine Plan of Salvation" (Chap. IV) traces the underlying structure of XI-XXII—God as Creator, the nature of man and angels, the Fall, the origin and destiny of human societies, judgment. Where the writer's main purpose is to manifest the structure, one cannot fairly demand much discussion. Perhaps the problem of creation (p. 112) might have been related more closely to the Doctrine of the Trinity (113-4); and the work of the Holy Spirit seems to be unduly limited (114) to His more unusual manifestations. Surely His work in Church and Sacrament and in sanctification was not "perplexing and theoretically unnecessary to patristic theologians", however uncertain they were about His Person? Pages 131-4 reveal the difficulties of distinguishing the Two Cities as such from the empirical Church and State. What is said here of the earthly city (e.g. it hopes for no more than earthly goods) is not necessarily true of the State. The difficulty is due to the facts and to Augustine, not to Professor Burleigh, who discusses it more fully

in the next chapter; but rather more explanation of the way in which "the two cities are inextricably mingled and intertwined in history"—that is, in *both* Church *and* state—would be pertinent at this point.

Chapter V concerns the Two Cities. Taking as a text Jaeger's remark that "St. Augustine took Plato's Republic and Christianised it into his City of God", Professor Burleigh, while acknowledging the debt to Neoplatonism, brings out the essential differences which that Christianising makes. The *Civitas Terrena* is not the result of creation, but of the Fall. The possession of a body does not of itself exclude men from citizenship in the *Civitas Dei*. Man is a social being. Though the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle had been social, political individualism had triumphed in late antiquity (but can this thesis be sustained?) whereas the Christian thought of Augustine is once more eminently social. On the vexed question of Augustine's definition of the State, Professor Burleigh concludes (with most critics against A. J. Carlyle) that he did not insist upon justice as of its *esse*; States are determined by their common aims and loves, which are all various forms of *Amor sui*, at least among the heathen. But is a Christian State possible? Burleigh dwells rather on Augustine's pessimism and contrasts the *Civitas Dei* of Lionel Curtis, the progressive democratic commonwealth achieving the unification of the world in one political society, with Augustine's fear of the deified State, so much reinforced to-day. Man must look for his chief good beyond politics (not that Curtis would deny this) and *therefore* claims a freedom from the State. The interesting point is made that Augustine does not in the *De Civitate* use Romans 13, so prominent e.g. in Calvin.

Professor Burleigh insists on the distinction between the Church and the City of God, treating passages which suggest it as incidental, while more fundamentally the visible church is the *communio sacramentorum* and the City of God the *communio sanctorum*, and none other than the Invisible Church of Wycliffe and Hus, Luther and Calvin. True at bottom, this is something of a simplification.

The final chapter, *A Philosophy of History*, excellently describes Augustine's pioneer work. Riled by Hearnshaw's sneer, "the first attempt to frame a complete philosophy of history . . . it contained neither philosophy nor history, but merely theology and fiction", Professor Burleigh forcibly justifies approaching history with presuppositions, as, of course, Augustine did. True, he was a poor historian, in the academic sense, and little interested in secular history. Paradoxically, however, he saw better than pagan thinkers how much history matters, as the sphere of divine revelation; and at the same time he saw that history is not self-explanatory. "To

know God's will is to understand history, and that will is revealed in the divine acts, judgments and promises recorded in Scripture." From this point of view (admittedly unprovable) Augustine surveys history. Generally, his interpretation runs counter to the idea of inevitable progress towards a final happy chapter on earth. It is not only that he sees the goal beyond history and is pessimistic about the approximation of even Christian societies on earth to the City of God, but also—and here he is positive and optimistic—that he sees the worth and destiny of the individual, whose final salvation is not contingent upon the historical process and whose life, even on earth, transcends history. But if his is no facile view of progress, Augustine does see a straight line in history, opposing the cyclical and fatalistic interpretations of pagan thought. The end is not in history, but history, in God's providence, moves towards an end and contributes to it. Against any Gnosticism, he is sure that history matters, a conviction which Christians again need to uphold against fashionable orientalisms, the product of disillusionment. The fruitfulness of Augustine's thought is proved by the deep concern of philosophers, historians and theologians to-day with the philosophy of history. Here the Christian finally triumphed over the Neoplatonist.

Here and there are questions of detail which one might raise. For instance, Aug. Ep. 97 (not 95, 96 as stated) does not imply that the anti-heretical laws were a dead letter under Stilicho, but that the Donatists argued that Stilicho had forced them upon Honorius who might now let them drop; and to say that Rome had no political significance is perhaps to confuse politics with administration. But it would be ungracious to make much of details in a book whose main purpose, exposition on broad lines, is well fulfilled. Reluctantly, however, one must castigate the very numerous trivial errors, mostly misprints, which a final proof-reading should have removed. No doubt there will be opportunity to clear them away from later editions of a book which is likely to help many students to enter into one of the world's difficult masterpieces. S. L. GREENSLADE

Thessalonians. By WILLIAM NEIL. The Moffatt New Testament Commentary. Hodder & Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

THE Thessalonian Epistles may not seem to provide the Pauline commentator with his most fruitful material. As Dr Neil puts it, they "appear to be a mixture of rather ordinary sentiments and very obscure apocalypticism". But they do confront New Testament scholars with two fascinating problems. One is theological: Does Paul in his writings present us with any clear and consistent

eschatological teaching, and to what extent if any do his views change with the passage of time? The second is critical and is closely tied up with the first: What is the relationship between the two Thessalonian Epistles, and can the Second Epistle in particular be accepted as authentically Pauline? The interest of any new commentary will centre on its treatment of these two questions. The present volume completes after twenty-two years the famous "Moffatt" series of commentaries which has done so much to interpret the meaning and message of the New Testament to "Greekless everyman". To readers of this journal it will be of particular interest as coming from the pen of one of our younger Scottish scholars who has already won an influential place for himself in the University of the North.

Consider then, first, Paul's eschatological teaching. The prominence of eschatology in the Thessalonian Epistles, thinks Dr Neil, is due to the fact, not that they belong to a stage in the development of Christian thought when problems concerning "the End" were exercising men's minds with special urgency (an alleged "primitive" stage in the growth of the *kerygma*), but that the Thessalonian Church happened to be troubled by certain practical problems arising from a possible misunderstanding of this aspect of Paul's teaching. The eschatological background of the *kerygma* is common to all early Church teaching and is implicit, though not so prominent as in Thessalonians, in all Paul's letters. Nor is there any real evidence that Paul's own views on the subject underwent any marked change, so that Thessalonians would represent only a primitive stage in his thinking. The Apostle's views are nowhere sufficiently clearly defined to allow us to say that between the writing of this letter and that he ceased to believe in the imminence of the Parousia. What did happen was that his views about his own probable part in the Parousia changed. "His expectancy did not become any less intense. . . . He merely had to reckon with the new possibility that he himself might be one of those . . . who had 'fallen asleep' before the Lord came" (p. xxxiii). Our difficulty in reducing Paul's eschatology to consistency is due to the fact that previous knowledge on the part of his readers is presupposed. "We are therefore merely overhearing echoes of the missionary preaching, variations on a theme already played. It is like listening to one end of a telephone conversation, or trying to piece together a jig-saw puzzle without the master-picture to guide us" (p. xxxv). Finally interpreters have created unnecessary difficulties by over-stressing the time-factor in Paul's teaching concerning the Parousia, and have thereby bedevilled all discussion of the relationship between First and Second Thessalonians. But it is true of all Biblical eschatology that "not

only does it use pictorial, symbolical, imaginative description in place of logical exactitude, but in a real sense the question of time . . . does not enter into it. . . . When a prophet spoke of the Day, it meant for him primarily the vindication of God's Holy Will, the revelation of His purpose, and the defeat of evil. . . . Thus the Parousia is, like Creation, in a real sense timeless; not an historical event, but the underlying purpose of history and the summing up of all things in Christ. . . . That the early Church believed in a speedy Parousia is simply a measure of the intensity of their sense of living already in the Age to come" (pp. xli-xliii). How futile then to use the time-factor as the test of the authenticity of a Pauline Epistle!

We turn now to the critical problem. Dr Neil accepts without question the authenticity of 1 Thessalonians: "Every sentence rings true and reflects the affection or concern of the great missionary. A forger would have had to have the mind of Paul himself to produce so lifelike a letter" (p. xviii). But the authenticity of 2 Thessalonians "still presents a problem" which is one of "accounting for the similarity to and difference from a letter written by the same hand, to the same people, only a short time before" (p. xxi). The older Higher Critics found the chief difficulty in the eschatological teaching. Why in 1 Thessalonians is the Second Advent imminent, whereas 2 Thessalonians assumes a considerable historical prelude including the unveiling of Anti-Christ, which figure itself was thought to have its origin in the Nero Redivivus myth, and therefore to date the Second Epistle well into the post-Pauline period? As already noted Dr Neil finds relief here in his thesis that "in the nature of eschatological thought the question of time sequence does not arise". Moreover modern explanations of the "Man of Lawlessness" in terms of the Babylonian, Persian and Jewish mythological background make quite unnecessary any identification of that figure with Nero Redivivus. But the difference of tone between the two letters—the First warm and affectionate, the Second chilly and formal; the First obviously addressed to converted Gentiles, the Second apparently to readers well-versed in Jewish traditions—still creates real difficulty. Of the various solutions propounded Dr Neil rejects both the suggestion that 2 Thessalonians is a forgery ("who is to judge what is psychologically impossible" to one and the same writer?), and that it was written by either Timothy or Silvanus. Though attracted by it he has difficulty in accepting Harnack's theory that the second letter was written by Paul to Thessalonica soon after the first, but not to the same people —1 Thessalonians being addressed to Greek converts and 2 Thessalonians to a separate circle of Jewish readers. Can we imagine

Paul "countenancing the existence of two factions . . . and condoning their continuance by praising their good works"? (p. xxv). Our author might well have considered Maurice Goguel's attractive suggestion, also toyed with by Harnack, that 2 Thessalonians was written to the Church at Berea. A near neighbour of Thessalonica, it differed from it in that it was recruited largely from the Synagogue. The almost simultaneous composition of the two letters would explain their affinity in literary style and general theological background, while the difference in destination would make natural the variation in the eschatological teaching—the letter to Berea being much more highly coloured with Jewish ideas. Dr Neil finally falls back on Dibelius' view that "the epistle was written to Thessalonica by Paul soon after the first, and was intended for the same people. But in the case of the second letter it was designed to be read in public as part of divine service, hence its formal style and cooler tone" (p. xxv). But what is virtually the traditional view is only accepted *faute de mieux*: "There is no solution other than the orthodox view which does not raise more questions than it solves" (p. xxvi).

The verse by verse commentary is admirably done, though the wide scope allowed by the series (where a volume on these minor epistles is uniform with that on e.g. Romans or the Fourth Gospel) occasionally tempts to an over-elaboration of the self-evident. Particularly helpful is the discussion of passages which reflect the pre-Pauline tradition of the Church (see e.g. pp. 10, 25-6, 47, 74, 76, 185). "Everyman" will find specially interesting the fuller notes on many of the key words and ideas of Paulinism—the Church (3 f.), "in Christ" (5 f.), election (14 f.), wrath (32, 82), glory (44 ff.), salvation (52 f.)—all of which set forth difficult theological ideas in lucid popular language. Specially good, as one would demand in a commentary on these epistles, are the extended notes on eschatological subjects—the Second Advent (29 ff.), the word "parousia" (60), "the day of the Lord" (109 f.), the words "God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep" (94 ff.), the "Rebellion" ("apostasia", 160), the "Lawless One" (161 f.), "he who restrains" (166 ff.). The last two enigmatic figures are both given a mythological rather than an historical interpretation.

Very happy use is made of some of the ancient commentators: "Wealth and the lust of possession is a drunkenness of the soul" (Chrysostom, 115); "As a shoemaker makes a shoe and a tailor makes a coat, so must a Christian pray. A Christian's trade is prayer" (Luther, 187); "Love had been engraved on their hearts, so that there was no need to write about it on paper" (Calvin, 85); and this from Augustine: "We, who do not know what they knew,

desire and yet are unable even with all our efforts to get at what the apostle meant, especially as the things which he adds makes his meaning still more obscure"! (156). Dr Neil's own style is pithy and pungent, not to say caustic, and never dull. Satan is "almost a paid leader of H.M. Opposition". "*Finally brothers*, when there is almost half of the letter still to come, seems a trifle reminiscent of some sermons" (75). The following comment on 2 Thess. 2.13 will provide a sample of the fine exegesis to be found in this commentary (p. 182):

By the consecration of your spirit and by faith in the Truth. Moffatt is surely wrong in translating this "*your* spirit". The A.V. once more is equally faithful to the Greek and more profound in interpretation when it recognises the "spirit", not as man's, but God's. Your salvation is made possible by the consecrating or sanctifying power of *His* Spirit and by *your* faith in the truth. . . . It is the work of the Holy Spirit in men's hearts, recreating sinful humanity into the likeness of Christ, that brings salvation; but it is also only by men's faith in the truth of the Gospel—not philosophical truth in general—that the Spirit can sanctify them. To accept the Gospel as true, and to trust in God, ensures that His Spirit makes us new creatures, though indeed it is in the last resort the work of the Spirit that increases our faith in the power of the Spirit. But the operation is mutual. God is the author, but man must make his response. This does not in any way deny either that the prime mover in the whole work of salvation is God, or that some are slower to respond than others and some do not respond at all. What it does say is that the twin marks of the Christian life are God's indwelling power in man and man's committal of himself to God.

Dr Neil's commentary is a worthy final contribution to a notable series and will greatly enhance the writer's reputation.

G. H. C. MACGREGOR

Makers of Modern Thought. By GWILYM GRIFFITH. Lutterworth Press. 15s.

THE decay of European thought, resultant on its growing neglect of God and its increasingly man-centred humanism, is not a new theme. In his first volume of Gifford Lectures Emil Brunner has traced the process in relation to a number of problems, such as the problems of time, of truth, of justice and of meaning. In this book Mr Gwilym Griffith pictures the growing disillusionment of the hopes of humanism as Christian Faith was gradually pushed more and more to one side. The author gives us short sketches of the life and thought of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, Comte, Marx, T. H. Huxley and Freud.

In Comte's positivism, "Man had become the centre of his own universe, and the object of his own devotion", but Marx "found it possible to exalt the kingdom of man only by denying man the

reality of his own spiritual dignity", while Freud reduces man to "a biochemical phenomenon, his spiritual dignity a fantasy, his moral personality an illusion, and even his rational processes an affair of reflex mechanism".

While this theme is not fresh, it is none the less true, and the skill with which the thesis is worked out is very great; and the delicate dovetailing in of the personal sketches with the exposition of the thought of each writer adds much vividness to the picture. One must admire the way in which Mr Griffith has summarised in such short compass the thought of various great men, and in each case he seems to have caught the necessary high lights and made just observations without being trite.

We have here the properties that we must have in such a study, Descartes' stove, Rousseau's waistcoat wet with floods of tears, Kant's daily walk followed by his faithful Lampe, Marx's intolerance of his equals, and sweets for the children.

But we have other things—for example, a brilliantly chosen quotation from a contemporary sermon in London by Spurgeon denouncing the exploitation of the poor to underline the prophetic element in Marx. Then there is the story of the small cloud floating in the sunlight seen by the Koenigsbergers on the day of Kant's death, and likened by them to Kant's soul ascending to heaven, but by Mr Griffiths to Kant's transcendental philosophy which had caught the light of the renaissance sun, and seemed to signal the ascent of man's soul towards the infinite perfection.

The author does not succumb to the temptation of regarding Kant merely as a downward step on the humanitarian road to despair as do both Protestant and Roman Catholic apologists—Hromadka and Maxence. Mr Griffiths does justice to Kant's noble, if not wholly successful attempt to secure many of the truths and sanctions of Christianity on a rationalistic basis.

This book serves as a most excellent introduction to modern thought, and should draw on the general reader to study the originals for himself; while the reader who has got a stage further on in the study of philosophy will find many things to stimulate his interest, and insights which first startle him, and then command his assent.

D. Cairns

The Book Supreme. An Introduction to the English Bible. By Joe Brice. Epworth Press. 10s. 6d.

In his foreword the author makes clear the limits to be expected in this book. "Its sole aim", he says, "is to reveal the subject-matter of the Bible. Readers who want only critical matter may be disappointed in it; but it is written expressly for readers whose first

need is to know what is inside the Bible. Critical conclusions are introduced, but only as and where they seemed strictly necessary for the proper elucidation of the text itself. The single purpose of the book is to make plain 'what the Bible is about'. Its method is quite simple. The books of the Bible are grouped in ten chapters, six for the Old Testament and four for the New Testament. The grouping is by historical reference and not by literary development. One chapter is devoted to each group, and in each chapter there are three sections: (1) a simple historical introduction to the period to which the books of the group refer; (2) a series of synopses of the books themselves with the necessary critical notes; (3) a selection of key-passages from the books. The important part of each chapter is the series of synopses, upon which no doubt most readers will concentrate; but our prayer is that they will not use this as a cram-book and make the synopses a substitute for the reading of the Bible itself."

Dr Brice having undertaken to accomplish his aim in less than 200 octavo pages printed in a comfortably large type, the result is inevitably dry. When Isaiah 1-39 is dehydrated to less than a page, Jeremiah to a page and a quarter, the Psalter to a couple of pages, the subject-matter of these books is hardly "revealed", but only pointed to in bare and rather unalluring hints; so that the most important single sentence in the book is undoubtedly the last in the quotation from the foreword.

Nevertheless, within the chosen perspective, the synopses are competently done, and so are the historical introductions at the beginning of the chapters. Together they give an excellent diagram, as clear as it is abstract, of the vast, intricate, rich continent of the Bible; and to have such a diagram firmly in mind is one of the prime necessities of serious Biblical study. In his book about the second Chindwin campaign, General Fergusson says that the most important thing to get from a map of jungle-country is the "tilt" of the land, since that determines communications and these are the secret of successful jungle-warfare. Resolute readers of Dr Brice's book will get from it a sense of the "tilt" of the Bible, a simplified map of the slopes along which God's self-revelation has historically found and continues to find its way into human experience. Once that is grasped, the explorer of the Bible itself will still often strike difficult country, but he will be like the Canadian bushman who, when asked whether he had ever been lost, replied: "No, I never bin lost. But once, for about three weeks, I was kinda puzzled." For he will know in an over-all way "what the Bible is about". If that does not stimulate him to go on exploring the Bible itself, the fault will not be Dr Brice's. A. C. Craig

The Old Catholic Movement, Its Origins and History. By C. B. Moss. S.P.C.K. 15s. net.

ANGLICAN interest in the Dutch Old Catholics began with the Tractarians and its early fruit was J. M. Neale's *History of the so-called Jansenist Church of Holland*, a book which fascinated Dr Moss in his undergraduate days. Again movements of resistance in Germany and Switzerland to the Vatican Decrees of 1870 attracted attention and sympathy in England, as seeming to offer hopes for some kind of non-papal Catholicism. To begin with, the Dutch held somewhat aloof from these movements, though they had countenanced the Germans to the extent of consecrating their first bishop, Reinkens. Not until 1889 did the remnants of "old" Catholics draw together on the basis of the Declaration of Utrecht. In 1908 the Society of St. Willibrord was formed in England to cultivate relations with this group, and eventually in 1931 by the Agreement of Bonn full intercommunion between the Anglican Churches and the Churches of the Union of Utrecht was achieved. Dr Moss was one of the secretaries of the joint Commission which drew up the agreement, and is therefore able to give us a first-hand account of the proceedings. They could have been finished in half an hour or less, he says, "but for the Evangelicals, who had misunderstood what the Old Catholics stood for". If in fact, "there were no real differences at all", it becomes difficult to understand Dr Moss's excitement about the result. "The ecclesiastical Straits of Dover no longer exist." "The Church of Colet and More and the Church of Erasmus are once again in full communion!"

However that may be, the book itself is most readable and informative. It covers a vast field. It glances at Jansenism and Port Royal, more fully explains the principles of the Gallicans and the Jesuits, of Febronianism and Josephinism, and even looks back to the Conciliar movement; of all of which the Old Catholic movement is in some sense the heir. Perhaps the most interesting part is the story of the Old Catholic Church in Holland, the only organic link still remaining in northern Europe with the Medieval Church, certainly the only instance of the survival, albeit in shadowy form, of pre-Reformation institutions in a land that accepted the Reformation. It is true Dr Moss adds little to the researches of J. M. Neale, but he presents afresh the tale of a tangled episcopal succession and an entirely honourable resistance to the doctrines and practices of the Jesuit Counter-Reformation. Much space is devoted to the doctrinal activities of the Pontificate of Pius IX and the Vatican Council, and to the subsequent submissions, one after the other, of candid men to decrees which they had conscientiously opposed. There follows a full account of the revolts in Germany,

Switzerland and elsewhere, with their ambitious projects of Ecumenical Union without the Pope, which came to nothing; not forgetting certain strange aberrations on the fringe of the movement, which put a strain on any theory of Apostolic Succession. The book closes with the establishment of the Canterbury-Utrecht Axis which ended "our Anglican isolation", and no doubt gives much comfort and support to the tiny Old Catholic Churches of the continent.

Dr Moss also claims that the Agreement of Bonn bridges the Reformation. But here we can by no means agree with him, though we welcome his acknowledgment that the Church of England is a "reformed" Church. The central doctrines of the Reformation were not raised at Bonn, at least not in any serious way. Even the problem of Scripture-versus-Tradition seems to have been side-tracked. It is not certain whether the brand of non-Roman Catholicism favoured by Dr Moss has a future. Certain it is that the Old Catholic formations have had very little success numerically. It looks as if Pius IX shrewdly foresaw coming trends of thought, and was first in the field with an impassioned and flamboyant totalitarianism, which catches the imagination and overpowers the reason of many in our time. Infallibility seems to be, at present at all events, a more potent slogan than liberty and truth. The Constitution *Pastor Aeternus* is full of historical inaccuracies, but it is not likely to be successfully challenged by mere historians, or by appeals to antiquity. Happily non-Roman Catholicism has not wholly disowned the Churches of the Reformation, but is to continue in contact, if not in communion, with them in the Ecumenical movement, to the enrichment of the latter.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

The Targum of Isaiah, edited with a Translation by J. F. Stenning, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1949. 232 pages. 30s.

THIS book provides a critical edition of the *Targum of Isaiah* which will be of service to the student of Aramaic and of the Targums. The Aramaic text with superlinear vocalisation is that of the British Museum Or. 2211 (dated A.D. 1475) collated with other mss. The Clarendon Press is to be congratulated on the singular clarity of the Aramaic print, and the editor on the English translation as well as on the short introductions to the subjects of the Targum in general and of the characteristics of *The Targum of Isaiah* in particular. A convenient list of the variations of the Aramaic from the Massoretic text reveals the state of the Hebrew text of Isaiah as this lay before the Targumist, say, in the fifth century A.D. But, apart from the linguistic interest which the book possesses for the grammarian and the textual critic, the Targum version of the book of Isaiah is of

much theological importance, as shedding light upon the current Jewish exposition of scripture in the early centuries of our era. How far the sense of scripture might, for example, be wrested by a dogmatic *tour de force* is apparent from the paraphrast's rendering of Isaiah 52.13-53.12. Thus v. 10 (R.V. "yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him: he hath put him to grief, etc.") receives the rendering: "And it was the Lord's good pleasure to refine and to purify the remnant of his people in order to cleanse their soul from sin: they shall look upon the kingdom of their Anointed One (or, *Messiah*), they shall multiply sons and daughters." In the paraphrast's view the Servant in this Servant-Song is the Messiah (cf. 52.13) but—and for this reason—he is not a *suffering* servant. Therefore, with a skill as astonishing as it seems perverse, the connexion between suffering and the Servant is severed and the mention of suffering, sickness and sorrow is given another reference. Thus "He was despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief" (v. 3) becomes: "Then shall the glory of all the kingdoms be despised and come to an end; they shall be infirm and sick even as a man of sorrows and as one destined for sickness."

O. S. Rankin

Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam. By W. Montgomery Watt. Luzac, London, 1948. 15s.

In this scholarly work Dr Watt has traced the development of Muslim thought regarding free will and predestination up to the early part of the fourth century of Islam. After an introductory chapter on the sources he has used, he deals with the Qur'an and Tradition, showing that Divine sovereignty and human responsibility are both prominent in the Qur'an, whereas Tradition emphasises the predetermined character of man's life. He argues that "the Traditions, though they mention God, at times tend to be atheistic". This he attributes to the ideas current among the Arabs and the surrounding peoples before the coming of Islam which imperceptibly made their way into orthodox teaching. He therefore seeks to trace two interwoven strands: "(1) the contrast between the Qur'anic conception of Divine omnipotence and human responsibility, and (2) the contrast between the religious and moral attributes of pre-Islamic fatalism and the Qur'anic sense of creatureliness or dependence on God."

Dr Watt argues that in the earliest instances the doctrine that man has power of choice was linked with the conception of God's righteousness, but that it later became associated with a rather humanistic outlook. All-Ash'ari's opposition to this doctrine is

shown to be "essentially religious and theistic in reaction to the humanism of the Mu'tazila." Attention is drawn to the fact that even the opponents of the doctrine that man has power of choice recognised the distinction between voluntary acts and those done under compulsion. "The great orthodox theologians of Islam were never sheerly deterministic . . . (but)were trying to hold the balance between two sides."

The chapter on the Mu'tazila, who have commonly been called the rationalists of Islam, is particularly valuable. While the earlier exponents of Mu'tazilite doctrine emphasised reason and man's ability to earn the reward of Paradise by his own striving, a tendency developed to acknowledge something of God's omnipotence and man's weakness. When this point was reached, retrenchment or advance was necessary. Some went back to rationalism and an insistence on man's ability to earn salvation; al-Ash'ari advanced to a recognition of God's ordering of the world.

The author discusses the views of men of different schools of thought, from those who held that man has power over his actions to those who held that man does not really act at all. He is a reliable guide through a maze of conflicting views which he has presented in a remarkably clear manner. This is an important work, indispensable to all who wish to know something about Muslim thought. And as Islam includes more than an eighth of the human race, it is clearly desirable to understand something of what Muslims think, and how they arrived at their religious doctrines.

JAMES ROBSON

Truth that Sings. By WILLIAM C. MACDONALD. James Clarke & Co. Ltd. 6s.

IN the recently published translation of Karl Barth's lectures based on the Apostles' Creed, delivered extempore to the students of Bonn in 1946, these significant sentences occur in the chapter headed *Faith as Confession.*

> By the very nature of the Christian Church there is only one task, to make the Confession heard in the sphere of the world. . . . Not now repeated in the language of Canaan, but in the quite sober, quite unedifying language which is spoken "out there". There must be *translation* into the language of the newspaper. We know (the) language of the pulpit and the altar, which outside the area of the Church is as effectual as Chinese. Let us beware of remaining stuck where we are and refusing to advance to meet worldly attitudes.

For anyone who has to do with the business of preaching, these words serve to remind us of a fundamental problem—a problem,

indeed, which may not be peculiar to our own generation, but which nevertheless appears to have special relevance to this time. It is one thing to recognise that "the language of Canaan" is unintelligible to those outside the area of the Church; it is considerably more difficult to find an effectual translation in which the Word of God can be communicated and applied.

We have often been reminded that there has been a tendency in Protestant orthodoxy to fail to recognise that there is any problem involved in communication, but it is becoming increasingly apparent to all who approach the task of proclaiming the Gospel with realism and honesty of purpose that it constitutes a primary intellectual challenge to the Church to-day. Anyone who has been concerned with the work of evangelism cannot disregard the fact that there is a widespread ignorance of the rudiments of the Faith and an alarming inability to understand the basic Christian ideas even when the preacher has won an attentive hearing. There is very little hostility to the Gospel on the part of those outside the Church; but there is always a great deal of blank bewilderment.

It might also be said that within what Barth calls "the area of the Church" there is a comparable problem. The increasing secularism of thought and culture is not peculiar to those outwith the Church. The work of evangelism cannot be thought of merely in relation to the highways and byways of modern life. The ignorance of the facts of the Faith, the inability to understand and apply the basic Christian ideas is no less challenging within our congregations, among a people whose attitude of mind is more deeply conditioned by the secularism of the time than by the message of the New Testament.

This little volume of sermons by the Rev. W. C. MacDonald is avowedly an attempt to meet this problem. The first sermon is given the title: "Truth that Sings", and in the opening sentences, Mr MacDonald acknowledges that the impulse to write his book came when he was listening to Dr John Mackay of Princeton delivering his Croall Lectures. He writes: "Dr Mackay drew attention to what he called the lyrical note in St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. 'Here is doctrine set to music, here is truth that sings: and only truth that sings has any chance of prevailing. It is the only kind of truth that can make a real impact on the situation.' "

There can be no doubt that Mr MacDonald in these sermons has achieved his purpose. There is vibrating through everything he writes this lyrical note; every sermon is stamped with a warm sincerity and enthusiasm which cannot but make a profound impact on the reader. The language is direct, the style is lucid and uninvolved, the illustrations are fresh and apposite. Above all, one

lays down this book with the conviction that the *Keryx* and the *Kerygma* are one—that, as in the apostolic preaching of the first century, the man and his message are inseparable.

It is here that a book of sermons like this makes its most significant contribution to the problem of communication. There is no possibility of making a decisive impact on the minds of our hearers —no matter how truly Biblical our preaching may be, no matter how intelligible our translation into the language of the world—unless the thing we preach is our own, appropriated, burning within us, and making its inescapable and imperative demand upon us. It is something more than sincerity: it is the compulsion which cries: "Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel." It was George Whitefield who wrote: "You will never preach the Gospel with power feelingly, while you deal in a false commerce with truths unfelt." There is no "false commerce" in Mr MacDonald's preaching—it is the proclamation of a "known" Gospel.

When we come to examine the *content* of that Gospel, however, we may find that Mr MacDonald, in his anxiety to overcome the difficulties of communication tends to simplify his message sometimes at the cost of sacrificing its deepest notes. Two sentences from his book seem to set the key. "Theology is difficult", he writes, "The Gospel is simple". And again, "Life is simple, and the Gospel is simple." There is a simplicity, of course, which every preacher must strive after; but is it not a simplicity of form and presentation rather than a simplicity of thought and content? There is a perennial danger of confusing the two, especially to-day when we are so aware of the vast problem of communication and so eager to win a hearing for the Gospel in a pagan world.

One is reminded of the searching words of P. T. Forsyth in his *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind*: "The situation of the soul is not a simple one. The moral difficulty of society is not that we are strayed children, great babes in a wood. It is not a pathetic situation that confronts the preacher so much as a tragic. The first question for a Redeemer is still the old one, *quanti ponderis sit peccatum.*" The words, written forty years ago, surely go to the heart of our own situation. Life in the modern world is of an infinitely complex character, and the preacher is faced, not merely with harmless idiosyncracies or minor foibles, but with a radical and critical breakdown at the deepest level. To meet such a situation something more than the lyrical note may be necessary. The warm simplicity of Mr MacDonald's sermons recaptures a theme too often absent from our pulpits. Truth that sings no doubt brings its own impact; but there is also a Truth that weeps over Jerusalem, and searches far down into the mutinous soul of man, and with searing

moral realism confronts us at once with the paralysing power of sin and the creative Word of God's redeeming grace.

THOMAS ALLAN

The Way. By E. STANLEY JONES. Hodder & Stoughton. 6s.

THIS is an unusual devotional book: it can be read daily; or in weekly sections; or straight through. It is designed for the seeker who is beginning "from scratch", but contains helpful material for all stages on The Way. It is stocked, perhaps over-stocked, with illustrative anecdote and alliterative thought-compression.

" . . . if there is just one book of the thirteen I have written into which I would like to pour a life-message and in which I would like to sum up a life conclusion, it is this one," says Dr Jones in the preface. The imprint of the author's personality is strong on every page, and if that will lead some to dissent strongly from, for instance, his pacifist convictions, many others will fall under the spell and find in these pages both challenge and inspiration.

D. H. C. READ

Let the People Read. By GORDON HEWITT. Lutterworth Press. 2s. 6d.

IN the small compass of one hundred pages the story is told of pioneering and achievement by the Religious Tract Society and by its successor, the United Society for Christian Literature. Thanks to the religious fervour of the few, the R.T.S. during the early years of the nineteenth century wielded an enormous influence on the spiritual life of Britain, and even in the decades of lessening interest in spiritual things every effort continued to be made to meet the needs of successive generations. To-day there are many who look on the recent "Lutterworth Leaflets" as of unsurpassed value in evangelistic campaigns: while Lutterworth books and periodicals find their way into countless homes.

The author's necessarily very condensed account of the work abroad is full of interest and variety. We are left with a clear call to meet the need of half the world now becoming literate as Britain did 150 years ago, and in even graver danger of finding the new faculty a curse instead of a blessing.

A half-crown well spent, whether by a minister seeking to understand religious movements of the last century and of this, or by a layman anxious to see something of one of the spiritual battle-lines of the present day.

W. C. SOMERVILLE

Some French Theological Periodicals

It is good to observe that the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, after temporary eclipse during the War, and a certain arbitrary irregularity since then, seems to have resumed its regular trimestrial appearance. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1950 (the thirtieth year of publication) are in our hands, in an external format slightly different from the one it carried until this year, and with contents as good and valuable as ever.

No. 1 contains the French text of Professor Oscar Cullmann's notable lecture at the *Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas* of Oxford, which appears in English dress in this volume of the *Journal*.

There is also an excellent contribution on Romans 13.3-4 by Professor Jean Héring, entitled "Serviteurs de Dieu". Professor Héring notes that the whole pericope from Romans 13.1-7, while advocating the familiar subordination of the Christian to the State and the justification of the use of force by it, wears also another and more neglected aspect. The State's institution by God has for its end the punishment of evil doers and the protection of those who do good. Failure on the part of a government to discharge this obligation, as well as the other failures implied by the text, is disobedience to the divine command and institution.

Professor Héring dissociates himself from Professor Cullmann's interpretation of the nature of the State's authority, finding that it is made expressly dependent upon God, not upon Christ, and has therefore a significance anterior to the Christian era, as also for non-Christian regions. "It is quite independently of Christianity that God, in the order of creation . . . and to assure a minimal order and justice in the world, instituted the 'authorities'. This rôle is not modified by the advent of the Christian Gospel, and thus their authority is neither reinforced nor diminished by it."

Hence it is not only by abstaining from persecution that a State conforms to the will of God. A persecuting government represents only one particular case of contravention of the divine will, by the unjust punishment of the innocent. Adherents of *all religions* have equal right to protection, so long as they "do that which is good".

The meaning of this doing "that which is good", "that which is evil", must therefore be construed in a legal or penal sense. To do evil, "c'est transgresser la loi". The evil meant is that which God condemns. Like Luther, Professor Héring thinks the passage supposes a social moral law known by the pagans. The rise or resurgence of totalitarianism provides exemplification for this thesis. There was no doubt—and certainly is—a certain ambiguity about the attitude of totalitarian régimes to Christianity. There was and there is no kind of ambiguity about their violation of this social

moral law. Explicit encouragement is given to disobedience to it, e.g. the delation by children of their parents. Precisely contrary effects prove the violation of the Pauline principle and criterion: those who do *well* are afraid of the authorities.

A State, then, does not fall under N.T. condemnation because it proclaims a polytheist or atheist ideology. What does merit N.T. condemnation is that "it neglects the primordial duties defined in the text. . . . A government with anti-Christian ideology is not *a priori* unable to discharge its divine mission."

There thus emerges, on the view of Professor Héring, a criterion by which totalitarian tendencies may be early judged, before the stage of express persecution is reached, and regardless of whether the State concerned be Christian or non-Christian. This sphere of social morals is one in which the Church cannot be disinterested; and it is one where the totalitarian State attempts a reversal of values by arbitrary definition of what is just and what unjust, what good and what evil.

Under "Notes et Comments", in the same issue, Henri Clavier assesses Principal Duncan's by now well-known Christological study on *Jesus, Son of Man*, as a new attempt to maintain the right equilibrium between "the two ends of the tunnel", theology and history, St. Paul and the historical Jesus. M. Clavier adduces the work of Professor Donald Baillie and Professor C. H. Dodd in his study of this problem. While questioning Principal Duncan's judgment on the place of the title of Messiah in the thought of our Lord (as others have also done), he finds himself in agreement with the cardinal points of Dr Duncan's thesis, and admires the "ressources d'une érudition 'à la page' " that have gone to make the volume what it is.

Readers interested in Existentialist philosophy and the so-called Phenomenology will find of exceptional interest Jean Héring's references to two lesser known disciples of Husserl, both of whom, like Louis Lavalle, stand on the side of the angels—over against the atheistic wing of this development of thought. Alexander Pfänder (obiit Munich 1941) holds that human teleology is to be construed not as a fate but as a task, and that the soul can only find its true realisation in contact with the creative source of all things, that is, in God.

Mme. H. Conrad-Martius (also of Munich) maintains that the "only place where the soul is able to realise itself and to reveal itself truly and completely is in a resurrection body".

Contact with Existentialism is also made in issue No. 2 of the current year, in an article "Le Tragique de la Connaissance dans le Théâtre de Sartre et de Marcel" by Pierre Chazel. Those who

have been puzzled by the stifling atmosphere and the despairing action that occurs behind Sartre's Closed Doors (*Huis Clos*) will find illumination here, with light borrowed from Proust. Insulated from the outside world, these haunted characters awake to the query concerning themselves; and, having nothing else on which to depend for answer, they look into each other's eyes and suffer the torments of a spiritual hell—"L'enfer c'est les autres". Having lost God, they cannot find the answer to what they are. Gabriel Marcel, on the other hand, is represented here as making this lack good in some of his (in this country at least) lesser known dramatic works—"une sorte de mise en action de son *Journal Métaphysique*". His characters look beyond the present world, and find their future in Him who said, "Since I live, ye shall live also". Death for them is the great mediator that constrains while helping us.

Thus Sartre, the more pessimistic of the two, despite his angry protests, who only wishes to know about life, declines to consider death. It is Marcel who expounds the human situation by a light that issues from beyond the tomb, by the "death more living than life"—"now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known".

In the same issue of the *Revue* is Roger Mehl's contribution on "Philosophie de l'Histoire ou Théologie de l'Histoire?", which is also sensibly affected by Existentialist terms and thought. He rightly regards the seriousness with which Marxism reckons with history as a challenge to Christian thought, which also is so committed to history. "The history lived by the faithful Church is prophetic in the measure in which it is an activity where the events and institutions of one epoch or aeon are the heralds of the age to come." The actions, worship and liturgy of the Church, as well as its social activities and cure of souls, are undertaken in view of the day of the Lord and the Kingdom that will be. "Secular history is apparently autonomous, for it retains its own logic and its own ethic; the history of salvation declares that the moment of its annihilation is not yet come." The Christian participates in two histories, as he does in two cities. "He must necessarily engage in the anguish and uncertainty of the world, its successes and its failures. The history of salvation is evidence to him that there is a future, and that this future is not an objective given reality, but the sphere of all his engagements and all his ventures." The conclusion is that the philosophy of history cannot simply be denied. "The great design of God implies precisely that there is left to man—and to the demons also—a time for undertaking their responsibilities." Borrowing from Toynbee and F. C. Rust, the writer concludes that the existence of crises (*kairoi*) "intimate to us that history is never all objective

datum, but always a task to be discharged, an adventure to be hazarded". These hazards and all the other "blows at human initiative are challenges to hope and to despair, and so points where the history of salvation encounters and interrogates the history of the world. The presence of the Church in the world appears in the lucidity with which it recognises these encounters and interrogations, and knows how in view of them to wait upon the word."

The *Bulletin trimestriel de la Faculte libre de Theologié protestante de Paris* (editor, Professor J.-G.-H. Hoffmann) contains a valuable study by Professor Oscar Cullmann on "Pierre à Rome". With his usual erudition and clarity, Professor Cullmann observes that the question of St. Peter's presence in Rome can only be settled *sine ira*, when the vested interests of Romanism and Protestantism have been subordinated to the requirements of purely historical investigation. Even if historical researches prove (as Cullmann believes himself) a Petrine sojourn in the imperial capital, this conclusion by no means proves that he became Bishop of Rome; nor if he became Bishop that the dominical "Thou art Peter, and on this rock" applies to future Bishops of Rome in any particular sense.

In a first section, Professor Cullmann deals briefly with the historical treatment of the question, showing how it raises a problem. In a second, he deals with the literary sources, and especially with the letter which Clement, Bishop of Rome, wrote to the Church of Corinth in 96, and the Epistle of Ignatius to the Romans before his arrival there under sentence of death. Cullmann finds, against Heussi, that the Epistle of Clement is evidence for the martyrdom of Peter in Rome—"through jealousy", i.e. through denunciation by fellow Christians in a time of general persecution.

Turning to the third and archaeological aspect of the problem, Cullmann cites the text of a certain Gaius (c. 200), cited by Eusebius: "But as for me, I am able to show the trophies of the apostles. If you will go to the Vatican or out on the Via Ostia, you will find the trophies of those who founded the Church." These "trophies" (tombs or commemorative tablets?) Cullmann thinks may have been unearthed in recent discoveries in Rome.

St. Peter having been interred at the site of the Vatican, and St. Paul on the Via Ostia, their bodies were transferred in 258 to repose in the catacombs for some years, whence they were later transported to their final resting place. It is, then, not the construction of the Vatican basilica by Constantine that created the tradition, but *vice versa*: the tradition determined the construction. For the construction here in so unpropitious a place demands a special reason. At the same time, Cullmann deprecates the rumour current till recently, and actually reported as news by *Figaro*, of a skeleton

found in the Pope's private chapel, and said to be that of St. Peter. But the tradition of St. Peter's interment at the Vatican, even in the absence of any discovered relic and in face of the impossibility of ascertaining the exact spot, is too strong to be resisted.

This essay can only accentuate the expectation with which Professor Cullmann's projected work on St. Peter will be awaited.

Études théologiques et religieuses, the *publication trimestrielle* (though still apparently with some irregularity: Nos. 1 and 2 of 1950 appear in a single issue) of the Theological Faculty of Montpellier (editor Professor Théo Preiss) is composed differently. The last two issues (1949, 3-4 and 1950, 1-2) are each devoted to a single theme. There the similarity ends, for while the first is a series of expository studies for the Christian Year between Pentecost and "Reformation Sunday" (21st after Trinity), the second by the single writer Georges Crespy is devoted to a study of "le Problème d'une Anthropologie théologique".

Some of the biblical studies are excellent. For the Sundays 16th-19th after Trinity, for example, Wilhelm Vischer contributes a brief tetralogy of exceptional interest on the Book of Jonah, illustrative of this theologian's familiar exegetical method. "The miraculous adventure of the prophet Jonah is a didactic legend. . . . The opinion that the Word of God addresses us only in facts of history is false. . . . Often wisdom opens her mouth in parables. In telling the adventures of Jonah, a charming smile plays upon this mouth, without which the message could not be taken seriously." The hesitation of Jonah's pagan fellow-sailors to throw him overboard does them credit: it shows they "not only escaped shipwreck; much more, they received a profound impression of the holiness of the Saviour". "Jesus Christ fulfilled the sign of Jonah: the Son obedient and innocent identifies Himself with His guilty brothers; He is rejected in order to save the ship." Christological emphasis runs throughout the interpretation, and issues every now and then in powerful practical application.

Georges Crespy's anthropological study shows evidence (as one might expect) of the pervasive Existentialist influence. He confesses his dissatisfaction with the traditional anthropologies—not that they are false, but that somehow they do not present a recognisable portrait of the individual, and the ordinary man confronted by them feels as though faced with a bad photograph: "This is me—but it is not really good of me." The author of the article finds the common fault in all the great systems from Plato to Descartes and later in the supposition that the being of man is a substance or a compound of substances, and the rigidity of these terms distorts the representation. The writer will not construct another system, but

another view is adumbrated. It is not the Existentialist anthropology, which sees man as "the being to whom the misfortune of time allows leisure to define himself in a dramatic rôle. He is rather the living creature of the living God." Man is always unachieved, always moving, always in tension between a *has been* and a *would be*, between a *was* and a *will be*. He is, as van der Leeuw says, an aorist, or a gerund.

It is then impossible to photograph man: it is possible only to pick up some fragments of his being. "To think of man, one must be a poet, for man is making himself (Jean Wahl). There is more truth about man in the twenty lines at the beginning of Genesis than in the thousands of works devoted to anthropology."

This will perhaps suffice to outline the theme and suggest the importance of the contribution here made to Christian anthropology.

J. K. S. Reid

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